Harper v. Warden, Federal Prison Camp Duluth

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
William Harper,
Petitioner,
v.
Warden, Federal Prison Camp Duluth,
Respondent.
Case No. 26-cv-240 (ECT/LIB)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to a general assignment made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636, this matter
comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge upon Petitioner William Harper’s
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus. [Docket No. 1].
Petitioner is a federal inmate currently confined at the Federal Prison Camp in Duluth,
Minnesota (“FPC-Duluth”). (See Pet. [Docket No. 1] at 2). In 2025, authorities with the Federal
Bureau of Prisons (“FBOP”) transferred him to FPC-Duluth from the Federal Correctional
Institution in Thomson, Illinois. This transfer involved approximately three months of “in transit”
status. (See Id. at 3; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Memorandum”)
[Docket No. 2]). Petitioner reports that for 46 days of this period, the BOP did not award him
earned-time credits (“ETCs”) under the First Step Act. (See, e.g., Pet. [Docket No. 1] at3). The
BOP’s rationale, as reflected in exhibits submitted by Petitioner, rests on Program Statement
5410.01, which limits credit-earning while an inmate is in transit or at a holdover facility. (See,
e.g., Id.; [Docket No. 1-2] at 3).
The Court received the Petition on January 13, 2026. The Petition raises one ground: it
challenges the BOP’s “refusal to recognize and apply [ETCs] based on the [BOP’s] position that
such credits do not accrue until an inmate reaches the [BOP’s] designated institution,” which
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Petitioner says is inconsistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). (See Pet. [Docket No. 1] at 1–2, 4; Mem.
[Docket No. 2] 9–16.)
The Petition suffers from two threshold problems, either of which compels denial. First,
the relief Petitioner seeks—recalculation of ETCs to facilitate a transfer to prerelease custody—is
not cognizable in habeas corpus. To be sure, a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the
proper remedy for challenges to the fact or duration of confinement. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973); see also, e.g., Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 1996)). But in the Eighth Circuit,
challenges to the place of confinement, such as a transfer to a halfway house or home confinement,
fall outside the core of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Kruger, 77 F.3d at 1073; Osorio-Calderon v.
Sandstone, No. 25-cv-398 (LMP/DLM), 2025 WL 2688917, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 19, 2025)
(citing cases, including Kruger). Because Petitioner does not seek release from all custody, but
instead a change in his location of confinement, his claim is not cognizable under § 2241.1
Second, even if Petitioner’s claim were cognizable in habeas (and the Court assumed for
present purposes that exhaustion raises no concerns here)2 the Court would still recommend
denying the Petition. The Petition fails to allege facts that would entitle Petitioner to relief—
specifically, it fails to allege the critical element of “participation.”
1 The Court understands that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670 (2025), may
have expanded habeas jurisdiction to include some placement challenges. But a court in this District recently addressed
and rejected that argument in Osorio-Calderon. That decision concluded that J.G.G. arose in the specific context of
civil-immigration detention under the Alien Enemies Act, making it distinguishable from cases involving criminal
sentencing. In the criminal-sentencing context, binding Eighth Circuit precedent still dictates that disputes over
transfer to prerelease custody are conditions-of-confinement claims not cognizable in habeas. See Osorio-Calderon,
2025 WL 2688917, at *4.
2 The Court previously issued an order directing Petitioner to explain his apparent failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. (See Order [Docket No. 3]). Petitioner filed a response arguing that the Court should excuse the exhaustion
requirement because the BOP’s administrative-remedy process was rendered unavailable by BOP conduct. (See
Response [Docket No. 4]). Because the Petition suffers from other independent (and fatal defects) identified herein,
the Court will assume, without deciding, that exhaustion should be excused for present purposes.
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The 	theory 	underpinning 	the 	Petition 	is 	that 	because 	Petitioner’s 	sentence 	had
“commenced” under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) while he was in transit, he was automatically entitled to
ETCs for that period. But this theory is incorrect as a matter of law. ETC eligibility turns on
activity, not just status. See, e.g., Crayton v. Eischen, No. 25-cv-1102 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL
2421014, at *2 (D. Minn. June 12, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2419594
(D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2025). The First Step Act mandates that to earn ETCs, a prisoner must
“successfully 	complete 	evidence-based 	recidivism 	reduction 	programming 	or 	productive
activities.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). As Crayton explained, “[t]he FSA is clear that prisoners
are eligible for time credits if, and only if, they are participating in evidence-based recidivism
reduction programming or productive activities—that is the whole point.” 2025 WL 2421014, at
*2 (citing authorities).
In Crayton, the Court rejected a petition like Petitioner’s because the inmate failed to
“affirmatively state that he was participating in FSA-eligible programming” during the transit
period. Id. The Court held that “[a]ny suggestion that [Petitioner] is automatically entitled to FSA
time credits regardless of whether actually participating . . . is plainly contrary to the statutory
language.” Id. at 3. Here, the Petition and accompanying Memorandum reveal the same deficiency.
Petitioner alleges that he was “FSA eligible” and that his sentence had “commenced,” but he does
not allege that he actually participated in any specific “evidence-based recidivism reduction
programming or productive activities” during the time that he was in transit.
Failing to allege participation in programming is a failure to allege a critical element of any
claim of entitlement to ETCs. Without an allegation of actual participation, Petitioner cannot show
he met the statutory requirements of § 3632(d)(4). As a result, even if the claim were
jurisdictionally sound (and properly exhausted), the Petition would still fail to state a claim upon
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which relief can be granted. The Court therefore recommends denying the Petition and dismissing
this action.
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Petitioner William Harper’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, [Docket No. 1], be DENIED; and
2. 	This action be DISMISSED without prejudice.
Dated: February 13, 2026 	s/Leo I. Brisbois
Hon. Leo I. Brisbois
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being
served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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