Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Eustaquio O.,
Petitioner,
v.
Peter 	Berg, 	Field 	Office 	Director 	of
Enforcement and Removal Operations, St.
Paul 	Field 	Office, 	Immigration 	and
Customs 	Enforcement; 	Kristi 	Noem,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; 	Pamela 	Bondi, 	U.S. 	Attorney
General; Executive Office for Immigration
Review; 	and 	Joel 	Brott, 	Warden 	of
Sherburne County Jail,
Respondents.
Civ. No. 26-153 (PAM/DTS)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Eustaquio O.’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. (“Pet.” (Docket No. 1).) For the following reasons, the Court denies the
Petition.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Eustaquio O. is a citizen of Mexico. (Id. ¶ 19.) He claims to have entered
the United States more than twenty years ago without inspection. (Id. ¶ 5.) He does not
have lawful status in the United States. 	(Id.) 	On January 9, 2026, Respondents
apprehended Petitioner, and he remains in the custody of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”). (Id. ¶ 19.)
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DISCUSSION
Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
claiming that he is a member of the nationwide class in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz,
No. 5:25-cv-01873 SSS BFM (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), and therefore is entitled to the
declaratory relief ordered in that case—his immediate release from custody. Respondents
contend that Maldonado Bautista is not binding or applicable here.
Federal district courts are authorized to grant habeas relief only “within their
respective jurisdictions.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). 	“[F]or core habeas petitions challenging
present 	physical 	confinement, 	jurisdiction 	lies 	in 	only 	one 	district: 	the 	district 	of
confinement.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004). Petitioner does not claim
to be confined in the Central District of California. 	Thus, the Maldonado Bautista court
does not have jurisdiction over Petitioner, and he is not entitled to relief ordered by that
court.
Moreover, the declaratory relief that Maldonado Bautista purports to confer on
petitioners 	nationwide 	is 	in 	practice 	no 	different 	than 	a 	universal 	injunction 	over
“individuals who were not parties to that action, and the power to issue such relief ‘likely
exceed[s] the equitable authority that Congress has granted to the federal courts.’” 	Ore
Falcon v. Wofford, No. 1:26-CV-00181-WBS-EFB, 2026 WL 171927, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 22, 2026) (quoting Trump v. CASA, 606 U.S. 831, 837 (2025).)
In any event, the Court finds that Petitioner’s argument fails in the first instance
because he is not entitled to relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. 	“When interpreting a statute,
[courts] begin with the statute’s plain language, giving words the meaning that proper
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grammar and usage would assign them. If the intent of Congress can be clearly discerned
from the statute’s language, the judicial inquiry must end.” 	United States v. Lester, 92
F.4th 740, 742 (8th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). 	Section 1225(a)(1) dictates that “[a]n alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States
(whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . . ) shall be deemed for purposes of this
chapter an applicant for admission.” There is no dispute that Petitioner is an alien present
in the United States. 	See id. 	And the facts are clear that he did not lawfully enter the
United States, i.e., an immigration officer did not inspect him and authorize his entry. Id.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (“The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an alien,
the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.”).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) instructs that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” The plain reading of the text is that detention
is mandatory. 	Other courts disagree with this reading, making distinctions based on the
length of an alien’s presence in the United States, an alien’s efforts to secure lawful status
here, or where an alien was apprehended. 	Such limitations are not found in the statute.
“What governs this case is the text of the statute, not what other district courts have
concluded.” Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025).
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Respondents may lawfully detain Petitioner under § 1225(b)(2), which requires
detention. 	See, e.g., Chavez v. Noem, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1140 (S.D. Cal. 2025); de
Leon Lopez v. Ladwig, No. 6:25-CV-01884, 2026 WL 19095, at *4–6 (W.D. La. Jan. 2,
2026); Alberto Rodriguez v. Jeffreys, No. 8:25CV714, 2025 WL 3754411, at *11–14 (D.
Neb. Dec. 29, 2025); Melgar v. Bondi, No. 8:25CV555, 2025 WL 3496721, *10–14 (D.
Neb. Dec. 5, 2025); Chen v. Almodovar, No. 1:25-CV-8350-MKV, 2025 WL 3484855,
*3–6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025); Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, *3–4. 	The text of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) is clear that a noncitizen who is an “applicant for admission” is necessarily
“seeking admission.” 	See Vargas Lopez v. Trump, No. 8:25CV526, 2025 WL 2780351,
at *9 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025) (explaining that “just because Vargas Lopez illegally
remained in this country for years does not mean that he is suddenly not an ‘applicant for
admission’ under § 1225(b)(2)”). Indeed, the law dictates that an alien’s mere presence in
the United States without lawful admission means that he or she is seeking admission “by
operation of law.” Matter of Lemus-Losa, 25 I & N. Dec. 734, 743 n.6 (BIA 2012). Thus,
as a matter of law, Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	The Petition (Docket No. 1) is DENIED; and
2. 	This action is DISMISSED without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 3, 2026 	s/ Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge
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