USA v. Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	Case No. 25-cr-352 (KMM/LIB)
Plaintiff,
v. 	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Mark Anthony Davis Jr.,
Defendant.
This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a
general assignment, made in accordance with the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local
Rule 72.1, upon Defendant Mark Anthony Davis Jr.’s (hereafter “Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss
the Indictment, [Docket No. 20]. Finding no hearing necessary, the Court took Defendant’s Motion
under advisement.
For the reasons discussed herein, it is recommended that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
the Indictment, [Docket No. 20], be DENIED.
I. 	Background
Defendant is charged with one (1) count of Felon in Possession of a Firearm in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). (Indictment [Docket No. 1]).
II. 	Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment. [Docket No. 20].
Defendant seeks an Order of this Court dismissing the Indictment underlying the present
case on the grounds that the charge against him violates (1) the Second Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n,
Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022); and (2) the nexus requirement of the Commerce
CASE 0:25-cr-00352-KMM-LIB Doc. 28 Filed 03/06/26 Page 1 of 4

2
Clause in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680,
144 S. Ct. 1889, 219 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2024). (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [Docket No. 20] at 1, 2).
On April 19, 2025, a Grand Jury in the District of Minnesota returned an Indictment finding
probable cause that Defendant, having been previously convicted of Aggravated Assault, Felon in
Possession of Firearm, Third Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, Fifth Degree Drug Possession, and
Theft, which were punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, was in possession
of a Ruger model LC9s 9mm semiautomatic pistol bearing serial number 451-29038 in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). (Indictment [Docket No. 1]).
In his Motion, Defendant acknowledged that his arguments that the charges against him
violate the Second Amendment and the nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause are foreclosed
by United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024), where the Eighth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Mot. to Dismiss [Docket No. 20] at 1). Nevertheless,
Defendant files this Motion to preserve the issues for further appellate review. (Id.).
A conviction under § 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that (1) the defendant
sustained a previous conviction for a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one
year; (2) he knowingly possessed a firearm; (3) he knew that he belonged to a category of persons
prohibited from possessing a firearm; and (4) the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.
See Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200, 204 L. Ed. 2d 594 (2019); United
States v. Coleman, 961 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2020). In Jackson, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, reviewing the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in light of Bruen, upheld the “longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” and found § 922(g)(1) to be constitutional.
Jackson, 110 F.4th at 1125 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008)).
CASE 0:25-cr-00352-KMM-LIB Doc. 28 Filed 03/06/26 Page 2 of 4

3
The Court in Jackson went on to hold that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is
“[c]onsistent with the Supreme Court's assurances that recent decisions on the Second Amendment
cast no doubt on the constitutionality of laws prohibiting the possession of firearms by felons[.]”
Id. at 1129.
The Eighth Circuit has also held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Commerce Clause.
See, e.g., United States v. Stuckey, 255 F.3d 528, 529 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hill, 386
F.3d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 2004) (Ҥ 922(g)(1) is a permissible extension of congressional authority
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.”); United States v. Schmidt, 571 F.3d 743, 746 (8th Cir. 2009)
(“This court has repeatedly held § 922(g)(1) . . . is expressly tied to interstate commerce.”).
This Court is bound to apply the precedent of the Eighth Circuit. See e.g., M.M. ex rel.
L.R. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 F.3d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 2008); Hood v. United States, 342
F.3d 861, 864 (8th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss the Indictment, [Docket No. 20], be DENIED.
III. 	Conclusion
Thus, based on the foregoing and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, [Docket No. 20], be DENIED.
Dated: March 6, 2026 	s/Leo I. Brisbois
Hon. Leo I. Brisbois
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CASE 0:25-cr-00352-KMM-LIB Doc. 28 Filed 03/06/26 Page 3 of 4

4
N O T I C E
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District Court
and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “A party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate
judge’s proposed findings and recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy of the
recommended disposition[.]” A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being
served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the
word or line limits set forth in LR 72.2(c).
Under Advisement Date: This Report and Recommendation will be considered under advisement 14
days from the date of its filing. If timely objections are filed, this Report and Recommendation will be
considered under advisement from the earlier of: (1) 14 days after the objections are filed; or (2) from
the date a timely response is filed.
CASE 0:25-cr-00352-KMM-LIB Doc. 28 Filed 03/06/26 Page 4 of 4