Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Justin E.,1
Plaintiff,
v.
Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-CV-0058 (JWB/JFD)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Justin E. seeks judicial review of the
Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his application for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The case has been referred to the undersigned
United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636 and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1. Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Brief
(Dkt. No. 16), Defendant’s Brief (Dkt. No. 18), and Plaintiff’s Reply Brief (Dkt. No. 19).
Plaintiff argues that the Social Security Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who authored
the final decision erred “by playing doctor instead of developing the record.” (Pl.’s Br. at
11.) Defendant responds that the ALJ properly determined that the existing record was
sufficient and no additional neuropsychological testing was necessary. As set forth below,
1 The District of Minnesota has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial
of nongovernmental parties in Social Security cases.
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the Court finds that the ALJ correctly determined that the record did not need further
development and recommends that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed.
I. 	Background
A. 	Process for Applying for Disability Benefits
People with disabilities can qualify for financial support from the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) through one or both of its assistance programs: the Disability
Insurance Program under Title II of the Social Security Act and the Supplemental Security
Income Program under Title XVI of the Act. See Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471, 475
(2019) (citing Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74, 75 (1988)). Only SSI benefits are at issue
in this case. The SSI Program is a public assistance program that provides support to people
with disabilities, whether or not they have paid social security taxes, who demonstrate
financial need. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1381a (guaranteeing support to eligible “aged, blind, or
disabled” people); 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (explaining program’s purpose).
For SSI purposes, “disability” is defined as the inability “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
A physical or mental impairment “results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(D).
To receive SSI, a claimant must submit an application to the SSA, which grants or
denies the application according to the SSA’s regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1400
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(outlining 	SSI 	administrative 	process 	under 	Title 	XVI). 	There 	are 	four 	levels 	of
administrative review. At the “initial determination” stage, the SSA decides whether the
claimant is eligible for benefits, and if the claimant is unsuccessful, the claimant may file
a request for reconsideration. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1400(a)(1), (2). If the application is denied
at the reconsideration level, the claimant may request a hearing before an ALJ. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1400(a)(3).
The ALJ determines whether a person is disabled using a five-step sequential
analysis described in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. For the first four steps, the claimant bears the
burden of proof. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). Steps one through four
ask “(1) whether claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) whether claimant
has a severe impairment, (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of a listed
impairment, [and] (4) whether claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform past
relevant work activity.” See Delph v. Astrue, 538 F.3d 940, 946 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Smith
v. Shalala, 987 F.2d 1371, 1373 (8th Cir. 1993)). If the claimant successfully meets the
burden of proof for the first four steps, the Commissioner bears the burden at step five to
establish 	that 	the 	claimant 	can 	make 	an 	adjustment 	to 	other 	work. 	20 	C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(v).
If the claimant is not satisfied with the ALJ’s decision, the next step is to ask for
review by the Appeals Council. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1400(a)(4). The Appeals Council’s
decision is the “final decision” of the Commissioner, which may then be appealed to a
federal district court. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1400(a)(5).
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B. 	Relevant Medical Evidence
Plaintiff fell off his front steps on July 23, 2022, and suffered a significant traumatic
brain injury (“TBI”). (See Soc. Sec. Admin. R. (hereinafter “R.”) 1265.)2 Plaintiff also has
diagnoses 	of bipolar 	disorder, schizoaffective disorder, depressive disorder, anxiety
disorder, and a history of alcohol use. (R. 12, 1266.)
On 	January 	25, 	2023, 	Plaintiff 	attended 	a 	psychological 	consultation 	and
examination with Monique Bourdeaux, Psy.D., L.P., for the purpose of assessing his daily
functioning. (R. 1265.) Dr. Bourdeaux administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-
Fourth Edition (“WAIS-IV”) and Wechsler Memory Scale-Fourth Edition (“WMS-IV”)
tests. The WAIS-IV test yielded a full-scale IQ of 86, which was “in the low average range
of intellectual functioning.” (R. 1268.) Most of Plaintiff’s other scores were also in the low
average range. (R. 1268.) The WMS-IV results were similar, with scores between the low
average and average range. (R. 1269.) Dr. Bourdeaux concluded that Plaintiff could
understand, remember, and follow directions; was moderately able to sustain attention,
concentration, persistence, and pace; could respond appropriately to others; and was
moderately able to tolerate mental stressors in an entry-level workplace. (R. 1269.)
On February 13, 2023, speech language pathologist Kelsey Kuhlman administered
the Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status (“RBANS”) test
to Plaintiff. (R. 1277.) This test was developed originally to assess dementia but is also
2 The Social Security administrative record is filed at Docket No. 11. The record is
consecutively paginated on the lower right corner of each page, and the Court cites to those
page numbers.
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used 	for 	closed 	head 	injuries. 	(R. 	1277.) 	The 	test 	measures 	cognitive 	decline 	or
improvement over five domains, including immediate memory and delayed memory. (R.
1277.) Plaintiff scored extremely low in immediate memory, in two of four components of
delayed memory (list recall and figure recall), and in one component of language (semantic
fluency). (R. 1277.) These results placed Plaintiff in the second percentile of similarly aged
adults. (R. 1278.) Interpreting the test results, Kuhlman found that Plaintiff had moderately
to severely impaired cognitive-linguistic deficits, moderately impaired verbal expression,
severely impaired immediate memory, moderately impaired delayed memory, moderately
impaired attention, and moderately impaired visuospatial/construction skills. (R. 1278.)
At the initial disability determination review stage, state-agency consultant Stuart
Waltonen, Ph.D., L.P. 	R., considered 	Plaintiff’s mental medical 	records 	and 	made
administrative findings. (R. 93–95, 97–98.) In the area of memory and understanding, Dr.
Waltonen found Plaintiff moderately limited in his ability to understand and remember
detailed instructions, but not significantly limited in understanding and remembering very
short and simple instructions or in remembering locations and work-like procedures. (R.
97.) According to Dr. Waltonen, Plaintiff had adequate mental capacity to concentrate on,
understand, and remember routine, repetitive instructions, but would be markedly impaired
for detailed or complex/technical instructions. (R. 97.) At the reconsideration level of
review, Marci Mylan, Ph.D., L.P. R., made essentially the same findings as Dr. Waltonen.
(R. 110–11.)
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C. 	Plaintiff’s Application for Benefits
Plaintiff filed his application for SSI on August 30, 2022. (R. 10.) The application
was denied at the initial and reconsideration stages of administrative review, and Plaintiff
requested a hearing before an ALJ. The ALJ convened a hearing on January 12, 2024. (R.
37.) Plaintiff, medical expert Dr. Tonya Porchia, and vocational expert David Salewsky
testified. (R. 37–38.)
Plaintiff testified that since his TBI, he has had memory problems, trouble following
a train of thought, trouble finding words, slowness in accomplishing tasks, balance
problems, and dizziness. (R. 43–44.) His mental health diagnoses were bipolar disorder,
schizoaffective disorder, alcohol use disorder, and depression. (R. 45–46.)
During Dr. Porchia’s testimony, the ALJ asked the doctor if Plaintiff met or equaled
any of the listings. (R. 48.) Dr. Porchia replied, “It’s really a challenge with this case,” and
then contrasted the RBANS, WAIS-IV, and WMS-IV test results. (R. 48–49.) Dr. Porchia
observed that Plaintiff scored in the extremely low range for concentration and memory on
the RBANS test. (R. 49.) She described this assessment as only a “brief measure,” however,
which is typically used to measure the decline in patients with dementia, and “not a test
that a psychologist or a neuropsychologist would rely on for accurate results in regard[] to
functioning.” (R. 49, 51.) Dr. Porchia also testified about Plaintiff’s IQ and memory scores
on the WAIS-IV and WMS-IV tests administered by Dr. Bourdeaux. (R. 49, 51.) Dr.
Porchia testified those tests provided a “more accurate result” and were “a good thorough
and accurate assessment of a patient’s cognitive and memory functioning.” (R. 49, 51.) On
those assessments, Plaintiff’s IQ scores were in the low average to average range. (R. 49.)
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In addition, according to Dr. Porchia, Plaintiff’s low average to average score on the WMS-
IV test demonstrated that Plaintiff was “still functioning relatively well.” (R. 49.)
Considering all of the test results, Dr. Porchia testified that she did not see anything
that would provide evidence of a neurocognitive disorder that would meet or equal a listing.
(R. 49.) However, Dr. Porchia then said that additional testing “might be helpful.” (R. 49.)
To provide full context, Dr. Porchia’s testimony reads:
I’m not seeing anything in 4F or 5F that would provide evidence of a
neurocognitive disorder that would meet or equal the listings. Judge, it would
be better for the claimant to undergo a more detailed neuropsychological full
battery of testing. That might be helpful in the case. But what we have so far
does not show evidence that the claimant would meet or equal the listing.
(R. 49.)
The ALJ next asked Dr. Porchia to rate Plaintiff’s abilities in the four areas of mental
functioning needed for work, which are known as the “paragraph B” criteria. (R. 49.) Dr.
Porchia testified that Plaintiff had a mild limitation in understanding, remembering, or
applying information; no difficulty to mild difficulty in interacting with others; a mild
limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and a mild limitation in
adapting or maintaining oneself. (R. 49–50.) Dr. Porchia also recommended a slow-paced
work setting to account for Plaintiff’s TBI, bipolar disorder, and premorbid history of
alcohol use. (R. 50.)
During Plaintiff’s attorney’s opportunity to question Dr. Porchia, the attorney said,
“All right and again, your opinion on this case was further neuropsychological testing may
be warranted,” to which Dr. Porchia replied, “Correct.” (R. 51.) Plaintiff’s attorney
followed up, “Or would be a better option,” to which Dr. Porchia said, “Yes.” (R. 51–52.)
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On February 26, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled under the Social Security Act between the date of the application (August 30,
2022), and the date of the decision. (R. 7–23.) Following the five-step sequential analysis
described in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ determined at the first step that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 30, 2022. (R. 12.) At the second step,
the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: TBI with subarachnoid, left
subdural, and intraventricular hemorrhage, with some residual cognitive, fine and gross
motor, and gait deficits; bipolar disorder; schizoaffective disorder; major depressive
disorder; and anxiety disorder. (R. 12.)
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment
listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix I. (R. 13.) The ALJ specifically considered
the RBANS, WAIS-IV, and WMS-IV results in the discussion of Plaintiff’s ability to
understand, remember, or apply information. (R. 15.) The ALJ recalled that the RBANS
test “showed extremely low scores in immediate memory, semantic fluency, and delayed
recall.” (R. 15.) The WMS-IV test, on the other hand, “showed immediate and delayed
memory scores both in the low average range, with visual memory in the average range,
and auditory and visual working memory in the low average range,” and the WAIS-IV test
resulted 	in 	“a 	full-scale 	IQ 	score 	of 	86, 	in 	the 	low 	average 	range, 	with 	verbal
comprehension, working memory, and processing speed scores in the low average range,
and a perceptual reasoning score in the average range.” (R. 15.) The ALJ found persuasive
Dr. Porchia’s testimony that “the WAIS-IV and WMS-IV were more thorough and accurate
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assessments of the claimant’s cognitive and memory functioning than the RBANS” and
that “the RBANS is merely a very brief assessment tool, which would not be relied upon
by a psychologist or neuropsychologist to determine an individual’s overall cognitive
functioning relative to a traumatic brain injury.” (R. 15.)
Between steps three and four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”), which is a measure of “the most [Plaintiff] can still do despite
[Plaintiff’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). As part of this assessment, the ALJ
reiterated that the “more thorough” WMS-IV and WAIS-IV testing showed low average to
average scores in immediate and delayed memory, and auditory, visual, and visual working
memory. (R. 20.)
The ALJ considered Dr. Porchia’s testimony that additional neuropsychological
testing might be helpful, but found additional testing was not warranted. (R. 21.) In
explaining why, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s position that the RBANS test established
Plaintiff’s baseline functioning, finding that the WAIS-IV and WMS-IV tests were more
thorough and accurate. (R. 21.) The ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff did not return for
additional speech language therapy after the RBANS test, even though continued therapy
had been recommended. (R. 21.) Further, Plaintiff’s therapy goals involving moderately
complex, complex, and novel cognitive tasks were not changed after the RBANS test to,
for example, only simple tasks. (R. 21.) The ALJ also observed that the record did not
contain a referral for more neuropsychological testing. (R. 21.) Finally, the ALJ noted, the
RBANS test was administered in February 2023 by a speech language pathologist as part
of Plaintiff’s speech therapy, but Plaintiff did not return for additional speech therapy after
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that date. (R. 15, 21.) Based on the above reasoning, the AJ concluded that additional
testing via a second consultative examination was not warranted. (R. 21.)
Ultimately, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC
to perform light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §] 416.967(b) except [t]he
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform less than full range
of light work except with occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; no
climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequent balancing as that term is
defined in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations (SCO); frequent
stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; no work at unprotected heights
or around moving mechanical parts; no commercial driving; and simple,
routine, and repetitive work, but no assembly line work or other similar work
requiring an unvarying fast pace.
(R. 18.)
Proceeding to step four in the sequential evaluation, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work. (R. 22.) The analysis therefore advanced
to the fifth and final step, where the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could work as a cleaner,
merchandise marker, or inspector. (R. 23.) Therefore, Plaintiff was not disabled as defined
by the Social Security Act for the time period between August 20, 2022, and February 26,
2024. (R. 23.)
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. (R.
1.) This made the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner for the purpose of
judicial review.
II. 	Legal Standards
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits is limited to determining
whether substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the decision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), or whether the ALJ’s decision involved an error of law, Nash v. Comm’r, Soc.
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Sec. Admin., 907 F.3d 1086, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018). “Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the
Commissioner’s conclusion.” Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir.
2002) (citing Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000)). The Court must
examine “evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence
that supports it.” Id. (citing Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000)). The Court
may not reverse the ALJ’s decision simply because substantial evidence would support a
different outcome or the Court would have decided the case differently. Id. (citing Woolf v.
Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993)). In other words, if it is possible to reach two
inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions is that of the
Commissioner, the Court must affirm the decision. Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838
(8th Cir. 1992).
An error of law may be a procedural error, the application of the wrong legal
standard, or an improper application of law. Collins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 869, 871 (8th Cir.
2011) (citations omitted). An ALJ’s failure to comply with applicable SSA regulations is a
legal error. Lucus v. Saul, 960 F.3d 1066, 1070 (8th Cir. 2020). Such an error is not harmless
if the Court cannot determine whether the ALJ would have made the same decision even if
the ALJ had complied with the regulations or correctly applied the law. Id. at 1069–70
(citations omitted).
III. 	Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “erred as a matter of law by playing doctor instead of
developing the record.” (Pl.’s Br. at 11.) In particular, Plaintiff contends that the record
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contains evidence of conflicting test results—the RBANS from Kuhlman and the WAIS-
IV and WMS-IV from Dr. Bourdeaux—and the ALJ should have followed Dr. Porchia’s
recommendation to order additional neuropsychological testing. (Pl.’s Br. at 13.)
When an ALJ cannot make a determination of disability because the claimant’s
record contains incomplete or inconsistent evidence, the ALJ may need to develop the
record further. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(b). If the evidence is inconsistent, “we will consider
the relevant evidence and see if we can determine whether you are disabled based on the
evidence we have.” Id. § 416.920b(b)(1). “If the evidence is consistent but we have
insufficient evidence to determine whether you are disabled, or if after considering the
evidence we determine we cannot reach a conclusion about whether you are disabled, we
will 	determine 	the 	best 	way 	to 	resolve 	the 	inconsistency 	or 	insufficiency.” 	Id.
§ 416.920b(b)(2). The ALJ may recontact a medical source, ask for additional evidence or
information, 	or 	ask 	the 	claimant 	to 	undergo 	a 	consultative 	examination. 	Id.
§ 416.920b(b)(2)(i)–(iv). It is the ALJ’s duty to resolve inconsistent evidence. See Pearsall
v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 2001).
Here, the ALJ did not find the evidence of record insufficient, and the ALJ addressed
and resolved the inconsistent evidence. The ALJ explained why he found persuasive the
state-agency consultants’ opinions of no more than moderate “paragraph B” restrictions
and Dr. Porchia’s work-pace restriction. (R. 17.) The ALJ also explained why he found that
Dr. Porchia’s opinion supported a moderate limitation in the area of concentrating,
persisting, and maintaining pace, rather than the mild limitation she recommended. (R. 17–
18.) Similarly, the ALJ explained why he rated Plaintiff’s ability to understand, remember,
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or apply information as moderate, rather than mild, as Dr. Porchia opined. (R. 18.) Notably,
these last two findings were to Plaintiff’s benefit.
The ALJ expressly addressed Dr. Porchia’s statement that additional testing might
be helpful and explained why the record was not insufficient. First, as Dr. Porchia testified,
the WAIS-IV and WMS-IV tests provided a good, thorough, and accurate assessment of
Plaintiff’s memory and cognitive functioning. (R. 15, 21.) Incidentally, those tests were
administered by a consulting examiner at the SSA’s request. (See R. 15.) Second, Dr.
Porchia did not testify she was unable to determine from the existing record whether
Plaintiff met or equaled a listing or whether the “paragraph B” criteria were satisfied.
Rather, Dr. Porchia testified that Plaintiff did not meet or equal a listing and that Plaintiff’s
“paragraph B” limitations were mild. Her testimony that arriving at these conclusions was
a “challenge” or that more testing might be “helpful” or “better” does not nullify the
testimony.
The ALJ also noted that, in contravention to Dr. Porchia’s remark that additional
neuropsychological testing might be helpful, the record did not document a referral for a
more thorough neuropsychological assessment. (R. 21.) Nor did Plaintiff follow up on a
recommendation for further assessment of cognitive linguistic deficits or attend additional
speech therapy. (R. 21.) These facts supported the ALJ’s decision not to order additional
testing.
In sum, Plaintiff’s medical records, Plaintiff’s testimony and statements, the prior
administrative medical findings, the consultative examination results, and Dr. Porchia’s
testimony provided the ALJ with sufficient evidence to make a determination of disability.
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The ALJ also resolved inconsistencies between the RBANS and WAIS-IV and
WMS-IV testing. The ALJ credited Dr. Porchia’s testimony that the latter two tests were
more indicative of Plaintiff’s cognitive and memory functioning, as they were more
thorough tests than the RBANS test. (R. 21.) The ALJ pointed out that the RBANS “is
merely a very brief assessment tool, which would not be relied upon by a psychologist or
neuropsychologist to determine an individual’s overall cognitive functioning relative to a
traumatic brain injury.” (R. 15.) The RBANS test was administered as part of Plaintiff’s
speech language therapy, and the ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff had steadily improved in
speech therapy goals such as moderately complex recall tasks, complex reading tasks, and
complex word finding tasks. (R. 15–16.) The ALJ found Plaintiff’s improvement consistent
with a moderate limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information, which
was concordant with the WAIS-IV and WMS-IV test results. (R. 15–16.)
The Court turns now to some of Plaintiff’s other, specific arguments. Plaintiff
suggests that his mental health could have declined between the WAIS-IV and WMS-IV
tests on January 25, 2023, and the RBANS test on February 13, 2023. (Pl.’s Br. at 15.)
However, Plaintiff’s representative reported no such decline at the reconsideration stage of
administrative review (R. 107), and Plaintiff has identified no records other than the
RBANS test to support such a decline.
Plaintiff next observes that Drs. Bourdeaux and Waltonen did not have the RBANS
test results when they reached their medical opinions. (Pl.’s Br. at 16.) Similarly, Plaintiff
notes that Dr. Mylan did not mention the RBANS test in her findings, although Plaintiff
acknowledges that the test results were in his SSA file by the time of her review. (Pl.’s Br.
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at 	16.) 	The 	timing 	of 	the 	consultative 	examination, 	RBANS 	testing, 	and 	initial
administrative review is not in and of itself a basis for reversal. The dates of these events
were in the record before the ALJ, and Plaintiff has not shown the ALJ would have reached
a different result if he had explicitly considered the sequence of events. Moreover, given
the ALJ’s characterization of the RBANS test as a brief assessment tool on which a
psychologist or neuropsychologist would not rely to determine functioning, it is not likely
the ALJ would have found an opinion less persuasive because it was issued before the
RBANS test was administered.
Finally, Plaintiff contends this case is like Kaylan F. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-CV-2148
(DLM), 2023 WL 4407485 (D. Minn. July 7, 2023), where the court found the record was
not sufficiently developed to support the ALJ’s conclusions about the plaintiff’s limitations
in concentration, persistence, or ability to maintain pace. Id. at *4. The ALJ found those
abilities were moderately limited, despite the medical expert’s testimony that “he could not
say for sure on this record” whether Plaintiff would have limitations in concentration,
persistence, or pace. Id. at *3. The medical expert testified that “he did not get a good sense
from the record about the severity of compulsive behaviors, things like showering and
handwashing” and essentially “admitted his opinion on this subject was based on
insufficient evidence.” Id. at *4 (cleaned up).
Here, by contrast, Dr. Porchia did not say there was insufficient evidence or that she
was uncertain about her conclusions. Rather, Dr. Porchia gave concrete opinions on
whether Plaintiff met or equaled a listing and whether any of the “paragraph B” criteria
were satisfied. The ALJ explained in the written decision why additional testing was not
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necessary and why the existing evidence in the record was sufficient. The ALJ also resolved
the inconsistencies between the test results. Dr. Porchia’s testimony that additional tests
might be helpful and that reconciling inconsistent evidence in the record was challenging
does not necessarily mean the record was insufficient or that inconsistencies could not be
reconciled.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	The relief requested in Plaintiff’s Brief (Dkt. No. 16) be DENIED;
2. 	The relief requested in Defendant’s Brief (Dkt. No. 12) be GRANTED; and
3. 	JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: January 20, 2026 	s/ John F. Docherty
JOHN F. DOCHERTY
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days
after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to
those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set
forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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