Hendrickson v. Beltz et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Mark S. Hendrickson,
Petitioner,
v.
Tracy 	Beltz, 	Warden; 	and 	Keith 	Ellison,
Minn. Atty. Gen.,
Respondents.
File No. 25-CV-03410 (JMB/DTS)
ORDER
Mark S. Hendrickson, Faribault, MN, self-represented.
George Randolph Kennedy, Sherburne County Attorney’s Office, Elk River, MN; and Lisa
Lodin and Thomas R. Ragatz, Office of the Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; for
Respondents Tracy Beltz and Keith Ellison.
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (R&R) of
United States Magistrate Judge David T. Schultz, dated January 26, 2026, on Petitioner
Mark S. Hendrickson’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Expand the Record for Review. (Doc.
No. 22 [hereinafter, “R&R”].) Hendrickson objected to the R&R and Respondents filed a
response. 	(Doc. Nos. 23, 26.) 	For the reasons explained below, the Court will overrule
Hendrickson’s objection and deny the Petition.
BACKGROUND
The factual background for this matter is set forth in the R&R and is incorporated
here by reference. 	Because the R&R provides a detailed history, the Court only briefly
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summarizes it here.
In September 2018, a jury in Sherburne County, Minnesota, found Hendrickson
guilty of First-Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a). State
v. Hendrickson, No. 71-CR-17-970, Index #61 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 26, 2018). The trial
court sentenced Hendrickson to 172 months’ imprisonment. Id., Index #126. Hendrickson
thereafter sought postconviction relief and filed a direct appeal to the Minnesota Court of
Appeals. 	Hendrickson v. State, No. A24-1080, 2025 WL 1022292 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
7, 2025); State v. Hendrickson, No. A19-0680, 2023 WL 2564630 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar.
13, 2023), rev. denied, (Minn. May 31, 2023).
In August 2025, Hendrickson filed his Petition with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. 	(Doc. No. 1.) 	In it, he asserted ten grounds for habeas relief, including that he
received constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, that there
were defects with the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, and that the trial court improperly
admitted certain prior-bad-acts testimony at his trial. In January 2026, the Magistrate Judge
issued an R&R on the Petition. (Doc. No. 22.) In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge concluded
that all issues raised in Hendrickson’s Petition had been procedurally defaulted, and that
grounds for excusing procedural default did not exist on the record. 	Accordingly, the
Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition be denied, that all pending ancillary
motions be denied as moot, and that no certificate of appealability be issued.
DISCUSSION
Hendrickson generally objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations to deny
the Petition and to deny the motion to expand the record. Hendrickson also seeks review
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of the denial of his motion for appointment of counsel. 	Because Hendrickson’s general
arguments lack sufficient legal support, the Court adopts the recommendations of the
Magistrate Judge and affirms the decision to deny the motion for appointment of counsel.
A. 	Applicable Legal Standards
Magistrate judges issue recommendations concerning dispositive matters, and
courts conduct de novo review of any portion of magistrate judges’ recommendations to
which a petitioner makes specific objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b);
D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(b). 	However, “[o]bjections which are not specific but merely repeat
arguments presented to and considered by a magistrate judge are not entitled to de novo
review, but rather are reviewed for clear error.” 	Montgomery v. Compass Airlines, LLC,
98 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1017 (D. Minn. 2015). The Court gives the filings and objections of
self-represented litigants liberal construction. Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.
2004).
A different standard applies to nondispositive matters. 	District courts review
magistrate judge orders on nondispositive pretrial matters with extreme deference. Coons
v. BNSF Ry. Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 983, 991 (D. Minn. 2017). The Court will reverse such
orders only when the magistrate judge’s decision is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(a)(3). 	A
decision is “clearly erroneous” when “the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Coons, 268 F. Supp 3d at 991 (quotation
omitted). 	A decision is “contrary to law” when it “either fails to apply or misapplies
pertinent statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Id.
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B. 	Review of the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendations
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court dismiss the Petition because nine
of the ten grounds for relief asserted in it were procedurally defaulted, and the remaining
ground for relief raised an issue of state evidentiary law, which is not properly reviewed in
a federal habeas action. (See R&R.) The Magistrate Judge also recommends that the Court
deny Hendrickson’s motion to expand the record, and that no certificate of appealability
be issued. Because Hendrickson’s objection is not sufficiently specific or supported by a
well-developed 	legal 	argument, 	the 	Court 	overrules 	the 	objection 	and 	adopts 	the
recommendations of the Magistrate Judge.
Hendrickson is a state prisoner whose habeas petition is brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. 	Federal courts do not re-examine state court determinations of state law
questions. 	Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). 	Instead, a state prisoner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is not granted “with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state
court’s adjudication of the claim resulted in either
(1) 	. . . 	a 	decision 	that 	was 	contrary 	to, 	or 	involved 	an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) 	. . . 	a 	decision 	that 	was 	based 	on 	an 	unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). For that reason, “[b]efore seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a
state 	prisoner 	must 	exhaust 	available 	state 	remedies, 	thereby 	giving 	the 	State 	the
opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.”
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Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (quotation and internal citation omitted). That
being the case, a state prisoner seeking relief under section 2254 must have “fairly
present[ed] his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with
powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the
claim.” Latimer v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1223 (D. Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
It is not sufficient if a state prisoner presented the state courts with a claim that was only
“merely similar” to their federal habeas claim. 	Cox v. Burger, 398 F.3d 1025, 1031 (8th
Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
On habeas review, a claim is “procedurally defaulted” if the petitioner did not
exhaust his state court remedies, and the state court to which he should have presented his
claim “would now find it procedurally barred.” 	Hamilton v. Roehrich, 628 F. Supp. 2d
1033, 1045 (D. Minn. 2009). 	This Court cannot review an otherwise procedurally
defaulted claim in a section 2254 action unless the petitioner can show “[1] cause for the
default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or [2]
demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (emphasis added).
In 	his 	objection, 	Hendrickson 	makes 	conclusory 	assertions 	that 	he 	received
constitutionally ineffective assistance from both his trial and appellate counsel, that there
were defects in the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, and that the trial court erroneously
admitted Spriegl evidence at trial. (Doc. No. 23 at 5–11.) However, Hendrickson does not
raise any specific or discernible objection to the Magistrate Judge’s otherwise thorough
analysis of and conclusions of the following: (1) Hendrickson failed to fairly present his
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ineffective-assistance claims to the state courts and failed to demonstrate prejudice to
excuse the procedural default, (2) Hendrickson did not fairly present his jurisdiction claim
to the state courts, and (3) Hendrickson’s claims that the trial court erred by admitting
certain Spriegl evidence are not proper grounds for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (R&R
at 6–12.) 	Because Hendrickson does not raise any specific objection, and because the
Court detects no clear error in the Magistrate Judge’s treatment of Hendrickson’s claims
of ineffective assistance, jurisdictional defects, and erroneous admission of prior-bad-acts
evidence, the Court overrules Hendrickson’s objection.
In addition, after the close of briefing on his Petition, Hendrickson moved to expand
the record with certain documents from the state court proceedings. 	(Doc. No. 20; Doc.
No. 23 at 12.) 	The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court deny Hendrickson’s
motion. (R&R at 14.) Hendrickson now objects, arguing that the Court should order the
state courts to provide certain documents to this Court—primarily certain documents
pertaining to a harassment restraining order Hendrickson sought against his appellate
counsel. 	(Doc. No. 23 at 12; see also Doc. No. 21.) 	However, Hendrickson does not
specify why the documents are necessary to this Court’s consideration of his constitutional
claims. 	Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that the Magistrate Judge’s denial of
Hendrickson’s motion to expand the record was clearly erroneous.1
1 To the extent that portions of Hendrickson’s written submission could be construed as a
request that the Court review the diet offered to him while in custody (Doc. Nos. 24, 25),
the Court declines to consider this request because the issue was not raised to the Magistrate
Judge. In addition, dietary concerns relate to the conditions of his confinement (as opposed
to the validity of his conviction or length of detention) and exceed the scope of habeas
relief. E.g., Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 470–71 (8th Cir. 2014).
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C. 	Review of the Denial of the Motion to Appointment Counsel
Hendrickson also seeks review of the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his motion to
appoint counsel. (Doc. No. 18.) The Court concludes that the motion is untimely, and also
that the Magistrate Judge did not err in making this decision.
On November 24, 2025, approximately two months before issuing the R&R, the
Magistrate Judge denied Hendrickson’s motion to appoint counsel. (Id.) Objections to a
magistrate judge’s order must be brought within fourteen days of being served with the
ruling. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(a)(1). 	Here, Hendrickson raised an
objection two months after that ruling issued and only after the Magistrate Judge reviewed
and issued an R&R on the merits of the Petition. (Doc. No. 23 at 3–5.) The objection is
untimely.
In addition, the Court concludes that Hendrickson does not advance a sufficient
argument for the Court to have definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed or for the Court to conclude that the Magistrate Judge failed to apply or
misapplied pertinent statutes, case law, or rules of procedure. Coons, 268 F. Supp. 3d at
991; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(a)(3).
Therefore, the Court affirms the decision of the Magistrate Judge.
D. 	Certificate of Appealability
In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court not issue a certificate
of appealability on grounds that reasonable jurists could disagree with the Court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims raised in the Petition. 	(R&R at 13.) 	In his
objection, Hendrickson requests a certificate of appealability to pursue an appeal on six
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discrete grounds. 	(Doc. No. 23 at 14.) 	However, Hendrickson does not make any
arguments under the applicable standard for certificates of appealability. Therefore, absent
a discernible objection to the Magistrate Judge’s decision, and because the Court detects
no clear error in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis, the Court agrees that a certificate of
appealability shall not issue.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	The Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objection (Doc. No. 23) to the R&R.
2. 	The Court ADOPTS the R&R. (Doc. No. 22.)
3. 	The Court DENIES the Petition. (Doc. No. 14.)
4. 	The Court AFFIRMS the denial of the Motion to Appoint Counsel. 	(Doc.
No. 18.)
5. 	The Court DENIES AS MOOT Hendrickson’s remaining motions. 	(Doc.
Nos. 4 and 20.)
6. 	The Court will not issue a certificate of appealability.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 24, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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