Steelmantown Church et al v. Carlton County et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
STEELMANTOWN CHURCH;
EDWARD BIXBY; LOVING EARTH
MEMORIAL GARDENS, LLC; and
MATTHEW CONNELL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CARLTON COUNTY, MINNESOTA;
SARAH PLANTE BUHS, in her official
capacity as Carlton County
Commissioner; MARV BODIE, in his
official capacity as Carlton County
Commissioner; THOMAS R. PROULX,
in his official capacity as Carlton
County Commissioner; SUSAN
ZMYSLONY, in her official capacity as
Carlton County Commissioner;
DAN REED, in his official capacity as
Carlton County Commissioner;
KRISTINE BASILICI, in her official
capacity as Carlton County Recorder of
the Carlton County Recorder’s Office;
and CHRIS BERG, in his official
capacity as Carlton County Zoning and
Environmental Services Administrator,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-2323 (LMP/LIB)
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS
Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for
Plaintiffs.
Kristin C. Nierengarten and Shelby M. Borthwick, Squires, Waldspurger & Mace, P.A.,
Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants.
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Plaintiffs Steelmantown Church (“Steelmantown”), Edward Bixby, Loving Earth
Memorial 	Gardens, 	LLC 	(“Loving 	Earth”), 	and 	Matthew 	Connell 	(collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) brought this lawsuit relating to their attempt to establish a private cemetery in
Carlton County, Minnesota (the “County”) asserting several claims against the County,
Sara Plante Buhs, Marv Bodie, Thomas R. Proulx, Susan Zmyslony, Dan Reed, Kristine
Basilici, and Chris Berg (collectively, “Defendants”). 	ECF No. 4. 	Defendants move to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint either because it presents nonjusticiable claims or
because it fails to state a plausible claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 12. For
the reasons set forth in this Order, Defendants’ motion is granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Bixby 	is 	the 	president 	of 	Steelmantown, 	a 	New 	Jersey 	501(c)(3) 	nonprofit
corporation that is registered as a foreign nonprofit corporation in Minnesota. ECF No. 4
¶¶ 9–11, 14. Steelmantown identifies itself as a “religious corporation.” Id. ¶ 58. Connell
is the president and manager of Loving Earth, a Minnesota limited liability company. Id.
¶¶ 19–20. Buhs, Bodie, Proulx, Zmyslony, and Reed are members of the County’s Board
of Commissioners; Basilici is the County Recorder; and Berg is the County’s Zoning and
Environmental Services Administrator (collectively, the “County Officials”). 	Id. ¶¶ 30–
37.
1 	For purposes of assessing Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the
factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint as true. Brokken v. Hennepin County,
140 F.4th 445, 450 (8th Cir. 2025).
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In 2023, Steelmantown acquired an approximately twenty-acre parcel of land (the
“Property”) in the County. 	Id. ¶¶ 67, 134. 	Steelmantown intends to establish a private
cemetery on the Property, managed and operated by Loving Earth, for the purpose of
performing “green burials.” Id. ¶¶ 26, 65, 70. Plaintiffs describe green burials as the burial
of bodies “directly in the earth with organic materials and without embalming using
synthetic chemicals,” which is “an alternative to conventional burial methods and mortuary
customs that require concrete or plastic vaults or liners” or “exotic wood or metal caskets.”
Id. ¶ 70. Establishing and operating a private, green burial cemetery that is open to people
of “all religions and all faiths” is “an extension of the religious beliefs” Plaintiffs hold. Id.
¶¶ 18, 25, 69. 	Steelmantown asserts that its proposed cemetery “will comply with all
reasonable state and local laws and regulations involving health, safety, or welfare.” ECF
No. 4 ¶ 81.
The Property is situated in an “A-2” zoning district. Id. ¶ 172. Cemeteries that are
“platted as private cemeteries” under Minnesota Statutes Chapter 307 (“Chapter 307”) are
allowed in A-2 districts. ECF No. 4-4 at 50, 52.2 “Public cemeteries” established under
Minnesota Statutes Chapter 306 (“Chapter 306”), however, require a conditional use
permit. Id. at 52–53.
2 	Although the Court primarily considers the allegations in the amended complaint
when deciding whether to grant a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), it may consider “matters
incorporated by reference or integral to the claim,” including “items subject to judicial
notice, 	matters 	of 	public 	record,” 	and 	“exhibits 	attached 	to 	the 	complaint 	whose
authenticity is unquestioned.” 	Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab’y, Inc., 688 F.3d 928,
931 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
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In April 2023, Steelmantown sought to record a plat map and survey for a private
cemetery on the 	Property with 	the County Recorder’s Office, 	in accordance with
Chapter 307. ECF No. 4 ¶ 102. The County Recorder declined to record the plat map and
survey on the basis that Chapter 307 did not allow Steelmantown to establish a private
cemetery. 	See id. ¶¶ 2, 105–06. 	The County Recorder informed Steelmantown that,
instead, it needed to establish its proposed cemetery under Chapter 306. See id. ¶¶ 2, 139.
Around the same time, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a two-year moratorium
on establishing new green burial sites starting July 1, 2023, through July 1, 2025, to
“allow[] for further study of the environmental impacts of green burials and potential public
health risks.” 	ECF No. 4-3 at 5; see 2023 Minn. Laws, ch. 70, § 102, subds. 2–3. 	The
Minnesota Legislature directed the Minnesota Department of Health (“DOH”) to “develop
recommendations for the performance of green burials” while the moratorium was in place.
2023 	Minn. 	Laws, 	ch. 	70, 	§ 	102, 	subd. 	3. 	The 	DOH 	published 	its 	study 	and
recommendations on January 31, 2025, ECF No. 4-3 at 24–26, and the Minnesota
Legislature later incorporated the DOH’s recommendations into both Chapter 306 and
Chapter 307, which now regulate green burial practices in public and private cemeteries
governed by those statutes, Minn. Stat. §§ 306.991, 307.14.
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this matter on June 3, 2025. ECF No. 1.
One week later, and about three weeks before the state-level moratorium expired, the
County enacted its own one-year moratorium (“Interim Ordinance 41”), which paused “the
creation or expansion of green burial cemeteries” in the County, so that it may analyze the
DOH’s study and recommendations and determine “what modifications, if any, are needed”
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to the County’s zoning ordinances. 	ECF No. 4-7 at 56–59; see ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 156, 158.
While Interim Ordinance 41 is in effect, no individual or entity may establish a new green
burial cemetery in the County. ECF No. 4 ¶ 157; ECF No. 4-7 at 58.
Steelmantown filed the operative amended complaint on June 11, 2025, one day
after Interim Ordinance 41 was enacted. ECF No. 4 ¶ 156. In total, Plaintiffs assert four
causes of action, alleging that the County and the County Officials, in their official
capacities, have: (1) violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment 	to 	the 	U.S. 	Constitution, 	id. 	¶¶ 204–52; 	(2) 	violated 	the 	Freedom 	of
Conscience Clause of the Minnesota Constitution, id.; (3) violated the “Church Autonomy
Doctrine,” id. ¶¶ 253–78; and (4) violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq., id. ¶¶ 279–316. 	Plaintiffs seek a
declaration that Defendants’ conduct violates their constitutional and statutory rights.
Plaintiffs also seek a permanent injunction requiring the County Officials to record
Plaintiffs’ plat map and survey under Chapter 307. Id. at 64–67.
ANALYSIS
Although Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis that Plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim for
relief, ECF No. 13 at 6–25, Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable
either for lack of standing or because the claims are not ripe for adjudication, id. at 25–28.
The concept of justiciability “expresses the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon federal
courts by the ‘case or controversy’ requirement” of Article III. 	Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974). Therefore, because a court may not rule
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on the merits of any case if it lacks jurisdiction, Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 218
(2021), the Court first must address Defendants’ justiciability arguments.
I. 	Justiciability
Defendants contend that Bixby, Loving Earth, and Connell lack standing to bring
their claims, ECF No. 13 at 26–27, and that Steelmantown’s claims are not ripe for
adjudication, id. at 27–28. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees that Bixby,
Loving Earth, and Connell lack standing, but finds that Steelmantown’s claims are ripe for
adjudication.
A. 	Standing
Article III standing “is the threshold question in every federal case because it
determines the power of the court to entertain the suit.” Becker v. N.D. Univ. Sys., 112 F.4th
592, 595 (8th Cir. 2024) (citation modified) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975)). To establish standing, Plaintiffs must show that they (1) have “suffered an injury
in fact,” (2) that is “fairly traceable” to the Defendants’ conduct, and (3) that is “likely to
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338
(2016). If at least one Plaintiff has standing, “the suit may proceed.” Biden v. Nebraska,
600 U.S. 477, 489 (2023). 	But “standing is not dispensed in gross,” so Plaintiffs “must
demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they
seek.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021).
To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, Plaintiffs must show “‘an invasion of a
legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
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504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Whether a plaintiff can demonstrate injury in fact “often turns
on the nature and source of the claim asserted.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d
585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 500). 	This means that whether a
plaintiff “has a cognizable injury sufficient to confer standing is closely bound up with the
question of whether and how the law will grant him relief.” Id.
Plaintiffs contend that the “underlying theme” of their claims “pertains to the
application of Chapter 307.” ECF No. 17 at 42; see ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 220–21 (Count II); id.
¶¶ 244–47 (Count III); id. ¶¶ 266–68 (Count IV); id. ¶¶ 298–303 (Count V). 	They
specifically request only declaratory relief affirming their right to establish a private
cemetery 	under 	Chapter 	307 	and 	injunctive 	relief 	requiring 	Defendants 	to 	record
Steelmantown’s plat map and survey in accordance with Section 307.01. See ECF No. 4
at 64–67. 	Plaintiffs acknowledge, however, that Steelmantown “owns” the Property and
do not allege that any other Plaintiff has a direct ownership interest in the Property. 	Id.
¶ 130. And Chapter 307 provides that “[a]ny private person and any religious corporation
may establish a cemetery on the person’s or corporation’s own land.” Minn. Stat. § 307.01
(emphasis added). As such, Steelmantown—which “believes [it is] and identifies itself as
a religious corporation,” ECF No. 4 ¶ 58—is the only Plaintiff with any colorable claim of
a statutory right to establish a private cemetery on the Property under Section 307.01, see
Minn. Stat. § 307.01. And Steelmantown, as the owner of the Property, is the only Plaintiff
to whom the Court could grant the declaratory and injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek. 	See
Braden, 588 F.3d at 591.
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Plaintiffs argue that the County’s actions have “directly affected” Bixby, Loving
Earth, and Connell and “the exercise of their religious beliefs and practices,” ECF No. 17
at 42, but that is not enough to show that they have standing. Even assuming Bixby, Loving
Earth, and Connell have sufficiently alleged an injury in fact—which this Court does not
hold—a plaintiff “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim
to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. None of
those Plaintiffs has any basis to assert a claim premised on a purported statutory right to
create a private cemetery on land they do not own. See Minn. Stat. § 307.01. Instead, they
“rest [their] claim to relief” on Steelmantown’s “legal rights or interests,” Warth, 422 U.S.
at 499, which is insufficient to establish their own standing.3
The Supreme Court has recognized a “limited” exception to this rule for a litigant
who demonstrates (1) a “‘close’ relationship with the [third party] who possesses the right
and (2) a “‘hindrance’ to the possessor’s ability to protect [its] own interests.” Kowalski v.
Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991));
see also Swanson v. Hilgers, 151 F.4th 992, 996 (8th Cir. 2025). Bixby, Loving Earth, and
Connell do not meet these criteria. They allege a close relationship to Steelmantown (the
“third party”), but Steelmantown is a party in this case and clearly is not hindered from
bringing suit on its own behalf.
3 	This also may be appropriately framed as an issue of “statutory standing,” which
“has nothing to do with whether there is case or controversy under Article III” but instead
“goes to the merits of the claim” and asks “whether the statute gives [a] plaintiff authority
to sue.” 	Miller, 688 F.3d at 934 (citations omitted). 	Here, none of the Plaintiffs except
Steelmantown asserts that they own the Property, so Steelmantown is the only Plaintiff that
is authorized to sue on the facts alleged here. See Minn. Stat. § 307.01.
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Finally, at the hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs’ counsel asserted
that Plaintiffs have raised a claim for damages and that their interest in those damages is
enough to confer standing. But that assertion is not supported by Plaintiffs’ pleadings. As
noted, Plaintiffs only specifically request declaratory and injunctive relief. 	ECF No. 4
at 64–67. 	They also request, “if appropriate,” an award of “attorney fees and costs,”
id. ¶¶ 230, 252, 278, 316, and “any other relief this Court determines as applicable,” id.
at 67. 	But nowhere in Plaintiffs’ complaint do they expressly request an award of
compensatory damages or identify with any degree of specificity how such damages were
incurred. 	To the extent Plaintiffs contend their generic request for “any other relief this
Court determines as applicable” is somehow a request for compensatory damages, that is
insufficient to demonstrate standing. 	See Frost v. Sioux City, 920 F.3d 1158, 1162 n.1
(8 th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (holding requests for relief using “broad and non-specific”
language like “all such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper” does
not “comport[] with the constitutional requirement of redressability”). 	And Plaintiffs’
purported “interest in attorney’s fees is insufficient to create an Article III case or
controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim.” 	E. Iowa Plastics,
Inc. v. PI, Inc., 832 F.3d 899, 905 n.4 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998)).
For these reasons, Bixby, Loving Earth, and Connell lack standing, and, accordingly,
their claims are dismissed. 	Because Steelmantown has standing, however, “the suit may
proceed,” Biden, 600 U.S. at 489, so the Court turns to Defendants’ argument that
Steelmantown’s claims are not ripe.
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B. 	Ripeness
The ripeness doctrine “flows from both the Article III ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’
limitations and also from prudential considerations for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.”
Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 867 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Ripeness is “‘a question of timing’ and is governed by the situation at the time of review,
rather than the situation at the time of the events under review.” Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v.
MidAmerican Energy Co., 234 F.3d 1032, 1039 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson v. Green,
513 U.S. 557, 559 (1995) (per curiam)).
When determining whether a plaintiff’s claims are ripe, courts evaluate (1) the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration. Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at 867. The fitness factor requires a
court to consider whether a case would “benefit from further factual development,” and
“cases presenting purely legal questions” are therefore “more likely to be fit for judicial
review.” 	Id. (citation omitted). 	The hardship factor requires consideration of “the harm
parties would suffer” if the court were to decline to exercise jurisdiction and hear the case.
Id. These factors are “weighed on a sliding scale, but each must be satisfied ‘to at least a
minimal degree.’” Id. (quoting Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 234 F.3d at 1039). In the context
of land-use disputes, “including those involving First Amendment and RLUIPA claims,”
the ripeness doctrine also “requires a plaintiff to ‘obtain a final, definitive position as to
how it could use the property from the entity charged with implementing the zoning
regulations.’” 	Riverside Church v. City of St. Michael, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1029
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(D. Minn. 2016) (quoting Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 348
(2d Cir. 2005)).
Steelmantown’s amended complaint satisfies each of these requirements. Its claims
largely, if not exclusively, present questions of law which do not require further factual
development to resolve. Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at 867. The County Recorder’s
decision not to record Steelmantown’s plat map and survey under Chapter 307 was, in
effect, a “final, definitive position,” at least pertaining to the County’s view as to whether
Chapter 307 applies. 	Riverside Church, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 1029 (citation omitted). And
Steelmantown alleges that its constitutional and statutory rights have been violated, which
would certainly constitute “at least a minimal degree” of hardship. Neb. Pub. Power Dist.,
234 F.3d at 1039; cf. First Lutheran Church v. City of St. Paul, 326 F. Supp. 3d 745, 759
(D. Minn. 2018) (citations omitted) (noting that “violations of RLUIPA and the First
Amendment constitute irreparable injury in the preliminary-injunction context”).
Defendants argue that Steelmantown’s claims are not ripe because “the current
County moratorium on green burials would bar the creation of [its] proposed cemetery use
today.” ECF No. 20 at 15. But that puts the cart before the horse. A key issue in this case
is whether Steelmantown has a right to have its documents recorded under Chapter 307.
Assuming the Court ultimately determined that Steelmantown does have such a right, that
would only establish Steelmantown’s right to use the Property as a private cemetery. This
would be true regardless of the type of burials Steelmantown intends to conduct. 	And
Steelmantown still would be subject to state law and the County’s zoning rules. Whether
Steelmantown 	could 	begin 	conducting 	green 	burials, 	specifically, 	before 	Interim
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Ordinance 41 is lifted or expires is a separate question that would require analysis of
whether the moratorium itself violates Steelmantown’s rights. 	The same is true as to
whether, as Defendants suggest, the County could lawfully modify its zoning rules to
prohibit Steelmantown from ever performing green burials on the Property. 	See ECF
No. 13 at 28. 	Those questions are not before this Court; the question of whether
Steelmantown, based on the specific allegations in its complaint, has a statutory or
constitutional right to establish a private cemetery on the Property is.
For 	these 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Steelmantown’s 	claims 	are 	ripe 	for
adjudication.
II. 	Failure To State a Claim
To overcome a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 500 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible where
the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” which requires “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). 	When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor. 	Brokken v. Hennepin County, 140 F.4th 445, 450 (8th Cir. 2025). 	The complaint
must offer more than “labels and conclusions,” and the Court is “not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 500 U.S. at 555). Likewise, the Court need not resolve questions of law in the
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plaintiff’s favor and “may dismiss a claim founded upon a legal theory which is ‘close but
ultimately unavailing.’” 	Wilson v. Dryden, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1012 (D. Minn. 2001)
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
A. 	Applicability of Chapter 307
Chapters 306 and 307 control the creation, organization, and governance of
cemeteries in Minnesota. 	See Minn. Stat. §§ 306.01 et seq., 307.01 et seq. 	Since 1911,
Chapter 306 has stated that all cemeteries “started or established” in Minnesota, “except
cemeteries established by religious corporations,” are deemed to be “public cemeteries.”
1911 Minn. Laws, ch. 385; see Minn. Stat. § 306.87, subd. 3. Despite being titled “Public
Cemeteries,” the provisions of Chapter 306 generally apply even to private cemeteries. See
Minn. Stat. § 306.01 (stating that private cemeteries established after March 1, 1906, “shall
be organized and governed by” Chapter 306). 	Chapter 307, on the other hand, applies
exclusively to private cemeteries and provides a process for private persons and religious
corporations to establish such cemeteries. See Minn. Stat. § 307.01.
A central issue in this case is whether the language of Section 306.01 limits or
supersedes the language of Section 307.01 or the provisions of Chapter 307 more broadly.
See ECF No. 13 at 8 (arguing that “the interplay of Section 306.01 and Section 307.01 is
at the heart of this case”)); ECF No. 17 at 42 (stating that the “underlying theme” of
Steelmantown’s claims “pertains to the application of Chapter 307”). 	Defendants argue
that the plain language of Section 306.01 means Steelmantown may establish its proposed
private cemetery only under Chapter 306 because it clearly would be established after
March 1, 1906. 	ECF No. 13 at 9; see Minn. Stat. § 306.01. 	Steelmantown asserts that
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because it identifies as a “religious corporation,” it is lawfully entitled to avail itself of the
platting procedures articulated in Section 307.01. See ECF No. 4 ¶ 11.
Therefore, before addressing whether Steelmantown has stated plausible claims
under the First Amendment, the Minnesota Constitution, and RLUIPA, the Court first
considers whether Chapter 307, and specifically Section 307.01, applies to Steelmantown.
In short, it does not.
i. 	Nesgoda v. County of Le Sueur
Defendants primarily argue that Steelmantown fails to state a claim because it may
not establish a private cemetery under Chapter 307 in light of the language of Minn.
Stat. § 306.01, which states that “private cemeteries established after” March 1, 1906,
“shall be organized and governed by” Chapter 306. See ECF No. 13 at 7–13. During the
pendency of these proceedings, the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued its decision in
Nesgoda v. County of Le Sueur, No. A25-0112, 2025 WL 2902039 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 13,
2025), discussing the scope of Section 306.01 and holding that it does not preclude the
establishment of new private cemeteries under Section 307.01.
In Nesgoda, the appellant was a private person who submitted a plat application to
local municipal officials to establish a new private cemetery. See id. at *1. The officials
rejected the appellant’s plat application, stating that “private cemeteries are not authorized
by current Minnesota law.” 	Id. 	On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the
argument that Section 306.01 “controls the establishment of new private cemeteries,”
explaining:
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[S]ection 306.01 does not address whether, or under what circumstances, a
private cemetery may be established. By its plain terms, the statute addresses
only how a private cemetery is to be organized and governed. In doing so, it
explicitly acknowledges that private cemeteries may still be established after
March 1, 1906.
Id. at *2.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals also addressed the effect of Minn. Stat. § 306.87,
which excludes “cemeteries established by religious corporations” from Chapter 306’s
definition of “public cemeteries,” and explained that “at most, Minn. Stat. § 306.87,
subd. 3, makes provisions of chapter 306 applicable to private cemeteries which are
established.” Id. at *3. The court ultimately concluded that:
Minn. Stat. § 307.01 unambiguously allows a person to establish a private
cemetery on their land and directs that they do so through the platting
process. Minnesota Statutes sections 306.01 and 306.87, subdivision 3, are
not to the contrary. 	While those statutes make chapter 306 applicable to
private cemeteries, at least in certain respects, they do not apply to the
establishment of private cemeteries or the platting process.
Id.
At the hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Defendants argued that Nesgoda
is not binding because it is a nonprecedential decision.4 	But while decisions of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals designated as “nonprecedential” generally are not “binding
authority,” they “may be cited as persuasive authority.” 	Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01,
subd. 1(c). Absent any current controlling authority from the Minnesota Supreme Court
on this issue—which neither the parties nor this Court has identified—this Court must
4 	The Court notes that Nesgoda is currently under review by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. See Order, Nesgoda v. County of Le Sueur, No. A25-0112 (Minn. Dec. 31, 2025).
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“follow decisions of the intermediate state court when they are the best evidence of
Minnesota law.” Neth. Ins. Co. v. Main St. Ingredients, LLC, 745 F.3d 909, 913 (8th Cir.
2014) (citation omitted).
Defendants also attempt to distinguish Nesgoda by highlighting that the appellant
in Nesgoda was a private person, not a religious corporation. 	Defendants contend that
Nesgoda’s holding should be limited to Chapter 307’s application to private persons
because it does not explicitly address Chapter 307’s application to religious corporations.
Defendants note that, unlike private persons, “religious corporations” are expressly
contemplated 	as 	owning 	private 	cemeteries 	in 	Chapter 	306. 	See, 	e.g., 	Minn.
Stat. §§ 306.02, 306.027.
The Court does not read Nesgoda so narrowly. 	While it is true that Nesgoda’s
holding does not expressly state that religious corporations may establish new private
cemeteries under Section 307.01, that issue was not before the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
Regardless, Nesgoda is clear: although Section 306.01 extends certain provisions of
Chapter 306 to the organization and governance of private cemeteries, it does not supplant
the procedures articulated in Section 307.01 as to the establishment of private cemeteries.
See Nesgoda, 2025 WL 2902039, at *2–3. This Court reads Section 306.01 the same way.
And Section 307.01 unambiguously states that “[a]ny private person and any religious
corporation may establish a cemetery on the person’s or corporation’s own land.” Minn.
Stat. § 307.01 (emphasis added). If the Minnesota Legislature intended for Section 307.01
to apply exclusively to private persons, it surely would have amended the statute to remove
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its reference to religious corporations.5 Further, under Minnesota law, courts must “avoid
interpretations that would render a word or phrase superfluous, void, or insignificant,
thereby ensuring each word in a statute is given effect.” Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc.,
963 N.W.2d 164, 170 (Minn. 2021) (citation omitted).
Therefore, in accordance with Nesgoda, the Court agrees with Steelmantown that
Section 307.01 is a viable option for establishing new private cemeteries in Minnesota for
the types of persons and entities that fall within its scope.6 2025 WL 2902039, at *2–3.
ii. 	Application of Section 307.01
Notwithstanding the holding in Nesgoda, Steelmantown is not entitled to establish
a private cemetery under Section 307.01 because Steelmantown is neither a “private
person” nor a “religious corporation” under Minnesota law. This is the case even though
Steelmantown refers to itself as, and alleges its belief that it is, a “religious corporation.”
See, e.g., ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 11, 41, 57–58. That is because in Minnesota, that term refers to a
5 	Indeed, the Minnesota Legislature has added or amended other provisions of
Chapter 307 to clearly state that various provisions of Chapter 306 apply to private
cemeteries “subject to the provisions of” Chapter 307. See Minn. Stat. §§ 307.11, 307.115.
6 	Even if the Minnesota Supreme Court rejects the holding in Nesgoda, that does not
change the result here for at least three reasons. First, as noted, Nesgoda involves a private
person who sought to establish a private cemetery under Section 307.01, not a religious
corporation, 2025 WL 2902039, at *1, so the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis is
unlikely to address Section 307.01’s application to religious corporations. Second, to the
extent the Minnesota Supreme Court broadly finds Section 307.01 to be invalid, even for
religious corporations, such a holding necessarily would preclude Steelmantown from
using Section 307.01. 	Third, and most important, Steelmantown is not a religious
corporation for the reasons discussed in Part II.A.ii herein, so Section 307.01 does not
apply to Steelmantown in any event.
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specific type of entity that is incorporated under Minnesota 	Statutes Chapter 315
(“Chapter 315”). See Minn. Stat. §§ 315.01 et seq. It is not merely a descriptive term; that
is, it does not mean a corporation whose “identity and mission” are “derived from religious
or spiritual traditions.” 	ECF No. 4 ¶ 41. 	Steelmantown acknowledges that it “was not
organized under” Chapter 315, id. ¶ 48, and that, instead, it is registered under Minnesota
Statutes Chapter 303 (“Chapter 303”) and is recognized in Minnesota as a foreign nonprofit
corporation, id. ¶¶ 10, 49, 178. As a result, it is not the type of entity that has a statutory
right to establish a private cemetery under Section 307.01.
Despite acknowledging that it is not incorporated under Chapter 315, Steelmantown
nonetheless asserts that it should be treated as a “religious corporation” for purposes of
Section 307.01. 	See ECF No. 4 ¶ 58. 	But Steelmantown cites no authority for the
proposition that a business entity that is incorporated under and governed by one set of
statutes may self-identify and be legally recognized as another type of business entity that
is governed by an entirely different set of statutes.
A private corporation in this country “can exist only under the express law of the
state or sovereignty by which it was created.” Chi. Title & Tr. Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six
Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 124–25 (1937). Therefore, as a “creature of statute,” a
corporation only “has such rights and responsibilities, such powers and limitations, as are
accorded it by the legislature.” 	Kopio’s, Inc. v. Bridgeman Creameries, Inc., 79. N.W.2d
921, 923 (Minn. 1956). 	These fundamental principles of corporate law are so well
established that they cannot even remotely be called controversial. 	See, e.g., Head &
Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 166 (1804) (“It is a general rule that
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a corporation can only act in the manner prescribed by law.”). 	Steelmantown’s assertion
that there is no “law or other legal authority” that requires “a separate filing” to be
recognized 	as 	a 	religious 	corporation, 	ECF 	No. 	4 	¶¶ 12–13, 	is 	unsupported 	and
unequivocally contradicted by Chapter 315, see, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 315.21.
Steelmantown acknowledges that because it is registered as a foreign nonprofit
corporation, it is subject to the provisions of Chapter 303. ECF No. 4 ¶ 47; see also Minn.
Stat. § 317A.061, subd. 2 (“[A] foreign nonprofit corporation is subject to chapter 303.”).
As such, Steelmantown has “the same rights and privileges” it would possess if it was
registered as a domestic nonprofit corporation. 	Minn. Stat. § 303.09. 	The Minnesota
statutes 	governing 	domestic 	nonprofit 	corporations, 	however, 	“do[] 	not 	apply 	to
cooperative associations, public cemetery corporations and associations, and private
cemeteries,” nor do they apply to “religious corporations” (subject to exceptions that do
not apply here). Minn. Stat. § 317A.051, subds. 1–2 (emphasis added).
Moreover, Steelmantown’s home state of New Jersey, like Minnesota, recognizes
religious corporations as a separate type of entity from nonprofit corporations. 	See N.J.
Stat. §§ 16:1-1 et seq. (governing religious corporations); id. §§ 15a:1-1 et seq. (governing
nonprofit corporations). 	Steelmantown is incorporated there as a nonprofit corporation,
not a religious corporation. ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 9, 39. There simply is no basis for Steelmantown
to claim that it is a religious corporation under Chapter 315 when, in fact, it is registered
as a foreign nonprofit corporation under Chapter 303. 	See id. ¶ 47. And Steelmantown
cannot claim it should be recognized as a foreign religious corporation under Chapter 303
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because it also is not registered as a religious corporation in its home state of New Jersey.
Id. ¶¶ 9, 39.
In sum, Section 307.01 may be used to establish new private cemeteries in
Minnesota. See Nesgoda, 2025 WL 2902039, at *2–3. Steelmantown is correct there. But
because Steelmantown is registered and recognized as a foreign nonprofit corporation, not
a religious corporation, Steelmantown is not the type of entity that falls under that statute’s
scope. See Minn. Stat. § 307.01 (“Any private person and any religious corporation may
establish a cemetery on the person’s or corporation’s own land.”). Defendants are correct
there.
B. 	Steelmantown’s Claims
With that context, Steelmantown claims that Chapter 307’s requirement that
Steelmantown be incorporated under Chapter 315 to establish a private cemetery, either on
its face or as applied: (1) violates the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses and the
Minnesota Constitution, see id. ¶¶ 213–17, 227, 243–47 (Counts II and III); (2) the “Church
Autonomy Doctrine,” see id. ¶¶ 264–73 (Count IV); and (3) RLUIPA, see id. ¶ 298
(Count V).7 	For the reasons below, the Court finds that Steelmantown has not stated a
plausible claim for relief under any of its theories.
7 	Plaintiffs also asserted as Count I a claim under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Minnesota Constitution alleging that Defendants’
conduct and application of Minnesota law and the County’s zoning ordinances amounted
to a regulatory taking. See ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 160–203. At the hearing on Defendants’ motion
to dismiss, counsel for Plaintiffs stated that Plaintiffs have abandoned that claim and intend
to proceed only on their remaining claims. As such, the Court dismisses that claim. 	See
Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 273 (2025) (“If a party neglects to raise, concedes, or waives
an issue, a court generally has no obligation to consider it.”).
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i. 	Section 1983
The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses provide that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” 	U.S.
Const. amend. I. 	Steelmantown brings its First Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See ECF No. 4 ¶ 6. Under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658
(1978), a municipality and its officials acting in their official capacities, like the County
and County Officials here, may be liable under § 1983 “if the constitutional violation
resulted from an official municipal policy.” 	Brabbit ex rel. Bild v. Capra, 59 F.4th 349,
354 (8th Cir. 2023). “Hence, the existence of a constitutional violation is a threshold issue
for a Monell claim to move forward.” Rusness, v. Becker County, 31 F.4th 606, 617 (8th Cir.
2022). Steelmantown has not alleged sufficient facts to make that threshold showing.
a. 	Establishment Clause (Count II)
“‘The clearest command of the Establishment Clause’ is that the government may
not ‘officially prefer’ one religious denomination over another.” Cath. Charities Bureau,
Inc. v. Wis. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 605 U.S. 238, 247 (2025) (citation modified)
(quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982)). “This principle of denominational
neutrality bars States from passing laws that ‘aid or oppose’ particular religions.” 	Id.
at 247–48 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968)). As such, “[w]hen a
state law establishes a denominational preference, courts must ‘treat the law as suspect.’”
Id. at 248 (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 246).
As an initial matter, both Steelmantown’s and Defendants’ arguments refer to
elements of, or rely upon, the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
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403 U.S. 602 (1971), for the purpose of analyzing Establishment Clause claims. See ECF
No. 13 at 22 n.7; ECF No. 17 at 36–37; see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (articulating
the Lemon test factors). The Supreme Court “long ago abandoned Lemon,” however, and
“has instructed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by ‘reference to historical
practices and understandings.’” 	Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 534–35
(2022) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014)). 	Therefore, in
Establishment Clause cases, “the plaintiff has the burden of proving” that the facts it alleges
“align with a historically disfavored establishmentarian practice.” 	Firewalker-Fields v.
Lee, 58 F.4th 104, 122 n.7 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.
Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 25 n.6 (2022)); accord New Doe Child #1 v. United States, 901 F.3d
1015, 1021 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Galloway, 572 U.S. at 577) (“Where ‘history shows
that the specific practice is permitted,’ we typically need go no further; the Establishment
Clause claim fails.”).
Steelmantown neither plausibly alleges facts nor argues that Section 307.01’s
exclusion of non-religious corporations from establishing private cemeteries “align[s] with
a historically disfavored establishmentarian practice,” Firewalker-Fields, 58 F.4th at 122
n.7, or otherwise was not historically permitted, see New Doe Child, 901 F.3d at 1021. To
the contrary, Steelmantown favorably cites and discusses the legislative histories of Section
307.01 and other related statutes, which have existed in some form or another since at least
1905, in support of its argument that it is a “religious corporation” and, therefore, should
not be excluded from establishing its private cemetery under Section 307.01. 	See ECF
No. 17 at 25–29. 	For that reason alone, Steelmantown has not stated a plausible
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Establishment Clause claim. 	See New Doe Child, 901 F.3d at 1021; Firewalker-Fields,
58 F.4th at 122 n.7.
That aside, establishing and operating a cemetery of any sort is not inherently or
exclusively a religious practice, and Section 307.01 on its face does not “aid or oppose
particular religions” or “establish[] a denominational preference.” Cath. Charities Bureau,
605 U.S. at 247–48 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 	The statute
expressly authorizes “any private person” or “any religious corporation,” regardless of
whether they adhere to any religious faith, to establish a private cemetery on land the person
or corporation owns. 	See Minn. Stat. § 307.01. The statute’s reference to “any religious
corporation,” meaning those incorporated under Chapter 315, establishes only a preference
toward 	a 	specific 	type 	of 	incorporated 	entity, 	not 	a 	particular 	religious 	faith 	or
denomination. Indeed, Chapter 315 does not compel those seeking to establish a religious
corporation to divulge any information about their religious beliefs or practices (or lack
thereof), much less show any preference toward particular religious faiths or institutions.8
Minn. Stat. § 315.21, subd. 1.
Steelmantown’s 	amended 	complaint 	contains 	no 	facts 	that 	support 	its 	bare,
conclusory assertion that the relevant statutes, on their face or as applied, “favor[] one type
of religious faith over” Steelmantown’s. 	ECF No. 4 ¶ 213. 	For example, the amended
8 	Minn. Stat. § 315.21, subd. 1, provides that “at least three members” of an
organization “may become a [religious] corporation by adopting and signing a certificate
containing: (1) its name, general purpose and plan of operation, and its location; and (2) the
terms of admission, qualification for membership, selection of officers, filling vacancies,
and way it is to be managed.” That is all that is required.
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complaint does not contain a single factually supported allegation that Defendants have
ever authorized a non-religious corporation or other type of business entity to establish a
private cemetery under Section 307.01. 	Nor does it contain any facts that support
Steelmantown’s 	speculative 	assertion 	that 	Defendants 	“specifically 	rejected”
Steelmantown’s survey and plat map because of any hostility toward Steelmantown’s plan
to establish a green burial cemetery or to permit people of various faith backgrounds “to
use the planned cemetery.” 	See id. ¶ 216. 	Steelmantown’s plat map and survey offer no
indication about its burial practices and to whom it would offer such services, ECF
Nos. 4-1, 4-5. And there are no plausible allegations that the County Recorder was aware
of anything other than Steelmantown’s intention to establish a private cemetery—not
specifically a green burial cemetery—at the time she declined to record Steelmantown’s
documents. 	It 	may 	be 	true 	that 	“[c]ertain 	residents” 	of 	the 	County 	“opposed”
Steelmantown’s proposed cemetery, ECF No. 4 ¶ 142, but imputing any discriminatory
animus to Defendants based on the views of various County residents who had nothing to
do with the County Recorder’s decision is purely speculative. 	Cf. Gallagher v. Magner,
619 F.3d 823, 831–32 (8th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (explaining that “statements by
nondecisionmakers” do not establish “a specific link between the alleged discriminatory
animus and the challenged decision” in the context of Fair Housing Act claims).
Steelmantown 	also 	asserts 	that 	the 	County 	Officials 	lobbied 	the 	Minnesota
Legislature to impose the state-level moratorium on green burials to prevent Steelmantown
from establishing its proposed cemetery, ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 151–52, and implies that the County
Officials later enacted Interim Ordinance 41 for the same purpose, see id. ¶¶ 156–59.
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Although this conduct evidently raises Steelmantown’s suspicion about Defendants’
intentions, Steelmantown does not allege that these actions were unlawful or impermissible
on their face, nor does it directly challenge the lawfulness of Interim Ordinance 41 itself.
Steelmantown’s pleadings must raise “more than a sheer possibility” that Defendants
“acted unlawfully” to state a plausible claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, the only non-
speculative allegation Steelmantown makes regarding the intent of Interim Ordinance 41
is a statement Reed made at the County Board of Commissioners meeting when the
Ordinance was enacted: “[I]t is nice for a change, in a public discussion, we could talk
about doing it because of science and not because of somebody’s prejudices.” ECF No. 4
¶ 159. 	The Court finds it difficult to see how this statement, which expressly disclaims
making decisions based on “prejudices,” could possibly be construed as hostile or
discriminatory towards Steelmantown or its religious beliefs and practices.
Finally, the Court observes that while Steelmantown alleges that Section 307.01
unconstitutionally 	“favors 	one 	type 	of 	religious 	faith 	over 	another,” 	id. 	¶ 213,
Steelmantown also demands that it be treated as a religious corporation under Minnesota
law even though it acknowledges that it “was not organized” under Chapter 315, see id.
¶¶ 48, 58. Steelmantown asks this Court to declare that it can establish its private cemetery
under Section 307.01 and require the County to record its documents, see id. at 64–67, even
though Steelmantown is categorically outside the statute’s scope. 	In other words,
Steelmantown effectively seeks preferential treatment because of its religious beliefs that
a secular but otherwise identical institution—that is, a foreign nonprofit corporation whose
“identity and mission” are not “derived from religious or spiritual traditions,” id. ¶ 41—
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would not receive in the same circumstances. If anything, that outcome would appear to
be closer to a violation of the Establishment Clause than the conduct Steelmantown
challenges here. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,
703 (1994) (noting that “a principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause” is “that
government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion”).
Because Steelmantown’s pleadings do not plausibly allege that the relevant statutes,
on their face or as applied, “establish[] a denominational preference,” the Court sees no
reason to treat them as “suspect.” 	Cath. Charities Bureau, 605 U.S. at 248 (citation
omitted). 	And Steelmantown does not plausibly allege or argue that Section 307.01’s
limitations were not historically permitted. 	See New Doe Child, 901 F.3d at 1021;
Firewalker-Fields, 58 F.4th at 122 n.7. Accordingly, Steelmantown’s Establishment Clause
claim is dismissed.
b. 	Free Exercise Clause (Count III)
The Free Exercise Clause “protects religious observers against unequal treatment
and against laws that impose special disabilities on the basis of religious status.” Espinoza
v. Mont. Dep’t of Rev., 591 U.S. 464, 475 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation
omitted). 	To successfully plead a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, Steelmantown
“must establish that the governmental activity at issue places a substantial burden on [its]
religious practice.” Northland Baptist Church of St. Paul v. Walz, 530 F. Supp. 3d 790, 811
(D. Minn. 2021) (citing Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2008)).
“An incidental burden on religion, however, typically is insufficient to constitute a free-
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exercise claim.” 	Id. (citing Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878
(1990)).
Further, the right of free exercise “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” 	B.W.C. v.
Williams, 990 F.3d 614, 620 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 879). A law is not
neutral “if the object of [the] law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation.” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993). A law is not generally applicable “if religious observers are subject to unequal
treatment, namely, if ‘a legislature decides that the governmental interests it seeks to
advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation.’”
Riverside Church, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 1042 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542–43).
The statutes at issue here are both neutral and generally applicable. 	Neither
Section 307.01 nor Chapters 307 and 315 more broadly, either on their face or as applied
as alleged here, categorically prohibit any of the religious beliefs Steelmantown alleges it
has or restrict any of the religious practices in which Steelmantown intends to engage on
the Property. 	Quite the opposite: Chapters 306 and 307 expressly contemplate the
establishment or existence of green burial cemeteries. See Minn. Stat. §§ 306.991, 307.14.
Steelmantown alleges no facts that suggest any Defendant ever directly or explicitly
communicated to Steelmantown or any other Plaintiff that it would never, under any
circumstances, be permitted to establish a green burial cemetery on the Property;
Defendants only told Steelmantown it could not establish a private cemetery under
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Chapter 307. See ECF No. 4 ¶ 2. And even if Steelmantown were a religious corporation—
which it is not—Steelmantown does not allege any instances in which Defendants
authorized a different religious corporation or a non-religious corporation to establish a
private cemetery under Section 307.01 while prohibiting Steelmantown from doing the
same.
Steelmantown’s claim, in essence, appears to be that its religious practices are
burdened by the requirement to incorporate (or reincorporate) under Chapter 315 to use the
platting procedure articulated in Section 307.01. But nowhere does Steelmantown allege
any facts that show this requirement “significantly inhibit[s] or constrain[s]” any “conduct
or expression that manifests some central tenet” of its religious beliefs, “meaningfully
curtail[s]” its “ability to express adherence” to those beliefs, or denies it a “reasonable
opportunity to engage in those activities.” Patel, 515 F.3d at 813 (citation omitted). It does
not explain, for instance, why maintaining its status as a foreign nonprofit corporation
under Chapter 303 is central to its ability to express its religious beliefs or engage in its
religious practices. 	Nor does Steelmantown allege facts that suggest the requirement
“operates so as to make the practice of [its] religious beliefs more expensive.” Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 710 (2014) (citation omitted). In fact, aside from
minimal fees associated with filing documents with the appropriate county recorder, see
Minn. Stat. § 357.18, it appears Chapter 315 imposes no additional costs on an entity
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seeking to incorporate under that chapter, see id. § 315.21.9 	At most, the requirements
under Chapter 315 could be characterized as procedural inconveniences but not substantial
burdens on Steelmantown’s religious practices.
Steelmantown’s reliance on Hobby Lobby is misplaced. 	First and foremost, that
case was decided under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which the
Supreme Court acknowledged goes “far beyond” what is “constitutionally required” under
the Free Exercise Clause. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 706; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)
(“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability . . . .” (emphasis added)). Steelmantown
does not raise a claim under RFRA here.
Furthermore, in Hobby Lobby, the issue was whether requiring for-profit closely
held corporations to comply with a federal regulatory requirement that “violate[d] the
sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies’ owners,” while excepting nonprofit
corporations with “religious objections,” violated RFRA. 	573 U.S. at 689–92. 	Here, as
noted above, Steelmantown does not allege that Minnesota’s requirement that it incorporate
(or reincorporate) as a religious corporation under Chapter 315 violates Steelmantown’s
sincerely held religious beliefs (or those of its owners), or that it objects to that requirement
9 	Chapter 315 further provides that a religious corporation “may receive in trust for a
parish, mission, local church society, or congregation, incorporated or not, property given,
granted, transferred, devised, or bequeathed to it for the use of the parish, mission, local
church society, or congregation, for religious, charitable, or educational purposes.”
Id. § 315.24 (emphasis added). 	Therefore, even if Steelmantown does not wish to
reincorporate as a religious corporation, it could simply establish a separate corporate entity
under Chapter 315, grant the land to the new entity, and have the new entity establish its
proposed private cemetery.
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for any religious reason. 	While Hobby Lobby acknowledges that “organizations with
religious and charitable aims” might choose a particular corporate form “because of the
potential advantages of that corporate form,” id. at 712, the Supreme Court “d[id] not hold”
that “corporations and other commercial enterprises can opt out of any law (saving only
tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs,” id. at 692
(internal quotation marks omitted). 	If that holding is true under RFRA, which goes “far
beyond” what is “constitutionally required,” id. at 706, it must also be true under the Free
Exercise Clause.
At bottom, it was Steelmantown’s choice to register in Minnesota as a foreign
nonprofit corporation under Chapter 303, rather than as a religious corporation under
Chapter 315. 	The consequence of that choice is that it may not invoke the rights and
privileges accorded to religious corporations under Minnesota law—including the right to
establish a private cemetery under Section 307.01. See, e.g., Kopio’s, 79. N.W.2d at 923;
Head & Amory, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 166. That, by itself, does not constitute a substantial
burden sufficient to state a claim for a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly,
Steelmantown’s Free Exercise claim is dismissed.
ii. 	Minnesota Constitution (Counts II & III)
The Minnesota Constitution “afford[s] greater protection for religious liberties
against governmental action” than the First Amendment. 	Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers
v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 864 (Minn. 1992). Its Freedom of Conscience
Clause provides that the government may not “control” or “interfere[] with the rights of
conscience” or give “preference” to “any religious establishment or mode of worship.”
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Minn. Const. art. I, § 16. 	To state a claim under the Freedom of Conscience Clause,
Steelmantown must plausibly allege that “the state action burdens the exercise of religious
beliefs.” Satanic Temple v. City of Belle Plaine, 80 F.4th 864, 869 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Odenthal v. Minn. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 442 (Minn. 2002)).
To establish such a burden, Steelmantown must show that “the risk of interference with
religious beliefs or practice is real and not remote.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 204 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008)). “For a generally applicable law,” like those at issue here, “the focus is on whether
compliance requires a change in religious conduct or philosophy.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church, 745 N.W.2d at 204).
As discussed above, Steelmantown has not plausibly alleged that compliance with
Section 307.01 would require “a change in religious conduct or philosophy.” Edina Cmty.
Lutheran Church, 745 N.W.2d at 204. 	Again, the only religious conduct in which
Steelmantown alleges it seeks to engage is establishing and operating a private, green burial
cemetery. See ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 69–74. Since Steelmantown intends to establish its cemetery
under Chapter 307, it must be a religious corporation within the meaning of Chapter 315.
See Minn. Stat. § 307.01. 	Steelmantown does not allege that compliance with that
provision “requires a change in [its] religious conduct or philosophy” or “interfere[s] with
[its] religious beliefs or practice.” 	Satanic Temple, 80 F.4th at 869 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church, 745 N.W.2d at 204). While such
compliance may require a change in Steelmantown’s corporate form, that is not in any way
related to its “religious conduct or philosophy,” nor does it burden Steelmantown’s
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religious exercise. Steelmantown makes no such claim. And to the extent Steelmantown
alleges a change in corporate form would violate the “preference” provision of the Freedom
of Conscience Clause, that claim fails for the same reasons already discussed relating to
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.
For these reasons, Steelmantown has not plausibly alleged a violation of the
Minnesota Constitution’s Freedom of Conscience Clause, and its claims are dismissed.
iii. 	Church Autonomy Doctrine (Count IV)
Steelmantown asserts an independent cause of action under the “church autonomy
doctrine,” ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 253–78, which is also known as the “ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine,” Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered Augsburg
Confession of Worthington, 877 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Minn. 2016). The principle underlying
the doctrine is that courts should not intervene in disputes that cannot be resolved without
“extensive inquiry” into matters of “religious law and polity.” 	Wells ex rel. Glover v.
Creighton Preparatory Sch., 82 F.4th 586, 594 n.4 (8th Cir. 2023); see Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d
at 532–33. 	The doctrine “operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable
claim.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 195
n.4 (2012); see also Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 535 (noting that the doctrine could function either
“as an affirmative defense on the merits,” or “as a form of abstention, as one of its names
implies”).
This Court is unaware of, nor does Steelmantown cite, any authority acknowledging
a direct cause of action under the church autonomy doctrine. Regardless, this matter does
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not require any inquiry, “extensive” or otherwise, into “religious law and polity.” 	Wells,
82 F.4th at 594 n.4. Therefore, this claim is dismissed.
iv. 	RLUIPA (Count V)
RLUIPA was enacted to provide “broad protection” against government action that
affects religious exercise rights relating to land-use regulations and institutionalized
persons. 	Marianist Province of U.S. v. City of Kirkwood, 944 F.3d 996, 1000 (8th Cir.
2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)). The land-use provisions provide two causes of
action, both of which Steelmantown raises here: (1) a “substantial burden” claim and (2) an
“equal terms” claim. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc(b)(1)); see ECF No. 4
¶¶ 279–316. 	Steelmantown has not stated a plausible claim under either provision of
RLUIPA.
a. 	Substantial Burden
RLUIPA’s 	substantial-burden 	provision 	provides 	that 	“no 	government 	shall
implement a land-use regulation in a manner that ‘imposes a substantial burden on the
religious exercise’ of an institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposing the
burden (1) furthers a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that interest.” 	Marianist Province, 944 F.3d at 1000 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc(a)(1)).
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In Marianist Province, the Eighth Circuit did not squarely define the meaning of
“substantial burden” in the context of RLUIPA.10 However, it implied that a “substantial
burden” must be more than a “mere[] inconvenience[].” 	Id. at 1001. 	That comparison
aligns with the definition articulated in First Lutheran Church, a 2018 decision from this
District issued before Marianist Province was decided. See First Lutheran Church, 326 F.
Supp. 3d at 761. In First Lutheran Church, the court relied on decisions from other circuits
to conclude that “a government regulation substantially burdens an exercise of religion
when the regulation’s effects go beyond being an inconvenience to a religious institution,
and instead put substantial pressure on the institution to change that exercise.” 	Id.
(collecting cases); see also Living Water Church of God v. Charter Township of Meridian,
258 F. App’x 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Congress has cautioned that [courts] are to interpret
‘substantial burden’ in line with the Supreme Court’s ‘Free Exercise’ jurisprudence, which
suggest that a ‘substantial burden’ is a difficult threshold to cross.”).
Proceeding under the definition of “substantial burden” articulated in First Lutheran
Church and affirmed, at least in part, in Marianist Province, the Court concludes that
Steelmantown “has not demonstrated that its religious exercise is substantially burdened,
rather than merely inconvenienced.” Marianist Province, 944 F.3d at 1001. It is true that
Steelmantown has been unable to establish its proposed green burial cemetery, but that is
10 	Marianist Province involved a regulation that required a religious institution to “use
feasible alternative locations for religious exercise,” and the Eighth Circuit’s analysis under
the “substantial burden” provision relied largely on decisions of other circuits dealing with
factually similar claims. 944 F.3d at 1001. In doing so, the Eighth Circuit provided some
context as to what a “substantial burden” under RLUIPA is not, but did not specifically
articulate what it is.
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not because of any “pressure on [Steelmantown] to change that exercise.” 	See First
Lutheran Church, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 761. 	Setting aside Interim Ordinance 41—which,
again, Steelmantown does not challenge here—the only obstacle standing in the way of
Steelmantown establishing its proposed cemetery is that it has chosen not to incorporate
under Chapter 315. 	See Minn. Stat. § 307.01. 	But while “RLUIPA assuredly protects
religious institutions in their religious exercise, the statute’s language indicates that it is not
intended to operate as ‘an outright exemption from land-use regulations.’” 	Living Water
Church, 258 F. App’x at 737 (quoting C.L. for Urb. Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d
752, 762 (7th Cir. 2003)); see Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp.
2d 477, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[C]ourts must ensure that the facts warrant protection under
RLUIPA, rather than simply granting blanket immunity from land-use regulations.”), aff’d,
504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2007). And as a general matter, the “costs, procedural requirements,
and inherent political aspects” which are “incidental” to any intended land use “do not
amount to a substantial burden on religious exercise.” 	C.L. for Urb. Believers, 342 F.3d
at 761.
Moreover, “RLUIPA does not offer refuge to canny operators who seek through
subterfuge to avoid laws they’d prefer to ignore.” Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54
(10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.). Here, Steelmantown does not assert that it would be unable
to engage in its desired religious conduct—performing green burials—as a religious
corporation rather than as a nonprofit corporation. Nor does it plead facts from which the
Court can infer that complying with the requirements of Chapter 315 to establish a religious
corporation, thereby bringing itself within the scope of Section 307.01, is a “substantial
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burden” rather than a procedural inconvenience.11 	See Marianist Province, 944 F.3d
at 1001; C.L. for Urb. Believers, 342 F.3d at 761. 	Instead, the only real “burden” that
Steelmantown identifies is merely that it does not believe it should have to do so. See ECF
No. 4 ¶¶ 12–13 (alleging Steelmantown’s “belie[f] that there is no Minnesota law or other
legal authority that requires it to file a separate filing . . . as a religious corporation”). That
is not enough. See Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 54. Steelmantown no doubt chose for a reason
to incorporate in New Jersey as a nonprofit corporation and to register in Minnesota under
Chapter 	303 	as 	a 	foreign 	nonprofit 	corporation. 	But 	RLUIPA 	does 	not 	permit
Steelmantown to unilaterally declare itself to be, or to invoke the rights and privileges of,
a religious corporation under Minnesota law when it clearly is not one. See id. Nor does
RLUIPA authorize Steelmantown to claim immunity from the plain requirements of
Section 307.01 simply because Steelmantown wishes to engage in religious conduct on the
Property. 	See Living Water Church, 258 F. App’x at 736 (holding that “RLUIPA cannot
stand for the proposition” that a religious institution is “immune” from zoning laws “simply
because the institution . . . pursues a religious mission”).
11 	As noted, even if Steelmantown itself does not wish to incorporate (or reincorporate)
as 	a 	religious 	corporation, 	it 	appears 	Steelmantown 	could 	quite 	easily 	meet 	the
requirements of Section 307.01 by creating and incorporating a separate entity as a
religious corporation and granting the Property to that entity, with essentially no cost other
than the minimal fees associated with filing the appropriate documents. 	See supra at 23
n.8, 28 n.9; Minn. Stat. § 357.18, subds. 1, 3; see also S.J. Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan
Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that requiring a religious institution to
comply with generally applicable procedural requirements relating to land-use regulations
that “do not render religious exercise effectively impracticable” is not a substantial burden).
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Again, the impediment to Steelmantown’s plans is the corporate form it chose, not
the statutes at issue here. 	The statutes do not require any change to Steelmantown’s
religious practices as alleged. See First Lutheran Church, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 761. And by
insisting, without any factual or legal support, that it is a “religious corporation” under
Minnesota law, Steelmantown plainly “seek[s] through subterfuge to “avoid laws [it
would] prefer to ignore.” 	Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 54. 	Therefore, the Court finds that
Steelmantown has not stated a substantial burden claim under RLUIPA.
b. 	Equal Terms
To state an equal-terms claim under RLUIPA, Steelmantown must show that the
County “imposed or implemented a land-use regulation” on it that “treats [it] on less than
equal terms with a nonreligious . . . institution.’” 	Marianist Province, 944 F.3d at 1001
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)). 	The Eighth Circuit observed in Marianist Province
that “[o]ther circuits to consider the issue have held that, to meet the standard for an as-
applied equal terms challenge, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the government entity
has treated a religious institution less favorably than a ‘similarly situated’ secular
institution.” Id. at 1001–02 (citations omitted). But the Eighth Circuit noted that at least
one circuit has held that “while the equal terms provision has the feel of an equal protection
law, it lacks the similarly situated requirement usually found in equal protection analysis,”
id. at 1002 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 	The Eighth Circuit
ultimately declined to “decide whether to adopt the ‘similarly situated’ requirement”
because the record in Marianist Province showed that the religious institution at issue “was
not treated less favorably.” Id.
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This Court need not resolve that question either. 	The issue is even clearer here
because Steelmantown does not plead a single plausible factual allegation suggesting that
any secular institution (or religious one, for that matter) or any non-religious corporation
has been treated more favorably by Defendants when attempting to establish private
cemeteries under Section 307.01. 	Steelmantown identifies that green burial cemeteries
have been established in other municipalities across Minnesota. 	See ECF No. 4 ¶ 78.
Steelmantown does not, however, plead any facts showing that those green burial
cemeteries were private cemeteries. 	Nor does Steelmantown plead that they were
established under Section 307.01.
Instead Steelmantown rests this claim on speculative and conclusory allegations of
discriminatory conduct and unequal treatment. That is not enough to state a plausible claim
for relief. 	See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, Steelmantown’s RLUIPA claims are
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Nesgoda proved Steelmantown correct that religious corporations may establish
private cemeteries under Section 307.01. That, however, does not rescue Steelmantown’s
claims. 	Steelmantown ultimately relies on “labels and conclusions,” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, to assert that it is a religious corporation that may invoke such a right under
Minnesota law, see ECF No. 4 ¶ 11. But Steelmantown is not a religious corporation under
Chapter 315. And to adequately state a claim for relief, Steelmantown “must assert facts
that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [it] has the rights [it] claims,” not “facts that
are merely consistent with such a right.” 	Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 473
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(8 th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). 	Steelmantown does not do that here.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted, and Steelmantown’s claims are
dismissed.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings in this matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED;
2. 	Bixby’s, Loving Earth’s, and Connell’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for lack of standing; and
3. 	Steelmantown’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 11, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
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