Hoel v. City of Minneapolis et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Robert Brooks Hoel, General Delivery, Minneapolis, MN 55401, pro se
Plaintiff.
Matthew 	L.R. 	Messerli 	and 	Sarah 	McLaren, 	HENNEPIN 	COUNTY
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 300 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55487, for
Defendant Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office.
Adam E. Szymanski, Sara J. Lathrop, and J. Haynes Hansen, MINNEAPOLIS
CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 350 South Fifth Street, Minneapolis, Suite 210
MN 55415, for Defendants City of Minneapolis, Officer Adnan Didovic,
Officer Stephen Sporny, and Sergeant Phillip Gangnon.
ROBERT BROOKS HOEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS;
MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT;
HENNEPIN COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE;
OFFICER ADNAN DIDOVIC, Badge #1537;
OFFICER STEPHEN SPORNY, Badge #6736;
SERGEANT PHILLIP GANGNON, Badge
#2179;
JOHN DOES 1-X;
Defendants.
Civil No. 25-2212 (JRT/EMB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
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Plaintiff Robert Brooks Hoel, proceeding pro se, alleges that Defendants violated
federal and state law when he was arrested and detained on June 5, 2024. Hoel generally
asserts that Defendants, the City of Minneapolis, the Minneapolis Police Department, the
Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office, and several individual law enforcement officers violated
his rights under the United States Constitution through an unlawful search and seizure of
his person and property. Defendants now move to dismiss Hoel’s claims with prejudice,
arguing that some of the sued entities are immune and that, for the other entities, Hoel
fails to state a plausible claim. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the
Defendants’ motions to dismiss to the extent they seek dismissal of Hoel’s claims and will
dismiss the action without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
I. 	FACTS
Hoel was arrested on June 5, 2024, after a 911 report alleged theft. (Am. Compl.
at 3, June 12, 2025, Docket No. 9.)1 During the arrest, Hoel was searched by police who
discarded his “spiritually valuable” “personal gemstones,” resulting in their loss. 	(Id.)
Hoel asserts that other personal property was “lost, destroyed, or mishandled” and that
1 Because the Amended Complaint does not contain numbered paragraphs, the Court
cites to page numbers.
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his bicycle remains unreleased.2 (Id. at 4.) Hoel was subsequently held for three days at
the Hennepin County Jail, “operated by the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office” in “cold jail
conditions[.]” (Id. at 3–4.) Hoel was “forced under duress to identify himself to secure
release and retrieve the discarded gemstones.” (Id.at 4.) Following his release, Plaintiff
alleges that he “repeatedly contacted Sergeant Gangnon and other officials to recover his
personal property, including a bicycle, laptop, digital camera, two bags, and a custom
Swiss army knife, but was refused or ignored.” (Id.)
With respect to the Minneapolis Police Department and the City of Minneapolis,
Hoel alleges that they failed to train and supervise officers and jail deputies “contributing
to the unlawful arrest, property loss” and violations of Hoel’s constitutional rights. (Id. at
4.)
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hoel brought this action against Defendants on May 22, 2025 (Compl., Docket No.
1) and then filed an Amended Complaint on June 12, 2025 (Am. Compl., Docket No. 9). In
July and August of 2025, Defendants filed motions to dismiss. 	(Def. Hennepin Cnty.
Sheriff’s Office’s Mot. to Dismiss, June 27, 2025, Docket No. 14; Mot. to Dismiss by Def.
City of Minneapolis, Adnan Didovic, Stephen Sporny, and Phillip Gangnon, July 30, 2025,
Docket No. 25; Mot. to Dismiss by Defs. Officer Adnan Didovic, Officer Stephen Sporny,
2 In a subsequent filing, Hoel states the bicycle has since been returned, though Hoel
contends it was only returned because he filed this lawsuit. (Mot. Second Am. Compl. & Surreply
at 2, Sept. 5, 2025, Docket No. 42.)
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and Sergeant Phillip Gangnon, Aug. 18, 2025, Docket No. 30.) Hoel seeks compensatory
damages of $400,000 for the loss and destruction of his personal property and for the
“emotional, spiritual, 	and mental distress” caused by his “arrest, detention, and
mistreatment.” 	(Am. Compl. at 6.) 	Hoel further seeks punitive damages of $500,000.
(Id.)
After the motions to dismiss were fully briefed, Hoel filed a “Motion for Leave to
File Second Am. Compl. and Sur-Reply and Memorandum in Support.” 	(Sept. 5, 2025,
Docket No. 42.) The Court granted Hoel’s motion to file a surreply but denied leave to file
a second amended complaint. 	(Order, Sept. 11, 2025, Docket No. 44.) 	Hoel’s surreply
was filed on Oct. 24, 2025. (Pl.’s Surreply, Docket No. 45.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
Court considers all facts alleged in the complaint as true to determine if the complaint
states a “claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588
F.3d 585, 594 (8 th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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The Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
drawing all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665
(8 th Cir. 2009). Although the Court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and
construes the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is “not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” 	Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 286 (1986). In other words, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “does not
need detailed factual allegations” but must include “more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007).
The Court liberally construes documents filed by a pro se litigant and holds them
to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, pro se litigants are not excused from complying with
substantive or procedural law. Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8 th Cir. 1984).
II. 	ANALYSIS
Hoel asserts five counts in his Amended Complaint: “False Arrest and Unlawful
Detention (42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments),” “Unlawful Search
and Seizure (42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fourth Amendment),” “Failure to Train and Supervise
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(Monell Claim Against City of Minneapolis),” “Civil Conspiracy (42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 & 1986),”
and “State Law Claims for Conversion and Misconduct.” (Am. Compl. at 4–5.)3
Hoel’s Amended Complaint asserts these claims against the City of Minneapolis,
the Minneapolis Police Department; the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office; Officers Adnan
Didovic, Stephen Sporny, and Sergeant Phillip Gangnon (the “MPD Officers”); and John
Does 1-X, unidentified Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office deputies. Hoel does not clearly
identify which claims are asserted against which Defendants; however, because Hoel is
proceeding pro se, the Court will liberally construe his Amended Complaint and will
consider the most appropriate Defendants when possible.4
A. 	Counts One and Two: False Arrest, Unlawful Detention, and Unlawful
Search and Seizure
With respect to Count One, Hoel alleges that he was “arrested without probable
cause or warrant, violating his Fourth Amendment rights” and then “detained for three
days without charges, violating due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
3 In Hoel’s opposition to the motions to dismiss, Hoel makes additional factual assertions
and asserts new legal claims, including under the First and Eighth Amendments. (Pl.’s Mem. Opp.
at 3, Aug. 22, 2025, Docket No. 38.) The Court considers the supplemented facts, but it will not
address the additional legal theories. The Court, however, notes that, as presented, they would
fail to allege facts sufficient to state a claim.
4 Hoel’s original complaint included a police report and a transcription of a 911 call.
(Compl., Ex. A & Ex. B, May 22, 2025, Docket No. 1.) 	Neither the original Complaint nor the
Amended Complaint incorporates the facts contained in either of these exhibits. However, even
if such exhibits are considered, they offer no additional facts to help Hoel’s claims survive
Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
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(Am. Compl. at 4.) With respect to Count Two, Hoel alleges that his “person and property
were searched and seized without warrant or consent” resulting in the loss of his
“gemstones and other property” and “deprivation without due process.” (Id. at 4–5.)
42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows individuals to sue state actors who violate their rights under
the constitution and federal law. Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 606 U.S. 357, 365
(2025). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must adequately allege a constitutional
violation as well as each defendant’s personal involvement in the violation. Kingsley v.
Lawrence Cnty., Missouri, 964 F.3d 690, 700 (8 th Cir. 2020).
As a threshold matter, police departments and sheriff’s offices are not legal
entities amenable to suit under § 1983. De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Jail, Corr. Inst., 18
F. App’x 436, 437 (8 th Cir. 2001). Thus, any § 1983 claims against the Minneapolis Police
Department and the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office are improper and will be dismissed
without prejudice.
1. 	Search and Arrest
With respect to Hoel’s allegations that the MPD Officers who arrested him violated
his Fourth Amendment or due process rights, Hoel has not adequately alleged a
constitutional violation.
“To establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment in a section 1983 action, the
claimant must demonstrate a seizure occurred and the seizure was unreasonable.”
McCoy v. City of Monticello, 342 F.3d 842, 846 (8 th Cir. 2003). The parties do not contest
that a search and seizure occurred—Hoel was arrested and his belongings were searched
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and seized—but Hoel does not provide any facts to support his conclusion that either the
arrest or the search incident to the arrest were unreasonable. Hoel alleges simply that
he was “unlawfully arrested by Defendant Officers Didovic and Sporny without a warrant,
valid probable cause, or exigent circumstances.” (Am. Compl. at 3.) But in addition to
this unsupported legal conclusion, the only fact Hoel provides is that there was a 911 call
alleging theft (id.), a fact that would support the MPD Officers having probable cause to
arrest Hoel. Hoel does not assert any facts that would support his allegation that he was
unlawfully arrested.
Nor does Hoel assert any facts that would support his allegation that he was
unlawfully searched. 	Hoel’s Amended Complaint states only that he was unlawfully
arrested and that “officers searched Plaintiff’s pockets[.]” 	(Id.) 	But “[s]earches of the
person and those articles ‘immediately associated’ with the person may be made either
at the time of arrest or when the accused arrives at the place of detention.” Curd v. City
Ct. of Judsonia, Ark., 141 F.3d 839, 843 (8 th Cir. 1998).
In short, Hoel provides no facts that would support his conclusions that the search
or arrest violated any constitutional right.
2. 	Detention
With regards to the detention following his arrest, Hoel alleges that he “was
unlawfully detained for three days without charges, violating due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.” (Am. Compl. at 4.) Hoel again provides scant facts to support
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a constitutional violation, asserting only that he was held “in cold jail conditions” and he
was “forced under duress to identify himself.” (Id. at 3–4.)
Since Hoel alleges that he was detained “at the Hennepin County Jail, operated by
the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office” (id. at 3), it appears that he is attempting to assert
this claim against the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office or John Does 1-X, unidentified
deputies in the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office.
As noted above, sheriff’s offices cannot be sued under § 1983. De La Garza, 18 F.
App'x at 437. And Hoel has not alleged any specific deputy’s “personal involvement” in
any specific violation. See Kingsley, 964 F.3d at 700. In the absence of any such specifics,
the Court concludes that Hoel failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
The Court will dismiss Counts One and Two without prejudice.
B. 	Count Three: Monell Claim
Hoel alleges that “Defendant Minneapolis Police Department and the City of
Minneapolis failed to train and supervise officers and jail deputies, contributing to the
unlawful arrest, property loss, and violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” 	(Am.
Compl. at 4.)
To state a claim of municipal liability under Section 1983, also known as a Monell
claim, a plaintiff must allege that his “constitutional rights were violated by an action
pursuant to official municipal policy or misconduct so pervasive among non-policymaking
employees of the municipality as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.”
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Ware v. Jackson Cnty., Mo., 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8 th Cir. 1998) (cleaned up) (citing Monell
v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
Hoel’s barebones recitation of some of the legal elements of a Monell claim is
insufficient. Hoel provides no “factual content” that would “allow[] the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. Count Three will, therefore, be dismissed.
C. 	Count Four: Civil Conspiracy Claim
With respect to Count Four, Hoel alleges that “Defendants conspired to violate
[his] civil rights” or “failed to prevent or remedy these conspiracies.” (Am. Compl. at 5.)
To state a claim of civil conspiracy pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that
“(1) that the defendant conspired with others to deprive him of constitutional rights;
(2) that at least one of the alleged co-conspirators engaged in an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy; and (3) that the overt act injured the plaintiff.” White v. McKinley, 519
F.3d 806, 814 (8 th Cir. 2008). “The plaintiff is additionally required to prove a deprivation
of a constitutional right or privilege in order to prevail on a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim.”
Id.
As 	discussed 	above, 	Hoel 	has 	insufficiently 	alleged 	any 	deprivation 	of 	a
constitutional right. 	Further, Hoel has not provided any factual basis to permit the
inference that any Defendant conspired to violate his rights. 	Hoel only states in a
conclusory fashion that the Defendants have conspired to violate his civil rights. (See Am.
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Compl. at 5.) This legal conclusion, on its own, is insufficient to support his claim. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Count Four will, therefore, be dismissed.
D. 	Count Five: State Law Claims
In light of the Court’s dismissal of Counts One through Four, the Court will decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Hoel’s Count Five, “State Law Claims for
Conversion and Misconduct,” and will dismiss those claims without prejudice. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 1367; United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (noting
federal courts may dismiss state claims without prejudice so they may be “left for
resolution to state tribunals”).
E. 	Dismissal Without Prejudice
While Defendant Hennepin County moves the Court to dismiss Hoel’s claims with
prejudice, the Court determines that dismissal with prejudice is not warranted and will
dismiss Hoel’s claims without prejudice. 	See, e.g., De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Jail,
Corr. Inst., 18 F. App’x 436, 437 (8 th Cir. 2001) (modifying a dismissal to be without
prejudice so that plaintiff could refile his complaint to remedy defects); Thrall v. Cent.
New York Reg’l Transp. Auth., 399 F. App’x 663, 666 (2d Cir. 2010) (characterizing
dismissal with prejudice as a “harsh remedy,” particularly for pro se plaintiffs).
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CONCLUSION
Because Hoel has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted Defendants’
motions to dismiss will be granted to the extent they seek Hoel’s claims be dismissed, and
Hoel’s claims will be dismissed without prejudice.5
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendant Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office Motion to Dismiss (Docket No.
[14]) is GRANTED in part. 	Plaintiff’s claims against the Hennepin County
Sheriff’s Office and John Does 1-X are DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. 	Motion To Dismiss by Defendants City Of Minneapolis, Adnan Didovic, Stephen
Sporny, Phillip Gangnon (Docket No. [25]) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against
the City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department are DISMISSED
without prejudice.
3. 	Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Officer Adnan Didovic, Officer Stephen
Sporny, and Sergeant Phillip Gangnon (Docket No. [30]) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
5 A dismissal without prejudice means that Hoel may refile his Complaint, but for his new
Complaint to survive, Hoel must fix the deficiencies and defects in his claims that were noted in
this Order.
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claims against Officer Adnan Didovic, Officer Stephen Sporny, and Sergeant
Phillip Gangnon are DISMISSED without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED: March 2, 2026 	_____/s/ John R. Tunheim_____
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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