Erving v. Rardin

0:26-cv-00220Mnd26 de jan. de 2026

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Roosevelt Erving,
Petitioner,
v.
Jared Rardin, Warden,
Respondent.
Case No. 26-CV-0220 (ECT/SGE)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Roosevelt Erving is serving a very lengthy sentence in federal prison after
robbing several banks by force or violence. See United States v. Erving, No. 4:05-CR-3002
(RGK/DLP) (D. Neb.). As part of the judgment in that case, Erving was required to pay a
total of $443,912.34 in restitution to the various banks that he robbed. See id. The twentieth
anniversary of the criminal judgment passed a few weeks ago. Citing 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b),
Erving argues that his restitution obligation has now expired, and he petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus, asking that the Court pronounce that he no longer owes that money.
Erving’s habeas petition is now before the Court on preliminary review pursuant to
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.1
Because Erving is very plainly not entitled to relief, it is recommended that his petition be
denied and that this case dismissed.
1 Erving’s habeas petition is not brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases may nevertheless be applied to his petition. See Rule 1(b).
CASE 0:26-cv-00220-ECT-SGE Doc. 6 Filed 01/26/26 Page 1 of 3
2
Section 3613(b) states, in relevant part, that “[t]he liability to pay restitution shall
terminate on the date that is the later of 20 years from the entry of judgment or 20 years
after the release from imprisonment of the person ordered to pay restitution” (emphasis
added). Erving is now twenty years beyond the date that judgment was entered in his
criminal case, but he is not twenty years beyond his release from imprisonment. Indeed,
that twenty-year clock has not yet begun to tick, as Erving today remains in prison as a
result of the offenses for which restitution was ordered. Section 3613(b) expressly
terminates restitution obligations at the later of the two dates referenced. Because the later
date—“20 years after the release from imprisonment of the person ordered to pay
restitution”—has not yet passed, Erving remains subject to his restitution obligation.
There are also other reasons Erving’s habeas petition would likely need to be denied.
For one thing, it is exceedingly doubtful that claims regarding restitution obligations can
be raised through habeas corpus at all, as such a claim in “no way challenges [the
prisoner’s] custody.” Satterfield v. Scibana, 275 F. App’x 808, 810 (10th Cir. 2008). For
another thing, Erving does not appear to have presented his claim to the Federal Bureau of
Prisons prior to seeking habeas relief.2 See Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir.
1974) (requiring federal prisoners to administratively exhaust claims before seeking habeas
relief). But these further justifications for dismissal would be unnecessary.
Section 3613(b) does not say what Erving thinks it says. Under the plain text of that statute,
2 Erving asserts—and provides evidence supporting his assertion—that he exhausted a
different claim for relief three years ago, see Petition at 3 [Dkt. 1], but there is no reason to
believe that he has ever administratively exhausted any claim for relief referencing
§ 3613(b).
CASE 0:26-cv-00220-ECT-SGE Doc. 6 Filed 01/26/26 Page 2 of 3
3
Erving remains responsible for the restitution obligation imposed upon him. Erving’s
habeas petition should be denied accordingly.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	The petition for a writ of habeas corpus of petitioner Roosevelt Erving
[Dkt. 1] be DENIED.
2. 	This matter be DISMISSED.
Dated: January 26, 2026 	s/Shannon G. Elkins
Shannon G. Elkins
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits
set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
CASE 0:26-cv-00220-ECT-SGE Doc. 6 Filed 01/26/26 Page 3 of 3

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.