Sandoval et al v. Dustar Express, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
________________________________________________________________________
Edvin Sandoval and Hugo Sandoval,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Dustar Express, Inc., and Shawn Munns,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-CV-02601 (SRN/SGE)
REPORT &
RECCOMENDATION AND
ORDER
________________________________________________________________________
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions for
Spoliation of Evidence. (Dkt. 42.) Following briefing, the Court held oral argument on
December 4, 2025. (Dkt. 56.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends
granting Plaintiff’s request for an adverse inference instruction pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(e)(2), and separately, the Court grants in part and denies in part
Plaintiff’s request for sanctions under Rule 37(e)(1).
BACKGROUND
On September 16, 2022, a vehicle collision occurred between Plaintiffs and Shawn
Munns at the intersection of Minnesota Trunk Highway 60 and County Highway 1. (Dkt.
45-1 at 5.) At the time of the collision, Shawn Munns was employed by Dustar Express,
Inc. (“Dustar”) as a commercial truck driver (Dkt. 51 ¶ 2) and the tractor-trailer driven by
Munns and involved in the collision was owned by Dustar. (Id. ¶ 3.) Immediately following
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the collision, law enforcement had the tractor-trailer (“Truck 709”)1 towed and placed
under a law enforcement hold. (Dkt. 51 ¶ 4; Dkt. 51-1 at 1.)
Less than a week after the crash, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent preservation letters to
Dustar, Munns, and Dustar’s insurer, Secura Insurance, on September 21 and 22, 2022.
(Dkt. 45 ¶ 5; 45-4 at 1-11 (Dustar Letter); id. at 14-24 (Munns Letter); id. at 25-35 (Secura
Letter).). The letters specifically demanded that evidence “be maintained and preserved,
and not be destroyed, modified, altered, repaired or changed in any manner, and further
that you immediately put any third-party vendor that has or controls this information,
material, or documentation, on notice to maintain and preserve.” (Dkt 45-4 at 2.)2 The
preservation letters also specifically identified the following evidence, to be preserved:
The GPS location data for six months prior to the wreck for Mr. Munns.
. . . .
All OmniTRAC, Qualcomm, MVPC, QTRACS, OmniExpress, TruckMail,
TrailerTRACs, SensorTRACS, JTRACS, and other similar systems data for the six
(6) months prior to the collision and the day of the collision, for Mr. Munns, the
subject truck, and the subject trailer.
. . . .
The front and back of Mr. Munns’ daily logs and his co-driver’s logs (if any) for the
day of the collision, and the six-month period preceding the collision, together with
all material required by 49 C.F.R. 395.8 and 395.15 for the driver(s) involved in the
above matter together with the results of any computer program used to check logs
as well as all results of any audit of the logs by your company or a third party. This
specifically includes any electronic on-board computers (AOBRD’s, EOBR’s, etc.
. . .) and the audit trial for those entries. We require you to put any vendor which
stores or audits this information on notice of the need to preserve this data.
. . . .
1 Dustar refers to the truck driven by Shawm Munns as “Truck 709.” (See Dkt. 50 ¶ 2; Dkt.
48 at 3.)
2 The letters are verbatim the same, except for the addressee, thus the Court cites only
Plaintiffs’ letter to Dustar. (Dkt. 45-5.)
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Any computer data from the tractor or trailer to include but not be limited to: any
data and printout from on-board recording devices, including but not limited to the
ECM (electronic control module), any on-board computer, tachograph, trip monitor,
trip record, trip master, Hours of Service (HOS) or other recording or tracking
device for the day of the collision and the six (6) month period preceding the
collision for the equipment involved in the collision.
(Dkt. 45-4 at 3-4.) Shortly after the preservation letters were mailed, Dustar retained
Attorney Mark Brown, an experienced trucking accident lawyer. (Dkt. 45 ¶ 15; Dkt. 45-5
at 99:1–99:13;3 Dkt. 45-14; Dkt. 45-15.) Once Dustar received the preservation letter, it
simply forwarded the letter to its insurance provider, Secura. (Dkt. 45-5 at 97:25-98:21;
Dkt. 51 ¶ 11.) Although Secura received this letter directly from Plaintiffs and from Dustar,
Secura seemingly made no response to this letter. (Dkt. 45-5 at 98:19-25.)
On October 27, 2022, a little over a month after the crash, Plaintiffs’ counsel
emailed Mr. Brown specifically asking whether Truck 709 had “any cameras, electronic
logs, or aftermarket additions” that Plaintiffs needed to be aware of in preparation for a
joint inspection of Truck 709. (Dkt. 55-1.) Mr. Brown did not respond to that question, and
the joint inspection of Truck 709 took place on October 28, 2022 at the tow yard. (Id.)
Months later, on March 31, 2023, Truck 709 was released from the law enforcement hold,
and Dustar regained unfettered physical access. (Dkt. 51 ¶ 6; Dkt. 51-1 at 1.)
Plaintiffs eventually filed suit against Shawn Munns for negligence in operating the
truck and Dustar for vicarious liability and direct negligence, including negligent hiring,
3 Where the Court cites to deposition testimony, it cites to the page number in black font
located in the upper right-hand corner. Where the Court cites to documents filed on
CM/ECF it cites to the CM/ECF page number located in blue font at the top of the page,
unless otherwise noted.
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retention, and supervision. (See Dkt. 1.) During the first round of discovery Plaintiffs
learned from Dustar on February 25, 2025, that Truck 709 did in fact have a device installed
to collect telematics data. (Dkt. 45-7 at 6-7.)4 Specifically, Dustar answered that “Verizon
Connect was used to help drivers locate their delivery and for miles to be sent to the
individual who handles the miles report.” (Id. at 7.) Dustar later supplemented its discovery
response on May 28, 2025. (Dkt. 45-8.) In this supplement, Dustar asserted that the
“onboard Verizon Connect system was destroyed in an accident that occurred on May 9,
2023.” (Id. at 3, 6-8.)
Following Dustar’s disclosure, Plaintiffs deposed Dustar co-owner Patti Koopmans
on July 21, 2025. (Dkt. 45-5.) Ms. Koopmans testified that Truck 709 had a Verizon
Connect device installed at the time of the collision and Dustar used the device to track
miles, record speed, and to comply with licensing and permitting requirements. (Id. at 83:3-
85:19; 87:12-88:16; 92:12-25.) Ms. Koopmans explained that she could access the Verizon
Connect data by logging into Dustar’s Verizon Connect account on a computer. (Id. at
87:12-17.) Ms. Koopmans also testified that she remembered receiving the preservation
letter from Plaintiffs and acknowledged that she took no steps to preserve any Verizon
Connect data. (Dkt. 45-5 at 98:12-18.) Based on Ms. Koopmans’ testimony, on July 23,
2025, Plaintiffs served additional discovery requests to clarify the circumstances
surrounding the Verizon Connect data and obtain additional information. (Dkt. 44 at 6, 45-
4 At the hearing on this Motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed the first time they heard of
any device installed on Truck 709 was from Dustar’s interrogatory answers in February
2025.
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9.) When Dustar did not respond to Plaintiffs’ second set of discovery requests (Dkt. 44 at
6), Plaintiffs submitted a third set of interrogatories and request for production of
documents on August 4, 2025. (Dkt. 45-9.)
Dustar responded to Plaintiffs third set of discovery requests on October 7, 2025.
(Dkt. 45-10.) Dustar contended that the details of the relevant Verizon Connect device
installed on Truck 709 were unknown. (Id.) For the first time, Dustar asserted that the
“Verizon Connect device was replaced and activated on or about April 12, 2023, by Dustar
Express employees as the original device was not operable.” (Id. at 3, 5.) Dustar also
explained that the “Verizon Connect device was inoperable at the time the truck was
returned to Defendant after the subject incident. It was the understanding of Dustar [] that
no content could be downloaded or retrieved, and therefore it was not preserved.” (Id. at
5.)
Following Dustar’s response to discovery, Plaintiffs deposed Verizon’s corporate
representative on October 20, 2025. (Dkt. 45-6.) The representative explained that the
Verizon Connect device, or vehicle tracking unit (“VTU”), is a palm-sized device mounted
under the dashboard of a truck and connected to the truck’s onboard diagnostic port. (Id.
at 29:24-30:5; 33:3-18.)5 He testified that every thirty to one-hundred and twenty seconds,
a VTU attached to a truck records GPS data and harsh driving incidents such as hard
breaking or rapid acceleration. (Id. at 34:2-25; 49:11-25.) The VTU then transmits that data
to the Verizon Connect servers, which is stored in two places: the client-facing platform,
5 The Verizon representative testified to the VTU connected to a OBD2, which he later
explained is an acronym for “Onboard Diagnostic, Version 2.” (Dkt. 45-6 at 39:15-22.)
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Verizon Reveal; and Verizon Connect’s long-term, internal electronic archives. (Id. at
17:21–18:23.) The representative further explained that the Verizon Reveal platform
retains this telematics data for twelve months and Verizon Connect’s long-term archive
retains the data for up to five years. (Id.) Clients can access data from any VTU on the
Verizon Reveal platform online. (Id. at 17:21-18:23; 57:23-58:4.)
The representative explained that Verizon attempted to recover the VTU data by
searching its archive using Truck 709’s VIN number and the driver’s name (Shawn
Munns), however, nothing relevant was found. (Dkt. 45-6 at 25:23-28:1; 75:21-76:6.) In
addition to using Truck 709’s VIN and the driver’s name, Verizon also reviewed 700 pages
of customer communications with Dustar—the entire correspondence file for 2022. (Dkt.
45-6 at 10:22-12:7.) There was no mention of the collision on September 16, 2022 or of
any auto accident in 2022 within the correspondence. (Id. at 11:10-23.) And there was
never a request from Dustar to preserve or download the VTU data. (Id. at 11:10-23; 65:7-
19.) The representative explained that Verizon’s searches likely yielded no September 16,
2022 crash data because the VTU was self-installed by Dustar, instead of a professional
installer, and Dustar had not associated Truck 709’s VIN number, nor Shawn Munns’ name
with the specific VTU in its Verizon account. (Id. at 26:2-27:7, 62:14-63:4; Dkt. 45-13.)
The representative stated that Verizon could still search for data recorded by the VTU
installed at the time of the accident if they had the VTU’s serial number. (Id. at 29:2-11.)
In other words, the VTU’s serial number would reveal the data the VTU recorded
regardless of its destruction or whether Dustar linked it to Truck 709’s VIN number or
Shawn Munns’ name. (Id.)
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On November 11, 2025, less than a month after Plaintiffs’ deposition of the Verizon
representative, Plaintiffs brought this Motion for Sanctions. (Dkt. 25.) In response, Dustar
submitted affidavits of a co-owner Patti Koopman and the Office Administrator in charge
of managing Verizon Reveal for Dustar, Kimberly Rens. (Dkts. 50, 51.) According to Ms.
Rens, Dustar used the Verizon service to collect and compile monthly trucking data,
specifically tracking the location and milage of Dustar’s fleet to generate required
regulatory and tax reports. (Dkt. 50 ¶¶ 1-3, 5.) These monthly reports include the truck’s
daily start and stop time, start and stop location, total trip drive time, and idle time. (Dkt.
50-1.) Ms. Rens also explained she reviewed Verizon reports for Truck 709 to respond to
discovery requested in this lawsuit. (Dkt. 50 ¶ 7.) According to her, the VTU in question
stopped recording data for Truck 709 beginning on the day of the accident, September 16,
2022. (Id. ¶ 8-9.)6 She states that she contacted Verizon about the lack of data, and Verizon
informed her that it did not know why the “the system stopped recording or showing data
for Truck 709.” (Id. ¶ 9.) She then ordered a replacement VTU from Verizon and had it
installed on April 12, 2023. (Id. ¶ 13; Dkt. 50-1 at 51-53.) In an effort to respond to this
Motion, Ms. Rens contacted Verizon again and received an email on November 18, 2025,
explaining that Truck 709 was no longer part of Dustar’s fleet on its Verizon account, and
thus it could not pull reports for her. (Dkt. 50-1 at 54.)
6 The Court notes that in its brief Dustar contends that the VTU in Truck 709 stopped
recording data on September 15, 2022 (Dkt. 48 at 6), while Ms. Rens affidavit states data
stopped recording on September 16, 2022 (Dkt. 50 ¶ 8-9).
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In contrast to Ms. Ren’s account, Ms. Koopman’s affidavit claims, “Dustar did not
remove or disable the Verizon device on the subject truck while the vehicle was in our
possession, and I am not aware of any action by Dustar that caused any Verizon data to be
lost.” (Dkt. 51 ¶ 13.)
Following additional briefing and a hearing on December 4, 2025, the Court
permitted Dustar an additional twenty-six days to “locate the VTU or the serial number of
the VTU” involved in the collision and ordered Dustar to submit a letter to the Court
addressing:
(1) whether Dustar has located the VTU, (2) if the VTU has not been located, the
efforts Dustar took to locate it, (3) whether the VTU's serial number has been
recovered through other means, and (4) if the VTU's serial number has not been
recovered, what steps Dustar took to discover the serial number.
(Dkt. 56.) The Court informed the parties that it would take the motion under advisement
after Defendants submitted the letter (Id.) Dustar timely filed its letter on December 31,
2025, informing the Court that Dustar had not located the VTU or the VTU’s serial number,
and the steps it took to obtain both. (Dkt. 57.) The Cout took the matter under advisement
on December 31, 2025. (Dkt. 56.)
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs move for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(2),
alleging Defendants failed to preserve and intentionally allowed the destruction of the
electronically stored information (“ESI”) from the Verizon Connect telematics system (the
VTU) installed on the tractor-trailer involved in the September 16, 2022 accident. (Dkt.
42.) They also request curative measures to remedy the prejudice of the missing evidence
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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(1). (Id.) Dustar opposes imposition of any
sanction. (Dkt. 44.) 7
I. Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) applies to the spoliation8 of ESI. Rule 37 (e)
provides:
If electronically stored information that should have been preserved in the
anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take
reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced through
additional discovery, the court:
(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information, may
order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or
(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another
party of the information’s use in the litigation may:
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;
(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was
unfavorable to the party; or
(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
7 Dustar’s counsel chose not to respond to Plaintiffs’ request for a mandatory inference
instruction as opposed to a permissive inference instruction, and instead focused argument
on no instruction at all being warranted. (Dkt. 48.) Months after briefing completed and
over a month after the hearing on the Motion, Dustar’s counsel sought guidance from the
Court on whether additional briefing was needed to determine if any instruction should be
mandatory or permissive. (Dkt. 58). The Court declined to allow additional briefing at such
a late stage. (Dkt. 59.)
8 “Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to
preserve property of another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable
litigation.” Peterson v. Washington Cnty., No. 18-CV-2640 (DWF/ECW), 2021 WL
2686119, at *3 (D. Minn. June 30, 2021) (quoting Nicollet Cattle Co., Inc. v. United Food
Grp., LLC, No. 08-CV-5899, 2010 WL 3546784, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2010)).
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Rule 37(e) has two initial requirements for spoliation sanctions: (1) there was a duty
to preserve ESI, and no reasonable steps to preserve were taken, and (2) the ESI cannot be
“restored or replaced.” If there was a duty to preserve, and the ESI cannot be restored or
replaced, the Court may order sanctions in two circumstances under Rule 37(e). See Paisley
Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Boxill, 330 F.R.D. 226, 232 (D. Minn. 2019) (“Rule 37(e) makes
two types of sanctions available to the Court.”). First, if the adverse party suffered prejudice
from the spoliation of ESI, the Court may order sanctions “no greater than necessary” to
cure the prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1). Second, under Rule 37(e)(2), the Court can
impose more severe sanctions, such as an adverse jury instruction, where the Court finds a
party “acted with the intent to deprive.”
Notably, prejudice is required only for sanctions under Rule 37(e)(1). Prejudice is
not required for sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2) “because the finding of intent required by
the subdivision can support not only an inference that the lost information was unfavorable
to the party that intentionally destroyed it, but also an inference that the opposing party was
prejudiced by the loss of information that would have favored its position.” N. Am. Sci.
Assocs., LLC v. Conforti, No. 24-CV-287 (JWB/ECW), 2024 WL 4903753, at *15 (D.
Minn. Nov. 27, 2024) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2) advisory committee's notes to 2015
amendment). “The moving party bears the burden of proving spoliation.” Evenson v.
Johnson Bros. Liquor Co., No. 18-CV-3188 (JRT/LIB), 2020 WL 12948541, at *5 (D.
Minn. Nov. 12, 2020) (quoting Stepnes v. Ritschel, No. 08-CV-5296 (ADM/JJK), 2009
WL 10711698, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2009)).
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A. The Duty to Preserve
“A party is obligated to preserve evidence once the party knows or should know that
the evidence is relevant to future or current litigation.” Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 232
(citing E*Trade Sec. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 230 F.R.D. 582, 588 (D. Minn. 2005)).
“The duty to preserve relevant evidence must be viewed from the perspective of the party
with control of the evidence.” Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 232 (quoting Alabama Aircraft
Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., 319 F.R.D. 730, 740 (N.D. Ala. 2017)). There are “[a] variety
of events [that] may alert a party to the prospect of litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory
committee's note to 2015 amendment. Although Rule 37(e) “does not require that the
requesting party issue a document preservation letter,” Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 234,
courts have found preservation letters explicitly sufficient to alert a party of impending
litigation which triggers the duty to preserve. See Cooley v. Target Corp., No. 20-CV-2152
(DWF/DTS), 2022 WL 3647859, at * 3 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2022) (rejecting argument that
letter lacked merit and finding that “litigation was reasonably foreseeable” when letter was
received and duty to preserve was triggered); see e.g. Jones v. Hirschbach Motor Lines,
Inc., No. 1:21-CV-01004 (MAM), 2022 WL 4354856, at * 2 (D.S.D. Sept. 20, 2022)
(finding a duty to preserve was “most certainly [triggered] when the company's counsel
received” the preservation letter); Blazer v. Gall, No. 1:16-CV-01046-KES, 2019 WL
3494785, at * 4 (D.S.D. Aug. 1, 2019) (finding a duty to preserve when opposing counsel
“emailed an explicit request” to preserve evidence and rejecting party’s argument that
email “was not worded harshly enough to trigger a duty to preserve”).
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Here, Plaintiffs sent Dustar, Munns, and Secura a preservation letter on September
21, 2022. (Dkt 45-5.) It explicitly mentions preserving specific evidence and the legal relief
Plaintiffs would seek if the evidence were not preserved. (Dkt. 45-4 at 1-2.)
Dustar claims the “extraordinarily broad” scope of the letter renders it an
unreasonable preservation request, and implies therefore, the letter did not trigger a duty to
preserve. (Dkt. 48 at 9.) This is incorrect. Not only is Dustar’s argument lacking relevant
legal authority, but it also misconstrues the legal standard. While Dustar’s perspective is
relevant in so far as the duty to preserve “must be viewed from the perspective of the party
with control of the evidence,” Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 232, it is not the letter’s scope
that determines which evidence should be preserved. Instead, the “burden rests with the
preserving party” to preserve ESI that is relevant “to future or current litigation." Paisley
Park, 330 F.R.D. at 232, 234; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to
2015 amendment (explaining rule requires preservation of evidence when litigation is
reasonably foreseeable). Dustar received a letter explicitly requesting telematics data
relevant to the collision be preserved and Dustar had a duty to preserve the telematics data
identified in that letter on September 21, 2022, when it was received. Cooley, 2022 WL
3647859, at * 3; Blazer, 2019 WL 3494785, at * 4; Jones, 2022 WL 4354856, at * 2.
B. Reasonable Steps to Preserve
“To fulfill the obligation to preserve evidence a litigant must take affirmative steps to
prevent inadvertent spoliation.” Evenson, 2020 WL 12948541, at *6 (cleaned up); see also
Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 233 (finding duty to preserve “required [party] to take
reasonable steps to preserve”). “To be clear, Rule 37(e) ‘recognizes that reasonable steps
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to preserve suffice; it does not call for perfection.’” N. Am. Sci. Assocs., LLC, 2024 WL
4903753, at *17 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's notes to 2015
amendment). Courts evaluating a party’s reasonable steps to preserve should consider
factors such as the party’s resources, sophistication, control over the ESI, and retention
policies or systems. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015
amendment. However, when the duty to preserve attaches, “a party cannot ‘blindly destroy
documents and expect to be shielded by a seemingly innocuous []retention policy.’” Kelley
as Tr. of BMO Litig. Tr. v. BMO Harris Bank N.A., 657 B.R. 475, 487 (D. Minn. 2022)
(quoting E*Trade Sec. LLC, 230 F.R.D. at 589).
1. Dustar Failed to Take Reasonable Steps to preserve data on Dustar’s
Verizon Reveal Platform
Dustar admits that it took no steps to preserve the VTU data nor the VTU itself after
receiving Plaintiffs preservation letter. (Dkt. 45-5 at 98:12-25.) Dustar offers several
explanations as to why it believes it could not take reasonable steps to preserve the VTU
data. First, Dustar argues that because Truck 709 was under a law enforcement hold for
seven months, it could not access the VTU data to preserve it. Second, Dustar argues the
VTU in Truck 709 inexplicably stopped working on the date of the accident, so there was
allegedly no VTU data to preserve, and if the VTU data did exist its loss must have
“originated within Verizon’s systems.” (Dkt. 48 at 11, 13.) Lastly, Dustar argues that it
lacked the ability or knowledge to preserve the Verizon data and thus acted reasonably in
relying on Secura and retained counsel “to address any preservation obligations.” (Id. at
14-15.) For the reasons that follow, the Court finds Dustar’s arguments unpersuasive.
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First, the Court will address Dustar’s argument that it could not preserve the
evidence because it lacked physical access to Truck 709 following the collision. According
to the Verizon representative, the VTU data is transmitted from the tractor-trailer on which
it is installed to the Verizon Reveal platform on the data retention cloud and can be accessed
by the customer online, through their account. (Dkt. 45-6 at 17:21-18:5.) This information
is supported by Dustar’s co-owner, Ms. Koopmans, who acknowledged that she accessed
the Verizon Reveal platform on her computer, (Dkt. 45-5 at 87:12-17) and by the Dustar
Office Administrator, Ms. Rens, who described accessing the VTU data in Verizon Reveal
to create reports. (Dkt. 50 ¶ 5.) Thus, having actual physical access to Truck 709 is not
relevant to whether Dustar could take reasonable steps to preserve the VTU data.9
Second, Dustar claims that sanctions for failing to preserve evidence are
unwarranted because the VTU data sought does not exist. Dustar claims the VTU stopped
functioning on September 16, 2022, the day of the accident, and nothing related to the
accident was recorded. (Dkt. 50 ¶ 8-9.) This claim, however, is not supported by the record.
The Court notes that the timeline of Ms. Rens investigation appears to follow separate
tracks: one for the VTU itself and one for the VTU data. Ms. Rens states that on or about
April 12, 2023, the VTU in Truck 709 was replaced after she discovered that the Verizon
virtual map10 was showing the incorrect location for Truck 709. (Id. ¶¶ 10-13.) Ms. Rens
9 As discussed more below, physical access to Truck 709 did matter for obtaining the VTU
device.
10 Attached as Exhibit B to Ms. Rens’s declaration is an illegible screenshot of a map that
was purportedly taken on November 18, 2025. (Dkt. 50 ¶ 10; Dkt. 50-1 at 50.)
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explains that she “contacted Verizon” and “Verizon pinged the tracker and received no
response, indicating the [VTU] was ‘dead.’” (Id. ¶ 11.) However, Ms. Rens apparently did
not review the Verizon Reveal platform data for Truck 709 until Dustar needed to respond
to discovery, despite using this information “each month” for her regulatory reports. (Id.
¶¶ 3, 5, 7.) It was at this point she “observed that there was no data recorded for Truck 709
starting on the day of the accident.” (Id. ¶ 8.) And only in response to this motion, on
November 18, 2025, did Dustar even attempt to contact Verizon to obtain historical data.
(Dkt. 50-1 at 54.) Put simply, Dustar did not attempt to access nor preserve the VTU data
for Truck 709 until a little over two years after receiving Plaintiff’s preservation letter, and
long after the expiration of Verizon Reveal’s one-year retention policy.
What Ms. Rens’s affidavit and exhibits do not tell the Court is that no VTU data
exists. The email Dustar provided from Verizon states only that Truck 709 is not part of
the Verizon account, it does not state that the VTU that was installed in Truck 709 stopped
generating data. (Dkt. 50-1 at 54.) Moreover, this email is misleading because the Verizon
representative testified that Dustar self-installed the VTU and did not update their Verizon
account to reflect that the VTU was connected to Truck 709. (Dkt. 45-6 at 26:2-14; 62:14-
63:4; Dkt. 45-13.) But April 12, 2023, emails from Verizon show only that there was a new
equipment order from Dustar without any indication that the equipment had stopped
working. (Dkt. 50-1 at 51-53.)
Dustar’s argument that any VTU data lost must have been Verizon’s fault is
contradicted by the Verizon representative’s testimony that the data could be recovered
using the VTU’s serial number. (Dkt. 48 at 13-14; 45-6 at 29:2-18.) In other words, it is
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not Verizon’s retention at issue, but Dustar’s failure to preserve evidence for a lawsuit after
having received a preservation letter.
Dustar has given different explanations as to the VTU’s whereabouts throughout
this litigation.11 The Court gave Dustar several weeks after the December 4, 2025 hearing
to look for or obtain the VTU or the VTU’s serial number through other means, given the
importance of the serial number to retrieve the lost information. Dustar failed to preserve
the VTU, failed to preserve the VTU’s serial number, and allowed all VTU data on its
Verizon Reveal platform relating to Truck 709 to be destroyed.
Finally, Dustar argues it reasonably relied on its insurance provider, Secura, and
retained counsel “to address any preservation obligations.” (Dkt. 48 at 14.) This argument
also misunderstands the law. Merely sending a preservation letter to an insurance provider
and counsel “to address any preservation issues” does not relieve Dustar from its duty to
take reasonable steps to preserve evidence. (Dkt. 48 at 15.) Rather, parties “are responsible
for the conduct of their attorneys; an adverse party is not required to bear the burden of
misconduct committed by the opposing side’s counsel.” Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 233
(collecting cases). In Paisley Park, the Court rejected a party’s argument that they could
not have been expected to know to preserve relevant text messages in part because their
counsel did not tell them to preserve them. Id. at 233. Here, it similarly does not matter that
Dustar’s counsel did not inform Dustar to preserve the VTU data or the VTU itself.
11 The Court discusses Dustar’s shifting VTU explanations more below.
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Moreover, even taking into consideration that Dustar, as a small rural trucking
company, has less sophistication than a large corporation, Dustar’s claim that it lacked the
technical ability or knowledge to preserve the Verizon data lacks credibility. Dustar used
the data from Verizon Reveal to create monthly reports to meet regulatory requirements,
and Ms. Koopman, a co-owner, was aware that it collected telematics data. The Court also
finds Dustar’s claim that it could not recognize the importance of the VTU data and VTU
itself until Plaintiff’s filed this lawsuit incredulous. Telematics data and information about
the trailer-truck and driver is obviously relevant information to a collision. (Dkt. 48 at 19.)
The record before the Court establishes that Dustar could have easily accessed its
Verizon Reveal’s platform and downloaded the data any time after receiving the
preservation letter and before the twelve-month retention period ended in September 2023.
Dustar also could have utilized Verizon Reveal’s customer support for assistance as it did
when Dustar had the VTU replaced in April of 2023, and in response to this motion in
November of 2025. (Dkt. 50 at 2; Dkt. 50-1 at 51-54.) And perhaps more troubling is that
Dustar removed the VTU, before the twelve-month Verizon Reveal retention expiration
date, and disposed of it without noting the serial number. Dustar had multiple opportunities
to access the requested information and preserve it but failed to do so, without offering a
valid explanation.
Dustar admits that it took no steps to preserve the VTU data or the VTU itself after
receiving Plaintiff’s preservation letter. (Dkt. 45-5 at 98:12-99:12). Then Dustar actively
removed and destroyed the VTU, the only means of accessing the data from Verizon’s
long-term archive. (Dkt. 50 ¶ 13.) For these reasons, the Court concludes that Dustar did
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not take reasonable and affirmative steps to preserve evidence, and as discussed more
below, Dustar’s actions were willful and with the intent of destroying the discoverable
VTU data.
C. Information that Cannot Be Replaced or Restored
Under Rule 37(e), if ESI can be “restored or replaced through additional discovery,”
then sanctions are inappropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e). In other words, if the data exists
elsewhere and is retrievable, then “the loss of evidence from one source may often be
harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's notes to 2015 amendment; see also
Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 235 (stating that Rule 37 sanctions are not available when
another party had access to the deleted data).
Here, as Plaintiffs point out, the relevant VTU data likely still exists in Verizon’s
long-term archives. (Dkt. 44 at 17; 45-6 at 27:11–29:11; 75:21-76:20.) However, it is not
retrievable for two reasons. First, Verizon cannot effectively search its archive for the
relevant VTU data because Dustar opted to self-install the VTU, did not retain the serial
number to the VTU, and did not connect Truck 709’s VIN or Shawn Munns’ name to the
VTU in its Verizon account. (Dkt. 45-6 at 26:2-27:7; 62:14-63:4; 75:21-76:16.) Verizon
searched using Truck 709’s VIN and Shawn Munns’ name and only found irrelevant VTU
data for a different truck owned by Dustar. (Id. at 75:21-76:16; Dkt. 45-12.) Second,
Verizon could search its long-term archive using the VTU’s serial number, but Dustar has
informed the Court that it was unable to find the VTU serial number to enable Verizon’s
search. (Dkt. 57.) In short, although the relevant VTU data could still exist in Verizon’s
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archives, it cannot be restored or replaced, because Dustar failed to preserve the VTU or
its serial number despite having ample opportunity to do so.
II. Intent to Deprive – 37(e)(2)
Having established that (1) Dustar had a duty to preserve, (2) Dustar did not take
reasonable steps to preserve, and (3) the ESI cannot be restored or replaced, the Court
moves next to sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2).
Whether it be mandatory or permissive, an adverse inference instruction regarding
the content of missing ESI is only appropriate when the “party acted with the intent to
deprive another party of the information's use in the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).
That said, “[s]anctions in the form of an adverse inference instruction or entry of default
judgment are extreme and should not be given lightly.” N. Am. Sci. Assocs., LLC, 2024 WL
4903753, at *16 (citing Rao v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 3d 678, 712 (D. Minn.
2022)). “Negligent conduct is insufficient to support such severe sanctions.” Kelley, 657
B.R. at 485 (citing Auer v. City of Minot, 896 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2018)); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (explaining that “[n]egligent
or even grossly negligent behavior does not logically support” an adverse inference
instruction).“[T]here must be evidence of ‘a serious and specific sort of culpability’
regarding the loss of the relevant ESI.” Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 236 (quoting Auer, 896
F.3d at 901). “Intent rarely is proved by direct evidence, and a district court has substantial
leeway to determine intent through consideration of circumstantial evidence, witness
credibility, motives of the witnesses in a particular case, and other factors.” Morris v.
Union Pacific R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 2004). Other factors may include the timing
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of the destruction of the ESI. See N. Am. Sci. Assocs., LLC, 2024 WL 4903753, * 23 (“The
Court considers the timing of the destruction of the USB devices as one factor when
determining intent.”).
Plaintiffs contend that Dustar consciously allowed the data to be deleted pursuant
to Verizon’s automatic deletion policy, despite notice and counsel’s commercial trucking
litigation expertise. (Dkt. 44 at 21-23.) Plaintiffs also point to Dustar’s shifting
explanations for the VTU as demonstrating intent to deprive. (Id. at 23-24.) And lastly,
Plaintiffs asserted at the motion hearing that Dustar’s physical removal of the VTU was
active spoliation. Dustar argues that its failure to “anticipate a sophisticated telematics-
based litigation argument that even” its “counsel did not recognize at that time” amounts
to negligence, not intent. (Dkt. 48 at 19.)
The Court notes that the two cases on which Plaintiffs rely for intent to deprive are
not cleanly analogous to the circumstances in this case. First, in Stevenson v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 354 F.3d 739, 747-48 (8th Cir. 2004), the court addressed the destruction of
ESI by a party pursuant to that party’s internal retention policy. In Taylor v. Null, No. 4:17-
CV-0231-SPM, 2019 WL 4673426, at * 23 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2019), the court similarly
addressed the destruction of evidence pursuant to a party’s “routine retention policy”
allowing ESI be overwritten automatically. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Dustar’s conduct is
indistinguishable from those cases because Dustar allowed the VTU data to be
automatically deleted pursuant to Verizon Reveal’s twelve-month retention period. (Dkt.
44 at 22-23.) In other words, Plaintiffs attempt to superimpose a third party’s retention
policy, Verizon’s policy, onto Dustar. Consequently, neither Stevenson nor Taylor are
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cleanly on point, because the parties there could have prevented the destruction of ESI
pursuant to their own retention policy, whereas here, Dustar did not have its own retention
policy. Instead Dustar waited to even seek the ESI from its Verizon Reveal platform until
Verizon’s retention period expired.
This case is more analogous with the circumstances in Paisley Park. In considering
intent for sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2), the court in Paisley Park discussed:
Were the missing ESI only the result of Wilson and Staley's failure to
disengage the auto-delete function on their phones, then the Court might
consider the loss of evidence to be the result of mere negligence. But that is
not the case here. As noted previously, Wilson and Staley failed not only to
turn off the auto-delete function when they anticipated litigation in February
2017, they also wiped and discarded their phones (twice, in Wilson's case)
after Plaintiffs filed suit …. This despite the fact that, as evidenced by the
fact that Staley backed up photographs from his phone to his cloud storage
space and Dropbox, they knew how to preserve information on their phones
and knew that information on their phone might be discoverable. The Court
finds from these circumstances alone that the RMA Defendants intentionally
destroyed evidence.
330 F.R.D. at 236-37. Similarly, here, Dustar knew how to preserve information from its
Verizon Reveal platform as Ms. Rens used monthly reports in the course of business and
Ms. Koopman testified to using the VTU data to monitor driver’s speed among other
things. (Dkt. 45-5 at 83:3–85:18; 87:18–88:6; 92:12-15; Dkt. 50 ¶¶ 3, 5.)
Were it simply Dustar’s failure to access its Verizon Reveal platform to preserve
the VTU data, the Court, like in Pasiley Park, might consider the loss VTU data to be the
result of mere negligence as Dustar asserts. But Dustar removed and discarded the VTU,
the only means of obtaining the data from Verizon’s archive, after having received
Plaintiffs’ preservation letter, after Plaintiff’s counsel emailed Dustar’s counsel asking if
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Truck 709 had a telematics device, and after the parties jointly inspected Truck 709. (Dkt.
45-4 at 1-13; Dkt. 55-1.) The timing of this destruction is a factor that demonstrates
Dustar’s intent to deprive. N. Am. Sci. Assocs., LLC, 2024 WL 4903753, * 23.
Additionally, in discovery, Dustar gave shifting explanations regarding what
happened to the VTU and its data. First, Dustar claimed the VTU was destroyed in a
separate accident on May 9, 2023. (Dkt. 45-8 at 3.) Second, it claimed the VTU was
inoperable and replaced following the accident. (Dkt. 45-10 at ¶¶ 4-9.) Dustar also gave
shifting explanations regarding the VTU in its briefing and supporting exhibits. In support
of Defendant’s Memorandum Opposing Sanctions, Ms. Koopman submitted an Affidavit
that “Dustar did not remove or disable the Verizon device on the subject truck while the
vehicle was in our possession.” (Dkt. 51 at 3.) But Ms. Rens submitted an Affidavit that
Dustar replaced the VTU in Truck 709 in April 2023. (Dkt. 50 ¶ 13.) At the motion hearing
on December 4, 2025, Dustar’s counsel acknowledged the affidavits are contradictory and
could not explain why. The Court notes these shifting representations demonstrate that Ms.
Koopman and Ms. Rens lack credibility. See Kelley as Tr. of BMO Litig. Tr., 657 B.R. at
490 (upholding court’s determination that party acted with intent to deprive in part based
on inconsistent representations made to the other party and to the court about the destroyed
ESI).
Instead of clearly explaining to the Court what happened to the VTU and the VTU’s
data, Dustar attempts to shift the loss of the VTU data onto Verizon without providing any
substantiating documentation. The documents Dustar submitted demonstrate that Dustar
contacted Verizon to obtain a replacement VTU, not that the VTU stopped working or
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reporting data at the time of the collision. The Court notes that it gave Dustar an additional
opportunity after the hearing to find the VTU or its serial number through other means and
Dustar did not do so. (Dkt. 57.) Dustar “cannot not now escape spoliation sanctions by
hiding behind” Verizon’s retention policy when Dustar had access to its Verizon Reveal
platform before the expiration of any data and then removed and destroyed the relevant
VTU without noting its serial number. Evenson, 2020 WL 12948541, at * 12.
The fact that Dustar checked the reports from Verizon Reveal monthly but did not
discover the VTU in Truck 709 allegedly stopped reporting data until years after the
collision, combined with Dustar’s affirmative removal and destruction of the VTU after
receiving Plaintiffs’ preservation letter and providing contradicting representations of what
happened to the VTU in discovery and to this Court, demonstrate a “serious and specific
culpability.” Auer, 896 F.3d at 901. The Court can only conclude from these circumstances
that Dustar acted with the intent to deprive Plaintiffs from using this information.
A. Appropriate Sanction
“If spoliation is determined, the Court has broad discretion in determining an
appropriate sanction and considers the culpability of the party and timing of the
actions.” Peterson, 2021 WL 2686119, at *3 (citing Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.3d
263, 268 (8th Cir. 1993)). However, “Courts should select the least harsh sanction that can
provide an adequate remedy.” N. Am. Sci. Assocs., LLC, 2024 WL 4903753, at * 27
(quoting Jonathan R. v. Just., No. 3:19-CV-00710, 2024 WL 1339522, at *10 (S.D.W. Va.
Mar. 28, 2024)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2) advisory committee's notes to 2015
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amendment (“Courts should exercise caution, however, in using the measures specified in
(e)(2).”).
Plaintiffs request a mandatory adverse inference instruction directing the jury to
presume that the destroyed VTU data would have been unfavorable to Defendants. Under
all the facts and circumstances before the Court, the Court agrees that an adverse inference
instruction is an appropriate sanction. Because the parties just recently completed expert
discovery, the record is not closed, the parties plan to file motions challenging experts, and
“the case is still some time from trial,” the Court recommends deferring crafting the
language of the adverse inference instruction “to a later date, closer to trial.” Paisley Park,
330 F.R.D. at 237; see also N. Am. Sci. Assocs., LLC, 2024 WL 4903753, at * 29 (“At this
point, given the NAMSA entities’ shifting positions as to the adverse inference instruction
and “the fact that discovery is still on-going, the record is not yet closed, and the case is
still some time from trial, the Court believes it more appropriate to defer consideration of
those sanctions to a later date, closer to trial.”); Monarch Fire Prot. Dist. of St. Louis Cnty.,
Missouri v. Freedom Consulting & Auditing Servs., Inc., 644 F.3d 633, 639 (8th Cir.
2011) (“Here, the district court withheld ruling on Monarch's Rule 37 motion for sanctions
until the case proceeded to trial, noting that the appropriate sanction for Indellicati's actions
would likely be an adverse inference jury instruction.”).
III. Prejudice Under 37(e)(1)
This Court, however, will order Dustar to pay monetary sanctions pursuant to Rule
37(e)(1). Sanctions may be awarded under Rule 37(e)(1) “upon finding prejudice to another
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party from loss of the information.”12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1) advisory committee's notes
to 2015 amendment. “‘Prejudice likely exists from lost or destroyed ESI if the lost or
missing evidence would be different or more helpful to the party claiming spoliation than
the evidence already in existence,’ but ‘prejudice does not exist when there is no support
for the speculation that the lost evidence would have affected the litigation.’” N. Am. Sci.
Assocs., LLC, 2024 WL 4903753, at * 15 (quoting FA ND CHEV, LLC v. Kupper, No.
1:20-CV-138, 2022 WL 16699304, at *3 (D.N.D. Aug. 31, 2022)). The destroyed ESI need
not be a “smoking-gun” for a party to be prejudiced, and “[i]n some cases, prejudice can
be satisfied by the nature of the evidence itself.” Id. (citing Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 748).
Here, Plaintiffs have been prejudiced by the loss of the VTU data. The data itself is
relevant to Plaintiffs negligence claims in two ways. First, since this is a suit about a
vehicular collision the lost VTU data may have illustrated Mr. Munns’ driving behavior
around the time of the collision with Plaintiffs. Second, the lost information regarding Mr.
Munns’ historic driving behavior during the six-months preceding the collision would have
been relevant to Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims. It is
unknown what the destroyed VTU data would have shown or how significant that data
would be to this litigation. See Vogt v. MEnD Corr. Care, PLLC, No. 21-CV-1055
(WMW/TNL), 2023 WL 2414551, at * 11 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2023) ) (finding party was
prejudiced where destroyed camera footage that may have contained evidence relevant to
claim), R&R adopted sub nom. Vogt as Tr. for Vogt v. MEnD Corr. Care, PLLC, 2023 WL
12 As discussed above, Rule 37(e)(1) also requires a duty to preserve, failure to take
reasonable steps, and irreplaceability—which have already been established.
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2414531 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 2023). Dustar’s contention that it may be equally prejudiced
by the loss of the VTU data is unconvincing.13 See Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 236 (“The
RMA Defendants’ claim that no prejudice has occurred is ‘wholly unconvincing,’ given
that ‘it is impossible to determine precisely what the destroyed documents contained or
how severely the unavailability of these documents might have prejudiced [Plaintiff’s]'
ability to prove the claims set forth in [their] Complaint.’” Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 236
(quoting Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 110 (S.D. Fla. 1987)).
Dustar’s other arguments regarding prejudice are similarly unconvincing. First,
Dustar relies on cases evaluating sanctions under its inherent authority or Rule 37(b), not
prejudice under Rule 37(e)(1). (Dkt. 49 at 17-18 (citing Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. Supp.
2d 950, 955 (D. Minn. 1999) (discussing Rule 37(b)(2) and the inherent authority to
sanction); Fed. Foam Techs., Inc. v. McGuckin & Pyle, Inc., No. 17-CV-0940
(WMW/KMM), 2018 WL 6529499, at * 2 (D. Minn. Oct. 11, 2018) (discussing inherent
authority to sanction); Mgmt. Registry, Inc. v. A.W. Companies, Inc., No. 17-CV-5009
(JRT/DTS), 2022 WL 4466071, at * 2 (D. Minn. Sept. 26, 2022) (same).) Second, Dustar’s
argument that Plaintiff can rely on other liability evidence misses the point that the
13 Dustar argues that the lost VTU data affects both sides equally and is “the type of
scenario where courts decline to find prejudice.” (Dkt. 48 at 19.) However, Dustar provides
only once case where a court found a party was not prejudiced by spoliation. (Id. at 19-20
(citing Fed. Foam Techs., Inc. v. McGuckin & Pyle, Inc., No. 17-CV-0940 (WMW/KMM),
2018 WL 6529499 (D. Minn. Oct. 11, 2018).) This case does not evaluate sanctions under
Rule 37(e)(1) and is distinguishable because the spoliated evidence would not have assisted
in determining the cause of the damage or amount of materials at issue in the case, whereas
here, the lost VTU data goes directly to the central issue in the case – the cause of the
collision. Fed. Foam Techs., Inc., 2018 WL 6529499, at 3.
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destruction of the VTU data now forces Plaintiffs “to go to already existing discovery and
attempt to piece together what information might have been contained in [the VTU data],
thereby increasing their costs and expenses.” Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 236; see also
Kelley, 657 B.R. at 492 (“Even if the spoliated evidence is cumulative to some extent, the
availability of the same or similar evidence from third parties or other sources does not
necessarily demonstrate a lack of prejudice.”).
“Rule 37(e)(1) allows the Court to impose any measures necessary to cure the
prejudice resulting from spoliation.” Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 237. The range of
sanctions available to the Court is “quite broad” and “[m]uch is left to the court's
discretion.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e), advisory committee's note to 2015
amendment). Many courts have imposed monetary sanctions under Rule
37(e)(1). See Spencer v. Lunada Bay Boys, No. 16-CV-2129, 2018 WL 839862, *1 (C.D.
Calif. Feb. 12, 2018) (collecting cases); Jones, 2022 WL 4354586, at *5 (“Among the
available sanctions for ESI spoliation, a court may order the spoliating party to pay the
aggrieved party's attorney's fees and expenses relating to the ESI loss.”). Because Plaintiffs
have been prejudiced the Court will order Dustar, pursuant to Rule 37(e)(1), to pay
Plaintiffs the attorney’s fees and costs that Plaintiffs incurred as a result of investigating
the spoliation and bringing this Motion for Sanctions before the Court. The Court will not
grant Plaintiffs other requested curative measures as it finds monetary sanctions under Rule
37(e)(1) sufficient to cure the prejudice.14
14 The Court notes that Plaintiffs provided only a conclusory argument for the other curative
measures requested. (Dkt. 44 at 29-30.) Moreover, as requested, the curative measures
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RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions be GRANTED IN PART, to the extent it seeks an
adverse inference instruction as a sanction for the spoliation of evidence under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(2); with the language of the adverse inference
instruction to be determined at a later date.
2. Plaintiffs’ motion be DENIED without prejudice in all other respects.
ORDER
3. Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks attorneys’ fees under Rule
37(e)(1).
a. Within 21 days of the date of this Order, Plaintiffs shall file a submission
with the Court detailing all reasonable fees, costs, and expenses they have
incurred as a result of bringing this Motion for Sanctions. Within 14 days of
that filing, Defendant Dustar may, if it deems necessary, file a memorandum
in response.
4. Failure to comply with any provision of this Order or any other prior consistent
order shall subject the non-complying party, non-complying counsel and/or the
Plaintiffs propose appear to have the “effect of measures that are permitted under
subdivision (e)(2)” which Courts are to prevent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2) advisory
committee's notes to 2015 (“An example of an inappropriate (e)(1) measure might be an
order striking pleadings related to, or precluding a party from offering any evidence in
support of, the central or only claim or defense in the case”)
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party such counsel represents to any and all appropriate remedies, sanctions and the
like, including without limitation: assessment of costs, fines and attorneys' fees and
disbursements; waiver of rights to object; exclusion or limitation of witnesses,
testimony, exhibits, and other evidence; striking of pleadings; complete or partial
dismissal with prejudice; entry of whole or partial default judgment; and/or any
other relief that this Court may from time to time deem appropriate.
Dated: March 31, 2026 s/Shannon G. Elkins
SHANNON G. ELKINS
United States Magistrate Judge
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