Doxsey v. Mullin et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Susan Tincher, John Biestman, Janet Lee,
Lucia Webb, Abdikadir Noor, and Alan
Crenshaw, on behalf of themselves and
other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Kristi Noem, Secretary of U.S.
Department Of Homeland Security; Todd
Lyons, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Marcos
Charles, Acting Executive Associate
Director, Enforcement and Removal
Operations (ERO), ICE; David
Easterwood, Acting Field Office Director,
ERO, ICE Saint Paul Field Office; John A.
Condon, Acting Executive Associate
Director, Homeland Security
Investigations; the Department of
Homeland Security; Unidentified Federal
Agencies; and Unidentified Federal
Agents; in their official capacities,
Defendants.
No. 0:25-cv-4669 (KMM/DTS)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Indicative Ruling
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1. (Dkt. 237.) For the following reasons,
the Motion is granted. If the Court had jurisdiction to do so, it would grant a motion to
dissolve the January 16, 2026 Preliminary Injunction because it is now moot.
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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 17, 2025 alleging that Defendants and
their agents violated Plaintiffs’ First and Fourth Amendment rights while carrying out
Defendants’ immigration enforcement activities in Minnesota. (See generally Dkt. 1.)
Plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order, which the Court converted to a
motion for a preliminary injunction. (Dkts. 16, 24.)
On January 16, 2026, the Court granted that motion and issued a preliminary
injunction (“Injunction”) enjoining Defendants and their agents from engaging in certain
conduct. (Dkt. 85.) The Court observed that its Injunction was narrower than what
Plaintiffs sought, in part because of Defendants’ concern that a broader injunction could
hamper routine federal law enforcement activities unrelated to the immigration
enforcement operation then underway. As the Court explained:
[T]he Court has limited the language used in the injunction to
the Defendants and their officers and agents engaging in
immigration enforcement activities as part of the current
Operation Metro Surge. While the Court declines to specify a
geographic limitation at this time because the operation is
expanding beyond Minneapolis and St. Paul, it makes clear that
the regularly conducted business of Border Patrol agents on the
northern border, Coast Guard officers on the Great Lakes,
customs officials at the airports, and other federal officers
doing their work unrelated to Operation Metro Surge are not
covered by the injunction.
(Id. at 79.) The Injunction’s protections covered “all persons who do or will in the future
record, observe, and/or protest Operation Metro Surge and related operations that have
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been ongoing in this District since December 4, 2025.” (Id. at 81 ¶ 1.)1 The Injunction’s
limitations constrained “Defendants and their officers and agents operating in the District
of Minnesota to conduct immigration enforcement activities as part of Operation Metro
Surge” as well as “to Defendants and their officers and agents responding to protests that
arise in response to Operation Metro Surge.” (Id. at 81 ¶ 2.) These two categories of officers
and agents were identified as “Covered Federal Agents.” (Id.) The Court then specified
that the Injunction did not “apply to Defendants and their officers and agents otherwise
conducting routine operations within the District of Minnesota.” (Id. at 81–82 ¶ 2.) Finally,
the Injunction established it would “remain in effect until Operation Metro Surge concludes
or the conditions change such that it is no longer necessary.” (Id. at 82 ¶ 5.)
On January 19, 2026, Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the Injunction to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and, a day later, filed a motion to
stay the Injunction pending appeal. On January 21, the Eighth Circuit entered an
administrative stay of the Injunction, and soon thereafter granted Defendants’ motion to
stay the Injunction pending appeal. Tincher v. Noem, 164 F.4th 1097, 1098 (8th Cir. 2026).
On February 13, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a motion before the Eighth Circuit seeking to
stay the proceedings to allow Plaintiffs time to file a motion to dissolve the Injunction
before this Court.2 Pls.-Appellees’ Mot. to Stay Proceedings, Tincher v. Noem, No. 26-
1105 (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 2026). Defendants opposed the request for a stay. Opp’n to Mot. to
1 Citations are to the ECF pagination.
2 Plaintiffs also filed an Amended Complaint in this Court on February 13. (Dkt.
136.)
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Stay Proceedings, Tincher v. Noem, No. 26-1105 (8th Cir. Feb. 17, 2026). On February 19,
2026, the Eighth Circuit granted the stay in part, stating:
After consideration of Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Motion to Stay
Proceedings and the Government’s response, the Court will
hold this appeal in abeyance until March 6, 2026 pending an
indicative ruling by the district court on a motion to dissolve
the preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 62.1. If no
indicative ruling is entered by that date or the district court
denies such a motion, the appeal will proceed in due course.
(Dkt. 233). Plaintiffs subsequently filed this Motion on February 23, 2026, seeking,
pursuant to Rule 62.1, an indicative ruling that the Court would dissolve the Injunction on
the grounds that it is now moot. (Dkt. 237.) Defendants oppose the Motion. (Dkt. 245.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“[A] federal district court and a federal court of appeals should not attempt to assert
jurisdiction over a case simultaneously.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459
U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Accordingly, once a notice of appeal has been filed, the district court
is divested of jurisdiction over any matters at issue on appeal. FutureFuel Chem. Co. v.
Lonza, Inc, 756 F.3d 641, 648 (8th Cir. 2014). However, “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure recognize that in some circumstances it can be helpful to the parties and to the
court of appeals to know what the District Court might do if given the chance to consider
some aspect of the appealed case.” Defs. of Wildlife v. Salazar, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D.
Mont. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1). Specifically, Rule 62.1 creates a mechanism for
considering “trial-court motions for relief that are filed when an appeal is pending[.]” 11
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2911 (3d ed. Sept. 2025
Update). In relevant part, Rule 62.1 states:
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(a) Relief Pending Appeal. If a timely motion is made for relief
that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that
has been docketed and is pending, the court may:
(1) defer considering the motion;
(2) deny the motion; or
(3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court
of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion
raises a substantial issue.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a). Here, the Court has been ordered to indicate how it would rule on
a motion to dissolve the Preliminary Injunction if it had the jurisdiction to do so.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert that the Court’s January 16th Preliminary Injunction is now moot
and should be dissolved. A preliminary injunction can become moot “where the effective
time period of the injunction has passed.” Stevenson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 762
F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation and emphasis omitted). If the passage of time or
changing circumstances render an injunction moot, it should be dissolved. See Forbes v.
Ark. Educ. Television Commc’n Network Found., 982 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam); Fauconniere Mfg. Corp. v. Sec’y of Def., 794 F.2d 350, 352 (8th Cir. 1986); see
also Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394 (1981) (“If the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the determination whether the preliminary injunction was properly
granted, . . . then we must vacate the district court’s order and remand the case for
consideration of the remaining issues.”) (quoting Ammond v. McGahn, 532 F.2d 325, 328
(3d Cir. 1976)).
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Plaintiffs argue that the Injunction is now moot because Operation Metro Surge
(“OMS”) has ended. They cite recent remarks from White House Border Czar Tom Homan,
one of OMS’s leaders, stating that OMS has ended and that the number of federal agents
is being reduced. (E.g., Dkt. 241-2 at 5 (“I have proposed, and President Trump has
concurred, that this surge operation conclude.”); Dkt 241-2 at 3 (“But as far as the
immigration surge, it’s over[.] . . . And we should be back to regular footprint within a
week.”).) And because the Injunction applies only to OMS-related conduct, Plaintiffs argue
that the end of that Operation renders it moot.
For their part, Defendants do not dispute that OMS is over,3 but contend that the
Injunction is not moot because it encompasses not just OMS but also other “related
operations.” According to Defendants, the Injunction could remain relevant while other
immigration enforcement activities are ongoing. Defendants further argue that protest
activities are ongoing such that the Injunction continues to limit agents’ responses to those
protests.
The Court concludes that the Injunction is now moot because OMS has ended. The
scope of the Injunction expressly encompassed only conduct stemming from OMS and
excluded non-OMS conduct. Indeed, the Injunction specified that the covered class of
plaintiffs were those “record[ing], observ[ing], and/or protest[ing] Operation Metro Surge
3 Were there a dispute, the Court would have no trouble finding that OMS is over.
In fact, the government has stated as much in at least one other case in this District. Hussen
v. Noem, No. 26-cv-324 (ECT/ECW) (D. Minn.) (Dkt. 163 at 4:16–5:17, 5:24–6:12
(confirming drawdown of federal agents in Minnesota and describing OMS as “ending”));
Dkt. 169-2 ¶¶ 3–7 (detailing the drawdown of agents and referring to OMS in the past
tense)).
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and related operations that have been ongoing in this District since December 4, 2025”;
that the covered Defendants and officers were those “operating in the District of Minnesota
to conduct immigration enforcement activities as part of Operation Metro Surge” or
otherwise “responding to protests that arise in response to Operation Metro Surge[]”; and
that it excluded “Defendants and their officers and agents otherwise conducting routine
operations within the District of Minnesota.” (Dkt. 85 at 81–82 ¶¶ 1–2.) Moreover, the
Injunction clearly stated that it “shall remain in effect until Operation Metro Surge
concludes[.]” (Id. at 82–83 ¶ 5.) The Injunction was expressly tied to the ongoing nature
of OMS; now that OMS has concluded, the Injunction can no longer be effective.
Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. First, Defendants
emphasize that the Injunction covers plaintiffs who “record, observe, and/or protest
Operation Metro Surge and related operations that have been ongoing in this District since
December 4, 2025.” (Id. at 81 ¶ 1 (emphasis added).) But Defendants’ focus on “and related
operations” strips this clause of its context. The plain language of the Injunction—both in
its discussion of the Court’s limitations as to breadth and in the decretal language—clearly
ties it to OMS, which is now over. Moreover, Defendants’ reading would vitiate any
temporal limit whatsoever on the Injunction, which is far from the limited order the Court
intended.
Defendants also argue that the Injunction is not moot because, even if OMS itself is
over, protests against it continue. Defendants cite a news article discussing a then-planned
week of action protesting ICE beginning more than 10 days after Mr. Homan’s
announcement. But nothing in the article indicates that those protests were in response to
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OMS; instead, it appears that they reflected opposition to ICE and the Department of
Homeland Security generally. (Dkt. 245-1 at 2–3 (citing Kristi Miller, 2,000 Expected to
Participate in Anti-ICE Organizing Effort, Pioneer Press (Feb. 24, 2026),
https://www.twincities.com/2026/02/24/2000-expected-to-participate-in-anti-ice-
organizing-effort (last visited Mar. 5, 2025)). It cannot be that the Injunction remains in
effect indefinitely despite its express limitations simply because Minnesotans continue to
protest ICE. More critically, the demonstrations Defendants point to fell beyond the scope
of the Injunction because it only restricted the conduct of the Covered Federal Agents. All
reporting suggested that only state and local officers engaged with these protestors, and no
mention was made of any ICE or HSI agents. See Whipple Protests: 38 Arrests Made
During Sunday Protest, Fox 9 KMSP (Mar. 1, 2026),
https://www.fox9.com/news/whipple-protests-38-arrests (last visited Mar. 5, 2026)
(detailing arrests made by state and county law enforcement officers). This demonstration
does not support the idea that the Injunction is not moot. And Defendants provide no
evidence that protests of the sort at issue in this case—individuals observing at the sites of
immigration enforcement activity—is ongoing. See Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds, 33 F.4th 1042,
1044 (8th Cir. 2022) (vacating a preliminary injunction as moot where the “current
conditions differ[ed] vastly from those prevailing when the district court addressed” the
issues underlying the original litigation).
Finally, Defendants oppose dissolution of the Injunction because Plaintiffs refuse to
dismiss the case as a whole. They argue that “if the preliminary injunction is moot, then so
is Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint.” (Dkt. 245 at 5.) According to Defendants,
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Plaintiffs are engaged in a “gambit” designed “to evade a potential adverse decision from
the Eighth Circuit.” (Id. at 7.) Defendants’ argument that the case as a whole suffers from
the same mootness issues that Plaintiffs ascribe to the Injunction is not without some force.
It is not yet apparent whether there is, in fact, any daylight between the Plaintiffs’ assertion
that the Injunction is moot and their anticipated position that there nevertheless remains a
live case or controversy in the Amended Complaint. However, the issue of whether the
entire case is now moot is not currently before the Court, and the Court declines to address
it prematurely. Should the Eighth Circuit remand this matter to this Court so it can grant a
motion to dissolve the Injunction, nothing will prevent Defendants from then arguing that
the entire case should be dismissed on mootness grounds as well. The Court will cross that
bridge when it comes to it. But the tension in Plaintiffs’ position on these issues does not
preclude a finding that the end of OMS has rendered the January 16 Injunction moot.
Accordingly, the Court states pursuant to Rule 62.1(a)(3) that it would grant a timely
motion to dissolve the Injunction if the Court of Appeals remands for that purpose.
ORDER
For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Indicative Ruling Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 62.1 (Dkt. 237) is GRANTED.
2. Pursuant to Rule 62.1, the Court indicates that it would grant a motion to dissolve
the January 16, 2026 Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 85) as moot if the Court of
Appeals remands for that purpose.
Date: March 5, 2026 s/Katherine Menendez
Katherine Menendez
United States District Judge
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