Hendrickson v. Beltz et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Mark S. Hendrickson, 	Case No. 25-cv-3410 (JMB/DTS)
Petitioner,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
v.
Tracy Beltz, et al.,
Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Mark Hendrickson seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 	2254, 	challenging 	his 	state 	conviction 	for 	first-degree 	criminal 	sexual 	conduct.
Hendrickson raises ten grounds in support of his right to habeas relief, all of which are
procedurally 	defaulted. 	Therefore, 	as 	discussed 	below, 	the 	Court 	recommends
Hendrickson’s petition be denied.
FINDINGS OF FACT1
In 2017, the State of Minnesota charged Hendrickson with two counts of first-
degree and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual misconduct. See State v.
Hendrickson, No. A19-0680, 2023 WL 2564630, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2023)
[hereinafter Hendrickson I]. The charges alleged that Hendrickson engaged in repeated
sexual contact and penetration of his daughter, T.H., over a period of several years when
1 The Court’s findings of fact cite to the state court opinions at issue in Hendrickson’s
petition. When reviewing a habeas petition by a prisoner in state custody, the Court
assumes the State courts’ factual determinations to be correct, unless rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Lee v. Gammon, 222 F.3d
441, 442 (8th Cir. 2000).
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she was under the age of 13. See id. Before trial, the State provided notice of its intent to
introduce evidence of alleged sexual abuse involving another minor, A.L., as other-crime
evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) (commonly referred to as Spreigl evidence). See
id. 	at 	*1, 	5. 	The 	district 	court 	ruled 	that 	A.L.’s 	testimony 	was 	admissible, 	over
Hendrickson’s objection, for the limited purpose of proving motive, intent, absence of
mistake or accident, and common scheme or plan. See id. at *1. A jury trial was held in
2018, and Hendrickson was found guilty on all four counts. See id. at *1-2. The district
court convicted Hendrickson of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced him
to 172 months imprisonment. Id. at *2.
Hendrickson filed a direct appeal to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, arguing the
district 	court 	erred 	by 	admitting 	A.L.’s 	testimony 	and 	the 	prosecutor 	committed
prosecutorial misconduct. See id. at *1. Hendrickson also filed a pro se supplemental brief
raising numerous additional claims, including allegations of fraud, jury prejudice, due
process violations, improper venue, denial of access to courts, grand jury violations,
denial or cancellation of postconviction proceedings, and ineffective assistance of
counsel. See Ex. 2 at 2, Dkt. No. 13-2. The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected
Hendrickson’s arguments regarding A.L.’s testimony and prosecutorial misconduct. See
Hendrickson I, 2023 WL 2564630, at *1 It declined to consider Hendrickson’s pro se
arguments because they were not supported by the record or legal authority. See id. at
*8. Hendrickson sought review in the Minnesota Supreme Court, raising only the
admission of A.L.’s testimony and prosecutorial misconduct. See Ex. 3 at 2, Dkt. No. 13-
3. The Minnesota Supreme Court denied further review. See Pet. 5, Dkt. No. 14.
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Hendrickson subsequently pursued postconviction relief in state court, reasserting
the claims he raised in his pro se supplemental brief on direct appeal in addition to seeking
a change of postconviction venue and removal of the presiding judge. See generally Ex.
4 at 1-21, Dkt. No. 13-4. The district court denied relief, and the Minnesota Court of
Appeals affirmed in a separate decision. See Hendrickson v. State, No. A24-1080, 2025
WL 1022292, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2025) [hereinafter Hendrickson II]. Hendrickson
again sought review in the Minnesota Supreme Court, which was denied. See Pet. 11.
Hendrickson now brings this habeas petition, alleging ten grounds for relief, each
of which was previously raised in his pro se supplemental brief: (1) fraud; (2) prejudiced
jury; (3) due process violations; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue; (6) denial of access to the courts; (7) grand jury violations;
(8) denial or cancellation of postconviction proceedings; (9) improper admission of A.L.’s
testimony; and (10) prosecutorial misconduct. See id. at 1-20.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. 	Standard of Review
A. 	Federal Court Review of State Prisoner Habeas Petitions
This Court’s review of habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners is governed
by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA). Section 2254(a) provides that a federal court shall entertain a habeas
petition of a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” A federal court does not reexamine
state court determinations of state law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68
(1991). A state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus:
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shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision may constitute an unreasonable application
of federal law if it “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably
to the facts of a particular prisoner's case.” Evenstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Penny v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001)).
B. 	Exhaustion and Procedural Default
Generally, “[b]efore seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must
exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.”
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he prisoner
must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme
court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature
of the claim.” Latimer v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1223 (D. Minn. 2018) (quoting
Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29). “Presenting a claim that is merely similar to the federal habeas
claim is not sufficient to satisfy the fairly presented requirement.” Cox v. Burger, 398 F.3d
1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1161-62 (8th Cir.
1999)). “If the petitioner has failed to exhaust his State Court remedies, and if the Court
to which he should have presented his claim would now find it procedurally barred, the
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claim is procedurally defaulted.” Hamilton v. Roehrich, 628 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1046 (D.
Minn. 2009) (citing Sloan v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1371, 1381 (8th Cir. 1995)). Under Minnesota
law, “[o]nce a defendant has had a direct appeal, ‘all matters raised therein, and all claims
known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for post-
conviction relief,’” unless the claim is novel, or the interests of fairness and justice warrant
relief. Zenanko v. State, 587 N.W.2d 642, 644-45 (Minn.1998) (quoting State v. Knaffla,
243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976)); Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 2013)
(finding a claim must have “substantive merit and must be asserted without deliberate or
inexcusable delay” to meet the fairness and justice standard).
If a claim is procedurally defaulted, a federal court can review it only if “the prisoner
can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged
violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
To demonstrate cause, a petitioner must show that “some objective factor external to the
defense impeded [the petitioner's] efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.”
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491 (1986). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must
demonstrate that the claimed errors “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,
infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). In order to assert a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a
petitioner must “present new evidence that affirmatively demonstrates that he is innocent
of the crime for which he was convicted.” Abdi v. Hatch, 450 F.3d 334, 338 (8th Cir. 2006).
If a petitioner cannot satisfy one of these exceptions to procedural default, a federal court
cannot consider the defaulted claims.
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II. 	Grounds One, Two, Three, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight
Grounds One (fraud), Two (prejudiced jury), Three (due process violations), Five
(lack of jurisdiction or improper venue), Six (denial of access to the courts), Seven (grand
jury 	violations), 	and 	Eight 	(denial 	or 	cancellation 	of 	postconviction 	claims) 	are
procedurally defaulted. See generally Pet. 1-20. Hendrickson did not raise, but could have
raised, any of these claims in his direct appeal petition for review to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, which was limited to two questions:
Issue 1: Did the district court commit reversible error by
allowing AL to testify that Hendrickson also sexually abused
her?
Issue 2: Did the prosecutor commit prejudicial plain error by
telling jurors “If you believe [TH], Mark Hendrickson is guilty.
Period” 	and 	by 	urging 	jurors 	to 	remember 	an 	incident
transpiring 	during 	jury 	voir 	dire 	when 	deciding 	whether
Hendrickson was guilty?
Ex. 3 at 2.
Hendrickson raised Grounds One, Two, Three, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight of his
habeas petition in his pro se supplemental brief to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, but
“fair presentation” requires him to have sought review of these claims in the Minnesota
Supreme Court. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 30-32 (finding “fair presentation” unsatisfied if
the state supreme court would have to read the lower court's opinion to discover the
prisoner's constitutional claims). And while Hendrickson moved for the Minnesota
Supreme Court to consider his pro se brief, the court rejected that request pursuant to
Minn. R. Crim. P. 29.04. Dkt. No. 19-6. When a state court rejects a claim on the basis of
state procedural grounds, that claim is procedurally barred. See Clemons v. Luebbers,
381 F.3d 744, 750 (8th Cir. 2004) (“A federal district court is precluded from substantively
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considering a habeas corpus claim that a state court has disposed of on independent and
adequate 	non-federal 	grounds, 	including 	state 	procedural 	grounds.”). 	Moreover,
Hendrickson’s allegations in the habeas petition do not suggest the presence of new
evidence or other excusable circumstances that would allow a state post-conviction court
to overcome the procedural bar in the interest of justice. See Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 8
(citing Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741). Therefore, these claims are procedurally defaulted.
Nor has Hendrickson satisfied any of the federal court exceptions to procedural
default. Hendrickson attributes his procedural default to his appellate counsel's failure to
include in his petition for review to the Minnesota Supreme Court the issues Hendrickson
raised in his pro se supplemental brief to the Court of Appeals. See Dkt. No. 20 at 7-9.
But “attorney error does not qualify as ‘cause’ to excuse a procedural default unless the
error amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.” Davila v. Davis, 582
U.S. 521, 524 (2017). Counsel is not constitutionally ineffective for failing to bring
meritless claims. Rodriguez v. United States, 17 F.3d 225, 226 (8th Cir. 1994); Dyer v.
United States, 23 F.3d 1424, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994) (same). Here, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals reasonably concluded Hendrickson’s claims did not merit relief because they
were “unsupported by the record and devoid of legal authority.” Hendrickson I, 2023 WL
2564630, at *8. Therefore, appellate counsel’s failure to raise Hendrickson’s pro se claims
to the Minnesota Supreme Court does not constitute cause sufficient to excuse the
procedural default. Moreover, Hendrickson has not shown actual prejudice regarding
these grounds because he has not demonstrated errors that “worked to his actual and
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.”
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Frady, 456 U.S. at 170. Accordingly, Grounds One, Two, Three, Five, Six, Seven, and
Eight are procedurally defaulted.
III. 	Ground Four
Ground 	Four 	of 	Hendrickson’s 	habeas 	petition, 	which 	alleges 	ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel, is likewise procedurally defaulted. To satisfy the
fair presentation requirement, a petitioner must reference “a specific federal constitutional
right, a particular constitutional provision, a federal constitutional case, or a state case
raising a pertinent federal constitutional issue.” Murphy v. King, 652 F.3d 845, 849 (8th
Cir. 2011) (quoting McCall v. Benson, 114 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1997)). Hendrickson
fails to meet this standard.
In 	his 	first 	Petition 	for 	Further 	Review 	to 	the 	Minnesota 	Supreme 	Court,
Hendrickson did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Ex. 3 at 2.
However, unlike most other claims, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not
barred under State v. Knaffla and may properly be raised for the first time in postconviction
proceedings. See Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn. 2007). Accordingly,
Hendrickson was not required to assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his
first Petition for Further Review. Nevertheless, when Hendrickson later filed a second
Petition for Further Review following postconviction proceedings, he again failed to fairly
present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In that petition, Hendrickson made
only 	generalized 	references 	to 	attorney 	misconduct 	without 	identifying 	the 	Sixth
Amendment, citing Strickland v. Washington, or referencing any federal or state authority2
2 In his second petition Hendrickson cites Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2004).
See Ex. 6 at 9. In Opsahl, the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the appellant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Strickland standard. See id. at 420-421.
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that applied the federal ineffective assistance of counsel standard. See Ex. 6 at 1-14, Dkt.
No. 13-6. Nor did he clearly present a distinct ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Rather, his allegations of attorney misconduct appear interwoven with his claims of fraud,
due process violations, denial of access to the courts, and obstruction. See id. These
vague allegations are insufficient to alert the Minnesota Supreme Court to the presence
of a federal ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32.
Accordingly, Ground Four is procedurally defaulted.
Hendrickson also has not demonstrated cause or prejudice sufficient to excuse the
default. He does not explain why he failed to adequately present an ineffective assistance
claim to the Minnesota Supreme Court, nor does he identify any objective external factor
that impeded his ability to do so. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 491. Nor has he demonstrated
actual prejudice. To establish prejudice in this context, Hendrickson must show “a
reasonable probability that, [b]ut for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984); see Armstrong v. Kemna, 590 F.3d 592, 606 (8th Cir. 2010).
Hendrickson asserts numerous claims against his pretrial and trial counsel,
alleging, among other things, violations of attorney-client privilege, failures to challenge
jurisdiction, 	improper 	withdrawal 	from 	representation, 	obstruction 	of 	exculpatory
evidence, failure to investigate or introduce a USB device as evidence, mistreatment of
Hendrickson, prejudice to the jury, concealment of expert witness testimony, and refusal
to challenge a witness’s memory. See Pet. 8-11. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
However, Hendrickson cites Opsahl to support his argument for an evidentiary hearing
rather than to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
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addressed 	Hendrickson’s 	allegations 	on 	direct 	appeal 	and 	later 	in 	postconviction
proceedings. 	On 	direct 	appeal 	(Hendrickson 	I), 	the 	court 	declined 	to 	consider
Hendrickson’s arguments regarding his counsel because they were “not supported by the
record or by legal authority.” Hendrickson I, 2023 WL 2564630, at n. 2. The court noted,
however, that Hendrickson could pursue such claims in a petition for postconviction relief.
See id.
In Hendrickson’s postconviction appeal (Hendrickson II), the Minnesota Court of
Appeals substantively addressed Hendrickson’s arguments. As it had on direct appeal,
the court first noted that “Hendrickson [did] not support [his] assertions with any analysis
or authority.” Hendrickson II, 2025 WL 1022292, at *5. Nevertheless, the court analyzed
the merits of Hendrickson’s allegations and concluded that they failed under both prongs
of Strickland. See id. Specifically, the court determined that many of Hendrickson’s claims
involved matters of trial strategy, which are presumed reasonable, and that Hendrickson
failed to demonstrate prejudice as to any remaining claim. See id.
Hendrickson also alleges ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, asserting
that counsel acted unreasonably by pursuing a direct appeal rather than continuing
postconviction proceedings and by declining to bring an ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim. See id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected this argument as well,
concluding that appellate counsel acted reasonably in “deciding to pursue a direct appeal
after concluding that the postconviction claim based on ineffective assistance of trial
counsel would be unsuccessful.” Id. at *6.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision was a reasonable application of clearly
established federal law. The state court correctly identified and applied Strickland’s two-
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prong test. It first determined that Hendrickson’s trial and appellate counsel acted
reasonably, and that, in any event, Hendrickson failed to demonstrate resulting prejudice.
Accordingly, Hendrickson has not shown that any alleged error “worked to his actual and
substantial disadvantage[.]” Frady, 456 U.S. at 170. Therefore, Ground Four does not
provide a basis for federal habeas relief.
IV. 	Ground Nine
Ground Nine of Hendrickson’s habeas petition challenges the admission of A.L.’s
testimony. Because this claim alleges an error of state evidentiary law, it is not proper for
federal habeas relief. See Robinson v. Leapley, 26 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 1994) (“As the
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, ‘federal habeas corpus relief
does not lie for errors of state law.’” (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67)).
On direct appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the admission of
A.L.’s testimony under Minnesota’s Spreigl framework and concluded that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion “because the admission of Spreigl evidence did not affect
Hendrickson's substantial rights, A.L.’s testimony met the clear-and-convincing standard
for Spreigl evidence, and the probative value of the testimony outweighed its potential for
unfair prejudice.” See Hendrickson I, 2023 WL 2564630, at *6. In his petition for review
to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Hendrickson challenged that ruling solely through the
lens of Minnesota evidentiary law. See Ex. 3 at 5-8. He did not identify a specific federal
constitutional provision, cite a federal constitutional case, or argue that the admission of
the testimony rendered his trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. See id.
Because Hendrickson failed to present Ground Nine as a federal constitutional claim to
the Minnesota Supreme Court, the claim is procedurally defaulted.
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Even construing Hendrickson’s claim as raising a federal issue, it fails on the
merits. A federal court may grant habeas relief based on evidentiary rulings only if the
errors are “so ‘gross’ ... ‘conspicuously prejudicial’ ... or otherwise of such magnitude that
it fatally infected the trial and failed to afford [appellant] the fundamental fairness which is
the essence of due process.” Rainer v. Dep’t of Corr., 914 F.2d 1067, 1072 (8th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Mercer v. Armontrout, 844 F.2d 582, 587 (8th Cir.1988)). This standard is not
met here. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that the district court
properly admitted A.L.’s testimony and, in any event, found that “the testimony of T.H.
alone was more than sufficient to support Hendrickson's conviction.” Hendrickson I, 2023
WL 2564630, at *4. Therefore, this claim for habeas relief fails.
V. 	Ground Ten
Ground Ten alleges prosecutorial error based on two statements made during
closing arguments: (1) the prosecutor’s statement that “[i]f you believe [T.H.], Mark
Hendrickson is guilty. Period[,]” and (2) the prosecutors’ refence to an incident during voir
dire where a prospective juror cried when asked if they “had a secret.” See Ex. 3 at 2; see
also Hendrickson I, 2023 WL 2564630, at *6-7. Because Hendrickson did not object to
the prosecutor’s closing argument at trial, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reviewed this
claim under Minnesota’s modified plain-error standard. See Hendrickson I, 2023 WL
2564630, at *6-7. “[T]he Eighth Circuit has held that when a state court reviews a federal
habeas petitioner’s claim for plain error because the claim was not objected to at the trial
level, that claim is procedurally defaulted.” Bush v. Smith, No. 17-CV-3129, 2017 WL
7048898, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 2017) (citing Clark v. Bertsch, 780 F.3d 873, 874 (8th
Cir. 2014); Hayes v. Lockhart, 766 F.2d 1247, 1253 (8th Cir. 1985)).
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Even if Ground Ten were not procedurally defaulted, it would fail on the merits.
Prosecutorial misconduct provides a basis for habeas relief only if it “so infected the trial
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). Hendrickson does not satisfy this demanding
standard. With respect to the first statement, the court reasonably determined that it did
not constitute plain error and even if it had, “it is unlikely that the error affected
Hendrickson's substantial rights because the district court properly instructed the jury on
the burden of proof.” See Hendrickson I, 2023 WL 2564630, at *7. Likewise, the court
reasonably concluded the second statement did not rise to the level of plain error because
“[t]he prosecutor did not state that the jury voir dire incident was evidence that supported
Hendrickson's guilt; rather, she briefly mentioned the jury voir dire incident as an analogy
to A.L.’s memory of the abuse.” Id. Accordingly, Ground Ten does not provide a basis for
federal habeas relief.
VI. 	Certificate of Appealability
A § 2254 habeas petitioner cannot appeal an adverse ruling on his petition unless
he is granted a certificate of appealability (COA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Rule 11(a),
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts. Federal district courts
cannot grant a COA unless the petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, “[t]he petitioner
must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The issues raised in this petition are straightforward, and it is highly unlikely that any other
court, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, would treat Hendrickson’s habeas
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petition differently than it is being treated here. The Court therefore recommends that
Hendrickson not be granted a COA in this matter.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS THAT:
1. 	Petitioner Mark Hendrickson’s habeas petition (Dkt. No. 14) be DENIED.
2. 	Hendrickson’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 4) be DENIED AS
MOOT.
3. 	Hendrickson’s Motion to Expand Record for Review (Dkt. No. 20) be
DENIED AS MOOT.
4. 	No certificate of appealability be issued.
Dated: January 26, 2026 	__s/ David T. Schultz_________
DAVID T. SCHULTZ
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court. It is not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All
objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set for in LR 72.2(c).
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