Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Martin R.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Daren K. Margolin, Director
for Executive Office of Immigration Review;
Executive Office for Immigration Review;
David Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement;
Respondents.
File No. 26-CV-168 (JMB/LIB)
ORDER
David L. Wilson and Gabriela Sofia Anderson, Wilson Law Group, Minneapolis, MN, for
Petitioner.
Trevor Brown and Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for
Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, and David Easterwood.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Martin R.’s1 Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus 	(“Petition”) 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 2241. 	(Doc. 	No. 	1 	[hereinafter, 	“Pet.”].)
Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Department of Homeland Security, Todd M.
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in immigration cases.
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Lyons, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Daren K. Margolin, Executive
Office for Immigration Review, and David Easterwood (together, “Respondents”) oppose
the Petition. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the Petition in part.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 	Martin R. is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States
without inspection in 2001. (Pet. ¶ 27.)
2. 	Martin R. was residing in Minnesota prior to his detention. (Id. ¶ 13.)
3. 	On or about July 11, 2026, Martin R. was arrested and taken into ICE
custody. (Id. ¶ 29.) His Petition was filed on the same day. (Doc. No. 1.) Martin R. seeks
immediate release or, in the alternative, a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
(Pet. at 24.)
4. 	The next day the Court issued an order temporarily restraining and enjoining
Respondents from moving Petitioner out of the District of Minnesota until the Court had
issued a ruling on the Petition. (Doc. No. 3.)
5. 	After this order was issued, Respondents Martin R. was moved to El Paso,
Texas.2 (Doc. No. 4 at 2.)
2 As a threshold issue, the Court finds that the physical transfer of Martin R. to Texas after
the initiation of this proceeding did not deprive this Court of jurisdiction over his habeas
petition. Weeks v. Wyrick, 638 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1981), particularly because he was
transferred after—and in violation of—the Court’s order enjoining Respondents from
transferring him out of the District of Minnesota. 	Respondents offer no explanation for
transferring Martin R. in violation of this Court’s Order. 	Nevertheless, and despite the
fundamental importance of the rule of law in this country, the Court declines, at this time,
to address what sanctions might be appropriate as a consequence for not complying with
this Court’s order.
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6. 	Respondents timely filed their Response on January 15, 2026. (Doc. No. 4.)
DISCUSSION
Respondents argue that Martin R.’s detention is mandatory pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b). 	(See Doc. No. 4.) 	For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that
because section 1225(b) is not applicable to him, Martin R. is entitled to a bond hearing
pursuant to section 1226(a)(1). The Court therefore grants Martin R.’s Petition.3
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted
to any person who demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(concluding that the Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to
every individual detained within the United States” (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2));
Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 702 (D. Minn. 2025). For most of the nation’s
history, habeas review “has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it
does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” 	Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525
(quotation omitted). The right to challenge the legality of a person’s confinement through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “extends to . . . immigration-related detention.” Deng
Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2020) (citation omitted). 	The
petitioner bears the burden of proving that his detention is illegal by a preponderance of
3 Because a bond hearing is the primary relief available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Court
denies the remaining relief requested. 	In addition, to the extent that the Petition also
includes a request for immediate release, the Court declines to address this requested relief
because the Petition does not develop an argument that Martin R.’s January 11, 2026, arrest
was unlawful or provide any factual statements or allegations that it was a warrantless
arrest.
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evidence. 	Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), 2025 WL 2466670, at *5
(D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H., 782 F. Supp. 3d at 703).
The fundamental question raised in this case is whether Martin R. is an applicant
for admission under section 1225(b), or a noncitizen residing in the United States under
section 1226. Respondents argue that because Martin R. is a noncitizen who is present in
the United States without having been admitted, he is an “applicant” for admission under
section 1225(b) and therefore subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b)(2).
(Doc. No. 9 at 2.) Courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ interpretation that
section 1225(b)(2) requires the mandatory detention of all noncitizens living in the country
who are “inadmissible” because they entered the United States without inspection. 	See,
e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 & n.22
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that this interpretation had been rejected in 350 cases
“decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across
the United States” and collecting cases in an Appendix A); Jose Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No.
25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025)
(collecting cases); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL
2802947, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 	This Court also finds
Respondents’ interpretation unpersuasive.
When interpreting a statute, “every clause and word of a statute should have
meaning.” 	United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432
(2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883)). 	Noncitizens who have been residing in the United States but who entered
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without inspection have not, historically, been considered to still be “arriving” under
section 1225(b). 	This is because the statute itself states that, in order to apply, several
conditions must be met; specifically, an immigration officer must determine that the
noncitizen “is an applicant for admission . . . seeking admission . . . [and] not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Determining the plain
meaning of the statute requires consideration of the tense of the verb “is” and the present
participle “seeking.” 	Here, section 1225(b)(2) applies to persons who presently are
applicants for admission and who presently are seeking admission at the time of their
detention. 	To be seeking admission means to be seeking entry, which “by its own force
implies a coming from outside.” United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401
(1929). In this case, Martin R. has been residing in the United States and is, therefore, not
currently “seeking admission” into the United States.
In addition, Respondents’ interpretation of 1225(b)(2) renders superfluous other
immigration laws. Specifically, interpreting section 1225(b)(2) as applying to noncitizens
who have already entered the country and are not currently seeking admission into the
country, as Respondents urge, would render meaningless a recent amendment to section
1226 by the Laken Riley Act (LRA). The LRA added new categories of noncitizens subject
to mandatory detention under section 1226(c), and one such category was for noncitizens
lacking valid documentation and who have been charged with or convicted of certain
crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). But if Respondents’ interpretation of section
1225 were correct, then there would have been no need for the LRA to create these
additional categories because all noncitizens who are present in the United States and have
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not 	been 	admitted 	would 	have 	already 	been 	ineligible 	for 	bond 	under 	section
1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court also agrees with those courts that have found that Respondents’
interpretation of section 1225(b) is “at odds with both the relevant legislative history and
longstanding agency practice.” Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *7; see, e.g., Maldonado
v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1150 (D. Minn. 2025) (discussing the longstanding practice
of treating noncitizens who resided in the United States, but who had entered without
inspection, as being subject to section 1226(a)).
Therefore, because section 1225(b) is inapplicable to Martin R., he is subject to the
provisions of section 1226, which “sets forth a discretionary process for the apprehension
and detention of aliens who are already present in the United States and eligible for
removal.” Selvin Adonay E.M. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025 WL 3157839,
at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025). Pursuant to section 1226(a), Martin R. is entitled to a bond
hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)(2); see also Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *5–6; Jose
Andres R.E., 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2. For these reasons, the Court finds that Martin
R.’s detention is governed by section 1226(a), and he is not subject to section 1225(b)’s
mandatory detention. Accordingly, the Court grants the Petition.4
4 The Court does not address the Petition’s request for an award of fees and costs under
the Equal Access to Justice Act; Martin R. may move separately for such relief within 30
days of final judgment in this action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petition (Doc. No. 1) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part, as follows:
1. 	Respondents must immediately provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and in any event, on or before 5:00 p.m. CT on January
16, 2026.
2. 	If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be immediately released from
detention.
3. 	On or before 11:00 a.m. CT on January 20, 2026, Respondents shall provide
the Court with a status update concerning the results of any bond hearing
conducted pursuant to this Order, or if no bond hearing was held, advise the
Court regarding Petitioner’s release.
4. 	Respondents shall not remove, transfer, or otherwise facilitate the removal
of Petitioner from the District of Minnesota prior to compliance with
Paragraphs 1–3 of this Order.
5. 	To the extent Petitioner seeks additional relief, the Petition is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 15, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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