Clark v. US Bancorp/ U. S. Bank

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Michael Fernando Clark,
Plaintiff,
v.
US Bancorp/U.S. Bank,
Defendant.
Civil No. 25-3986 (DWF/ECW)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant US
Bancorp/U.S. Bank (“U.S. Bank”)1 (Doc. No. 3) and an amended motion to remand filed
by pro se Plaintiff Michael Fernando Clark (Doc. No. 9). For the reasons set forth below,
the Court denies Clark’s motion to remand and grants U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Clark alleges that on January 25, 2022, he attempted to conduct banking business
at a U.S. Bank branch in St. Paul, Minnesota but was denied service on the basis of race.
(Doc. No. 1-1 at 5.) Based on that basic allegation, Clark brought this action in state
court, asserting the following claims against U.S. Bank: Violation of Minnesota Human
Rights Act (Race Discrimination); Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Violation of Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. § 1691); Violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
1 	U.S. Bank is the proper defendant in this action. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 8.)
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of 1964; Constitutional Violations (via 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182; Violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794; and Violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) (Minn. Stat.
§§ 363A.11, 363A.12, 363A.17). (Id. at 5-6.)
On October 16, 2025, U.S. Bank removed this action to federal court. (Doc.
No. 1.) In the notice of removal, U.S. Bank stated that U.S. Bank is the only proper party
to this action and that U.S. Bank is a citizen of Ohio. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 8.) U.S. Bank now
moves to dismiss this action in its entirety for failure to allege plausible claims. Clark
files a separate motion to remand this action to state court.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Remand
Clark argues that this case is properly remanded back to state court because his
claims pose no “substantial federal question” and complete diversity between the parties
does not exist. (Doc. No. 10 at 2.)
Under § 1331, district courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Under § 1332, district courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove “any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division
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embracing the place where such action is pending.” A party opposing removal may bring
a motion requesting that the federal court remand the case back to state court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c). The district court shall remand the case back to state court if it determines that
the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Martin v. Franklin Cap.
Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 134 (2005).
On a motion to remand, the party seeking removal and opposing remand bears the
burden of demonstrating federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. In re
Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010). The Court should resolve
any doubt as to the propriety of removal in favor of remand. Id. at 620. U.S. Bank
opposes Clark’s motion to remand, arguing that the Court has both federal question and
diversity jurisdiction over this action.
“Removal based on federal question jurisdiction is governed by the well pleaded
complaint rule: jurisdiction is established only if a federal question is presented on the
face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Pet Quarters, Inc. v. Depository Tr. &
Clearing Corp., 559 F.3d 772, 779 (8th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, a plaintiff “may avoid
federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Cent. Iowa Power Coop. v.
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 561 F.3d 904, 912 (8th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). Federal question
jurisdiction exists either when “federal law creates the cause of action” or “the plaintiff’s
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. of S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).
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Here, Clark asserts six causes of action based on federal statutory law and two
claims under MHRA. Plaintiff minimizes the focus of federal statutory law, claiming
now that his claims arise solely under the MHRA and that the complaint’s “mere
reference to federal civil-rights principles does not create federal jurisdiction.” (Doc.
No. 10 at 1-2.) The Court disagrees. At the time of removal, Clark’s complaint explicitly
stated six causes of action based on federal statutory law. It goes without saying that all
of these claims are created by and arise under federal law. Clark’s invocation of these
federal statutes is enough to confer federal jurisdiction upon the Court. See Favors v.
Comenity Cap. Bank, No. 18-cv-1857, 2018 WL 6718528, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 5, 2018)
(recommending denial of motion to remand and finding that pro se plaintiff raised claims
under federal statutes that conferred original subject matter jurisdiction in federal court),
report and recommendation adopted by, No. 18-cv-1857, 2018 WL 7050301 (D. Minn.
Dec. 6, 2018).
The Court finds that U.S. Bank has demonstrated federal question jurisdiction.
Moreover, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the MHRA claims because they
form part of the same case or controversy as the federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
Thus, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to remand.2
2 	Having found federal subject matter jurisdiction based on federal questions, the
Court need not consider whether diversity jurisdiction also exists.
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II. 	Motion to Dismiss
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all
facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts
in the light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th
Cir. 1986). A court may consider the complaint, matters of public record, orders,
materials embraced by the complaint, and exhibits attached to the complaint in deciding a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d
1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed
factual allegations,” it must contain facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. In addition, the Court notes that pro se
complaints are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Even so, a pro se
complaint must allege facts, and not just bare, unsupported, legal conclusions. See
Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
As an initial matter, U.S. Bank argues that Clark’s complaint lacks any concrete
factual allegation to put it on notice of the claims against it. Under Rule 8, a complaint
must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). And while the Rule 8 pleading standard does not
require “detailed factual allegations,” it does demand “more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
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(2009). A complaint will not suffice “if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement.” Id. (citation modified). Complaints must contain “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Here, Clark asserts eight separate counts against U.S. Bank based on bare factual
allegations. In whole, Clark alleges the following:
On January 25, 2022, plaintiff attempted to [open a bank account/ deposit a
settlement check/ apply for credit/ conduct banking business] at U.S. Bank
in ST. Paul, MN. Plaintiff was treated differently and denied services on
the basis of race, subjected to racial profiling, humiliation and experienced
banking while Black. Plaintiff suffers from [mental health conditions. e.g.,
depression, PTSD, anxiety, agoraphobia], which were exacerbated by
defendant’s discriminatory actions. Defendants engaged in systemic racial
profiling and discrimination in banking and lending practices, as shown by
prior lawsuits, regulatory actions and statistical disparities.
(Doc. No. 1-1 at 5.) Based on these facts, Clark seeks monetary relief, including
compensatory damages for emotional distress, humiliation, and financial harm and
punitive damages, as well as various injunctive relief and financial relief for future costs
for mental health and addiction treatment. (Id. at 6.)
Upon careful review, the Court concludes that these allegations do not satisfy
Rule 8. Instead, it is apparent that Clark merely “tenders naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation modified). First, Clark
fails to allege any specific fact to support any individual claim. Second, Clark asserts
that he was discriminated against and treated differently when U.S. Bank denied him
banking services, yet he does not specify any particular service that U.S. Bank refused to
provide him access to. Nor does Clark allege any facts that would connect any denied
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service to racial discrimination or any facts suggesting that he was treated differently than
another similarly situated customer. Also missing from the complaint are any facts
showing that Clark was otherwise qualified or eligible for any denied service, such as any
type of credit account. And while Clark has alleged that he suffers from various mental
conditions, he has not alleged facts to support any claim that he was denied services
based on these conditions. In short, Clark merely makes bald assertions that fail to
provide facts necessary to render any of his claims plausible or to put U.S. Bank on
notice of the substance of any of the claims asserted against it. Accordingly, the claims in
Clark’s complaint are properly dismissed.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing and the record in this case, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that:
1. 	Clark’s amended motion to remand (Doc. No. [9]) is DENIED.
2. 	U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss (Doc. Nos. [3]) is GRANTED.
3. 	Clark’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: December 19, 2025 	s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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