USA v. Wilkinson

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v. 	ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Case No. 25-cr-00200 (MJD/LIB)
James Earl Wilkinson,
Defendants.
Robert D. Richman, Robert D. Richman LLC, Counsel for Defendant.
Mary Riverso, Assistant United States Attorney, Counsel for Respondents.
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court upon the Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) of United States Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois filed
January 16, 2026. [Doc. 60.] Defendant James Earl Wilkinson (hereafter
“Defendant”) has filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. [Doc. 61.]
The Plaintiff responded to the objections. [Doc. 62.]
Pursuant to statute, the Court has conducted a de novo review upon the
record. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b). Based upon that review, the
Court adopts the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Brisbois.
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I. 	Facts
The following facts are adopted from the R&R. [Doc. 60 at 2–8.] However,
the Court includes additional facts which are not contrary to those already
included in the R&R but are raised by Defendant and necessary to understand
Defendant’s objections. [See Doc. 61 at 3–5.] Further, the Court’s description of
the facts below highlight only those relevant for the Court to decide the matters
at issue. For a full description of the facts, see the R&R. [Doc. 60 at 2–8.]
On October 16, 2022, around 5:30 a.m., a 911 call was transferred from the
Pine County Sheriff’s Department to the Duluth Police Department regarding a
shooting in the downtown Duluth area. [Id. at 2 (citing Def. Ex. 10).] Scott
Lindgren had placed the call, and he claimed that he had been in the alley behind
Sammy’s Pizza in downtown Duluth when Defendant attacked him, shot him in
the elbow, and stole $1,500 from him. [Id. (citing Def. Ex. 10A at 1–5).] Lindgren
communicated to police that Defendant had been driving either a white Chevy
Malibu or a white Chevy Cruze with a bumper that did not match the rest of the
car. [Id. (citing Def. Ex. 10A at 5).]
The Pine County Sheriff’s Office went to speak to Lindgren soon after the
initial 911 call. [Doc. 61 at 3 (citing Tr. at 67.)] Pine County police interviewed
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Lindgren and found discrepancies in his account of what transpired. [Doc. 61 at
3.] Pine County sheriffs who responded found no evidence to corroborate that
Lindgren had been shot. [Id. at 5 (citing Tr. 51).] Medics also confirmed that
Lindgren had a minor scrape on his elbow, but it was not consistent with a
gunshot wound. [Id. (citing Tr. 51).] Lindgren had also told the sheriffs that
Defendant had shot and hit his side view mirror, but officers did not find
damage to the car that was consistent with a gunshot. [Id. (citing Tr. 53).]
This information, including the discrepancies in Lindgren’s account, was
relayed to the Duluth Police Department, although the exact timeline remains
somewhat elusive. [Id. (citing Tr. 51).] Pine County deputies reported to Duluth
Police Officer Tomlin that Lindgren had a scrape on his elbow that was
inconsistent with a gunshot wound. [Doc. 61 at 4 (citing Tr. 51).] Officer Tomlin
called Lindgren that same morning around 8:08 a.m. [Doc. 61 at 4 (citing Def. Ex.
11).] During their phone call, Lindgren’s account of what transpired continued
to change. [Id.] The Duluth Police Department continued their investigation, and
they did not find any evidence that there had been a shooting in the area behind
Sammy’s Pizza. [Doc. 60 at 5–6.]
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However, earlier that morning around 6:00 a.m., Duluth Police
Department Investigator Elijah Anderson had learned of the alleged shooting
and robbery behind Sammy’s. [Doc 60 at 3 (citing Tr. 18).] He was informed that
Defendant had been implicated by name; that Defendant was allegedly in
possession of and used a handgun; and that Defendant had been driving a white
passenger car, possibly a Chevy Malibu or a Chevy Cruze. [Id. (citing Tr. at 18,
19).] As Investigator Anderson went to leave the police station to begin his
patrol, an active 911 call came in from Maleecyia Hopson for a domestic incident.
[Id. (citing Tr. 19, 20).]
At approximately 6:44 a.m., Hopson called 911 to report that the father of
her son, Defendant, had assaulted her that morning at her apartment complex.
[Id. (citing Gov’t. Ex. 1 at 2).] Hopson mentioned that Defendant was in
possession of a firearm and had also been known to carry a firearm in the past.
[Id. (citing Gov’t. Ex. 1 at 2, 3).] Hopson also told police that Defendant had
arrived at the apartment complex in a silver Buick LaCrosse. [Id. (citing Gov’t.
Ex. 1 at 5).]
While she was on the 911 call, Defendant returned to Hopson’s apartment
and pounded on the door asking for his car keys. [Id. (citing Def. Ex. 12 at 03:15–
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03:21).] Hopson reported that Defendant told her he was going to “stash the gun
he has.” [Doc. 61 at 4 (Def. Ex 12A at 6; Tr. 45).] Defendant eventually left after
Hopson did not let him in, and she observed him fleeing into a wooded area
behind the apartment complex on foot. [Doc. 60 at 3 (citing Gov’t. Ex. 1 at 2).]
Security camera footage confirms that Defendant did not return to his vehicle.
[Doc. 61 at 4 (citing Def. Ex. 13-18.)]
Investigator Anderson, and Duluth police Officers Letica and Dardis,
arrived at the apartment building in response to the 911 call. [Doc. 60 (citing Tr.
24).] Officer Dardis located Defendant’s vehicle in the parking lot. [Id. (citing Tr.
25).] The vehicle matched the make, model, color, and license plate number that
Hopson had described in her 911 call. [Id. (citing Tr. 25, 26).] Investigator
Anderson and Officer Letica briefly searched the park area behind the apartment
complex, but did not locate Defendant. [Id. (citing Tr. 42, 43).]
Investigator Anderson, Officer Letica, and Officer Dardis spoke to Hopson
at her apartment, where they noted she appeared to have been crying and
seemed to have some bruising and puffiness around her eyes. [Id. at 4 (citing Tr.
26).] Hopson never indicated that she had the keys to the Buick LaCrosse, and
officers were otherwise unable to locate them. [Id. (citing Tr. 62).] Officers
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received Defendant’s phone number from Hopson, and Investigator Anderson
spoke to Defendant briefly on the phone. [Id. (citing Tr. 26–27).] Defendant did
not come out of the woods, even after Investigator Anderson informed him that
his vehicle would be towed. [Id. (citing Tr. 27).] Officers then had the Buick
LaCrosse towed. [Id.]
The vehicle was towed by Gus Gaskill to his personal tow yard, an indoor
secure storage facility, pending issuance of a search warrant. [Id. (citing Tr. 29).]
Defendant’s mother, Melody Gonsalez, reportedly called to inquire about
obtaining her vehicle two weeks after it was towed, but at that time, the officers
informed her that Defendant was still under investigation and therefore, the car
would not be released. [Id. (citing 72).] There is no documentation regarding
whether or not Mr. Gaskill received any notification indicating that the Buick
LaCrosse was free to be released from his tow yard. [Id. at 6 (citing Tr. 60).] Ms.
Gonzales also apparently did not make any further attempts to retrieve her
vehicle. [Id. (citing 72, 74).]
In the meantime, the investigation into Lindgren’s account of a shooting
and robbery behind Sammy’s Pizza was closed in January 2023 for lack of
corroborating evidence. [Id. at 6 (citing Tr. 30).]
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On December 8, 2022, Duluth Police Officer Nitz submitted an application
to the Minnesota State Court requesting a search warrant for Defendant,
Hopson’s apartment, and Hopson’s Chevy Equinox for firearms, firearm
ammunition, and firearm indicia and accessories. [Id. (citing Gov’t. Ex. 1).] In his
affidavit submitted in support of the December 8, 2022, Search Warrant, Officer
Nitz provided information regarding Hopson’s 911 call; Defendant’s alleged
possession of a firearm on October 16, 2022; surveillance footage of Defendant
with an object believed to be a gun in his possession on October 16, 2022;
Defendant’s arrest warrant for the October 16, 2022, domestic incident; a
Minnesota Department of Corrections Felony Warrant issued on October 16,
2022; and a brief description of the phone calls between Investigator Anderson
and Defendant at the scene of the alleged domestic incident. [Id.]
The Honorable Mark M. Starr determined that probable cause existed to
support the issuance of the Warrant. [Id. at 7] Thereafter, law enforcement
officers executed the December 8, 2022, Search Warrant.
Meanwhile, Mr. Gaskill continued storing the Buick LaCrosse in his locked
storage area on Grand Avenue in Duluth. [Id. (citing Tr. 33).] Law enforcement
never obtained a search warrant or went to see the vehicle. [Id. (citing Tr. 59).]
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Mr. Gaskill, after the necessary time had passed, took legal possession of the
Buick LaCrosse. [Id. (citing Tr. 32; Def. Ex. 6).] Upon taking legal possession, Mr.
Gaskill looked inside the vehicle and found a pistol, drugs, a magazine for a
firearm, and an expended nine-millimeter cartridge casing. [Id. (citing Tr. 33).]
Mr. Gaskill turned over these items to the Duluth police. [Id. at 7–8.]
II. 	Report and Recommendation Determinations & Accompanying
Objections
As part of his R&R, Magistrate Judge Brisbois analyzed 1) Defendant’s
motion to dismiss count 2 of his indictment (the “felon in possession”) based on a
violation of the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution; and 2)
Defendant’s motions to suppress evidence, based on violations of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Court evaluates Magistrate Judge Brisbois’s determinations and holds
that 1) Defendant’s indictment for felon in possession does not violate his Second
Amendment rights, and 2) the police’s seizure of Defendant’s vehicle as well as
subsequent search of Hopson’s home pursuant to a search warrant does not
violate Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
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A. Motion to Dismiss Count Two [Doc. 37]
Defendant moved the Court to dismiss count 2 of his indictment (the felon
in possession charge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) because the charge
violates the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in New York State. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1
(2022). [Doc. 37.] Magistrate Judge Brisbois correctly dismissed this argument,
pointing to the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir.
2024). Therefore, because this Court is bound by Eighth Circuit precedent,
Magistrate Judge Brisbois viewed this matter as effectively settled. [See id.]
Defendant acknowledges that his objection to Magistrate Judge Brisbois’s
conclusion on the Second Amendment issue is based on the “current uncertainty
in Second Amendment jurisprudence” and was made solely to preserve the
argument on appeal. [See Doc. 61 at 1, n. 1.] However, the question surrounding
the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not uncertain in this Circuit. Therefore, this
objection is overruled.
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B. Motions to Suppress Evidence Obtained as a Result of Search and
Seizure [Docs. 38, 41.]
Defendant made two separate motions to suppress evidence obtained as a
result of a search and seizure. The first motion focuses on the seizure and
subsequent search of the Buick LaCross. [See Doc. 38.] The second motion
focuses on evidence seized during the search of Hopson’s apartment. [See Doc.
41.] Magistrate Judge Brisbois recommended denying both motions. [See Doc. 60
at 15–27.]
1. 	Motion to Suppress the Seizure and Subsequent Search of the Buick
LaCross [Doc. 38.]
In his motion, Defendant argues that the Duluth Police Department lacked
probable cause to support the seizure of the Buick LaCrosse. [Doc. 38; Doc. 52.]
As noted by Magistrate Judge Brisbois, the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement permits warrantless searches/seizures that
are supported by probable cause. See United States v. Soderman, 983 F.3d 369,
375 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51–52 (1970)).
Probable cause exists when, “given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable
person could believe there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime would be found in a particular place.” United States v. Murillo-Salgado,
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854 F.3d 407, 418 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Wells, 347 F.3d 280, 287
(8th Cir. 2003)). In evaluating whether probable cause supports a warrantless
search, “courts apply a common sense approach and consider all relevant
circumstances.” United States v. Wells, 347 F.3d 280, 287 (8th Cir. 2003).
Magistrate Judge Brisbois determined that the totality of the circumstances
supported a finding that there was probable cause for the police to tow the Buick
LaCrosse. [Doc. 60 at 19–20.] Specifically, Magistrate Judge Brisbois pointed out
that two different 911 calls—placed within an hour of each other—recognized the
Defendant by name, identified him as carrying a firearm, and described that he
was driving a “light colored passenger vehicle.” [Id. at 19]
Further, Magistrate Judge Brisbois dismissed Defendant’s argument that
the Pine County Sheriffs knew of inconsistencies in Lindgren’s account before
the Buick was towed. Magistrate Judge Brisbois emphasized that the two 911
calls triggered separate investigations involving different officers, noting that
“the Pine County officers who learned of these inconsistencies before the vehicle
was towed are different from the Duluth Police Department officers who, at the
time they made the decision to tow the vehicle, had no knowledge of Lindgren's
inconsistencies.” [Id. at 20.] Overall, Magistrate Judge Brisbois concluded that
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under these circumstances, the “potential likelihood of evidence in the
Defendant’s vehicle was at the time reasonably high.” [Id. at 19.]
Defendant’s objection challenged Magistrate Judge Brisbois’s iteration of
the facts, stating that the R&R “omitted” or “contradicted without basis”
important facts that demonstrated how Duluth police knew about the
inconsistencies in Lindgren’s narrative prior to the vehicle’s towing. [Id. at 3–4.]
However, when this Court conducted its independent review of the Evidentiary
Hearing transcript, it fails to see how the facts Defendant cites meaningfully
suggest that the Duluth Police responding to Hopson’s 911 call were entirely
sure of Lindgren’s inconsistent story about Defendant prior to the decision to
tow the vehicle.
For instance, Defendant notes that at the evidentiary hearing, the “Pine
County Sheriff’s Office kept the Duluth police apprised of the discrepancies in
Lindgren’s account,” as well as cited testimony that the Pine County Sheriffs
reported to Duluth police that Lindgren had not been shot in the stomach or the
elbow. [Doc. 61 at 3–4.] While the pages cited by Defendant demonstrate that
these inconsistencies were, at some point, communicated to the Duluth police
responding to Hopson’s 911 call, what is missing from the record is a clear
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understanding of who knew what, and at what time. The Court cannot conclude
from the record before it that the Pine County Sheriff’s Office had communicated
the fact the Lindgren was not telling the truth about Defendant’s use of a firearm
prior to the Duluth police department’s decision to tow the vehicle. Certainly, the
testimony cited by Defendant is not persuasive enough evidence to challenge
Magistrate Judge Brisbois’s conclusion that the two investigations occurred
“simultaneously.”
Further, the Court fails to see how the inclusion of certain factual
representations from Hopson to the Duluth police change the equation.
Defendant noted that Hopson told police that Defendant did not return to his
car, Defendant stated he was going to “stash his gun,” and security footage did
not show Defendant with a firearm. [Doc. 61 at 3–4.] However, the Court remains
persuaded by the government’s assertion that “each [911] report alone serves as
corroboration for the other.” [Doc. 55 at 9.] Two alleged victims independently
reported separate armed assaults by Defendant in the city of Duluth in the same
early morning hours, each identifying him by name and using similar descriptors
to describe the vehicle he drove. Such corroboration can support the finding of
probable cause. See e.g., United States v. Crawford, 93 F.4th 436, 440 (8th Cir.
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2024) (citing that the combination of multiple 911 calls, a victim’s statement that
the defendant had a gun, and police observation supported a finding that the
officers’ warrantless search of a vehicle was supported by probable cause);
United States v. Sims, 424 F.3d 691, 692–93 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that probable
cause existed to seize defendant’s car because it matched the victim’s description
of the car); United States v. Martinez, 78 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that
probable cause existed, at least in part, to search a car when two sources
identified defendant). In light of the similar reports from Lindgren and Hopson,
the additional facts Defendant highlights do not undermine the officers’ probable
cause determination that the vehicle may have contained evidence of the
assaults. Accordingly, those details do not alter the Court’s conclusion that law
enforcement had sufficient probable cause to seize the vehicle.
Further, Defendant erroneously relies on U.S. v. Gilette to argue that the
knowledge of the Pine County deputies is “properly imputed to the Duluth
police because they were all working together on the same investigation.” [Doc.
61 at 6–7 (citing United States v. Gillette, 245 F. 3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2001)).]
Defendant is correct that the collective knowledge doctrine is used to impute the
knowledge of one officer to another in order in certain circumstances. However,
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as described above, the Court has concluded that the Pine County Sheriffs and
the Duluth Police Departments were not working together on the same
investigation, which is crucial to application of this doctrine. Moreover, Eighth
Circuit case law makes clear that the collective knowledge doctrine is used to
“uphold an otherwise invalid search or seizure,” not the other way around. [See
Gillette, 245 F. 3d at 1034 (emphasis added).] Therefore, the attempt to rely on
this doctrine to invalidate the seizure in this circumstance is unavailing.
Finally, Defendant objects to how the government “continued to hold the
vehicle without regard to the fact that they had no basis to do so.” [Doc. 61 at 8.]
However, as the facts make clear, Mr. Gaskill waited the necessary time to take
legal possession of the vehicle. [Doc. 60 at 7.] There is no reason to conclude,
based on the present facts, that the police maintained control over the vehicle in
the interim period.
In sum, Defendant’s objections to Magistrate Judge Brisbois’s
recommendation to deny the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on
the illegal seizure are overruled.
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2. 	Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained as a Result of Search
Warrant for Hopson’s Apartment [Doc. 41.]
Defendant first argued that the December 8, 2022 search warrant the police
obtained to search Hopson’s apartment failed to establish a sufficient nexus
between Defendant’s possession of a firearm and Hopson’s home and, in the
alternative, argued that the search warrant was based on stale information. [Doc.
52 at 20–28.] Instead of reaching the merits of Defendant’s argument, Magistrate
Judge Brisbois concluded, after applying the factors outlined in United States v.
Gomez, that Defendant lacked standing to raise the challenge to evidence
flowing from the search warrant. [See Doc. 60 at 24–27 (citing 16 F.3d 254, 256 25
(8th Cir. 1994)). As part of his analysis, Judge Brisbois emphasized that:
Defendant fails to sufficiently allege that he has an ownership interest,
control over, or a subjective expectation of privacy in Ms. Hopson’s
Apartment subject to the December 8, 2022, Search Warrant. Moreover,
nothing on the record now before the Court supports a finding that
Defendant had an objective expectation of privacy in said apartment at the
time the December 8, 2022, Search Warrant, was issued or executed.
[Doc. 60 at 26.]
Defendant objects to such conclusion, arguing that his mother, Melody
Gonsalez, testified at the suppression hearing that Defendant lived with Hopson.
[Doc. 61 at 11–12.] Further, Defendant asserted that the issue of probable cause is
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“limited to the four corners of the search warrant affidavit.” [Id. at 12.] Finally,
Defendant emphasized throughout that because the government did not raise
the issue of standing, the argument was not completely developed. [Id. at 11–12.]
Defendant’s arguments, however, are unpersuasive. The Eighth Circuit
has noted that, “[b]ecause fourth amendment rights are personal, a person
challenging a search warrant must demonstrate that he or she has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched.” See United States v. Wiley, 847 F.2d
480, 481 (8th Cir. 1988). Magistrate Judge Brisbois correctly emphasized that
Defendant had not demonstrated that he had an expectation of privacy in
Hopson’s home. Instead, Defendant repeatedly demonstrates that the contrary is
true. For instance, Defendant originally noted that he had to “forcibly” enter
Hopson’s apartment—indicating that Defendant “did not have his own keys to
the apartment and was not permitted access”—and that for the two months the
police were tracking Defendant’s cell phone, the police did not “spot [Defendant]
in the area of Hopson’s apartment until December 8.” [Doc. 52 at 20–23.] Yet,
now Defendant takes issue with the Court’s conclusion that Defendant did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Hopson’s apartment.
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Defendant cannot have it both ways. The Court understands that the
evidence in front of it presents contradictory facts. One the one hand, Defendant
asserts that there is an insufficient nexus tying him to Hopson’s apartment. On
the other hand, Defendant points to his mother’s comments that he lives with
Hopson. However, the weight of the evidence favors Magistrate Judge Brisbois’s
interpretation that Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
Hopson’s apartment and therefore lacks standing to assert a challenge to what
evidence was discovered from the execution of the December 8, 2022 search
warrant. Not only does the objective evidence support his conclusion, Magistrate
Judge Brisbois was also in the best position to weigh witness credibility. See
United States v. Sinclair, 474 F.3d 1148, 1149 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that the
magistrate judge is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witness
testimony); United States v. Kuhnel, No. CR 17-158 (JRM/BRT), 2019 WL 6769417,
at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 12, 2019) (because Magistrate Judge was present for the
examination of the witness, she was “in a much better position to evaluate his
credibility and demeanor when subject to questioning” and therefore, the court
found that the “R&R accurately reflected the facts” and adopted them).
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As such, the Court need not reach Defendant’s objections to the search
warrant itself.
Accordingly, based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation
of United States Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois filed January 16, 2026. [Doc. 60.]
as follows:
1. 	Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count 2 [Doc. 37] is DENIED; and
2. 	Defendant’s Motions to Suppress Evidence Obtained as a Result of Search
and Seizure [Docs. 38, 41] are DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 12, 2026 	s/Michael J. Davis
Michael J. Davis
United States District Court
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