Styczinski et al v. City of Eden Prairie et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Jennifer Styczinski and Thomas Styczinski,
on behalf of the minor A.S.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
City of Eden Prairie; Valerie Verley, in her
individual and official capacity as
Community Center Manager or her
successor in their official capacity; and Amy
Markle, in her official capacity as the City’s
Parks and Recreation Director, or her
successor in their official capacity;
Defendants.
File No. 24-CV-2664 (JMB/ECW)
ORDER
Elizabeth A. Nielsen and Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman, Kaardal and Erickson, P.A.,
Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs Jennifer Styczinski and Thomas Styczsinki.
John M. Baker and Katherine M. Swenson, Greene Espel PLLP, Minneapolis, MN, for
Defendants City of Eden Prairie, Valerie Verley, and Amy Markle.
This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
(Doc. Nos. 29, 33.) For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Defendants City of
Eden Prairie’s, Valerie Verley’s, and Amy Markle’s motion and denies Plaintiffs Jennifer
Styczinski’s and Thomas Styczinski’s motion.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
In this action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs Jennifer and Thomas
Styczinski, on behalf of their minor son A.S., claim that their free-speech and due-process
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rights were violated when the Eden Prairie Community Center (EPCC) revoked their access
to its Aquatic Center. The parties cross-move for summary judgment.
Defendant City of Eden Prairie (the City) owns and operates the EPCC. (Doc. No.
35-9 at 18:25–19:06.) Plaintiffs became EPCC members in 2015. (Doc. No. 35-1 at 40:11–
40:13.) 	In doing so, they agreed to abide by the EPCC’s policies, which included the
“Behavioral Guidelines: Verbal Abuse” policy (the Policy). 	The Policy applies when “a
participant 	demonstrates 	threatening 	or 	personalized 	abusive 	behavior 	toward 	staff
members and/or other patrons.” (Doc. No. 35-20 at 3.) The Policy states as follows:
Verbal abuse is speaking with the intent to demean, humiliate,
blame or threaten the person spoken to. 	It includes, but is not
limited to, name calling or personal attacks, condescension,
criticism 	aimed 	at 	the 	particular 	individual, 	degradation,
manipulation, blame, accusations, blatantly ignoring staff trying
to enforce building policy and refusing to comply, circular
arguments or threatening a particular individual.
(Id.) 	It lays out “Progressive Consequences” and includes that “staff will determine if an
incident rises to the level where disciplinary action is warranted.” (Id.) Two main incidents
at the EPCC set the backdrop for this lawsuit.
A. 	Fitness Center Incident
Plaintiffs Thomas and Jennifer Styzcinski, their teenage children, son A.S., and a
daughter, visited the EPCC on April 5, 2022. A.S. wore his tennis shoes, with which he
walked through the wet parking lot, into the Fitness Center, violating the Fitness Center’s
rule against “outside shoes.” 	(Doc. No. 35-6 at 22:16–26:21; Doc. No. 35-7 at 93:22–
95:25.) 	Fitness Instructor Kelly Henderson approached A.S., introduced herself, and
instructed him to dry his shoes, as required by her job duties. 	(Doc. No. 35-6 at 28:21–
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32:17.) A.S. initially ignored her, then walked away toward a treadmill as Henderson was
speaking to him. 	(Id. at 31:7–31:12.) Although Henderson instructed A.S. to wait for a
few minutes to allow his shoes to dry, A.S. disregarded the directive and began using the
treadmill anyway. 	(Id. at 31:07–31:14.) 	Henderson then spoke with Fitness Lead Jill
Bickler. (Id. at 31:15–18; Doc. No. 37 ¶¶ 2, 8.)
Bickler approached A.S. and asked to speak with him about his interactions with
Henderson. 	(Doc. No. 35-6 at 41:19–41:25; Doc. No. 37 ¶¶ 11, 14.) 	After initially
dismissing Bickler, A.S. told her that Henderson was harassing him. (Doc. No. 37 ¶¶ 15–
16.) Bickler gathered that Thomas was nearby and asked to speak with him. (Id. ¶¶ 19–
20.) Jennifer then approached and touched her son’s shoes “all around” and confirmed that
they were dry. (Doc. No. 35-7 at 91:17–91:25, 102:18–22.) Thomas told Bickler he wanted
to speak with her manager. 	(Doc. No. 35-7 at 105:20–106:05.) 	The Manager on Duty,
Julie Krull, spoke with Thomas. (Doc. No. 35-6 at 47:17–48:20; Doc. No. 37 ¶¶ 24–26.)
Simultaneously, the Styczinskis’ fifteen-year-old daughter was behaving in an unsafe
manner nearby. (Doc. No. 37 ¶¶ 30–33.)
Two days later, Defendant Valerie Verley, the EPCC’s manager, emailed Jennifer
about what occurred at the Fitness Center, highlighting that everyone needed to follow the
EPCC’s behavior guidelines. 	(Doc. No. 35-20 at 2.) 	Verley cautioned that if issues
continued, the Styczinskis would jeopardize their membership and “further conversations
will need to be had.” (Id.) Jennifer did not respond or share the email with Thomas until
after the Aquatic Center Incident (discussed infra). (Doc. No. 35-7 at 122:07–124:1.)
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B. 	Aquatic Center Incident
On July 15, 2022, Jennifer, Thomas, A.S., and his friend L.M. visited the EPCC. (Id.
at 125:09–125:21.) 	Jennifer, A.S., and L.M. went to the Aquatic Center. (Id. at 126:18–
127:03.) 	A.S. broke the rules for the diving board by running and not waiting for the
previous diver to swim away. (Id. at 171:05–173:16; Doc. No. 35-1 at 30:05–30:10.) This
caused the lifeguard to close the diving board, but A.S. disregarded the closure and
immediately climbed on the diving-board ladder and railing until he was told to stop. (Doc.
No. 35-6 at 94:19–95:24; Doc. No. 35-1 at 34:15–35:08.)
In an unrelated matter earlier that day, a group of 15 to 20 teenage boys had been
asked to leave after misbehaving in the pool. 	(Doc. No. 35-8 at 82:12–82:18, 118:16–
118:24, 154:24–155:11; Doc. No. 36 ¶¶ 4–8.) 	Jennifer overheard the conversation that
Mayia Melchert, the head lifeguard, was having with them. (Doc. No. 35-1 at 44:05–44:20;
Doc. No. 35-7 at 209:09–209:22.) 	Jennifer then intervened. 	(Doc. No. 35-7 at 197:9–
197:14.) 	Jennifer became visibly angry, gesturing, waiving her arms, and pointing
emphatically. 	(Doc. No. 35-1 at 46:33–49:05.) 	Observing that Jennifer was growing
frustrated, Melchert, following her training, asked Jennifer to write down her contact
information. 	(Doc. No. 35-8 at 24:06–24:19, 119:21–120:09; Doc. No. 35-7 at 201:22–
201:25.) She did so. (Doc. No. 35-1 at 49:18-49:56.)
Jennifer left the Aquatic Center and Thomas arrived. 	(Id. at 25:24–35:30, 45:34–
54:45.) 	Thomas asked the lifeguards to reopen the diving area, which they did, and
subsequently A.S. and L.M. repeatedly broke the diving area’s posted rules. (Id. at 59:22–
59:30, 1:08:32–1:08:42.) Thomas approached Melchert to discuss lifeguards blowing their
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whistles too frequently. (Doc. No. 35-5:147:07–15; Doc. No. 35-6 at 124:16–22.) While
Thomas was in the pool and Melchert was crouched on the pool deck, Thomas began
gesturing with his hands, pointing, and shaking his finger and fist at her. (Doc. No. 35-1 at
1:09:30–1:14:23; Doc. No. 35-5 at 175:22–177:05; Doc. No. 35-8 at 149:23–150:03.) He
emerged from the water and continued to be upset with Melchert and other staff. Melchert
directed Thomas to review the rules, posted on the wall. 	(Doc. No. 35-1 at 1:15:12–
1:16:00.)
L.M. reported to Thomas that a barefoot, teenage lifeguard had given him a “dirty
look” earlier, and Thomas decided to find Melchert to make a formal complaint against the
lifeguard. (Doc. No. 35-5 at 192:22–194:21, 196:19–197:12.) Thomas asked Melchert for
her name and the name of the barefoot lifeguard, and she informed him that she could not
provide them, as both were minors. 	(Doc. No. 35-5 at 198:04–199:15; Doc. No. 35-8 at
89:25–90:07, 147:25–148:06.) Per her training, Melchert asked Thomas to write down his
contact information, and he did so. 	(Doc. No. 35-8 at 24:06–24:19, 137:05–137:07.)
Thomas followed two minor female lifeguards out the door, and called out to the barefoot
lifeguard that he would be complaining about her. (Doc. No. 35-5 at 201:20–202:15.)
While Thomas later admitted he was “a little agitated,” Thomas minimized his
previous threatening demeanor; in Melchert’s view, Thomas was at a level of very “elevated
anger,” “screaming,” “very animated, very loud,” and in Melchert’s “personal space,” which
caused Melchert to feel physically threatened. 	(Id. at 185:07–185:12; Doc. No. 35-8 at
65:19–65:20, 77:02–12, 148:04–148:21, 150:1-3.) Melchert and the other lifeguards were
troubled by the unusual situation with Plaintiffs. 	(Doc. No. 35-8 at 79:02–79:16.) 	The
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barefoot lifeguard began crying when they left. 	(Id. at 79:17–79:20.) 	Five lifeguards
completed a “General Aquatic Patron Conflict Form” that evening. 	(Id. at 44:20–44:21;
Doc. No. 35-19.)
C. 	Plaintiffs’ EPCC Membership
The following week, Verley met with Melchert and another lifeguard who were in
tears “about coming back to work if members of the [Styczinski] family came back.” (Doc.
No. 35-9 at 120:25–121:06.) On July 20, 2022, Verley, after reviewing the detailed lifeguard
reports, conversing with the head lifeguard on the shift when the group of teenagers initially
misbehaved, Melchert, and the barefoot lifeguard, revoked Plaintiffs’ Aquatic Center access,
concerned for staff safety. 	(Id. at 191:03–191:05; Doc. No. 35-20 at 2.) 	Verley emailed
Plaintiffs about this decision and attached a copy of the Policy, explaining that their broader
membership to the EPCC was in jeopardy. 	(Doc. No 35-20 at 1.) 	The next day, July 21,
2022, Thomas emailed multiple questions to Verley, and asked that she cancel the family’s
membership with the EPCC and issue a pro-rated refund. (Doc. No. 35-22 at 1–3.)
On July 22, 2022, Thomas began an email exchange with then-City Parks and
Recreation Director, Jay Lotthammer, ultimately requesting a meeting of “at least 2 hours”
with him and a “diversity representative.” (Doc. No. 35-26 at 2.) The meeting took place
on August 12, 2022, with Thomas, Jennifer, Lotthammer, and a human resources manager
from the City, and lasted approximately one-and-a-half hours. (Doc. No. 35-5 at 227:05–
227:22; Doc. No. 35-7 at 279:06–279:23.) 	On August 31, 2022, Lotthammer emailed
Jennifer and Thomas, informing them that he was declining to reverse “any actions taken.”
(Doc. No. 35-30 at 5.) 	Thomas responded, asking how to appeal Lotthammer’s decision.
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(Id. at 4.) 	Lotthammer replied that if Jennifer and Thomas would like him to, he would
review it with the City Manager, Rick Getschow, but they did not ask him to. (Id. at 2; Doc.
No. 35-5 at 236:02–236:21.) Lotthammer stated, “I think it is important to reiterate that our
decision is based on your behavior and is supported by similar reports from over 10 different
people. Many of these people cite your behavior as threatening and making them feel fearful
of you.” (Doc. No. 35-30 at 3.)
Nearly a year later, on August 1, 2023, Thomas wrote to Getschow, asking that Verley
and Lotthammer be disciplined and that Plaintiffs’ full rights to the EPCC be restored. (Doc.
No. 35-32.) 	Getschow responded that he would not pursue any action against Verley or
Lotthammer, as their decisions were appropriate, but that Plaintiffs were welcome to rejoin
the EPCC and use the Aquatic Center. (Doc. No. 35-33 at 3, 5.)
D. 	This Action
This lawsuit followed. 	Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their right to free
speech under the First Amendment and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment,
bringing both facial and as-applied challenges. 	Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive
relief, as well as damages and attorney’s fees.
ANALYSIS
Defendants now move for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims (Doc. No.
33), and Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment as to their facial claims for violations
of their free-speech and due-process rights (Doc. No. 29). 	Because no reasonable juror
could find in Plaintiffs’ favor on any claim given these undisputed facts, the Court grants
Defendants’ motion.
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As a threshold matter, the Court observes that summary judgment is warranted if
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact or the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	Although “[c]redibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986),
a “genuine” dispute of material fact only exists if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for either party.” Peter v. Wedl, 155 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 1998). “When opposing parties
tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007) (reversing denial of summary judgment because the district court “rel[ied] on such
visible fiction” where the video evidence clearly favored the moving party); see also, e.g.,
Wallingford v. Olson, 592 F.3d 888, 892 (8th Cir. 2010) (reversing denial of summary
judgment because video evidence “clearly contradicts the version of the story told by [non-
moving party]”); O’Neil v. City of Iowa City, 496 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2007) (observing
that summary judgment is proper when “no reasonable jury could believe” the non-moving
party’s view of the facts) (quotation omitted).
I. 	PLAINTIFFS’ AS-APPLIED FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM FAILS
Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated their free-speech rights by applying the Policy
to them, which resulted in losing their access to the Aquatic Center. However, because as a
matter of law, the EPCC is a non-public forum and Plaintiffs present no argument that the
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Policy is unreasonable, and because Plaintiffs’ conduct—not speech—violated the Policy,
the Court grants Defendants’ motion as to this claim.
“An as-applied challenge consists of a challenge to the statute’s application only as-
applied to the party before the court.” 	Republican Party of Minn., Third Cong. Dist. v.
Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004). “If an as-applied challenge is successful, the
statute [or Policy] may not be applied to the challenger, but is otherwise enforceable.” Id.
In addition, content-based restrictions are permissible in non-public fora. 	See Fams.
Achieving Indep. & Respect v. Neb. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 111 F.3d 1408, 1421–22 (8th Cir.
1997) (allowing content-based restrictions to serve the purposes of the forum). “In placing
limits on the forum, the government cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination, but it can
engage in content discrimination to preserve ‘the purposes of that limited forum.’”
Viewpoint Neutrality Now! v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 516 F. Supp. 3d 904, 919 (D. Minn.
2021) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30
(1995)). “In addition to being viewpoint neutral, a restriction on access to a limited public
forum must be ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.’” Id. at 920 (quoting
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
Defendants first argue that the Court should grant the motion as to Plaintiffs’ as-
applied claim because the EPCC is not a public forum. 	“In defining the parameters of a
speaker’s First Amendment right of access to public property, the Supreme Court looks first
to the nature of the forum the public entity is providing.” 	Victory Through Jesus Sports
Ministry Found. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 640 F.3d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 2011).
Government 	property 	that 	“is 	not 	by 	tradition 	or 	designation 	a 	forum 	for 	public
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communication” is a nonpublic forum. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 	Here, there is no evidence presented that the City held out the
EPCC as a forum for public discourse, and the Court concludes that the EPCC is not a public
forum. Defendants further argue that unbridled free speech would be dangerous at a pool,
as it could impede lifeguards’ ability to do their jobs and create a safety risk. Thus, the City
“has a significant interest in providing pool-side safety, not to mention preserving a pleasant
atmosphere for its paying patrons” because “[a] pool deck is a precarious place for unbridled
free 	speech—any 	disruptions 	could 	distract 	the 	lifeguards 	and 	compromise 	safety.”
Presnick v. Delaney, 110 F. Supp. 2d 74, 79 (D. Conn. 1999). Absent any contrary argument
(Plaintiffs offer none) and given the clear weight of authority, the Court concludes that the
Policy is reasonable and limited to serve the purposes of the EPCC.
In addition, Defendants separately argue that Plaintiffs violated the Policy provisions
concerning conduct, not speech. Again, the Court agrees. The First Amendment does not
prohibit restricting conduct that may incidentally burden speech. See Brandt by & through
Brandt v. Griffin, 147 F.4th 867, 889 (8th Cir. 2025). 	“[I]t has never been deemed an
abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written, or printed.” Id. (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, 502 (1949)). The EPCC revoked Plaintiffs’ access to the Aquatic Center due to
their behavior. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ conduct violated the Policy
in three ways. First, A.S. wore outside shoes into the Fitness Center and disregarded staff’s
directions to comply with the rules. Second, Thomas behaved in a threatening and harassing
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manner toward staff by aggressively getting close to Melchert and following two lifeguards
around the deck. 	Third, Jennifer interfered with the lifeguard’s attempts to enforce rules
with the group of teenagers at the pool. 	The Policy’s restrictions on conduct did not
unlawfully restrict Plaintiffs’ speech; there is no First Amendment right to wear wet shoes
in a fitness center, ignore staff, get in someone’s personal space while screaming at them,
or interfere with a lifeguard’s attempt to enforce safety rules with swimmers.
For each of these reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment in their favor on Plaintiffs’ as-applied First Amendment claim.
II. 	PLAINTIFFS’ FACIAL FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE FAILS
To evaluate a facial First Amendment challenge, courts ask whether “a substantial
number of the law’s applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s
plainly legitimate sweep.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723 (2024) (quotation
omitted). “Plaintiffs can prevail on their facial challenge only if they show ‘that application
of the [Policy] will lead to the suppression of speech.’” Viewpoint Neutrality Now!, 516 F.
Supp. 3d at 917 (quoting Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry Found., 640 F.3d at 337).
The first step is to assess the Policy’s scope, Moody, 603 U.S. at 724, given the text
of the Policy, Hershey v. Jasinski, 86 F.4th 1224, 1231 (8th Cir. 2023). The Policy applies
only to behavior within the EPCC and it restricts only “threating or personalized abusive
behavior toward staff members and/or other patrons” and “verbal abuse,” with the speaker
intending to “demean, humiliate, blame, or threaten.” (Doc. No. 35-20 at 4.)
The second step under Moody is to balance the Policy’s applications that violate the
First Amendment against its non-violating applications. Moody, 603 U.S. at 725. Plaintiffs
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contend that the Policy is not viewpoint neutral, because it is silent as to whether patrons
may compliment staff but contains limitations on criticizing staff. 	Because this argument
mischaracterizes the Policy, it lacks merit. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the Policy does
not prohibit patrons from voicing concerns or criticism to or about EPCC staff; rather, it
limits the manner in which a patron may voice concerns or criticism. 	It allows patrons,
including 	Plaintiffs, 	to 	communicate 	their 	viewpoint—whether 	positive 	or 	negative,
compliment or criticism—to the EPCC: patrons could speak to a manager, leave a comment
in the comment box, or speak to any employee, assuming that the patron does not behave
in a threatening or demeaning manner. 	To be clear, the Policy does not prohibit patrons
from complimenting or criticizing staff, and in this way, it is viewpoint neutral. Regardless
of a patron’s viewpoint, the Policy prohibits “verbal abuse.” (Doc. No. 35-20 at 3.)
In short, as a matter of law, the Policy permits positive and negative feedback and
allows patrons to express whatever viewpoint they have, and Plaintiffs fail to show that the
Policy leads to the suppression of speech. Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment in their favor on Plaintiffs’ facial First Amendment claim.
III. 	PLAINTIFFS’ DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE FAILS
In Count II, Plaintiffs raise a due process challenge, arguing that Defendants deprived
them of their constitutionally protected property interest of “full access” to the EPCC. “A
statute, regulation, or official policy pronouncement will give rise to a protected property
interest only where (1) it contains particularized substantive standards or criteria that guide
the decisionmakers, and (2) it uses mandatory language requiring the decisionmakers to act
in a certain way, thus limiting the official’s discretion.” Jennings v. Lombardi, 70 F.3d 994,
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996 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 	Plaintiffs do not establish that they have a
constitutionally protected property interest in using the EPCC, nor could they, because there
exists no constitutionally protected property right in unrestricted access to a public building.
Royer ex rel. Est. of Royer v. City of Oak Grove, 374 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir. 2004)
(“[Plaintiff] can point to no property interest in having unlimited access to a public
building.”). In addition, based on the undisputed facts, no reasonable juror could disagree
that Plaintiffs received adequate due process to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs had ample notice of the Policy and Verley, the EPCC’s manager, sent an email to
Jennifer reminding her of EPCC’s behavior guidelines, shortly after the Fitness Center
incident and before the Aquatic Center Incident. 	Moreover, Plaintiffs received post-
deprivation due process in the form of written answers from the City of Eden Prairie,
meeting with the City’s Parks and Recreation Director, and obtaining the relief requested:
the EPCC offered to restore their full membership, including access to the Aquatic Center.
Therefore, Defendants’ motion is granted as to Plaintiffs’ as-applied due process
claim. 	As a result, Plaintiffs’ facial due process claim likewise fails.1 	See, e.g., 	Vill. of
Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 500 (1982); U.S. v. Lazzaro,
637 F. Supp. 3d 640, 646–47 (D. Minn. 2022) (declining to consider facial challenge when
party had not prevailed on as-applied claim); see also Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 610
(1973) (observing “the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be
1 Because there was no constitutional violation, the Court need not address Verley’s
argument of immunity.
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applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be
applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court”).
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiffs Jennifer and Thomas Styczinski’s motion for summary judgment
(Doc. No. 29) is DENIED.
2. 	Defendants City of Eden Prairie, Valerie Verley, and Amy Markle’s motion
for summary judgment (Doc. No. 33) is GRANTED.
3. 	Plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 30, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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