Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Amy S.,1
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 25-cv-1026 (JWB/LIB)
v. 	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Frank Bisignano,
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
Plaintiff, Amy S. (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), seeks judicial review of the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”) denying her application for disability benefits.
The matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for disposition pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rules 7.2(a)(1). This Court has jurisdiction over the claims under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
Pursuant to the Federal Supplemental Rules of Civil Procedure which govern actions
seeking judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, the present action
“is presented for decision by the parties’ briefs.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. SS Rule 5. Plaintiff filed a
brief and a reply brief which both request reversal of the Commissioner’s final decision and
remand to the Social Security Administration for further administrative proceedings. [Docket
Nos. 12, 19]. Defendant filed a brief asking this Court to affirm the underlying decision denying
Plaintiff’s request for benefits and to dismiss this action. [Docket No. 18].
1 This District has adopted the policy of using only the first name and last initial of any nongovernmental parties in
Social Security opinions such as the present Report and Recommendation. Thus, when the Court refers to Plaintiff
by her name only her first name and last initial are provided.
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For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s request for
relief, [Docket Nos. 12, 19], be GRANTED and Defendant’s request for relief, [Docket No. 18],
be DENIED.
I. 	Background
On May 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income. (Tr. 19,
60, 245).2 Plaintiff alleged that her disability began on June 16, 2007. (Tr. 19, 245). The
Commissioner 	initially 	denied 	Plaintiff’s 	claim 	on 	January 	26, 	2023, 	and 	again, 	upon
reconsideration, on April 18, 2023. (Tr. 19, 181, 187). On April 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a written
request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (Tr. 19, 190).
Administrative 	Law 	Judge 	David 	R. 	Bruce, 	Jr., 	(hereinafter 	“ALJ”) 	conducted 	a
telephonic hearing on March 4, 2024, at which Plaintiff was represented by legal counsel. (Tr.
19, 37–84). Plaintiff along with an independent vocational expert, Edward Pagella (“IVE
Pagella”), testified at the hearing. (Tr. 19, 37–84).
On May 1, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s request for supplemental
security income. (Tr. 19–30). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 29–30).
Plaintiff thereafter sought review of the decision by the Appeals Council. (Tr. 2–4).
Subsequently, on January 27, 2025, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review.
(Tr. 2). As a result, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
2 Throughout this Report and Recommendation, the Court refers to the Administrative Record, [Docket No. 7], by
the abbreviation “Tr.” Where the Court cites to the Administrative Record, it refers to the page numbers found in the
bottom-right corner of each page of the record.
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On March 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed this action. (Compl. [Docket No. 1]). Thereafter, this
matter was presented to the Court for review pursuant to the parties’ briefs, [Docket Nos. 12, 18,
19], and the Court took the matter under advisement on the written submissions.
II. Standards of Review
A. Administrative Law Judge’s Five-Step Analysis
If a claimant’s initial application for disability benefits is denied, she may request
reconsideration of the decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907–404.909. A claimant who is dissatisfied
with the reconsidered decision may then obtain administrative review by an administrative law
judge. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.929.
To determine the existence and extent of a claimant’s disability, the administrative law
judge must follow a five-step sequential analysis. This analysis requires the administrative law
judge to make a series of factual findings about the claimant’s impairments, residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4);
Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit has described this five-
step process as follows:
The Commissioner of Social Security [through the administrative law judge] must
evaluate: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits
the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;
(3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively
disabling impairment listed in the regulations; (4) whether the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the
claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform.
Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003).
The claimant bears the burden under the Social Security Act of proving that she is
disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); Whitman v. Colvin, 762 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2014).
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Once the claimant has demonstrated she cannot perform any of her prior, relevant work due to a
disability, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant retains the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to engage in some other substantial, gainful activity. Goff
v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005).
B. Appeals Council Review
If the claimant is dissatisfied with the administrative law judge’s decision, the claimant
may request review by the Appeals Council, although the Appeals Council is not required to
grant that request for review. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967–404.982. The decision of the Appeals
Council (or, if the request for review is denied by the Appeals Council, then the decision of the
ALJ) is final and binding upon the claimant, unless the matter is appealed to federal court within
sixty days after notice of the Appeals Council’s action. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. §
404.981. In the present case, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision finding
that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 1).
C. Judicial Review
If a claimant remains dissatisfied with the final decision of the Commissioner following
the resolution of claimant’s request for review to the Appeals Council, the claimant may seek
judicial review in federal court. Judicial review of the administrative decision generally proceeds
by considering the decision of the administrative law judge at each of the five steps discussed
above.
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision (through the administrative law judge) to
deny disability benefits, however, is constrained to a determination of whether the decision is
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bradley v.
Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008); Tellez v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir.
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2005); Buckner v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000). “Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the
Commissioner’s conclusion.” Buckner, 213 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d
1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000)); see Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007).
In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court may not substitute its own
judgment or findings of fact for that of the administrative law judge. Hilkemeyer v. Barnhart,
380 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2004). The possibility that the Court could draw two inconsistent
conclusions from the same record does not prevent a particular finding from being supported by
substantial evidence. Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994). The Court should
not reverse the administrative law judge’s finding merely because evidence exists in the
administrative record to support a conclusion contrary to the Commissioner’s findings. Woolf v.
Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).
After balancing the evidence, if it is possible to reach two inconsistent positions from the
evidence and one of those positions represents the administrative law judge’s decision, the Court
must affirm the decision. Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992); Medhaug v.
Astrue, 578 F.3d 805, 813 (8th Cir. 2009). Thus, the Court will not reverse the administrative
law judge’s “denial of benefits so long as the [administrative law judge’s] decision falls within
the ‘available zone of choice.’” Bradley, 528 F.3d at 1115. The decision of the administrative
law judge “is not outside the ‘zone of choice’ simply because [the Court] might have reached a
different conclusion had [it] been the initial finder of fact.” Id.
III. Decision Under Review
In the present case, the ALJ made the following determinations during the five-step
disability evaluation process.
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At step one, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engage in substantial gainful
activity since the date of her application for benefits, May 10, 2022. (Tr. 18). This finding is not
in dispute. The Court will refer to the time period between May 10, 2022, and the date of the
ALJ’s decision as “the adjudicated period.”
At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
“bipolar disorder, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).” (Tr. 21). Plaintiff does
not challenge the findings made by the ALJ at step two.
At 	step 	three, 	the 	ALJ 	concluded 	that 	Plaintiff 	did 	not 	have 	an 	impairment 	or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 22–24). Plaintiff does not
challenge the ALJ’s findings at step three.
At step four, the ALJ made the following RFC determination:
[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at
all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: she can
understand simple and uninvolved tasks and work-related decisions; she can make
simple work-related decisions; and she can occasionally interact with supervisors
and coworkers, but never with the public.
(Tr. 24). Plaintiff challenges this RFC determination made by the ALJ.
In 	making 	this 	RFC 	determination, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	“medically
determinable 	impairments 	could 	reasonably 	be 	expected 	to 	cause 	some 	of 	the 	alleged
symptoms”; however, the ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not consistent with the medical
and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in [the ALJ’s] decision.” (Tr. 26).
Plaintiff does not directly challenge this credibility determination by the ALJ, but Plaintiff does
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indirectly challenge this determination to the extent it is based on the challenged RFC
determination.3
At step five, the ALJ concluded that “[c]onsidering the [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in
the national economy that [Plaintiff] can perform.” (Tr. 28). Relying upon testimony from IVE
Pagella, the ALJ specifically found that among the occupations Plaintiff would be able to
perform were “laundry worker” of which there are 138,000 positions in the national economy;
“dishwasher” of which there are 175,000 positions in the national economy; and “packer” of
which there are 190,000 positions in the national economy. (Tr. 29). Plaintiff does not directly
challenge the ALJ’s findings at step five, other than as an implicit derivative challenge based on
Plaintiff’s aforementioned challenge to the ALJ’s RFC determination.
Based on his finding at each of the steps of the sequential analysis, the ALJ ultimately
concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability, as that term is defined by the Social Security
Act, at any time during the adjudicated period. (Tr. 30).
IV. Analysis
Plaintiff asserts one overarching argument in her appeal of the ALJ’s decision. (See Plf.’s
Mem. [Docket No. 12]; Plf.’s Reply [Docket No. 19]). Plaintiff argues that remand is required
because in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ inexplicably omitted certain non-exertional
limitations contained within the opinions of two state agency medical consultants which,
3 “Social Security Ruling 16-3p eliminates use of the term ‘credibility’ and clarifies that the Commissioner’s review
of subjective assertions of the severity of symptoms is not an examination of a claimant’s character, but rather, is an
examination for the level of consistency between subjective assertions and the balance of the record as a whole.”
Noerper v. Saul, 964 F.3d 738, 745 n.3 (8th Cir. 2020). SSR 16-3p applies to the present case, “but it largely
changes terminology rather than the substantive analysis to be applied,” and in discussing said determination, Courts
have continued to use the “credibility” terminology. Noerper, 964 F.3d at 745 n.3; ; see Terra M. v. Colvin, No. 23-
cv-3849 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 593785, at *10 (D. Minn. Jan. 10, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub
nom. Terra M. v. Dudek, 2025 WL 591166 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 2025); Ricky T. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2088 (LTS),
2023 WL 2664741, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 28, 2023).
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according to Plaintiff, resulted in an RFC determination that did not reflect Plaintiff’s actual
impairments. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ did so without providing the explanation
required under the law.
In support of her arguments, Plaintiff points to the prior administrative medical findings
of two state agency medical consultants, Jeffrey Boyd, Ph.D., L.P., and Maria Mylan, Ph.D.,
L.P., who both opined that Plaintiff’s “ability to cope with co-workers would be reduced but
adequate for brief and superficial contact.” (Tr. 145, 156). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
improperly and without explanation omitted the “brief” and “superficial” limitations from
Plaintiff’s RFC, instead finding that Plaintiff could “occasionally interact with supervisors and
coworkers” without commenting on the length or quality of those contacts. Plaintiff does not
argue that the ALJ was required to adopt the limitations opined by the state agency consultants’
opinions; Plaintiff instead argues that if the ALJ chose not to adopt the limitations he was
required to explain his decision. Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s general discussion of
the opinions from those state agency consultants.
A. Law 	Governing 	the 	Evaluation 	of 	Opinion 	Evidence, 	including 	Prior
Administrative Findings
Under the relevant regulations, the administrative law judge does “not defer or give any
specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), including those from [the claimant’s] medical sources.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); see Austin v. Kijakazi, 52 F.4th 723, 728 (8th Cir. 2022). Instead, the
administrative law judge evaluates the persuasiveness of all medical opinions and prior
administrative medical findings in the record by considering the following five factors: (1)
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supportability;4 (2) consistency;5 (3) relationship with the claimant; (4) specialized training of
the medical source; and (5) “other factors.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).
The 	two 	most 	important 	factors 	are 	supportability 	and 	consistency. 	20 	C.F.R. 	§
404.1520c(b)(2); Austin, 52 F.4th at 728. The ALJ is required to explain how these two factors
were considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2); Bonnett v. Kijakazi, 859 F. App’x 19, 20 (8th
Cir. 2021). The ALJ may also, but is not required to, explain how the remaining factors were
considered. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). However, where the ALJ “find[s] that two or more
medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings about the same issue are both equally
well-supported . . . and consistent with the record . . . but are not exactly the same,” the ALJ
must “articulate how [they] considered the other” enumerated factors “for those medical opinions
or prior administrative medical findings[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(3).
In evaluating a medical opinion or prior administrative finding, the ALJ is not required to
adopt or reject the opinion in total. An ALJ may “accept some, but not all, of a medical opinion,”
provided the ALJ decision to do so is supported by the record and adequality explained. Austin
v. Kijakazi, 52 F.4th 723, 729 (8th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). But the ALJ “is not required to
explicitly reconcile every conflicting shred of medical evidence.” Austin, 52 F.4th at 729. Nor is
the ALJ “required to adopt the exact limitations set forth in the opinions [he] found persuasive.”
Wyatt v. Kijakazi, No. 23-1559, 2023 WL 6629761, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 12, 2023).
The requirement that an ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinions and prior administrative
findings be adequately explained is intertwined with the ALJ’s duty to properly develop the
4 “Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a
medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more
persuasive the medical opinions [sic] or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(c)(1).
5 “Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the
evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).
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record. It is well-established that an ALJ has a duty to sufficiently develop the record to permit
meaningful review on appeal. See, e.g., Noerper v. Saul, 964 F.3d 738, 747 (8th Cir. 2020). This
duty to develop the record “arises from the simple fact that the disability determination process is
not an adversarial process,” and thus, the duty to develop the record “exists alongside the
claimant’s burden to prove [their] case.” Id. Moreover, the ALJ’s duty exists even when a
claimant is represented by counsel. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly
recognized this duty,” and it has “remanded for further development not only where evidence of
functional limitations is lacking, but also where the record presents conflicting medical opinions
as to which the Commissioner fails to explain a choice.” Id.
B. The ALJ Erred in his Evaluation of Drs. Boyd and Mylan’s Medical Opinions
Dr. Boyd and Dr. Mylan are both state agency medical consultants who evaluated
Plaintiff’s medical record as part of the disability determination process. (Tr. 139–158). On
January 24, 2023, Dr. Boyd performed the evaluation at the initial determination level, and on
April 6, 2023, Dr. Mylan performed the evaluation at the redetermination level. (Tr. 139–158). In
each determination, the respective state agency medical consultant opined that Plaintiff’s “ability
to cope with co-workers would be reduced but adequate for brief and superficial contact.” (Tr.
145, 156).
The entirety of the ALJ’s discussion of the opinions of these state agency medical
consultants is as follows:
I have considered the January and April 2023 opinions of the State Agency
medical consultants, at Exhibits D7A and D8A. These examiners also found
claimant has no physical limitations and that, while she does have severe mental
impairments that impose some level of restriction, the degree of limitation arising
from those mental impairments does not preclude the performance of all work. I
agree with these opinions to the extent they are consistent with the indicated
residual functional capacity. The above residual functional capacity provides an
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accurate representation 	of 	claimant’s 	impairments 	and 	their 	impact 	on 	her
remaining functional abilities.
(Tr. 28). From this limited discussion it appears that the ALJ found these opinions to be at least
partially persuasive, although the ALJ’s discussion does not make clear the extent to which he
found the opinions persuasive.
Before discussing the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinions from the two state agency medical
consultants and the ALJ’s incorporation of those opinions into Plaintiff’s RFC, it is important to
note 	two 	overarching 	consideration 	underlying 	the 	Court’s 	present 	analysis. 	First, 	when
discussing the limitations on an individual’s ability to interact with others, the terms “brief and
superficial” are not interchangeable with the term “occasional.” See, e.g., Jolene J.-D. v.
O’Malley, No. 23-cv-2297 (JMB/DLM), 2024 WL 3488001, at *5 (D. Minn. July 1, 2024)
(citing Charlita N. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-1283 (NEB/DTS), 2024 WL 1667155, at *1 (D.
Minn. Apr. 15, 2024)), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3470786 (D. Minn. July
19, 2024); Nathan L. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-1310 (JWB/DJF), 2024 WL 3015139, at *5 (D.
Minn. May 3, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3014866 (D. Minn. June 14,
2024); Jason L. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-184 (JWB/JFD), 2024 WL 965240, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar.
6, 2024).6 Second, although the ALJ declined to include any limitations on the quality of the
contacts Plaintiff may have with coworkers and supervisors, the record contains substantial
evidence to support a substantive limitation on the quality of the contacts Plaintiff can have with
coworkers and supervisors. As noted above, both Dr. Boyd and Dr. Mylan opined that Plaintiff
was limited to only “brief and superficial contact” with coworkers and supervisors. The only
other relevant medical opinion in the record opined that Plaintiff had a “moderate” limitation on
6 “‘[B]rief’ refers to the length of a particular interaction, and ‘superficial’ refers to the quality of the interaction; but
‘occasional’ refers to how often such interactions occur.” Nathan L., 2024 WL 3015139, at *5 (bracket in Nathan L.)
(quoting Tiffany B. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-1227 (ECT/DLM), 2023 WL 3958424, at *2 (D. Minn. May 22, 2023),
report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3955348 (D. Minn. June 12, 2023)).
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her ability to interact with coworkers and supervisors. (Tr. 490). Indeed, at step three of the
sequential analysis, the ALJ himself opinioned that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in her
ability to interact with others. (Tr. 22).
Here, the ALJ only included the qualifier “occasionally” to limit Plaintiff’s interactions
with coworkers and supervisors, and he omitted the “brief” and “superficial” qualifiers found in
opinions he found to be at least partially persuasive. (See Tr. 24). 	When an ALJ omits opined
limitations on the quality of an individual’s interactions with others and includes only limitations
on the frequency of those interactions but fails to explain why he did so, that failure can warrant
remand unless the ALJ limited “the quality and duration of Plaintiff’s workplace interactions
elsewhere in the Decision.” Jolene J.-D., 2024 WL 3488001, at *6 (quoting Nathan L., 2024 WL
3015139, at *5); see Wyatt v. Kijakazi, No. 23-1559, 2023 WL 6629761, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 12,
2023); Lane v. O’Malley, No. 23-1432, 2024 WL 302395, at *1 (8th Cir. Jan. 26, 2024). In the
present case, the ALJ’s decision is devoid of any such limitations.
Because 	the 	ALJ 	found 	at 	least 	partially 	persuasive 	the 	opinions 	that 	Plaintiff’s
workplace interactions should be limited to brief and superficial contacts but failed to include
any limitations on quality and duration of Plaintiff’s workplace interactions in the RFC
determination, the next question is whether the ALJ “explained the rejection of ‘brief’ and
‘superficial’ . . . as qualifiers to Plaintiff’s ability to interact” with others in the workplace. Jolene
J.-D., 2024 WL 3488001, at *6. The ALJ’s decision in the present case lacks any such
explanation. The ALJ simply failed to provide any explanation as to why he substituted the
physiological experts’ finding that Plaintiff was limited to “brief and superficial” interaction with
others 	in 	the 	workplace 	with 	his 	own 	apparent 	conclusion 	that 	Plaintiff 	could 	tolerate
“occasional” interaction of any quality and duration with coworkers and supervisors.
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Applying the relevant law to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court
finds that the ALJ’s failure to provide any explanation for his apparent decision to omit the
limitation on the quality and duration of Plaintiff’s workplace interactions represents error.
Specifically, the ALJ erred in failing to adequality explain the inconsistency between, on the one
hand, his decision that the opinions were at least partial persuasive and on the other hand, his
omission of “brief” and “superficial” as limiting qualifiers on the length and quality of Plaintiff’s
interactions with coworkers and supervisors.
The critical point here is that two state agency consultants opined that Plaintiff was
limited 	to 	“brief 	and 	superficial” 	contact 	with 	coworkers 	and 	supervisors 	without 	any
contradictory medical opinion in the record, yet the ALJ failed to offer any explanation for
excluding those limitations from the RFC assessment. While the ALJ is not required to
incorporate every recommended limitation, the ALJ’s decision regarding “which limitations to
include or exclude must be well-supported by evidence and clearly explained.” Jason L., 2024
WL 965240, at *2.
The need for such an explanation is illustrated by the present case. Without any
explanation from the ALJ, it is ambiguous whether the ALJ inadvertently omitted the opined
limitations, improperly replaced the term “superficial” with “occasional,” thought that the
“occasional” limitation was sufficient to account for the impairments supported by the record,
“or deliberately decided against including a limitation on superficial interactions for another
reason. What is not ambiguous, however, is that the ALJ has a duty to clearly articulate the
rationale linking the evidence to [his] finding.” Jason L., 2024 WL 965240, at *2. Here, the ALJ
failed to do so.
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From the ALJ’s decision it is clear that the ALJ recognized Plaintiff had at least some
limitations on her qualitative ability to interact with others, albeit to a lesser degree than Plaintiff
asserts. (See Tr. 22) (providing the ALJ’s finding at step three of the sequential analysis that
Plaintiff had moderate limitations in her ability to interact with others). Both state agency
consultants agreed and specifically opined that Plaintiff should be limited to “brief and
superficial” contact with coworkers and supervisors. And the only other medical opinion in the
record agreed that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in her ability to interact with others. (Tr.
490). The ALJ’s error here is his failure to provide any explanation reconciling the inconsistency
between the uncontradicted medical opinions in the record opining that Plaintiff had limitations
on the quality of Plaintiff’s interactions with others and the RFC’s lack of any qualitative
limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to interact with coworkers and 	supervisors. Without 	an
explanation reconciling this inconsistency, the Court cannot determine “whether the ALJ
intended to omit this limitation (and if so, why), whether he improperly conflated” the terms
brief and superficial with the term occasional, “or whether he meant to substitute a more
vocationally relevant term but then neglected to address the quality and duration of Plaintiff’s
workplace interactions elsewhere in the Decision.” Nathan L., 2024 WL 3015139, at *5.7
7 The ALJ’s conclusory discussion of the opinions of Dr. Boyd and Dr. Mylan also represents error because the ALJ
wholly failed to address either the consistency factor or the supportability factor as required by 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(b). The ALJ’s decision lacks any substantive discussion of the opinion of Dr. Boyd or Dr. Mylan. Indeed,
a literal reading of the ALJ’s opinion is that the ALJ agrees with the medical opinions to some unspecified extent
because the opinions are consistent with the ALJ’s RFC determination as opposed to because the opinions are
consistent with other evidence in the record. Even if that reading is merely a result of inadvertent wording, that still
leaves the ALJ’s complete failure to discuss both the supportability and consistency factors. Although the ALJ is not
required to use any specific or talismanic language to demonstrate that he considered the consistency or
supportability factor, “it must be clear [the required factors] were addressed.” Kimm W. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-
2497 (JMB/DLM), 2024 WL 3896613, at *6 (D. Minn. July 15, 2024) (quoting Diane W. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-
2651 (SRN/ECW), 2022 WL 4377731, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 22, 2022)), report and recommendation adopted, 2024
WL 3890913 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2024); see Samantha A. v. O’Malley, No. 22-cv-3119 (TNL), 2024 WL 841270, at
*5–6 (D. Minn. Feb. 28, 2024). In the present case, the ALJ’s decision, even considered as a whole, fails to
demonstrate that the consistency or supportability factor was considered in the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical
opinions from Dr. Boyd and Dr. Mylan. The ALJ’s decision simply lacks any discussion regarding whether those
medical opinions are consistent with evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the record or
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Defendant argues that remand is not warranted because there is substantial evidence in
the record to support the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s functional capacity regarding limitations
on interacting with others in the workplace. (See Def.’s Mem. [Docket No. 18] at 8–11). In
support of this argument, Defendant highlights the ALJ’s discussion at step three of the
sequential analysis where the ALJ found Plaintiff had only moderate limitations, and Defendant
further highlights the ALJ’s discussion of the record at large. But the ALJ’s discussion at step
three of the sequential analysis only further illustrates the ALJ’s error here because the ALJ
failed to provide any explanation as to the inconsistency between his finding that Plaintiff had
moderate limitation and his apparent decision not to include a limitation on the quality and
duration of Plaintiff’s interactions with others in the workplace. While the ALJ’s discussion of
the evidence at the third step of the sequential analysis, and even the ALJ’s discussion of the
record at large, may demonstrate that Plaintiff “can interact with others in some situations, it
remains unclear if the ALJ’s decision—to not include any limitations for [brief and] superficial
interactions—is well-supported by the evidence.” Jason L., 2024 WL 965240, at *2.“The ALJ’s
decision certainly does not make clear that the evidence cited in the third step was the basis for
omitting the limitation on superficial contacts.” Id.8
In summation, the ALJ’s decision regarding which limitations to include or exclude was
not clearly explained. See Jason L., 2024 WL 965240, at *2. Without that explanation, the Court
supported by the explanations of the respective state agency consultant. The ALJ’s failure to discuss the consistency
and supportability factors in relation to Dr. Boyd and Dr. Mylan’s medical opinion represents a sufficient,
independent legal error warranting remand of the present action. See, e.g., Bonnett, 859 F. App’x at 20; Lucus v.
Saul, 960 F.3d 1066, 1069–70 (8th Cir. 2020); Gregory F. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-3787 (LMP/LIB), 2025 WL
308085, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2025) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Gregory F.
v. King, 2025 WL 307420 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 2025); Carol S.D. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-1939 (DJF), 2024 WL
4117487, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 2024); Samantha A, 2024 WL 841270, at *5–6; Violet G. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-
2105 (TNL), 2023 WL 2696594, at *6 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2023).
8 Moreover, “is unclear if this evidence alone justifies not imposing any restriction on superficial interactions,
particularly when such a restriction was considered necessary by” two separate state agency medical consultants
“whose opinion the ALJ otherwise found” at least partial persuasive. Id.
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cannot determine whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. And ‘[t]he
Court “should not be left ‘to speculate on what basis the Commissioner . . . denied a claim.’”
Nathan L., 2024 WL 3015139, at *5 (quoting Collins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 869, 872 (8th Cir.
2011)). In the present case, the ALJ simply failed to explain his reasons for not including a
“brief” or “superficial” limitation on Plaintiff’s workplace interactions. This represents a failure
of the ALJ to sufficiently develop the record to permit meaningful review on appeal. See, e.g.,
Kenneth J.V. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-373 (KMM/DJF), 2023 WL 2394397, at *11 (D. Minn. Jan.
27, 2023); Troy L.M. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-199 (TNL), 2022 WL 4540107, at *16 (D. Minn.
Sept. 28, 2022); Christine F. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-2048 (NEB/LIB), 2022 WL 3648674, at *5
(D. Minn. July 27, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3647808 (D. Minn.
Aug. 24, 2022); Dianna L.B. v. Saul, 19-cv-2561 (TNL), 2020 WL 4586822, at *5 (D. Minn.
Aug. 10, 2020); Holdeman v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-729 (NKL), 2021 WL 6062368, at *6 (W.D.
Mo. Dec. 22, 2021); Noerper v. Saul, 964 F.3d 738, 747 (8th Cir. 2020); Jason L., 2024 WL
965240, at *2; Nathan L., 2024 WL 3015139, at *5–7.
Having determined that the ALJ erred, the Court must next determine whether the error
was harmless. It is well settled that harmless error review is applicable to social security
administrative appeals, Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009), and that a harmless error
does not warrant remand. Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 917–18 (8th Cir. 2012). It is typically
the plaintiff who bears the burden of demonstrating harm. Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409. To do so, a
plaintiff “must provide some indication that the ALJ would have decided differently if the error
had not occurred.” Byes, 687 F.3d at 917–18 (citing Van Vickle v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 825, 830
(8th Cir. 2008); Hensley v. Barnhart, 352 F.3d 353, 357 (8th Cir. 2003)). However, if the ALJ’s
conclusory discussion or lack of explanation of the challenged decision precludes the Court from
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being able to meaningfully review the ALJ’s at-issue decision, then the ALJ’s error is not
harmless because the Court is unable to “determine whether the ALJ would have reached the
same decision denying benefits, even if he had followed the proper procedure[.]” Lucus v. Saul,
960 F.3d 1066, 1070 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d 689, 695 (8th
Cir. 2003)).
Because there exists an insufficient basis upon which to conduct a meaningful appellate
review of the ALJ’s decision not to include the relevant portion of the state agency consultants’
opinions and because that decision directly affects the ALJ’s RFC determination, there is also an
insufficient basis for meaningful appellate review of the ALJ’s RFC determination as a whole.
Jason H. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-743 (WMW/LIB), 2024 WL 689594, at *7 (D. Minn. Jan. 4,
2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 471645 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2024); Brad J.
v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-1109 (WMW/LIB), 2023 WL 4089478, at *7 (D. Minn. May 17, 2023),
report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 4088853 (D. Minn. June 20, 2023). Because there
is an insufficient basis upon which to conduct a meaningful appellate review of both the ALJ’s
RFC determination and his at-issue decision regarding the evaluation of the opinions from the
state agency medical consultants, the ALJ’s error was not harmless. This represents reversable
error warranting remand. See, e.g., Noerper, 964 F.3d at 747; Lucus, 960 F.3d at 1070; Sara R.,
2023 WL 4564421, at *8; Kenneth J.V., 2023 WL 2394397, at *9–11; Jason L., 2024 WL
965240, at *2; Nathan L., 2024 WL 3015139, at *5–7; Jason H., 2024 WL 689594, at *7; Brad
J., 2023 WL 4089478, at *7.
V. Conclusion
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
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1. 	Plaintiff’s request for relief, [Docket Nos. 12, 18], be GRANTED, as set forth above;
2. 	Defendant’s request for relief, [Docket No. 19], be DENIED; and
3. 	The above captioned matter be REMANDED to the Social Security Administration,
pursuant 	to 	sentence 	four 	of 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	405(g), 	for 	further 	administrative
proceedings consistent with this Report and Recommendation.
Dated: January 30, 2026 	s/Leo I. Brisbois
Hon. Leo I. Brisbois
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days after being served
with a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections
within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All objections and
responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in LR 72.2(c).
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