Rivera v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
EZEQUIEL RIVERA, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SEDGWICK CLAIMS
MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
ACE FIRE UNDERWRITERS
INSURANCE COMPANY, and
NESTLE USA INC.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-3247 (LMP/SGE)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Ezequiel Rivera, Jr., pro se Plaintiff.
Mack H. Reed, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant
Sedgwick Claims Management Services.
Amanda E. Becker and Joel T. Wiegert, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Minneapolis, MN,
for Defendant Ace Fire Underwriters Insurance Company.
Jennifer A. Nodes, Jackson Lewis, P.C., Minneapolis, MN, and Michaela Utrup and
Tony H. McGrath, Jackson Lewis P.C., Madison, WI, for Defendant Nestle USA Inc.
On July 7, 2025, the Court dismissed Plaintiff Ezequiel Rivera’s complaint without
prejudice. 	See generally ECF No. 92. 	Rivera thereafter moved to alter or amend the
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), ECF No. 94, and moved to
disqualify this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), ECF No. 104. The Court denied both
motions on September 19, 2025. ECF No. 117. Prior to the Court’s September 19 order,
Rivera filed a notice of appeal seeking to challenge the Court’s dismissal order. 	ECF
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No. 111. 	That appeal remains pending. 	See generally Rivera v. Sedgwick Claims
Management, et al., No. 25-2773 (8th Cir.).
Rivera now moves the Court for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b). 	ECF No. 118. 	Defendants Nestle USA Inc. (“Nestle”), ACE Fire
Underwriters Insurance Company (“ACE”) and Sedgwick Claims Management Services
(“Sedgwick”) (collectively “Defendants”), all responded. 	ECF Nos. 123–25. 	Rivera
replied to Defendants’ responses. ECF No. 128. The relief Rivera is seeking has now been
fully briefed. For the reasons that follow, Rivera is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b),
and the Court denies the motion.
BACKGROUND
The Court has detailed the factual background underlying Rivera’s complaint
extensively, see ECF No. 92 at 2–6; ECF No. 117 at 1–6, and incorporates that background
here. As it relates to the present motion, the Court notes that Rivera’s August 12, 2024
complaint accused Defendants of conspiring to deny him benefits after he was injured
while working for Nestle. See generally ECF No. 1 at 1–7. Rivera brought claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et. seq.; the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. ECF No. 1 at 6–7.
In dismissing Rivera’s complaint without prejudice, the Court first held that Rivera
did not state a plausible ERISA claim because he did not allege that he was “covered by an
employee benefit plan” sufficient to bring him within ERISA’s protections. 	ECF No. 92
at 8–9. 	The Court then held that the District of Minnesota was not a proper venue for
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Rivera’s Title VII and ADA claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), and that venue
was proper in one of Wisconsin’s federal districts. 	Id. at 10. 	The Court then chose to
dismiss Rivera’s complaint without prejudice instead of transferring the case to the Eastern
District of Wisconsin because Rivera had already filed two federal lawsuits there
challenging the very subject matter he challenged in this action. 	Id. at 11–12. 	Notably,
Rivera never asked the Court to transfer his case; instead, he argued that Minnesota was
the proper venue for this action. ECF No. 29 at 4–6.
On February 11, 2026, Rivera filed this Rule 60(b) motion. ECF No. 118. Relevant
here, Rule 60(b) allows a court to “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding” because of several enumerated 	factors, including:
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2, 6). Rivera asserts that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(2)
or 60(b)(6) because on July 15, 2025, the Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review
Commission (the “WLIRC”) awarded Rivera $18,737.95 in wrongfully withheld disability
benefits. 	ECF No. 119 at 1; see also ECF No. 122-1. 	Rivera argues that the WLIRC
decision is “newly discovered evidence” that helps support the federal claims he asserts in
this action, and he asks the Court to either: (1) allow him to file an amended complaint
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incorporating the new evidence; or (2) transfer his complaint to a federal district court in
Wisconsin. ECF No. 119 at 2.1
ANALYSIS
Rule 60(b) is to be given “a liberal construction so as to do substantial justice and
to prevent the judgment from becoming a vehicle of injustice.” MIF Realty L.P. v.
Rochester Assocs., 92 F.3d 752, 755 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). 	The relief provided under Rule 60(b) is “extraordinary,” however, and
“may be granted only upon an adequate showing of exceptional circumstances.” Williams
v. York, 891 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 	District courts have “wide
discretion” in ruling on Rule 60(b) motions. 	Jones v. Swanson, 512 F.3d 1045, 1048
(8th Cir. 2008).
Rivera is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(2) because the newly discovered
evidence he relies on, namely the WLIRC decision, was not in existence at the time
judgment was entered. 	Scheffler v. Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No. 14-cv-2946
(JNE/SER), 2015 WL 4715530, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2015) (quoting Swope v. Siegel–
Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 486, 498 (8th Cir. 2001)) (Rule 60(b) “‘permits consideration only
of facts which were in existence at the time of trial’ but which were not available to the
1 	Rivera also repeatedly asserts that the Court cannot rule on his Rule 60(b) motion
because of the pending appeal but that the Court should nevertheless give an “indicative
ruling” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1. 	ECF No. 119 at 2. 	Rivera is
incorrect, though, that the Court cannot rule on the Rule 60(b) motion. 	Hunter v.
Underwood, 362 F.3d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Our case law, however, permits the district
court to consider a Rule 60(b) motion on the merits and deny it even if an appeal is already
pending in this court.”). Therefore, the Court need not delve into Rule 62.1 as it can rule
on the Rule 60(b) motion before it.
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movant despite his exercise of due diligence.”). Rivera appears to acknowledge this point.
ECF No. 128 at 3.
As to Rule 60(b)(6), Rivera asserts that the WLIRC “changed the equity landscape,”
and he alleges that his ADA and Title VII retaliation theories are now “plausible and non-
speculative.” ECF No. 128 at 4. Indeed, Rivera’s argument largely is that his retaliation
claims have more merit now and that he should be given a chance to replead his claim. Id.
at 4–14; ECF No. 119 at 4. The Court disagrees that the WLIRC justifies the “extraordinary
relief” of Rule 60(b)(6) because the WLIRC decision has no impact on the Court’s decision
to dismiss the case.
Regarding Rivera’s ERISA claim, the WLIRC opinion does not alter the Court’s
conclusion that Rivera did not adequately plead the existence of an ERISA-eligible plan.
The WLIRC decision considered only whether Rivera “reach[ed] an end of healing for his
knee injury on April 29, 2024, such that he is not entitled to temporary total disability
benefits from that date until his second surgery on August 15, 2024.” ECF No. 122-1 at 11.
It says nothing about whether Rivera was covered by an “employee benefit plan” governed
by ERISA. ECF No. 92 at 8. It therefore has no effect on the ERISA pleading deficiencies
in Rivera’s complaint, and Rivera makes no real argument to the contrary. ECF No. 119
at 4 (Rivera acknowledging that he might simply amend his complaint to drop the ERISA
claim entirely).
That leaves Rivera’s argument that the WLIRC decision supports the merits of his
retaliation claims. Notably, the Court did not dismiss Rivera’s claims because they lacked
merit; the Court dismissed those claims because they were not properly brought in this
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District. ECF No. 92 at 9–12; ECF No. 128 at 2. The Court then decided that transfer to
the proper district was not in the interests of justice because “Rivera has already filed not
one but two federal lawsuits in the Eastern District of Wisconsin” concerning the same
subject matter, and both had been dismissed. 	ECF No. 92 at 12. 	Rivera, to his credit,
acknowledges all of this. 	See, e.g., ECF No. 119 at 5. 	But he argues that the WLIRC
decision makes his retaliation claims stronger and that the Court should reopen the case
and transfer it to a proper venue—the Eastern District of Wisconsin—instead of dismissing
it. 	Id. 	Rivera, essentially, asserts that the WLIRC decision undercuts the Court’s
conclusion that it made little sense to transfer his case to a district where it would likely be
dismissed.
But there’s one problem that Rivera omits: he already presented this argument in the
very district to which he seeks transfer. 	On February 11, 2025, a court in the Eastern
District of Wisconsin dismissed one of Rivera’s lawsuits on summary judgment. Rivera v.
Nestle USA Inc., No. 23-cv-1431, 2025 WL 578480, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 21, 2025).
Notably, in that case, Rivera brought similar Title VII claims of “a hostile work
environment, 	unlawful 	pay 	and 	promotion 	practices, 	retaliation, 	and 	unlawful
termination.” 	Id. 	The Seventh Circuit affirmed that order. 	Rivera v. Nestle USA, Inc.,
2025 WL 3124839, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 7, 2025).
Then, on February 9, 2026, Rivera brought a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from
judgment in the Eastern District of Wisconsin in which he asserted, as he does here, that
the WLIRC 	decision 	“bear[s] 	directly 	on 	retaliation, 	pretext, 	and 	credibility” 	and
“materially strengthens” his claims. 	Rivera v. Nestle USA Inc., No. 23-cv-1431, ECF
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No. 156 at 1 (E.D. Wis. filed Feb. 9, 2026). 	The court denied Rivera’s motion because
“[n]one of the evidence or arguments Plaintiff presents in his motion changes the court’s
conclusion.” Id., ECF No. 158 at 2 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2026). On the very next day, Rivera
brought his Rule 60(b) motion here, making the same argument. ECF No. 118. As a result,
the Court does not believe, as Rivera asserts, that the WLIRC decision upends the Court’s
earlier conclusion that transfer to the Eastern District of Wisconsin is unnecessary, because
it remains true that transferring the case would end with the same result: dismissal.
ORDER
In short, none of Rivera’s arguments merit relief under Rule 60(b). 	This case is
therefore over. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Rivera’s Rule 60(b) Motion for
Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 118) is DENIED.
Dated: March 20, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
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