Loyd v. Schmitt et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
MINNIE LOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.
JASON SCHMITT, in his individual and
official capacities; and CITY OF
MINNEAPOLIS,
Defendant.
Case No. 24-cv-1391 (LMP/JFD)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Patrick Michael Kennedy, The Law Office of Patrick Kennedy, PLLC, Roseville, MN;
and Richard W. Hechter, Coleman & Erickson, LLC, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff.
Adam Edward Szymanski and Heather Passe Robertson, Minneapolis City Attorney’s
Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Minnie Loyd brought this Section 1983 lawsuit against Defendants Jason
Schmitt (“Officer Schmitt”) and the City of Minneapolis (“the City”), alleging that
Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights when Officer Schmitt obtained several
search warrants related to Loyd. ECF No. 1. Defendants now move for summary judgment
on all of Loyd’s claims, ECF No. 17, to which Loyd did not provide any response. For the
following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Officer Schmitt is a police officer with the Minneapolis Police Department. 	ECF
No. 19-5 at 3. 	In 2019, Officer Schmitt was working on an investigation focusing on
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weapons, violent crime around weapons, and narcotics crimes. Id. at 3, 5. In January 2019,
Officer Schmitt arrested someone for a drug-related offense and conducted an interview
with that person. Id. at 7. This person stated that there was a large-scale heroin dealer that
was known to this person only as “Stunna.” 	Id. 	The person also stated that Stunna was
known to drive a rose-colored Porsche and had a phone number ending in 1225 (“1225
phone”). Id. at 8–9. Based on this information, Officer Schmitt searched Facebook for an
individual who called himself “Stunna” and found an individual named Kevin Green, who
had a prior conviction for a controlled substance crime. Id. at 9.
In early February 2019, Officer Schmitt was conducting surveillance on another
case when he observed a rose-colored Porsche which was being driven by Green. 	ECF
No. 19-5 at 11–12. 	When Officer Schmitt ran the registration for the Porsche, he found
that it was registered to Loyd. Id. at 11. Officer Schmitt then observed Green engage in
behavior that was consistent with drug-trafficking activity while driving the Porsche, and
he included that information in a search warrant application for a tracker on Loyd’s
Porsche. 	Id. at 12–13. 	A state court judge issued a warrant, but the tracker was never
installed because Officer Schmitt was unable to locate the Porsche again. Id.
On March 6, 2019, Officer Schmitt applied for a search warrant to track the 1225
phone. Id. at 14. In drafting a tracking warrant for the phone number, Officer Schmitt used
a template developed by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (“BCA”) and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), which contains standardized language and can
be adapted to the factual circumstances of the case. Id. at 15–16. When using the template
for the first warrant for the 1225 phone, Officer Schmitt included the line, “Both the CRI
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and CI have provided information in the past that has been reliable, accurate and
confirmable,” but that information was not accurate.1 Id. at 47; ECF No. 19-8 at 2. A state
court judge signed the tracking warrant for the 1225 phone on March 6, 2019. 	ECF
No. 19-8 at 7. Officer Schmitt applied for an extension to the tracking warrant for the 1225
phone on May 1, 2019. 	ECF No. 19-9. 	In creating that extension application, Officer
Schmitt used the original search warrant and added new information he needed for the
extension. ECF No. 19-5 at 18. But the extension application still contained the inaccurate
information about the CRI and CI having previously provided reliable information. 	Id.
at 47–48. The extension warrant was granted by a state court judge. ECF No. 19-9 at 8.
After the extension for the 1225 phone was approved, Officer Schmitt received
information identifying an individual named Black, who worked for Green, and also
learned of a new phone number ending in 9886 (the “9886 phone”) that was potentially
associated with criminal activity. ECF No. 19-5 at 21. Officer Schmitt decided to draft a
warrant for the 9886 phone and used the 1225 phone warrant extension application as a
template for the 9886 phone warrant application. Id. at 21–22. However, because Officer
Schmitt had borrowed the earlier search warrant language, the 9886 phone warrant
application concededly contained three inaccurate statements: (1) that a confidential
informant had identified the 9886 phone as associated with Green; (2) that “a current court
order is in place on this cell phone” which “was expiring”; and (3) that the 9886 phone
1 	A “CRI” is a “confidential reliable informant,” which is “a distinct type of informant
characterized by a proven track record of accurate tips.” State v. Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d 138,
149 (Minn. 2024). A “CI” is a “confidential informant” whose “reliability [is] not vouched
for by the affiant.” State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
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belonged to Loyd and was used to rent a Maserati on June 10, 2019. Id. at 50–51. A state
court judge signed the warrant for the 9886 phone on June 11, 2019. ECF No. 19-10. The
warrants obtained by Officer Schmitt allowed him to obtain historical records of phone
numbers associated with calls made or received by the 1225 and 9886 phones and the
phones’ physical locations. 	ECF No. 20 ¶ 16. 	Neither Officer Schmitt nor anyone else
involved in the investigation ever obtained or listened to the contents of any phone calls
made or received by Loyd. Id.
On June 13, 2019, Officer Schmitt applied for and was granted a tracking warrant
on an Audi registered to Loyd. 	Id. The tracker was successfully placed on the Audi and
was used to monitor its location during the investigation into Green. Id. ¶ 15.
Eventually, federal narcotics charges were brought against Green on August 13,
2019. 	ECF No. 19-1. As part of his federal criminal case, Green moved to suppress all
evidence from various searches and seizures conducted during the investigation, including
the tracking warrants for the Porsche and Audi, for lack of probable cause, and further
moved for a Franks2 hearing alleging that there were false statements in the phone-tracking
warrants and the searches of the phones. 	See ECF No. 19-3. 	Green did not move to
suppress the tracking warrants on the Porsche and Audi based on any false statements in
those warrants. See id.
2 	This refers to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978), in which the Supreme
Court held that a warrant based on an affidavit containing “deliberate falsehood” or
reflecting “reckless disregard for the truth” violates the Fourth Amendment.
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A Franks hearing was held before United States Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan
Wright on May 6, 2021. 	ECF No. 19-5. 	At the hearing, Officer Schmitt testified and
admitted that the statement in the 1225 phone warrant application about the CRI and CI
having previously provided reliable information was inaccurate. Id. at 47. Officer Schmitt
testified that the statement about the CRI and CI was part of the warrant application
template he used, and that he mistakenly forgot to delete that statement when drafting the
1225 phone warrant application. Id. at 14–16, 47. Officer Schmitt testified that the warrant
extension application for the 1225 phone had the same inaccurate statements because
Officer Schmitt used the original warrant application as a template for the warrant
extension application. Id. at 19, 47–48.
Officer 	Schmitt 	also 	addressed 	the 	inaccuracies 	in 	the 	9886 	phone 	warrant
application. As for the inaccurate statement that a confidential informant had identified the
9886 phone as associated with Green, Officer Schmitt explained that he used the 1225
phone warrant extension application as a template for the 9886 phone warrant application.
Id. at 21–22. To adapt the warrant for the 1225 phone to be a warrant for the 9886 phone,
Officer Schmitt used the “find-and-replace-all” feature in Microsoft Word to replace every
instance of “1225 phone” with “9886 phone,” as the phone number appeared 25 to 30 times
in the warrant application. 	Id. at 23–24. 	That feature worked for most of the warrant
application, but it unintentionally changed the statement that a confidential informant had
identified the 1225 phone as associated with Green (which was correct) to now say that the
confidential informant had identified the 9886 phone as associated with Green (which was
not correct). 	Id. at 24–25. 	Officer Schmitt did not notice that error in the 9886 phone
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warrant application until the prosecutor in the federal criminal case brought it to his
attention much later. Id. at 24. Officer Schmitt stated that he did not intend to purposely
mislead the state court judge. Id.
As for the statement that “a current court order is in place on this cell phone” which
“was expiring,” Officer Schmitt explained that this statement was accidentally maintained
when adapting the 1225 phone warrant extension application to the 9886 phone warrant
application. Id. at 27. And as for the statements that the 9886 phone belonged to Loyd and
was used to rent a Maserati on June 10, 2019, Officer Schmitt explained that it was accurate
that the 9886 phone belonged to Loyd. 	Id. at 52. 	However, at the time Officer Schmitt
was drafting the 9886 phone warrant application, he had contacted a car rental agency,
which had informed him that the 9886 phone had been used to rent a Maserati on June 10,
2019. 	Id. at 51, 58, 65–66. 	Officer Schmitt testified that he later learned that the 9886
phone was not actually used to rent a Maserati. Id. at 51, 58–59, 65–66.
Finally, Green’s counsel questioned Officer Schmitt about a statement made in the
9886 phone warrant application: that Green “is rarely observed without Loyd being
present.” 	ECF No. 19-10 at 4. 	Green’s counsel asked if Loyd was present with Green
during a traffic stop on April 19, 2019. 	ECF No. 19-5 at 53–54. 	Officer Schmitt stated
that he could not remember but that the 9886 phone warrant application did not indicate
that Loyd was with Green when he was stopped on April 19, 2019. Id.
After 	the 	Franks 	hearing, 	Magistrate 	Judge Wright 	issued 	an 	order 	largely
recommending denial of Green’s motions to suppress. ECF No. 19-11. As for the Porsche
warrant, Magistrate Judge Wright denied the motion to suppress as moot to the extent that
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Green sought suppression of evidence obtained from the Porsche warrant, given that the
warrant was never executed. 	Id. at 10. 	However, Magistrate Judge Wright granted the
motion to suppress the existence of the Porsche warrant itself as evidence, not because the
warrant contained any inaccuracies, but because information in the warrant was stale. Id.
at 10–11. 	Magistrate Judge Wright also denied suppression of evidence from the 1225
phone warrant. Id. at 11–17. The order did not describe any inaccuracies in the 1225 phone
warrant; rather, the analysis focused on whether information in the 1225 phone warrant
was stale, and Magistrate Judge Wright found it was not.3 Id. at 14–17. As for the 9886
phone warrant, Magistrate Judge Wright concluded that even when all of the admitted
inaccuracies were removed from the warrant, probable cause still existed to seek the 9886
phone warrant. 	Id. at 18–22. 	Finally, Magistrate Judge Wright concluded that the Audi
warrant was supported by probable cause but did not note any inaccuracies in that warrant.
Id. at 50–54. Magistrate Judge Wright’s order was largely adopted by the presiding district
judge.4 See ECF No. 19-12. Ultimately, Green was found guilty of narcotics offenses and
was sentenced to 180 months in prison. ECF No. 19-13.
3 	Magistrate Judge Wright did not engage in a separate analysis of the 1225 phone
extension warrant but denied any motion to suppress that warrant. ECF No. 19-11 at 59.
4 	The district judge did not adopt Magistrate Judge Wright’s conclusions regarding
the 9886 phone warrant because the Government indicated that it did not intend to offer
evidence obtained from that warrant in Green’s prosecution. 	ECF No. 19-12 at 2.
Accordingly, the district judge denied the motion to suppress evidence from the 9886 phone
warrant as moot. Id.
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On April 17, 2024, Loyd brought this Section 1983 lawsuit against Officer Schmitt
in his individual and official capacities, alleging that the warrant applications “ma[de]
falsehoods” and violated Loyd’s Fourth Amendment rights. 	Id. ¶¶ 18–34. 	Loyd also
brought a Monell5 claim against the City.6 	Loyd seeks monetary damages, a declaration
that Defendants’ conduct “violate[s] the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
constitute[s] unreasonable search and seizure in violation of Minnesota state law and
Federal Law,” and injunctive relief to “ensure and compel law enforcement officers in the
[City] to take proper training and to ensure the agencies who employ these [law
enforcement officers] instruct properly on the applications and affidavits for warrants.” Id.
¶¶ 44, 47; id. at 12.
Since filing the complaint, Loyd and her counsel have largely abandoned this case.
Loyd failed to provide initial disclosures (as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(1)), nor did Loyd request any discovery. ECF No. 19 ¶ 1. On September 18, 2025,
Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Loyd’s claims. 	ECF No. 17. 	Loyd
failed timely to respond to Defendants’ summary-judgment motion, so the Court issued an
order directing Loyd to show cause within seven days as to why Defendants’ motion should
not be taken under advisement on Defendants’ briefing alone. ECF No. 22. Loyd did not
5 	Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
6 	This title of this section of Loyd’s complaint references 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but the
rest of the allegations describe municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Those are
different claims. 	Given that the substantive allegations in Count II describe a municipal
liability claim under Section 1983, the Court construes Count II of Loyd’s complaint to
raise a Monell claim against the City.
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respond to the show-cause order, so the Court took Defendants’ motion under advisement.
ECF No. 23. To date, the Court has not received any response from Loyd.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is proper only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact” and “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Riedl v. Gen. Am.
Life Ins., 248 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). 	At this procedural juncture, the Court does “not weigh the evidence, make
credibility determinations, or attempt to discern the truth of any factual issue.” Avenoso v.
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 19 F.4th 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). 	If a party fails to properly address another party’s
assertion of fact, the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”
and “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts
considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
I. 	Loyd Lacks Standing To Pursue Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
Defendants first assert that Loyd lacks standing to pursue injunctive and declaratory
relief. ECF No. 18 at 22–23. “An injunction is inherently prospective and cannot redress
past injuries.” Frost v. Sioux City, 920 F.3d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2019). Declaratory relief,
too, must be “prospective,” for the purpose of a declaratory judgment is “to define the legal
rights and obligations of the parties in anticipation of some future conduct, not simply to
proclaim liability for a past act.” 	Just. Network Inc. v. Craighead County, 931 F.3d 753,
764 (8th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, when a plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,
“past injuries alone are insufficient to establish standing. Rather, [the plaintiff] must show
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[s]he is suffering an ongoing injury or faces an immediate threat of injury.” Frost, 920 F.3d
at 1162 (citation omitted) (alteration in original); see also Harmon v. City of Kansas City,
197 F.3d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The mere fact that injurious activity took place in the
past does nothing to convey standing to seek injunctive relief against future constitutional
violations.”).
There is no evidence in the record that Loyd is suffering an ongoing injury related
to the allegedly false search warrants. Rather, the tracking of Loyd’s cars and cell phones
occurred in 2019 in a criminal investigation of Green—an investigation which concluded
several years ago and culminated in Green’s conviction and imprisonment. 	See ECF
No. 19-6 (Minneapolis Police Department investigative file from 2019); ECF No. 19-13
(Green’s sentencing judgment). 	Indeed, the complaint’s use of past tense to describe
Loyd’s alleged injuries confirms that Loyd’s injuries are not ongoing or impending. See,
e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶ 2 (alleging that Loyd “was the victim of a violation of her Fourth
Amendment” rights); id. ¶ 28 (alleging that “Defendants violated clearly established City
and Police policies”); id. ¶ 33 (alleging that Loyd “suffered Constitutional violations”).
Loyd’s allegations of past unconstitutional searches are insufficient to confer standing to
pursue prospective injunctive and declaratory relief. See Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457
F.3d 806, 815–16 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that juveniles subjected to strip searches lacked
standing to pursue injunctive relief on a Fourth Amendment claim because the “allegations
of the complaint relate entirely to past conduct by the defendants”). And to the extent that
Loyd seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to remedy the purported injuries of other
parties not before the Court, see ECF No. 1 at 12, Loyd lacks standing to seek that relief,
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see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (explaining that a plaintiff “generally must
assert [her] own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest [her] claim to relief on the legal
rights or interests of third parties”). Loyd’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief
are therefore dismissed.
II. 	Summary Judgment Is Warranted on the Section 1983 Claim Against Officer
Schmitt In His Individual Capacity
Turning to Loyd’s Section 1983 claim against Officer Schmitt, although the
complaint is not entirely clear, the essence of Loyd’s claim appears to be that Officer
Schmitt violated her Fourth Amendment rights by including false information in the search
warrants for the 1225 phone, the 9886 phone, the Porsche, and the Audi. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 18–
34.
“A warrant based upon an affidavit containing deliberate falsehood or reckless
disregard for the truth violates the Fourth Amendment and subjects the police officer to
§ 1983 liability.” Morris v. Lanpher, 563 F.3d 399, 402 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, an “innocent mistake or negligence will not
suffice to demonstrate reckless or deliberate falsehood.” Estate of Nash v. Folsom, 92 F.4th
746, 754 (8th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). And even if
a warrant application contains deliberate falsehoods or reckless disregard for the truth, a
violation of the Fourth Amendment does not occur unless “the affidavit’s remaining content
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is insufficient to establish probable cause.” 	United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 774
(8th Cir. 2001).
Here, summary judgment is warranted on Loyd’s Section 1983 claim against Officer
Schmitt in his individual capacity because there is no genuine dispute that: (1) the
inaccuracies in the warrant applications for the 1225 and 9886 phones were the result of
innocent mistakes or negligence; (2) no search occurred with respect to the Porsche; and
(3) there were no inaccuracies in the warrant application for the Audi.
a. 	1225 Phone Warrants
As a threshold matter, Defendants note, and the Court agrees, that there is no
evidence in the record suggesting that the 1225 phone belonged to Loyd. 	ECF No. 18
at 24–25. 	The record suggests that the 1225 phone belonged to and was used by Green.
ECF No. 19-6 at 20–21. Without any contrary evidence, that would tend to undermine a
claim that Loyd had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 1225 phone. 	See United
States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374, 382 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted) (“With regard to the
content of cell phones, an accused must first establish that [s]he personally has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the object that was searched.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The result would not change even if the Court assumed for argument’s sake that
Loyd had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 1225 phone. Defendants accept that
the statement “[b]oth the CRI and CI have provided information in the past that has been
reliable, accurate and confirmable” in the 1225 phone warrant application and warrant
extension application was inaccurate. ECF No. 19-5 at 47–48. However, the evidence in
the record discloses that Officer Schmitt mistakenly included that statement as a holdover
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from a warrant application template that he used when drafting the 1225 phone warrant
application. Id. at 14–16, 47. These templates are developed by the BCA and the FBI. Id.
at 15–16. Officer Schmitt further explained that the warrant extension application for the
1225 phone had the same inaccurate statement because Officer Schmitt used the original
warrant application as a template for the warrant extension application. Id. at 19, 47–48.
Officer Schmitt described his process of reviewing and proofreading warrant applications,
and he testified at Green’s Franks hearing that the inaccuracies stemmed from not “putting
as key of an eye onto it as I should have.” Id. at 16, 57.
Crediting this evidence—as the Court must, given that there is no competing
evidence in the record, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)—Officer Schmitt’s oversight in including
this statement from the warrant application template regularly used by law enforcement
rises only to the level of an “innocent mistake or negligence,” which does not establish a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 	Nash, 92 F.4th at 754; see United States v. O’Neill,
94 F.4th 531, 538–39 (6th Cir. 2024) (finding no Franks violation when an officer “copied
and pasted [inaccurate] material from a template affidavit and mistakenly forgot to delete
it”); United States v. McKnight, CR18-16 TSZ, 2019 WL 998416, at *8 (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 1, 2019) (finding no Franks violation when officer made “innocent” mistake by using
“a ‘copy and paste’ method for later affidavits that propagated the error in his affidavit”).
b. 	9886 Phone Warrant
Loyd’s complaint challenges four purportedly inaccurate statements in the 9886
phone warrant application: (1) that a confidential informant had identified the 9886 phone
as associated with Green; (2) that “a current court order is in place on this cell phone”
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which “was expiring”; (3) that the 9886 phone belonged to Loyd and was used to rent a
Maserati on June 10, 2019; and (4) that Green “is rarely observed without Loyd being
present.” 	ECF No. 1 ¶ 17. 	Loyd’s Fourth Amendment claim based on the 9886 phone
warrant must be dismissed because she does not demonstrate how the first three statements
were anything other than the product of an innocent mistake or negligence, and she fails to
show that the fourth statement was inaccurate at all.
As for the statement that a confidential informant had identified the 9886 phone as
associated with Green, Officer Schmitt explained that he used the 1225 phone warrant
extension application as a template for the 9886 phone warrant application. ECF No. 19-5
at 21–22. 	To adapt the warrant for the 1225 phone to be a warrant for the 9886 phone,
Officer Schmitt used the “find-and-replace-all” feature in Microsoft Word to replace every
instance of “1225 phone” with “9886 phone,” as the phone number appeared 25 to 30 times
in the warrant application. Id. at 23–24. That feature unintentionally changed the statement
that a confidential informant had identified the 1225 phone as associated with Green (which
was correct) to instead say that the confidential informant had identified the 9886 phone as
associated with Green (which was not correct). 	Id. at 24–25. 	Officer Schmitt did not
include that statement to mislead the state court judge, and he did not even notice that error
in the 9886 phone warrant application until the prosecutor in the federal criminal case
brought it to his attention much later. 	Id. at 24. On this record, Officer Schmitt’s use of
the “find-and-replace-all” function demonstrated, at most, negligence in drafting the 9886
phone warrant application, particularly because Officer Schmitt entertained no serious
doubts regarding the veracity of the statements contained in the warrant application when
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he submitted it. Id.; see United States v. Lowe, 516 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding
no Franks violation with similar “find-and-replace” errors because “at worst,” the
investigator “was simply negligent and should have read the affidavit more carefully”).
As for the statement that “a current court order is in place on this cell phone” which
“was expiring,” Officer Schmitt acknowledged that this statement was an inadvertent
holdover from the 1225 phone warrant extension application, which was adapted for the
9886 phone warrant application. ECF No. 19-5 at 21–22, 27. Again, in the absence of any
evidence contradicting Officer Schmitt’s Franks hearing testimony, there is no genuine
dispute that this inaccuracy rises only to the level of an innocent mistake or negligence.
See McKnight, 2019 WL 998416, at *8.
As for the statement that the 9886 phone belonged to Loyd and was used to rent a
Maserati on June 10, 2019, Officer Schmitt explained that he believed that statement was
true when he wrote it because a car rental agency had informed him that the 9886 phone
had been used to rent a Maserati on June 10, 2019. ECF No. 19-5 at 51, 58, 65–66. Only
later did Officer Schmitt learn that the 9886 phone was not actually used to rent a Maserati.
Id. at 51, 58–59, 65–66. A statement in an affidavit must be “‘truthful’ in the sense that the
information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.” Franks,
438 U.S. at 165. “This does not mean ‘truthful’ in the sense that every fact recited in the
warrant affidavit is necessarily correct.” Id. A fact is “appropriately accepted” if the affiant
had a “reasonable basis for [his] conclusion.” United States v. Schmitz, 181 F.3d 981, 986
(8th Cir. 1999). 	Here, there is no dispute that Officer Schmitt had a reasonable basis for
writing that the 9886 phone had been used to rent a Maserati on June 10, 2019, given that
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he was told that information by the car rental agency. 	The fact that the information
ultimately turned out to be inaccurate does not mean that a “false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included in the affidavit.”
Reinholz, 245 F.3d at 774.
Finally, Loyd has not demonstrated that the statement that Green “is rarely observed
without Loyd being present” is even false. In her complaint, Loyd pointed to the fact that
Loyd was not present with Green at a traffic stop on April 19, 2019. 	ECF No. 1 ¶ 17.l;
ECF No. 19-5 at 53–54. 	But the fact that Loyd was not present with Green for a single
traffic stop does not render untrue the observation that Green is rarely observed without
Loyd. 	Because there is nothing in the record to suggest that this statement was false, it
cannot premise a Franks violation. 	Reinholz, 245 F.3d at 774 (explaining that a Franks
violation requires proving a “false statement”).
Regardless, even if a warrant application contains deliberate falsehoods, a violation
of the Fourth Amendment does not occur unless “the affidavit’s remaining content is
insufficient to establish probable cause.” Id. Magistrate Judge Wright addressed this very
issue in the Franks proceedings during Green’s prosecution: she concluded that, even
removing the inaccuracies in the 9886 phone warrant application, the warrant was still
supported by probable cause. ECF No. 19-11 at 18–22. Loyd has offered no evidence or
argument to counter Magistrate Judge Wright’s thorough consideration of this issue.
Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute that any Fourth Amendment violation occurred
with the issuance of the 9886 phone warrant for the independent reason that it was
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supported by probable cause beyond the inaccuracies identified by Loyd. 	Reinholz, 245
F.3d at 774.
c. 	Porsche Warrant
Loyd’s Fourth Amendment claim based on the tracking warrant sought for the
Porsche fails for the simple reason that the warrant was never executed, and a search never
took place. The Fourth Amendment “protects persons against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” United States v. Stephen, 984 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
But here, it is undisputed that the warrant for the Porsche was never executed and that a
tracker was never placed on the Porsche. 	ECF No. 19-5 at 11–13. 	Loyd’s complaint
correctly notes that the “Government’s attachment of [a] GPS device to [a] vehicle, and its
use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 22 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)). But
here, it is undisputed that the government never attached a GPS device to the Porsche, so
a “search” of that vehicle never occurred. 	Accordingly, absent a “search,” Loyd cannot
demonstrate how her Fourth Amendment rights have been injured by issuance of the
Porsche warrant. 	See Stewart v. City of Red Wing, 554 F. Supp. 2d 924, 929 (D. Minn.
2008) (finding plaintiffs lacked standing to bring Fourth Amendment claim because their
property was not actually searched); Lane v. District of Columbia, 211 F. Supp. 3d 150,
177 (D.D.C. 2016) (rejecting the argument that issuance of a warrant with inaccuracies
alone states a Fourth Amendment violation because the “Fourth Amendment protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, not against unreasonable warrants,” and
explaining that plaintiffs “would have no cause of action if the [police] had never executed
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the warrant”). 	Loyd’s Section 1983 claim based on the Porsche warrant is therefore
dismissed.
d. 	Audi Warrant
Loyd’s Fourth Amendment claim based on the tracking warrant sought for the Audi
must be dismissed because she has not demonstrated that the warrant for the Audi contained
any false statements. The inaccuracies alleged in Loyd’s complaint, ECF No. 1 ¶ 17, and
discussed above do not appear in the warrant application for the Audi. See ECF No. 19-7.
Indeed, in his criminal proceedings, Green never argued that the warrant application for
the Audi contained false statements; rather, he argued that the information in the warrant
application did not sufficiently tie him to Loyd, the Audi, and drug dealing. ECF No. 19-11
at 50–54. Absent a false statement in the warrant application for the Audi, Loyd cannot
succeed on her Fourth Amendment claim based on Franks. Reinholz, 245 F.3d at 774.
Because Loyd does not raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Officer
Schmitt deliberately or recklessly made false statements to demonstrate probable cause for
the warrants she challenges, Loyd’s Section 1983 claim against Officer Schmitt in his
individual capacity is dismissed.
III. 	Summary Judgment Is Warranted on the Monell Claim Against the City
Loyd also brings a Section 1983 claim against the City.7 	Under Monell, a
municipality cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under Section 1983 solely
7 	Loyd also brings a Section 1983 claim for damages against Officer Schmitt in his
official capacity, ECF No. 1 ¶ 2, but a Section 1983 claim for damages against a municipal
officer in their official capacity is really “an action directly against the public entity itself.”
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because it employs a tortfeasor. 	See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 	Rather, liability for a
constitutional violation will attach to a municipality only if the violation resulted from:
(1) an official municipal policy; (2) an unofficial custom; or (3) a deliberately indifferent
failure to train or supervise an official or employee. 	Bolderson v. City of Wentzville, 840
F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2016). 	However, “for municipal liability to attach, individual
liability first must be found on an underlying substantive claim.” 	Brockinton v. City of
Sherwood, 503 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 	Because the Court has
dismissed all of Loyd’s individual claims against Officer Schmitt, the Court must likewise
dismiss the Monell claim against the City. See id.; Stearns v. Wagner, 122 F.4th 699, 704
(8th Cir. 2024) (“Because [plaintiff’s] constitutional rights were not violated, his Monell
claim fails.”).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED; and
2. 	Loyd’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 17, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
See Guggenberger v. Minnesota, 198 F. Supp. 3d 973, 1003 (D. Minn. 2016) (quoting
Roberts v. Dillon, 15 F.3d 113, 115 (8th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, such claims are analyzed
under the Monell framework. 	See Lopez-Buric v. Notch, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049
(D. Minn. 2001).
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