Mohamed et al v. Walz et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Abdikadar Mohamed and Fowsiya
Hassan,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Tim Walz, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of Minnesota; State
of Minnesota; Shireen Gandhi, in her
official capacity as Interim Commissioner
of the Minnesota Department of Human
Services, and individually; Minnesota
Department of Human Services; Jennifer
Fenrow; John Doe 1-10, individually; and
Jane Doe 1-10, individually,
Defendants.
Civil No. 25-2930 (DWF/EMB)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Tim Walz, State of Minnesota (the
“State”), Shireen Gandhi,1 and the Minnesota Department of Human Services’
(collectively, “State Defendants”) motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 11) and Defendant
Jennifer Fetrow’s 2 motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 16). Plaintiffs Abdikadar Mohamed and
1 	Gandhi’s first name is currently misspelled on the docket. The Court directs the
Clerk’s Office to change the spelling of “Shareen” to “Shireen” on the docket.
2 	Fetrow’s last name is currently misspelled on the docket due to a spelling error in
the complaint. (See Doc. No. 1; Doc. No. 17 at 1 n.1.) The Court directs the Clerk’s
Office to change the spelling of “Fenrow” to “Fetrow” on the docket.
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Fowsiya Hassan oppose the motions. (Doc. No. 31.) For the reasons set forth below, the
Court grants in part and denies in part the motions.
BACKGROUND
Mohamed and Hassan are Somali Americans that owned and operated childcare
centers in Hennepin County, Minnesota. (Doc. No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 4.) Mohamed owned
City Center Childcare Center (“City Center”). (Id.) Hassan owned Sunshine Child Care
Center (“Sunshine”). (Id.) Both centers participated in Minnesota’s Child Care
Assistance Program (“CCAP”). (See id. at 7.) CCAP is a state program operated by the
Minnesota Department of Human Services (“DHS”) that helps low-income families pay
for childcare. Child Care Assistance Program Information for Child Care Providers,
Dep’t of Child., Youth, & Fams., https://dcyf.mn.gov/child-care-assistance-program-
information-child-care-providers (last visited Mar. 5, 2026); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 142E.02, subdiv. 1 (2025) (charging DHS Commissioner with duty to create a childcare
assistance program). Childcare providers that register with CCAP can receive payments
directly from CCAP for services provided. Child Care Assistance Program Information
for Child Care Providers, supra.
At some point before August 2022, Fetrow, a Special Agent with Minnesota’s
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (“BCA”), began investigating City Center and
Sunshine for CCAP fraud. (See Compl. at 5.) On August 23, 2022, agents from the BCA
along with employees from DHS, supervised and directed by Fetrow, executed search
warrants on multiple childcare centers owned by people of East African descent,
including City Center and Sunshine. (Id. at 5-7.) At the time of arrival, the agents did
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not have the search warrants on hand, but after 30 minutes, they produced the warrants
and executed those warrants. (Id. at 5.) Mohamed alleges that during the search, agents
destroyed his security camera, forced him and his employees to stand against a wall,
seized his phone to prevent him from calling his attorney, and asked questions without
providing proper Miranda warnings. (Id.)
The affidavits used to obtain the search warrants for each childcare center were
nearly identical. (Id. at 6; see Doc. Nos. 22, 22-1.) Each affidavit stated that hidden
cameras had been placed and positioned to focus on the doorway of the childcare center.
(Compl. at 6.) Agents monitored those videos to cross-check the number of children
arriving with the number of children claimed for CCAP payments. (Id.) Each affidavit
claimed that the particular center had reported more CCAP-eligible children than were
seen arriving at the center. (Id.) The only difference between each affidavit was the
number of children observed and the personal details of each center. (See id.; Doc.
Nos. 22, 22-1.) Plaintiffs allege that the information about the hidden cameras in each
search warrant was false or intentionally misleading. (Compl. at 6.) The affidavits did
not allege other complaints or otherwise reveal the origin of the probe into each particular
center. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiffs allege that the investigations were started because of State
officials’ “history of negative stereotypes and expressions of animus towards the Somali
community.” (Id.)
Following the execution of the search warrants, City Center and Sunshine were
notified that their eligibility for payment through CCAP was being suspended temporarily
due to DHS’s determination that they had provided materially false billing information.
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(Id. at 7.) These suspensions were effective September 1, 2022. (Id.) Despite the
suspension, DHS told Plaintiffs that they were required to continue providing services to
CCAP eligible families for an additional fourteen days to allow those families time to
find an alternative placement. (Id. at 8.) As part of the suspension, City Center and
Sunshine were locked out of the CCAP billing system on September 1, 2022. (Id. at 7.)
As a result of this lockout, City Center and Sunshine provided twenty-four days of
CCAP-eligible care that they were unable to bill for through the CCAP billing system.
(See id. at 7-8.)
The notices stated that the centers could seek administrative review of the
suspension and payment withholding. (Id. at 8.) The statute governing this review
provides for only narrow administrative review. (See id.) Plaintiffs requested
administrative review, but their appeals to DHS were summarily denied without
explanation. (Id.)
While under temporary suspension, Plaintiffs sued DHS, Jodi Harpstead (then-
Commissioner of DHS), Ramsey County, and Hennepin County. (Doc. No. 22-4 at 2; see
Doc. No. 22-5 at 4 n.1.) Plaintiffs challenged DHS’s ability to indefinitely suspend
CCAP eligibility without imposition of a sanction under the Due Process Clause. (See
Compl. at 9-10.) Plaintiffs also brought a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. No. 22-4 at 17.) The state district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss on August 24, 2023, dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims with
prejudice. (Doc. No. 22-5 at 2.) Plaintiffs appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals
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affirmed. (Compl. at 11; see Sunshine Childcare Ctr., LLC v. Ramsey County, 7 N.W.3d
611 (Minn. Ct. App. 2024).)
The Minnesota Court of Appeals analyzed whether Plaintiffs had a “protected
property interest in the temporarily suspended CCAP payments and temporarily revoked
CCAP authorization.” Sunshine, 7 N.W.3d at 614. After a thorough analysis of the
CCAP statute, it concluded that “the CCAP statute does not create a protected property
interest upon which appellants can rely to sustain their procedural-due-process claims
because DHS has acted in accordance with the statute.” Id. at 617. Notably, the Court of
Appeals limited its decision to those particular circumstances. See id. at 618 n.6 (“We
take no position on whether a childcare provider possesses a constitutionally protected
property interest in CCAP payments and authorization under different circumstances.”).
Plaintiffs petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for review and it accepted.
(Compl. at 11-12.) Shortly after review was granted, the BCA closed its investigation
into the centers without a finding of wrongdoing. (Id.) Accordingly, DHS asked the
Minnesota Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal as moot. (Id.) The Minnesota Supreme
Court granted DHS’s request, explaining that because the sanctions challenged were
lifted, there was no relief left to grant. (Doc. No. 22-6 at 4.) It continued, “the holds are
withdrawn, payments due will be processed, and should the Centers wish to become
relicensed, they may apply for authorization like any other applicant.” (Id.) On
January 13, 2025, following the dismissal, Minnesota’s Clerk of the Appellate Court
entered a judgment containing the following language: “Pursuant to a decision of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals duly made and entered, it is determined and adjudged that
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the decision of the Hennepin County District Court, Civil Division herein appealed from
be and the same hereby is affirmed and judgment is entered accordingly.” Judgment at 1,
Sunshine Childcare Ctr., LLC v. Ramsey County, No. 27-CV-23-3010 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 13, 2025.)
Following the dismissal and entry of judgment, DHS refused to pay the centers for
the 24 days of childcare provided in August and September of 2022 because of a statute
that requires claims for payment to be submitted within one year of the provision of
services. (Compl. at 12-13.) Consequently, Plaintiffs filed this case to challenge
Defendants’ actions throughout the investigation and temporary suspension, but also their
refusal to pay Plaintiffs for services already provided.
Plaintiffs bring eight claims against Walz, the State, Gandhi, DHS, Fetrow, and 20
unnamed John and Jane Does who are described as unknown agents of the BCA and DHS
(the “Doe Defendants”). (See id. at 4.) Plaintiffs sue Walz and Gandhi in their official
capacities. 3 (Id.) Fetrow and the Doe Defendants are sued in their individual capacities.
(Id.) Count 1 alleges selective discriminatory enforcement against all Defendants. (Id.
at 13-14.) Counts 2 and 3 allege facial and as-applied procedural due process claims
against the State Defendants. (Id. at 14-17.) Count 4 alleges Fourth Amendment
3 	The complaint caption appeared to list that Gandhi was being sued in her
individual capacity as well. (Compl. at 1.) The complaint later clarifies that she is only
sued in her official capacity. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiffs have also confirmed that Gandhi is only
sued in her individual capacity. (See Doc. No. 13 at 3 n.7.) The Court directs the Clerk’s
Office to change the party text for Gandhi to “in her official capacity as Interim
Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services.”
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violations by Fetrow and the Doe Defendants. (Id. at 17-18.) Count 5 alleges Fifth
Amendment violations by Fetrow and the Doe Defendants. (Id. at 18.) Count 6 alleges
involuntary servitude against all Defendants. (Id. at 19-20.) Count 7 alleges unjust
enrichment against all Defendants. (Id. at 20.) Count 8 alleges defamation per se and
defamation against all Defendants. (Id. at 21-22.) The State Defendants and Fetrow
moved to dismiss the complaint. (Doc. Nos. 11, 16.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	Legal Standards
A. 	Rule 12(b)(1)
A party may challenge a court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of
proving jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. V S Ltd. P’ship v. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urb. Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may
challenge a plaintiff’s complaint either facially or factually. Osborn v. United States, 918
F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). On a factual attack, a court may consider matters
outside the pleadings to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Here, as
confirmed at oral argument, the State Defendants assert a facial attack on the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction.
B. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in
the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the
light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.
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1986). In doing so, however, a court need not accept as true wholly conclusory
allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999),
or legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts alleged, Westcott v. City of
Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). A court may also consider certain matters
outside of the pleadings, including matters of public record or materials embraced by the
complaint. See Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must
contain facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Id. at 555. As the Supreme Court reiterated, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” will not pass muster
under Twombly. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555). In sum, this standard “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
II. 	Plaintiffs’ Concession to Dismiss Certain Counts
Plaintiffs agree in their opposition briefing that certain counts must be dismissed
due to Eleventh Amendment immunity or other pleading failures. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 31
at 3.) The Court clarified Plaintiffs’ concessions at oral argument. In line with Plaintiffs’
assertions at oral argument, the Court dismisses Counts 5 and 6 as to all Defendants,
Count 7 as to the State Defendants and Fetrow, and Count 8 as to the State Defendants.
The parties did not fully address whether this dismissal should be with or without
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prejudice. The Court finds dismissal without prejudice is appropriate here because the
concessions were based on Eleventh Amendment immunity or pleading failures that are
not persistent at this stage of the proceedings.
In sum, Counts 5 and 6 are dismissed in their entirety without prejudice, Count 7
remains only as to the Doe Defendants, and Count 8 remains only as to Fetrow and the
Doe Defendants.
III. 	State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
The Court first addresses the State Defendants’ subject matter jurisdiction
challenge under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
See Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming, 904 F.3d 603, 609 (8th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have an
independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists before
proceeding to the merits, even when no party raises the issue.”); Harmon Indus., Inc. v.
Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir. 1999) (explaining that sovereign immunity “is a
jurisdictional threshold matter”). Then, the Court addresses claim preclusion and the
State Defendants’ other arguments under Rule 12(b)(6).
A. 	Sovereign Immunity
A state or its agencies may not be sued in federal court unless the state has waived
its sovereign immunity or Congress has abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity. U.S.
Const. amend. XI; Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2011);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Sovereign
immunity also extends to state officials sued in their official capacity except where the
exception described in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), applies. See EEE Mins.,
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LLC v. North Dakota, 81 F.4th 809, 815 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing Pennhurst, 465 U.S.
at 101). Under Ex parte Young, sovereign immunity does not apply to state officials
when “the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S.
635, 645 (2002) (citation modified). Thus, requests for damages and retrospective
declaratory or injunctive relief are barred by sovereign immunity. See Green v. Mansour,
474 U.S. 64, 68, 74 (1985).
Only Counts 1, 2, and 3 remain as to the State Defendants. Count 1 seeks $13
million in damages. (Compl. at 14.) Count 2 seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief,
and nominal damages. (Id. at 15.) Count 3 seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
$13 million in damages. (Id. at 16-17.) Plaintiffs have not shown that the State waived
its sovereign immunity or that Congress abrogated its sovereign immunity. Accordingly,
the State and DHS are dismissed in their entirety without prejudice and shall be
terminated as parties to this case. Additionally, Walz and Gandhi are immune from any
claim for damages, so Count 1 must be dismissed in its entirety as to the State Defendants
and Counts 2 and 3 are dismissed insofar as they seek damages.
Walz and Gandhi argue that Plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory relief in Count 2
and for injunctive and declaratory relief in Count 3 must also be dismissed because they
seek retrospective relief. (See Doc. No. 33 at 1-2.) In contrast, Walz and Gandhi do not
challenge Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief on Count 2. (See id. at 2.) Count 2
specifically requests “a judgment declaring Minnesota’s denial of judicial appeals of
indefinite suspensions of CCAP payments to be unconstitutional.” (Compl. at 15.)
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Count 3 specifically requests “a judgment declaring that the notices of ‘temporary’
suspension of their CCAP eligibility were unconstitutional” and “a permanent injunction
barring Minnesota from issuing such notices to them in the future.” (Id. at 16-17.) The
Court agrees that the declaratory relief in Count 3 is retrospective, but the declaratory
relief sought in Count 2 and the injunctive relief sought in Count 3 is prospective. The
declaratory relief in Count 2 asks for a declaratory judgment regarding future application
of the CCAP suspension statute. The injunctive relief in Count 3 asks for an injunction
preventing future notices from being issued to them.
In sum, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the State and DHS and
over Count 1 as to all State Defendants. Counts 2 and 3 remain on limited relief theories.
B. 	Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The doctrine is confined to
situations “where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court
decision to a lower federal court.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (per
curiam). Not all claims that challenge a legal conclusion in a state court judgment qualify
under this doctrine. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293. The claim must also seek relief from
the state court’s judgment. Hageman v. Barton, 817 F.3d 611, 615 (8th Cir. 2016).
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To determine whether a claim qualifies, a court should look to the nature of the
claim or alleged injury and the kind of relief the plaintiff seeks. See id. at 614 (“The
boundaries for application of the doctrine depend upon the nature of the federal claims
and whether the plaintiff in federal court, in fact, seeks relief from the state court
judgment.”). For example, in Kvalvog v. Park Christian School, Inc., the lower court had
jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ claims did not seek relief from a state court judgment
but instead “request[ed] relief for the Defendants’ allegedly illegal acts and omissions
during the proceedings.” 66 F.4th 1147, 1152 (8th Cir. 2023). In contrast, in Skit
International, Ltd. v. DAC Technologies of Arkansas, Inc., the lower court did not have
jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s alleged injury stemmed directly from the state court
judgment, not from some separate conduct, as the plaintiff sought to have the state court’s
judgment declared null and void for lack of service of process and lack of jurisdiction.
487 F.3d 1154, 1156-57 (8th Cir. 2007).
The State Defendants argue summarily that all of Plaintiffs’ claims are barred
under this doctrine because the state court already decided the issues of equal protection
and due process and could have decided the other claims. (Doc. No. 13 at 16.) They
provide no further explanation of how the doctrine applies. The Court has conducted its
own review of the injuries alleged and remedies sought. While the claims embrace
conclusions made by the state court, the case is not styled as an appeal, and Plaintiffs do
not seek direct relief from the state court judgment. Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs’ remaining claims. Claim preclusion, a similar but distinct doctrine,
applies to many of these claims, however, so the Court addresses that next.
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C. 	Claim Preclusion
“Claim preclusion, or res judicata, provides that a final judgment on the merits of
an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could
have been raised in that action.” Plough ex rel. Plough v. W. Des Moines Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 70 F.3d 512, 515 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation modified). Claim preclusion applies
when “(1) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the first suit was
based on proper jurisdiction; (3) both suits involve the same parties (or those in privity
with them); and (4) both suits are based upon the same claims or causes of action.”
Elbert v. Carter, 903 F.3d 779, 782 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Costner v. URS Consultants,
Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 1998)). “Whether two claims are the same for res
judicata purposes depends on whether the claims arise out of the same nucleus of
operative fact or are based upon the same factual predicate.” Murphy v. Jones, 877 F.2d
682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 1989) (citation modified).
The State Defendants argue that the claims against them must be dismissed
because the state court’s judgment precludes re-litigation of these issues. Only Counts 2
and 3 remain as to the Walz and Gandhi, so the Court only considers claim preclusion on
those counts. The parties agree that the second and third elements of claim preclusion are
met but disagree about elements one and four. (See Doc. No. 31 at 7; Doc. No. 33 at 2.)
First, Plaintiffs contend that there is no final judgment on the merits because the
Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the discretionary appeal as moot. (Doc. No. 31
at 7.) Because a Minnesota court rendered the first judgment, the Court relies on
Minnesota law to determine whether there was a final judgment on the merits. C.H.
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Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Lobrano, 695 F.3d 758, 764 (8th Cir. 2012). Under
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, a court’s order for dismissal, other than a dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, or failure to join an indispensable party, is
an adjudication on the merits. Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(c); see State v. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d
322, 328 (Minn. 2001). Thus, unless the dismissal falls under one of the named
exceptions, or the issuing judge says otherwise, a state district court’s dismissal order is a
final judgment on the merits. That judgment is final upon entry and remains final unless
it is reversed, vacated, or otherwise modified by an appellate court. Brown-Wilbert,
Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., P.L.L.P., 732 N.W.2d 209, 221 (Minn. 2007).
While the Court agrees that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s dismissal was a
jurisdiction-related dismissal, that dismissal had no impact on the district court judgment
or the Court of Appeals judgment below. The dismissal only dismissed the discretionary
appeal and contained no further instructions to reverse, vacate, or otherwise modify the
trial court or intermediate appellate court judgments. Furthermore, the Clerk of the
Appellate Courts issued a judgment affirming the state district court’s order following the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s dismissal. The trial court’s judgment was never reversed,
vacated, or otherwise modified, so it remains a final judgment for res judicata purposes.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that these claims rely on an “entirely different set of
facts.” (Doc. No. 31 at 9.) In the state court litigation, Plaintiffs challenged Defendant’s
temporary suspension of their CCAP payments under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, among other laws. (See Doc. No. 22-4 at 17-21.) Plaintiffs
sought damages, an injunction, and declaratory judgment. (Id. at 21-22.) Here, Plaintiffs
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again challenge the suspension of CCAP payments, again under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The State Defendants are primarily correct that this case involves the same nucleus
of operative facts. However, additional events occurred after that lawsuit, namely, the
State’s refusal to reimburse Plaintiffs for twenty-four days of CCAP-eligible services that
were already provided after the investigation was closed and suspension was lifted.
Those events are distinct from the theories presented to the state court, and they could not
have been presented to the state court because they occurred after the Minnesota Supreme
Court dismissed the discretionary appeal. That is outside the nucleus of operative facts
considered in state court. See Baker Grp., L.C. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 228
F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2000) (“It is well settled that claim preclusion does not apply to
claims that did not arise until after the first suit was filed.”) Therefore, Counts 2 and 3
remain solely based on Walz and Gandhi’s refusal to pay for twenty-four days of CCAP-
eligible services that Plaintiffs already provided, after the temporary suspension ended.
The other theories are dismissed.
D. 	Failure to State A Claim
Only Counts 2 and 3 remain against Walz and Gandhi on the narrow theory that,
after the temporary suspension ended, they have refused to pay Plaintiffs for the 24 days
of services provided while the suspension was in place and they were locked out of the
CCAP billing system. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a procedural
due process claim on this set of facts because they have not alleged a protected property
interest. (Doc. No. 13 at 19-22.) Plaintiffs argue that they have a protected property
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interest in CCAP payments for eligible services provided now that the investigation has
ended and the suspension has been lifted. (See Doc. No. 31 at 19.) Defendants failed to
address this argument in the briefing, and seem to concede that this could be a protected
property interest. (See Doc. No. 33 at 11 (“At best, Plaintiffs’ due process claims apply
only to the services Plaintiffs were allegedly directed to provide shortly before and after
the CCAP suspension.”).) Given the lack of briefing on this issue, the Court concludes
that this theory is adequate, at least at this venture. The State Defendants’ motion is
denied as to Counts 2 and 3 against Walz and Gandhi on this narrow theory.
IV. 	Fetrow’s Motion to Dismiss
Following Plaintiffs’ concessions, only Counts 1, 4, and 8 remain against Fetrow.
The Court addresses each count in turn.
A. 	Count 1: Selective Discrimination Enforcement
Count 1 alleges that Fetrow selectively chose to investigate Plaintiffs’ childcare
centers, and other childcare centers, and enforce the law against them because they were
owned and operated by persons of East African descent. (See Compl. at 6-7, 13-14.) The
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits selective enforcement of
the law based on considerations such as race, ethnicity, or religion. See Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985);
Gilani v. Matthews, 843 F.3d 342, 347 (8th Cir. 2016). To make a selective enforcement
claim, the plaintiff must show that the enforcement had discriminatory effect and was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608; see, e.g., Jiang v. Porter,
156 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1004-05 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (finding plaintiff made sufficient
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allegations to support a selective enforcement claim). To show discriminatory effect, the
plaintiff must show that people of another race, ethnicity, or religion violated the law and
the law was not enforced against them. See Gilani, 843 F.3d at 348. To show
discriminatory purpose, a plaintiff must show the official’s decision to enforce the law
was at least partially based on race, ethnicity, or religion. See United States v. Bell,
86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996).
Fetrow argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because they did not plead a
discriminatory effect or discriminatory purpose and that she is entitled to qualified
immunity. (Doc. No. 17 at 22-27.) The Court agrees that Plaintiffs do not adequately
allege a selective enforcement claim. Plaintiffs do not allege that similarly situated
people of another race, ethnicity, or religion violated the law and that the law was not
enforced against them.
Plaintiffs counter that their pleading was sufficient because they pleaded that only
Somalis were targeted by Fetrow and that their case is akin to Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886). (Doc. No. 31 at 15-16.) In Yick Wo, all two hundred laundry businesses
owned by Chinese people that applied for a permit were denied while nearly all laundry
businesses owned by people who were not Chinese were approved for a permit. 118 U.S.
at 373-74. Yick Wo is an example of the rare case where a stark pattern of discrimination
is sufficient to make an equal protection claim. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). “Absent a pattern as stark as that in . . . Yick
Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence.” Id.
(footnote omitted). Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege such a stark pattern of
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enforcement by Fetrow or the State generally. Plaintiffs only include information about a
small subsect of enforcement actions on one day. The Court requires more. Accordingly,
the Court dismisses Count 1 as to Fetrow without prejudice. 4
B. 	Count 4: Fourth Amendment Violation
Count 4 alleges that Fetrow violated the Fourth Amendment by including false or
misleading statements in the search warrant affidavits. (Compl. at 17-18.) To state a
claim under § 1983 for false statements in a search warrant, the plaintiff must allege that:
(1) a false statement was knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard to the
truth, included in the affidavit, and (2) “the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to
provide probable cause.” Williams v. City of Alexander, 772 F.3d 1307, 1311 (8th Cir.
2014).
Fetrow argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to challenge the search
warrants. (Doc. No. 17 at 11-16.) To make this argument, Fetrow relies primarily on the
summary judgment standard and information from outside of the complaint. (See id.) At
the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff need only plausibly allege their claims. No
evidence is required. Plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly alleges that Fetrow included false or
misleading statements in the search warrant affidavits. (See, e.g., Compl. at 6.) Those
allegations may be disproved during discovery, but Fetrow’s assertion that there is no
4 	Although it is not necessary today, the Court notes that it would have denied
qualified immunity on this count as it does below on Count 4. It is clearly established
that selective enforcement of the law based on race, ethnicity, or religion violates a
person’s equal protection rights. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608; Gilani,
843 F.3d at 347.
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evidence and that the allegations will be disproved is irrelevant to the Court’s inquiry
under Rule 12(b)(6).
Fetrow also asserts that she is entitled to qualified immunity on Count 4 “because
it was not clearly established that her conduct violated the constitution.” (Doc. No. 17
at 27.) The doctrine of qualified immunity protects state actors from civil liability for
their discretionary acts when their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The defense provides “ample room for mistaken
judgments” as it protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 343 (1986). To overcome qualified
immunity, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the officer “violated a federal statutory or
constitutional right”; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018). The Court has discretion to
decide which prong to consider first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
A right is clearly established when there is “a sufficiently clear foundation in then-
existing precedent.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63. A clear foundation means that the law must
be sufficiently clear such that every reasonable officer would understand that their
conduct violates that right. See id. To make such a showing, a plaintiff may identify
“existing circuit precedent that squarely governs the official’s conduct, a robust
consensus of persuasive authority on the issue, or a general constitutional rule that applies
with obvious clarity to the facts at issue.” Webster v. Saint Louis County, 135 F.4th 614,
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617 (8th Cir. 2025). Courts must define clearly established law with a high level of
specificity, not generally. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63-64.
The Eighth Circuit held in Williams that “the Fourth Amendment right of citizens
not to be arrested without probable cause is indeed clearly established. Furthermore, it is
clearly established that the Fourth Amendment requires a truthful factual showing
sufficient to constitute probable cause in a sworn affidavit.” 772 F.3d at 1313 (citation
modified). Every reasonable official would understand that including false information
in a search warrant affidavit would violate clearly established constitutional rights.
Fetrow is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Lastly, the Court does not read Count 4 to claim that the search was conducted
without a warrant, that the warrant was unreasonably executed, or that Mohamed and his
employees were unlawfully seized. Instead, those allegations appear to be tied to
Count 5. (See Compl. at 18.) Regardless, to the extent those theories for relief are
brought under Count 4, they are dismissed. The complaint does not allege that a search
took place without a search warrant. At most, it alleges that a couple of BCA or DHS
agents stayed at Plaintiffs’ properties while Fetrow obtained physical copies of the
warrants. (See Compl. at 5.) This is insufficient to allege a warrantless search.
Additionally, the allegations regarding the execution of the search warrant do not rise to
the level of unreasonableness required by the law or constitute an unlawful seizure. See
Mountain Pure, LLC v. Roberts, 814 F.3d 928, 934 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining that
occupants or employees of a business may be detained while police officers execute a
search warrant on the business); Cook v. Gibbons, 308 F. App’x 24, 28-31 (8th Cir. 2009)
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(discussing when property damage constitutes unreasonable execution of a search
warrant).
C. 	Count 8: Defamation Per Se and Defamation
Count 8 alleges that Defendants’ issuance of CCAP suspension notices constitute
defamation per se and defamation. (Compl. at 21-22.) Fetrow argues that this claim is
barred by the statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts indicating
Fetrow was involved in issuing the notices. (Doc. No. 17 at 29.) Plaintiffs do not
address Fetrow’s arguments on Count 8. (See Doc. No. 31.)
Defamation and defamation per se are subject to a two-year statute of limitations
under Minnesota law. Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) (2025); see Willis Elec. Co. v. Polygroup
Macau Ltd. (BVI), 437 F. Supp. 3d 693, 706 (D. Minn. 2020). That period begins to run
on publication of the challenged statement. McGovern v. Cargill, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 556,
558 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). Here, the notices were published in August or September of
2022. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on July 21, 2025, nearly three years later.
Therefore, Count 8 is barred and the Court dismisses it with prejudice. See Johnson v.
Mott, 376 F. App’x 641, 641-42 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal with prejudice
because action was barred by the statute of limitations).
V. 	Doe Defendants
Counts 1, 4, 7, and 8 remain against the Doe Defendants. Neither the State
Defendants nor Fetrow advanced arguments on behalf of the Doe Defendants. Count 1 is
dismissed as to the Doe Defendants as well because the same pleading failures described
above pertain to them. Count 4 is dismissed as to the Doe Defendants because that count
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only covers Fetrow’s inclusion of false statements in the search warrant affidavit. All
other theories were dismissed. Count 8 is dismissed as to the Doe Defendants as well
because the statute of limitations completely bars that claim. Count 7 remains as to the
Doe Defendants.
VI. 	Request for Leave to Amend
Plaintiffs included various requests for leave to amend within their briefing on the
motions to dismiss. (See Doc. No. 31 at 29.) Plaintiffs did not make a formal motion to
amend the complaint. Plaintiffs missed the window to amend as a matter of course under
Rule 15(a)(1), so they must instead request leave of court to amend. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(2). Typically, such a request is made through a formal motion to amend in this
District. See D. Minn. L.R. 15.1. Given typical practice and the minimal briefing on the
proposed amendments, the Court denies the informal request. Plaintiffs may file a formal
motion to amend that complies with the requirements of Local Rule 15.1(b). That motion
should be filed within the next thirty days.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses most of Plaintiffs’ claims today but remains troubled by
Defendants’ alleged conduct. Defendants blocked Plaintiffs’ ability to submit claims for
CCAP services, then after the time to submit those claims passed, dropped the
investigation and represented to the Minnesota Supreme Court that Plaintiffs would
receive payment. Following the dismissal, Defendants refused to reimburse Plaintiffs
because they did not submit the payments within one year, a problem allegedly caused
only by the State’s decision to block Plaintiffs’ access to the billing system. Defendants
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now claim their hands are tied. The Court believes it would be in everyone’s best interest
for the parties to sit down and work this matter out without further litigation.
The remaining claims are as follows: Counts 2 and 3 remain only against Walz
and Gandhi on the limited theory that the State’s refusal to pay after the temporary
suspension was lifted and the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the state case
constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause. The requests for declaratory and
injunctive relief remain on Count 2. The request for injunctive relief remains on Count 3.
Count 4 remains on the challenge to the search warrants affidavits, not how the warrants
were executed. Count 7 remains solely as to the Doe Defendants.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing and the record in this case, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendants Tim Walz, State of Minnesota, Shireen Gandhi, and Minnesota
Department of Human Services’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. [11]) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.
2. 	Defendant Jennifer Fetrow’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. [16]) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
3. 	Count 8 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Defendant Fetrow and
the Doe Defendants. Count 8 is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to
Defendants Walz, the State of Minnesota, Gandhi, and the Minnesota Department of
Human Services.
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4. 	Counts 1, 5, and 6 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to all
Defendants.
5. 	The State of Minnesota and the Minnesota Department of Human Services
are TERMINATED as parties in this case.
6. 	Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend by filing a motion to amend, as outlined
in Local Rule 15.1(b), within the next thirty (30) days. If no such motion is filed, the
case will proceed on the surviving claims.
7. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to change the spelling of Defendant Shireen
Gandhi’s name from “Shareen” to “Shireen” on the docket.
8. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to change the spelling of Defendant Jennifer
Fetrow’s last name from “Fenrow” to “Fetrow” on the docket.
9. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to change the party text for Defendant
Gandhi to “in her official capacity as Interim Commissioner of the Minnesota
Department of Human Services.”
Dated: March 6, 2026 	s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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