USA v. Eskridge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America, 	Case No. 25-cr-207 (MJD/DTS)
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND
v. 	REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Noah Omar-Jahi Eskridge,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Noah Omar-Jahi Eskridge is charged with one count of possession of
a firearm as a felon. He moves (1) to suppress post-arrest statements; (2) to suppress
physical evidence seized at an East Bethel residence; and (3) for a hearing to review the
validity of a tracking warrant pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). For
the reasons stated below, the Court denies Eskridge’s motion for a Franks hearing and
recommends the motions to suppress be denied.
FACTS
I. 	Tracking Warrant
On the morning of December 31, 2024, St. Paul police officers responded to a
report of shots fired. Gov.’s Ex. 2 at 2 (Tracking Warrant Appl.). Witnesses reported “a
black male with long black dread locks wearing a white t-shirt, light blue jeans and white
basketball shoes exited the front passenger seat of a light grey or green colored older
model Ford Taurus and fired shorts toward a dark colored suburban[.]” Id. Surveillance
video from a nearby tobacco shop captured a green Ford Taurus parked directly in front
of the store next to a dark colored SUV. Id. The surveillance footage showed a black
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male, who officers identified as Kier Shawn Johnson, exit the front passenger seat of the
Taurus and enter the tobacco store. Id. While the Taurus was parked at the tobacco shop,
the driver briefly rolled the window down to spit. Id. at 3; see also Def.’s Ex. 1 at 9:10:50–
55 (Surveillance Video). Officers subsequently identified Eskridge as an associate of
Johnson. Tracking Warrant Appl. 2. Officer Timothy Moore from the St. Paul Police gun
unit identified the driver of the Taurus as Eskridge. Id. at 3.
Through open-source social media research, officers determined that Eskridge
was in a relationship with a woman named Brooklyn Williams. Id. at 2–3. A query of law
enforcement databases indicated that Williams owned a green 2006 Ford Taurus
matching the description of the suspect vehicle and registered to an Anoka County
address. Id. at 3. On January 7, 2025, police observed Eskridge leave the Anoka County
address driving the Taurus. Id. The next day, based on the above information, St. Paul
Police Officer Brian Wanschura requested a warrant to install a tracking device on the
Taurus, claiming that “[t]he information obtained from the tracking warrant will lead to
additional drivers of the vehicle and assist with tracking and locating the known suspects
to create a plan to safely conduct an arrest of the known suspect(s).” Id. An Anoka County
District Court Judge issued the tracking warrant that day. Id. at 6–7.
II. 	Eskridge’s Arrest
On January 28, 2025, Eskridge was charged in Ramsey County District Court with
drive-by shooting. Gov.’s Ex. 1 at 4 (Search Warrant Appl.). That same day, a woman
reported that Eskridge pointed a firearm at and tried to shoot her. Id. Shortly thereafter,
officers located Eskridge and took him into custody. Id.
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Body-worn-camera footage captured Eskridge’s arrest. See Def.’s Ex. 2 (Officer
Sanchez BWC). When Officer Sanchez arrived on scene at approximately 12:33 P.M.,
Eskridge was already handcuffed, lying face down on the ground next to the Taurus. See
id. at 12:32:52. Officers patted Eskridge down, pulled him to his feet, and escorted him to
Officer Sanchez’s police cruiser. Id. at 12:33:00–34:00. Eskridge repeatedly asked why
he was being arrested. Id. When Officer Sanchez began to explain, the following
exchange occurred:
Officer Sanchez: So, okay, so we got a report. . .
Eskridge: Yeah.
Officer Sanchez: of someone shooting at another individual.
Eskridge: What!
Officer Sanchez: Yes, okay?
Eskridge: When?
Officer Sanchez: Umm, just like literally maybe not even ten
minutes ago.
Eskridge: Alright.
Officer Sanchez: So, we go to the address. Where were you
just at?
Eskridge: Literally where I was just at? I was just on Maryland.
Officer Sanchez: Okay, great.
Eskridge: Literally.
Officer Sanchez: Sorry you’re all . . . 1
1 Officer Sanchez was wiping snow off Eskridge as she made this remark. Officer
Sanchez BWC 12:33:46–48.
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Eskridge: Yeah, literally, that gun that’s in the car right now. I
can tell you right now. Listen. There’s a gun in the car right
now, that gun is my wife’s gun, bro.
Officer Sanchez BWC 12:33:24–54. Eskridge continued to speak intermittently with
Officer Sanchez for another two to three minutes. See generally id. Police recovered a
9mm firearm from the Taurus. Search Warrant Appl. 4.
III. 	Search Warrant
On the day of Eskridge’s arrest, St. Paul Police Officer Timothy Moore applied for
and obtained a warrant to search 19715 Tri Oak Circle in East Bethel. Search Warrant
Appl. 5. The application sought permission to search the East Bethel residence for
firearms, firearm related equipment, ammunition, evidence of occupancy, and specific
clothing believed to belong to Eskridge. Id. at 1. The supporting affidavit recited the facts
contained in the tracking warrant application and summarized Eskridge’s arrest. It also
included the following facts.
Home-video footage of the December 31, 2024 shooting showed Johnson exit the
front passenger seat of the Taurus and fire several rounds from a handgun. Search
Warrant Appl. 3. Officers recovered thirteen 10mm casings from the scene of the
December 31 shooting. Search Warrant Appl. 2. Surveillance footage showed the driver
of the Taurus, whom law enforcement identified as Eskridge, Supra, Part I, wearing a
black sweatshirt. Search Warrant Appl. 3. Williams, who was in a relationship with
Eskridge, Supra, Part I, lived at the East Bethel residence. Id. at 3. Officer Moore
observed Eskridge driving the Taurus on January 22, 2025. Id. After conducting
surveillance, officers found that the Taurus was parked at the East Bethel residence every
morning. Id. Anoka County Deputies (who knew Eskridge) reported him living at the East
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Bethel residence. Id. Eskridge was ineligible to possess firearms due to prior felony
convictions. Id. at 4.
On January 28, 2025, an Anoka County District Court Judge issued the search
warrant. Search Warrant Appl. 8. Officer Moore executed the search warrant the same
day, 	recovering 	“a 	black 	sweatshirt, 	firearm 	equipment 	and 	accessories, 	and
ammunition.” Gov.’s Suppl. Mem. in Opp’n 4, Dkt. No. 38.2
ANALYSIS
I. 	Suppression of Post-Arrest Statements
Eskridge moves to suppress several statements he made to Officer Sanchez
shortly after his January 28, 2025 arrest. Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Statements, Dkt. No. 24.
To safeguard criminal defendants’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination,
“Miranda requires that law enforcement agents provide certain prescribed warnings
before conducting an interrogation of a suspect who is in custody.” United States v. New,
491 F.3d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
A person is in custody for purposes of Miranda when “there is a formal arrest or restraint
on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” United States v.
Turner, 125 F.4th 892, 896 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d
822, 826 (8th Cir. 2004)). An interrogation occurs “when an officer’s interaction with the
suspect is likely to elicit an incriminating response.” United States v. Wise, 588 F.3d 531,
536 (8th Cir. 2009) (United States v. Torres–Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir. 2007)).
Pre-Miranda statements prompted by custodial interrogation must be suppressed. See
2 The search warrant return was not included as part of the Government’s Exhibit 1
submitted to the Court. See generally Search Warrant Appl.
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Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492–98. However, Miranda does not require the suppression of
spontaneous 	statements—”[v]oluntary 	statements 	unprompted 	by 	interrogation 	are
admissible with or without Miranda warnings.” United States v. Bailey, 831 F.3d 1035,
1038 (8th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Harris, 64 F.4th 999, 1002 (8th Cir. 2023)
(affirming a district court’s finding that “statements were spontaneous, volunteered, and
not in response to interrogation”).
As an initial matter, the Government represents that the only statement it is
considering using at trial is the following: “Yeah, literally, that gun that’s in the car right
now. I can tell you right now. Listen. There’s a gun in the car right now, that gun is my
wife’s gun, bro.” Gov.’s Post-Hr’g Mem. in Opp’n 4 n.1; Officer Sanchez BWC 12:33:47–
54. Therefore, to the extent Eskridge moves to suppress other pre-Miranda, post-arrest
statements, the motion is moot. See United States v. Miller, No. 19-cr-64, 2020 WL
4060754, at *8 (D. Minn. May 19, 2020), R. & R. adopted by 2020 WL 4059888 (D. Minn.
July 20, 2020). Three more preliminary matters narrow the scope of the dispute. First,
Eskridge was in custody when he made the at-issue statement. See Officer Sanchez
BWC 12:33:24–54. Second, Eskridge was not provided a Miranda warning before making
the statement. Id. Third, Officer Sanchez’s question—where were you just at—was
reasonably likely to solicit an incriminating response.3 The fighting issue, then, is whether
Eskridge’s statement was volunteered or was made in response to Officer Sanchez’s
custodial interrogation. For several reasons, the Court is persuaded that the statement
was volunteered.
3 The Government does not appear to dispute any of these findings. See Gov.’s Post-Hr’g
Mem. in Opp’n 4–6.
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First, Eskridge’s statement was not responsive to Officer Sanchez’s impermissible
question. Courts tend to conclude a statement is volunteered when it does not bear “a
rational relationship to the impermissible question that preceded it.” United States v.
Miller, 382 F. Supp. 2d 350, 375 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); see also United States v. Castro, 723
F.2d 1527, 1530 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding a statement offering money unresponsive to an
officer asking what was going on); United States v. Wiggins, No. 12-cr-6114, 2013 WL
1645180, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013), R. & R. adopted by 2013 WL 2553971
(W.D.N.Y. June 10, 2013) (“Wiggins’s statement that he possessed the gun in order to
protect his family, although it concerns the general subject matter of the pistol, does not
directly respond to Wengert’s question about whether he had a permit for the pistol. This
fact also supports a finding that the statement was spontaneous.”). Cf. Rosa v. McCray,
396 F.3d 210, 222 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that a defendant not only responded to a
routine booking question “but also volunteered a response beyond the scope of the
question”). Here, Officer Sanchez asked Eskridge, “where were you just at?” Officer
Sanchez BWC 12:33:41–42. The at-issue statement—that there was a gun in the Taurus
and that it belonged to Eskridge’s wife’s—is non-responsive to Officer Sanchez’s
question. Moreover, this is not a case where all (or most) subsequent statements logically
flow from a custodial interrogation. Compare, Millhausen v. United States, 253 A.3d 565,
572 (D.C. 2021) (concluding “that the statements at issue were responsive to the officers’
interrogation” because “[t]he officers repeatedly asked [the defendant] what happened”),
with Wiggins, 2013 WL 1645180, at *2, 6–7 (noting that officers only asked a defendant
where his firearm permit was).
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Second, 	Eskridge’s 	statement 	did 	not 	directly 	follow 	Officer 	Sanchez’s
impermissible question. Courts have found the flow of conversation to be instructive when
deciding whether a statement was prompted by custodial interrogation. See United States
v. Laroche, No. CR. 08-30056-01, 2008 WL 4224782, at *5–6 (D.S.D. Sept. 9, 2008)
(“LaRoche made this statement after a moment of silence, in which Officer House said
nothing, so it was not a statement in response to interrogation.”); Wiggins, 2013 WL
1645180, at *8 (“[T]he statement was not made directly after Wengert questioned Wiggins
about ‘where’ his permit was.”). Here, Eskridge answered Officer Sanchez’s question.
Officer Sanchez BWC 12:33:42–44 (“Literally where I was just at? I was just on
Maryland.”). Officer Sanchez acknowledged Eskridge’s response and did not immediately
follow up. Id. at 12:33:44–45 (“Okay, great.”). Then Officer Sanchez apologized for the
snow on Eskridge. Id. at 12:33:46–47 (“Sorry you’re all . . .”). Only then did Eskridge offer
information about the gun in the Taurus. When Eskridge made the at-issue statement, he
had already completely answered Officer Sanchez’s question, Officer Sanchez had not
followed up, and the conversation had moved on. Therefore, the conversational context
cuts against concluding Eskridge’s statement was a response to Officer Sanchez’s
impermissible question.
Third, nothing else in the record suggests Officer Sanchez’s question intentionally
or unintentionally prompted the at-issue statement. Eskridge, not Officer Sanchez,
initiated the conversation. Officer Sanchez BWC 12:33:00–10 (Eskridge repeatedly
asking why he was being arrested). Once the conversation began, Eskridge repeatedly
and voluntarily engaged with Officer Sanchez before she asked an impermissible
question. Id. at 12:33:00–41. And Officer Sanchez only asked one question before
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Eskridge made the statement. So, this is not a case where a taciturn defendant was
cajoled into conversation through custodial interrogation. Nor is this a case where a
lengthy custodial interrogation makes it impracticable to parse voluntary responses from
prompted ones. Moreover, Eskridge offers no distinct argument to support the conclusion
that the statement was prompted by Officer Sanchez’s narrow question. See generally
Def.’s Post-Hr’g Mem. in Supp. In sum, the Court is persuaded that the at-issue statement
was volunteered. Therefore, the Court recommends denying Eskridge’s motion to
suppress post-arrest statements.
II. 	Suppression of Physical Evidence
Eskridge moves to suppress physical evidence seized from the East Bethel
residence, claiming that the application to search the residence was not supported by
probable cause. Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Evidence, Dkt. No. 30. The Fourth Amendment
prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and provides that law enforcement may
only obtain a warrant “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
U.S. Const., amend. IV. To establish probable cause, a warrant affidavit must set forth
“sufficient facts to lead a prudent person to believe that there is a ‘fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v.
Notman, 831 F.3d 1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Warford, 439 F.3d
836, 841 (8th Cir. 2006)). That is, “there must be evidence of a nexus between the
contraband and the place to be searched before a warrant may properly issue.” United
States v. Perry, 531 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Tellez, 217
F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 2000)). A judge issuing a warrant may “draw reasonable
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inferences from the totality of the circumstances” to determine whether such nexus exists.
United States v. Keele, 589 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.
Alexander, 574 F.3d 484, 490 (8th Cir. 2009)).
Reviewing 	courts 	must 	afford 	“great 	deference” 	to 	the 	probable 	cause
determination of the judge who issued the warrant, and the reviewing inquiry is limited “to
discerning whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed.” United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 962 (8th Cir. 2010). So long as the
issuing judge had a “substantial basis” to conclude the “search would uncover evidence
of wrongdoing,” this Court must uphold the probable cause determination. United States
v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236
(1983)).
A. 	Probable Cause
Eskridge argues that “there was no nexus to believe evidence of a crime would be
found at the East Bethel house[.]” Def.’s Post-Hr’g Mem. in Supp. 7. Eskridge contends
“there should be no per se assumption that someone found in possession of a single
firearm on one occasion in one location, and who allegedly had been present when
someone else possessed a firearm a month earlier, will have additional firearms in a
residence.” Id. at 10. This argument is not persuasive.
As an initial matter, the warrant affidavit included more than enough facts to
establish that Eskridge lived at the East Bethel residence. See Search Warrant Appl. 3.
The affidavit also established that Eskridge illegally possessed a firearm. Id. at 4 (female
caller reporting that Eskridge tried to shoot her). “[W]hen the government has shown
probable cause that a defendant illegally possessed a firearm, that showing naturally
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extends to his residence.” United States v. Huntington, No. 20-cr-145 (ECT/BRT), 2021
WL 165112, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 19, 2021). The wrinkle here is that the Government had
already recovered a 9mm firearm from the Taurus before searching the East Bethel
residence.
The Government argues that the facts of the investigation “allowed the issuing
judge to draw a reasonable inference, that the recovered 9mm firearm was not the only
firearm, firearm equipment, and ammunition that the Defendant possessed.” Gov.’s Post-
Hr’g Mem. in Opp’n 9. This is fairly debatable as to the likelihood of Eskridge possessing
additional firearms. True, the affidavit established that Eskridge twice engaged in criminal
activities involving firearms: first, by participating in the December 31, 2024 drive-by
shooting; and second, by pointing a gun at a female victim on January 28, 2025. The
Government’s position—that Eskridge’s criminal history outlined in the warrant affidavit is
sufficient for the issuing magistrate to draw a reasonable inference that Eskridge
possessed additional firearms—has some support. Cf. Briscoe v. St. Louis Cnty., No.
4:24-CV-440, 2025 WL 917227, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 26, 2025) (“Drawing on its judicial
experience and common sense, the Court finds that it was reasonable for Detective
Percich to infer that a violent criminal would possess multiple firearms in addition to
ammunition and related gear.”) (citation modified); Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S.
535, 548–49 (2012) (“Under these circumstances—set forth in the warrant—it would not
have been unreasonable for an officer to conclude that there was a ‘fair probability’ that
the sawed-off shotgun was not the only firearm Bowen owned.”). On the other hand,
Johnson, not Eskridge, fired the 10mm gun on December 31, 2024. Nothing in the warrant
affidavit suggested the 10mm gun was Eskridge’s. As for the firearm reported on
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January 28, officers presumably recovered that firearm (the 9mm pistol) when they
arrested Eskridge. Nor does Officer Moore articulate in the warrant affidavit, given his
expertise, why he believed Eskridge likely possessed additional firearms. See generally
Search Warrant Appl.
Regardless, the Government did not uncover any firearms in the search of the East
Bethel residence. Gov.’s Suppl. Mem. in Opp’n 4. Instead, the Government found
ammunition, firearm accessories, and a black sweatshirt. Id. Because people ordinarily
keep their clothes in their residence, the warrant affidavit established that Eskridge
resided at the East Bethel address, and the black sweatshirt could link Eskridge to the
December 31 drive-by shooting, there was probable cause for the Government to search
the East Bethel residence for a black sweatshirt. It was also reasonable for the issuing
magistrate to conclude it was fairly likely that ammunition and firearm accessories for the
9mm pistol would be found at the East Bethel residence. Therefore, even assuming that
the warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause to search the East Bethel address
for additional firearms, “items seized pursuant to valid portions of the warrant need not be
suppressed.” United States v. Timley, 443 F.3d 615, 622 (8th Cir. 2006).
B. 	The Good-Faith Exception
Even if the warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause, the Leon good-faith
exception would apply. Under the good-faith exception courts will not suppress “evidence
obtained 	in 	objectively 	reasonable 	reliance 	on 	a 	subsequently 	invalidated 	search
warrant.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). The good-faith exception does
not apply in four limited circumstances: (1) when an affiant knowingly or recklessly misled
a warrant-issuing judge with false information, (2) when the issuing judge “wholly
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abandoned his judicial role,” (3) when it is “entirely unreasonable” to believe an affidavit
creates probable cause for a warrant; and (4) when a warrant is so “facially deficient”—
such as by omitting a particularized place to search or items to seize—that no officer
could reasonably presume it is valid. Id. at 923.
At issue here is the third circumstance—whether the affidavit is so lacking in indicia
of probable cause “as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”
United States v. Jackson, 784 F.3d 1227, 1230 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). As the
Eighth Circuit has explained, “‘[e]ntirely unreasonable’ is not a phrase often used by the
Supreme Court, and we find nothing in Leon or in the Court’s subsequent opinions that
would justify our dilution of the Court’s particularly strong choice of words.” United States
v. Carpenter, 341 F.3d 666, 670 (8th Cir. 2003). For that reason, “it is rare for a search
warrant affidavit to be so flawed as to meet this demanding standard[.]” United States v.
Rios-Uscanga, No. 16-cr-316, 2017 WL 1534746, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 13, 2017), R. & R.
adopted by 2017 WL 1534745 (D. Minn. Apr. 26, 2017). This is not one of those rare
cases.
The Court has already explained why the warrant affidavit established probable
cause for officers to search the East Bethel residence for the items seized. Supra, Part
II.A. That it is a close call whether the affidavit established probable cause to search for
additional firearms suffices to explain why the affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render officers’ belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.
Accordingly, the Court recommends Eskridge’s motion to suppress physical evidence
seized during the search of the East Bethel residence be denied.
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III. 	Franks Hearing
Finally, Eskridge moves for a hearing to review the validity of a tracking warrant
pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Def.’s Franks Mot., Dkt. No. 31.
Franks allows criminal defendants to “request a hearing to challenge a search warrant on
the ground that the supporting affidavit contains factual misrepresentations or omissions
relevant to the probable cause determination.” United States v. Arnold, 725 F.3d 896, 898
(8th Cir. 2013). If the issuing judge’s probable cause determination was based on such
an affidavit, the search warrant may be invalid. United States v. Conant, 799 F.3d 1195,
1199 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 774 (8th Cir.
2001)). To receive a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a substantial preliminary
showing that (1) the affidavit contained a false statement (or omission) made either
knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (2) with the false statement
corrected and/or the missing information inserted, the affidavit no longer establishes
probable cause for the search. United States v. Gonzalez, 781 F.3d 422, 430 (8th Cir.
2015).
This preliminary showing requires defendants to “offer specific allegations along
with supporting affidavits or similarly reliable statements.” Id. “A Franks hearing must be
denied unless the defendant makes a strong initial showing of deliberate falsehood or
reckless disregard of the truth.” United States v. Freeman, 625 F.3d 1049, 1052
(8th Cir. 2010). “In determining if an affiant’s statements were made with reckless
disregard for the truth, the test is whether, after viewing all the evidence, the affiant must
have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons
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to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.” United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d
1107, 1114 (8th Cir. 2011).
Eskridge contends that the tracking warrant application contains information that
is either knowingly or recklessly false. First, Eskridge argues that “[i]t would be impossible
to conclusively identify anyone” based on the surveillance footage because “the face of
the driver of the Taurus is visible for approximately two seconds.” Def.’s Franks Mot. 3.
Second, Eskridge “does not believe that he was ever seen driving [the Taurus] on January
7th” because “[t]he address where [Williams’s] vehicle is registered is located on a large
lot in Anoka County, and there is an R.V. on the property that would have blocked anyone
from seeing the driveway.” Id. Neither alleged falsehood passes muster.
Eskridge is correct that the driver of the Taurus is only visible for a few seconds on
the surveillance footage. Surveillance Video 9:10:52–54. But, as the Government points
out, “[e]ven a brief appearance on video can be paused [and] carefully reviewed any
number of times.” Gov.’s Post-Hr’g Mem. in Opp’n 13. Having carefully reviewed the
surveillance footage, it is plausible that officers—with the benefit of comparing the paused
footage to known photographs—identified Eskridge. Without something more, Eskridge
fails to demonstrate that the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of the statement that Officer Moore identified the driver of the Taurus as Eskridge.
Tracking Warrant App. 3.
As for Eskridge’s claim that officers could not have seen him driving the Taurus on
January 7, 2025, he offers no evidence or sworn statement to support this bare assertion.
To satisfy the required preliminary showing, Eskridge must offer “supporting affidavits or
similarly reliable statements.” United States v. Gonzalez, 781 F.3d 422, 430 (8th Cir.
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2015); see also United States v. El-Alamin, 574 F.3d 915, 925 (8th Cir. 2009) (“A mere
allegation standing alone, without an offer of proof in the form of a sworn affidavit of a
witness or some other reliable corroboration, is insufficient to make the difficult preliminary
showing.” quoting United States v. Mathison, 157 F.3d 541, 548 (8th Cir. 1998)).
Eskridge’s brief factual description of the property in a legal brief is not enough. Moreover,
even accepting that the Taurus is registered to a large lot and there is an R.V. on the
property, this would not make it impossible for officers to see the Taurus parked in the
driveway or observe Eskridge leaving the East Bethel residence. Because Eskridge fails
to satisfy the required preliminary showing, his motion for a Franks hearing is denied.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Defendant Noah
Omar-Jahi Eskridge’s Motion for Hearing Pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (Dkt. No. 31) is
DENIED.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS THAT:
1. 	Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained in Violation of the
Fourth Amendment (Dkt. No. 23) be DENIED;
2. 	Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Statements (Dkt. No. 24) be DENIED; and
3. 	Defendant’s Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained in Violation
of the Fourth Amendment (Dkt. No. 30) be DENIED.
Dated: November 21, 2025 	__s/ David T. Schultz______
DAVID T. SCHULTZ
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. 	A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All
objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set for in LR 72.2(c).
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