USA v. Lewis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
William C. Mattessich, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 300 South
Fourth Street, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for Plaintiff.
Glenn P. Bruder, MITCHELL, BRUDER & JOHNSON, 9531 West 78th Street,
Suite 210, Eden Prairie, MN 55344, for Defendant.
Ryan Wayne Lewis is charged with being an armed career criminal in possession of
a firearm. (Indictment, Sept. 19, 2024, Docket No. 1.) 	After Lewis was arrested at the
Mall of America for an alleged trespass, Bloomington Police Officer Jai Hanson searched
his backpack without a warrant and found a handgun. Among Lewis’s pretrial motions
was a motion to suppress the gun as the product of an unlawful search under the Fourth
Amendment. 	After an evidentiary hearing and supplemental briefing, United States
Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) which, in
relevant part, recommended that the Court deny Lewis’s motion to suppress because the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RYAN WAYNE LEWIS,
Defendant.
Crim. No. 24-253 (JRT/JFD)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION AND DENYING
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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search was a lawful inventory search. 	(See R&R, Dec. 9, 2025, Docket No. 77.) 	Lewis
objects to that recommendation. (Obj. R&R, Jan. 6, 2026, Docket No. 80.)
The Court concludes that Officer Hanson’s search of Lewis’s backpack was an
inventory search, is not subject to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and
was reasonable when considering the totality of the circumstances. 	The Court will
overrule Lewis’s objection, adopt the R&R, and deny Lewis’s motion to suppress.
BACKGROUND
I. 	FACTS
The relevant facts related to Lewis’s suppression motion are presented in full in
the 	R&R, 	and 	Lewis’s 	objection 	does 	not 	pertain 	to 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s
characterization of those facts. The Court therefore incorporates them by reference here.
(R&R at 1, 4–6.)
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lewis moved to suppress the firearm discovered in his backpack on August 21,
2025. (Docket No. 57.) On October 17, 2025, the Magistrate Judge conducted a hearing
at which evidence was presented on the motion to suppress. (See Docket Nos. 69, 72.)
The parties filed supplemental briefing regarding the motion on November 13, 2025
(Docket No. 73) and December 1, 2025 (Docket No. 75). The Magistrate Judge issued the
R&R recommending the denial of the motion to suppress on December 9, 2025. (Docket
No. 77.) Lewis timely objected to the R&R on January 6, 2025. (Docket No. 80.)
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DISCUSSION
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
After a magistrate judge issues an R&R, a party may “serve and file specific written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2);
accord D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(1). 	“The objections should specify the portions of the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which objections are made and
provide a basis for those objections.” Mayer v. Walvatne, No. 07-1958, 2008 WL 4527774,
at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2008). “The district judge must determine de novo any part of
the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to” and “may accept,
reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); accord D. Minn.
LR 72.2(b)(3).
II. 	WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF LEWIS’S BACKPACK
A. 	Fourth Amendment
Lewis seeks to suppress the handgun discovered in his backpack as the product of
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 	The
Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV.1 “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process,
1 Lewis challenges the search under only the federal constitution.
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without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject 	only 	to 	a 	few 	specifically 	established 	and 	well-delineated
exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). Among these is the exception for inventory searches. See, e.g., United States
v. Garreau, 658 F.3d 854 (8 th Cir. 2011).2
The inventory search exception allows law enforcement to search certain property
“lawfully taken into custody, even without a warrant or probable cause to search.” Id. at
857. 	Closed bags and containers can fall within the inventory search exception. 	See
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983). 	“The justification” for a warrantless
inventory search “does not rest on probable cause, and hence the absence of a warrant
is immaterial to the reasonableness of the search.” Id. at 643. “An inventory generally
serves three purposes: ‘the protection of the . . . owner’s property while it remains in
police custody; the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen
property; and the protection of the police from potential danger.’” Garreau, 658 F.3d at
857 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)). “Because the police
are engaging in their community caretaking function—not their criminal investigatory
2 The United States argues that even if the Court concludes that the search was unlawful,
the gun should not be suppressed under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. See, e.g., United
States v. McManaman, 673 F.3d 841, 846 (8 th Cir. 2012). 	The Court takes no position on this
question because the Court concludes that the search comported with the inventory search
exception to the Fourth Amendment.
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function—in meeting these needs, they do not need a warrant or probable cause.” United
States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d 461, 464 (8 th Cir. 2011).
“The Government bears the burden of showing that its conduct complied with the
inventory search exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. The Court must “review the
propriety of an inventory search under a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” 	United
States v. Long, 906 F.3d 720, 725 (8 th Cir. 2018).
Generally, 	inventory 	searches 	are 	“reasonable 	and 	constitutional” 	when
“conducted according to standardized police procedures.” 	Garreau, 658 F.3d at 857.
However, “failure to follow standard procedures does not ineluctably render a search
unreasonable.” United States v. Morris, 995 F.3d 665, 670 (8 th Cir. 2021). “Even if police
fail to adhere to standardized procedures, the search is nevertheless reasonable provided
it is not a pretext for an investigatory search.” Taylor, 636 F.3d at 465. “[T]here must be
something else; something to suggest the police raised the inventory-search banner in an
after-the-fact attempt to justify a simple investigatory search for incriminating evidence.”
Morris, 995 F.3d at 670 (cleaned up). 	In other words, officers may not “raise the
inventory-search banner in an after-the-fact attempt to justify what was . . . purely and
simply a search for incriminating evidence.” 	United States v. Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171,
1175 (8 th Cir. 1993).
B. 	Evidence Presented to Support Lawfulness of Search
The gun in Lewis’s backpack was discovered by Officer Jai Hanson, who searched
the backpack without a warrant. Whether the Government has met its burden of proving
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that Officer Hanson’s falls within the inventory search exception to the warrant
requirement is a close question.
The Government presents the following, somewhat convoluted, evidence in
support of the search. 	Officer Hanson found the firearm, which Lewis is charged with
possessing, a 9mm handgun, in the backpack Lewis was carrying when he was detained
by Mall of America security. (R&R at 5.) Mall security detained Lewis for trespass and
initially held him in the Mall’s East Operations Room. (Id.) Mall Security reported their
citizen’s arrest to the Bloomington Police Department, which dispatched Officers Ian
Anderson and Jai Hanson. 	(Id.) 	Officer Hanson checked police databases for active
warrants for Lewis, and that check yielded two active state arrest warrants. (Id.) Because
of those active warrants, the decision was made by the Bloomington Police Officers to
bring Lewis to Hennepin County Jail. (See Tr. of Oct. 17, 2025 Mot. Hearing (“Tr.”) at 41:2-
3, Docket No. 72.)
At the pretrial hearing before the Magistrate Judge, Officer Hanson testified that
he first encountered Lewis’s backpack when Officer Ian Anderson brought it to the
Bloomington Police substation at the Mall, from the East Operations Room where Lewis
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was being held. 3 (Tr. at 34:17–22, Docket No. 72.) Hanson then “did an inventory search
on the backpack.” 	(Id. at 36:8.) 	Hanson testified that he performed the search not
because Lewis would be detained at the Bloomington Police substation, but rather
because “we knew Mr. Lewis would be going to Hennepin County on his active
warrants[.]” (Id. 36:10–11.) Hanson states that he “did an inventory search of [Lewis’s]
backpack knowing that Hennepin County does not take backpacks, so anything that is in
that backpack, along with the backpack, would be inventoried at the Bloomington Police
Station.” (Id. at 36:10–15.) When asked how he knew that this was the proper procedure,
Officer Hanson replied “[p]ast knowledge with Hennepin County Jail and then their policy
as well,” and stated that this is the typical procedure he follows when booking individuals
with active felony warrants. 	(Id. at 36:16–23.) 	Officer Hanson testified that when an
individual is being booked in the Bloomington Police Station, proper procedure is that the
person’s property “would stay at the Bloomington Police Department in our inventory
room,” and that if this property included a backpack, “[i]t would be inventoried as well.”
3 Officer Anderson had also searched Lewis’s backpack. 	He did not find the gun, and
therefore, the lawfulness of Officer Anderson’s search is not at issue here. 	The Court
nevertheless is troubled that Officer Anderson’s search took place at all—he did not testify that
he was inventorying the backpack, and it is doubtful his search was a valid search incident to
arrest, given that Lewis had been detained for some time before the search and was handcuffed
to a bench fifteen feet away. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644 (“We have held that immediately
upon arrest an officer may lawfully search the person of an arrestee . . . [and] he may also search
the area within the arrestee’s immediate control.” (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973) and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969))). Moreover, for these same reasons, Officer
Hansons’s search—like Officer Anderson’s—likely was not a valid search incident to arrest.
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(Id. at 46:7–13.) However, as recounted above, at that point Lewis was not going to be
booked at the Bloomington Police Department—he was to be taken to Hennepin County
Jail. 4
At the hearing, the Magistrate Judge questioned Officer Hanson as to whether he
relied upon any written policy or procedure in carrying out the inventory search. (Id. at
46:17–22.) 	Officer Hanson stated the Bloomington Police Department did have such a
policy. 	(Id.) 	Although the Government did not present the written policy at the
evidentiary hearing, the Magistrate Judge directed them to provide the policy to the Court
following the hearing, which they did.5 (Id. at 47:4–25.; see Govt.’s Response to Mot. to
Suppress (“Response”), Exhibit GX-5 (“Ex. GX-5”), Dec. 1, 2025, Docket No. 75-1 (providing
excerpts from the Bloomington Police Department Manual).)
4 The Court therefore observes that Officer Hanson’s testimony discussing the proper
procedure when an individual is booked at the Bloomington police station is not helpful, given
Officer Hanson’s testimony that prior to the discovery of the gun, he believed that Lewis was not
going to be detained at Bloomington, but rather the Hennepin County jail. The relevant inquiry
here is whether Officer Hanson followed the Bloomington Police Department’s standard
procedure for when the Bloomington Police Department arrests an individual who is going to be
detained elsewhere, but the Bloomington Police Department will be retaining custody of that
person’s property.
5 At the hearing, the Magistrate Judge rightfully expressed concern that the Government
failed to provide the written policy at the hearing. (See Tr. 47:18–25 (“I’m a bit conflicted about
asking for [the policy to be submitted after the hearing]. I sort of feel like the motions hearing
should rise or fall on what the lawyers do[.]”)). However, Lewis did not object to the Magistrate
Judge’s consideration of the written policy submitted after the hearing.
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Bloomington Police Department Policy 129, in relevant part, states that “[p]roperty
which 	has 	been 	discovered, 	gathered, 	received, 	or 	collected 	in 	connection 	with
departmental 	responsibilities 	will 	be 	processed 	in 	accordance 	with 	established
departmental procedures.” 	(Ex. GX-5 at 2.) 	Under the heading “Property Inventory
Procedure” the policy states that “[a]ll property must be inventoried and placed in secure
storage prior to the employee going off-duty. 	Employees inventorying property shall
observe the guidelines found in the property room procedure manual.” (Id.)6
The Government also provided—again, after the evidentiary hearing—certain
excerpts from the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office Policy Manual. (Response, Exhibit GX-
6 (“Ex. GX-6.”) Dec. 1, 2025, Docket No. 75-2.) 	The Government asserts that these
excerpts demonstrate that the Hennepin County Jail would not have been able to store
Lewis’s backpack. 	The Hennepin County manual states that any property taken into
custody from an arrestee cannot exceed “an amount easily stored in a single [jail] garment
bag.” (Ex. GX-6 at 2.) 	However, the Government did not provide evidence of whether
Lewis’s backpack would have fit in a Hennepin County jail garment bag, and, more
relevantly, did not provide any evidence of a Bloomington Police Department standard
6 The Government did not provide the “property room procedure manual,” referenced in
Policy 129. Policy 129 itself also makes no mention of the procedure for inventorying backpacks,
nor does it set forth any sort of policy for what Bloomington police officers are to do with
backpacks belonging to individuals who will be detained at another police station.
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procedure under which Bloomington officers would inventory and store backpacks
obtained from an individual who would be booked and detained at Hennepin County jail.
At the hearing, the Government also offered as evidence the Police Report
compiled by Officer Anderson and Officer Hanson after Lewis’s arrest. (See Resp. at 1–2
(listing exhibits).) In the police report, Officer Hanson described the search as follows:
Lewis also had two warrants for his arrest. . . . Both warrants were
confirmed through Bloomington Police Department (BPD) Dispatch.
While searching Lewis’ personal property, I located a 9mm Taurus Armas
G2C handgun in the center pocket of his backpack. 	The handgun had a
magazine inserted into the gun with eight rounds in it and no round in the
chamber. I ran the serial number through dispatch which advised it checked
clear.
(Ex. GX-1 at 3.) Also relevant is Officer Anderson’s report, which stated:
Mall security had arrested a male, identified as Ryan Wayne Lewis, for being
on an active trespass.
Checks showed Lewis had active warrants for his arrest.
Officer Hanson advised during a search incident to arrest, he located a gun
inside Lewis’s backpack. . . .
Items listed below were property inventoried at the police department:
• 	Black and silver G2C 9mm handgun (item #1)- inventoried wearing
latex gloves.
• 	Magazine and eight bullets belonging to item #1 (item #2).
• 	Backpack with miscellaneous personal belongings (item #3).
(Id. at 3–4.)
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C. 	Lewis’s Objection to the R&R
The Magistrate Judge concluded that the Government had met its burden of
demonstrating that the search was a lawful inventory search. 	The R&R stated that
“Officer Hanson testified that he followed the standard Bloomington Police Department
inventory procedures in his search of the backpack,” and that “[t]his testimony, which the
Court finds to be credible, is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the policies were
followed.” 	(R&R at 11–12.) 	The R&R also found that “Officer Hanson’s testimony is
bolstered by the Policy itself.” (Id. at 12.) Finally, the R&R concluded:
Mr. Lewis does not allege, nor can the Court conclude from this record, that
an 	inventory 	search 	was 	a 	post 	hoc 	rationale 	for 	an 	unscrupulous
rummaging through Mr. Lewis’s belongings. All of the testimony indicates
that Mr. Lewis was never under suspicion of carrying a firearm until after
[Hanson searched the backpack] and that the backpack was taken into
custody solely for safekeeping while Mr. Lewis was transferred to the
Hennepin County Jail[.]
(Id. at 12–13.)
Lewis offers two central arguments in support of his objection to the R&R. First,
Lewis 	argues 	that 	the 	written 	policies 	provided 	by 	the 	Government 	provide 	no
authorization for Officer Hanson’s search. (Def.’s Obj. to R&R (“Obj.”) at 5–8, Jan. 6, 2026,
Docket No. 80.) Lewis states “Section 129[] simply does not require that police officers
open the contents of a sealed container, such as a backpack, and conduct an inventory
search of its contents.” (Id. at 7.) Second, Lewis rejects the R&R’s statement that “Mr.
Lewis does not allege . . . that an inventory search was a post hoc rationale for
unscrupulous rummaging through Mr. Lewis’ belongings.” (Id. (quoting R&R at 12–13).)
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Lewis urges that he did argue, and continues to argue, that Officer Hanson had an
investigatory motive:
Although Officer Hanson contended that he was conducting an inventory
search to safeguard property, the government never bothered to produce
that inventory or the receipt which should, presumably, been delivered to
[Lewis]. Fortunately, Officer Anderson’s report . . . contains an inventory of
sorts. 	That summary describes the gun and magazine in detail but the
remaining items purportedly being inventoried for safeguarding purposes
are described merely as ‘backpack with miscellaneous personal belongings.’
As in Taylor, this ethereal description reveals the true nature of the officer’s
endeavor. Both Hanson and Anderson were searching for contraband[.]
(Id. at 7–8.)
D. 	Analysis
The 	Court 	concludes 	that 	the 	Government—narrowly—met 	its 	burden 	to
demonstrate that the search falls within the inventory search exception.
Officer Hanson testified that he searched Lewis’s backpack to inventory its
contents, “knowing that Hennepin County” (where, at that point, Lewis was being taken)
“does not take backpacks, so anything that is in that backpack, along with the backpack,
would be inventoried at the Bloomington Police Station.” 	(Tr. at 36:10–15.) 	Officer
Hanson testified that he conducted the search based on “[p]ast knowledge with Hennepin
County Jail and then their policy as well,” and that this is the procedure he has followed
in previous similar situations. 	(Id.at 36:17–23.) 	The Magistrate Judge expressly found
Officer Hanson’s testimony to be credible, and Lewis makes no assertion that Officer
Hanson’s testimony was not credible. (R&R at 11–12.)
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Although the portions of Bloomington Police Department Policy 129 and the
Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office Policy Manual submitted by the Government do not
expressly authorize 	the search Officer 	Hanson conducted, 	relevant Eighth 	Circuit
precedent indicates that even if the Government had failed to produce a written policy
entirely, this alone does not preclude a finding that the search fell within the inventory
search exception. See United States v. Petty, 367 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8 th Cir. 2004) (noting
that 	“testimony 	can 	be 	sufficient 	to 	establish 	police 	procedures”). 	Where 	the
Government presents evidence of an inventory search, the Court’s inquiry is whether “in
the totality of the circumstances, the search was reasonable.” 	See United States v.
Kennedy, 427 F.3d 1136, 1143 (8 th Cir. 2005). And “[r]equiring an officer to conduct an
inventory search pursuant to ‘standardized criteria’ or an ‘established routine’ does not
mean that the search must be made in a ‘totally mechanical’ fashion.” Id.
Moreover “[e]ven if 	police fail to adhere to standardized procedures, [an
inventory] search is nevertheless reasonable provided it is not a pretext for an
investigatory search.” 	Taylor, 636 F.3d at 465. 	“‘Something else must be present to
suggest that the police were engaging in their criminal investigatory function, not their
caretaking function,” in conducting the inventory search. 	Id. (cleaned up). 	As the
“something else” in this case, Lewis points to the report filed by Officer Anderson in which
he lists the objects inventoried by Officer Hanson—Officer Anderson describes the gun
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and 	ammunition 	in 	detail 	but 	describes 	the 	rest 	as 	merely 	a 	“[b]ackpack 	with
miscellaneous personal belongings.” (See GX-1 at 4.)
“[L]aw enforcement’s failure to record property” pursuant to an inventory search
can indeed support the conclusion that an “inventory search was pretextual.” 	United
States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 781 (8 th Cir. 2003). In this case, the Government’s failure
to present any evidence that Officer Hanson actually inventoried and recorded the
contents of Lewis’s backpack calls into question whether Officer Hanson was indeed
acting to “[protect the] owner’s property while it remains in police custody,” or “[protect]
the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property”—which are two of the
key rationales which allow inventory searches to exist outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement. Garreau, 658 F.3d 857. These same concerns were
present in Rowland where the officer testified “he only recorded items he considered
potential evidence,” 341 F.3d at 781, and also in Taylor, in which officers specifically listed
cocaine found in the defendant’s vehicle, but “did not itemize or list” the remaining
contents, including writing “misc. tools” to categorize hundreds of tools, 636 F.3d at 463.
However, in both Taylor and Rowland, “something else” was present beyond
concerns relating to the recording of inventoried property which led the Court to
conclude that the inventory search was pretextual. In Taylor, the “something else” was
the officer’s testimony that “the basis for the traffic stop, the arrest, the towing of the
vehicle, and the inventory search was the officer’s belief that Taylor had narcotics in his
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vehicle.” Id. at 465. And in Rowland, the “something else” was that officers had brought
a drug-sniffing dog to the scene and had “repeatedly asked Rowland whether there was
contraband in the vehicle,” leading the Eighth Circuit to conclude that “[c]learly,
therefore, police had an investigative motive.” Rowland, 341 F.3d at 780.
The Court finds no additional evidence of investigatory motive in this case. Beyond
the failure to make proper record of the contents of the backpack, Lewis points to no
evidence to demonstrate that Officer Hanson’s testimony that the search was an
inventory search conducted pursuant to department procedures was merely a post hoc
rationale to mask a search for contraband. For example, there is no evidence that Officer
Hanson, or Officer Anderson, ever questioned Lewis about the backpack or expressed a
belief that Lewis’s backpack would contain contraband. The Court is somewhat troubled
by the varying descriptions of the search over time—in his report, Officer Hanson merely
describes the search as a “search [of] Lewis’s personal property;” Officer Anderson’s
report describes it as a “search incident to arrest;” and Officer Hanson testified at one
point that he conducted the search because it “was my call, I’m doing the report on it, I
searched the backpack.” (GX-1 at 3; Tr. at 42:19–20.) But this does not rebut the evidence
put forward in the testimony offered by the Government that this search was conducted
according to standard caretaking practice, and not for an investigatory purpose.
The Court concludes by again stressing that the Government bears the burden to
demonstrate that an inventory search falls outside the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
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requirement. Additional evidence from the Government on the key questions in this case
would have been helpful. For example, the Government could have presented testimony
from Bloomington or Hennepin County officials verifying that Officer Hanson followed
standard procedure regarding the handling of property belonging to prisoners transferred
between the two departments. 	Relatedly, it is unclear based on Officer Hanson’s
testimony whether, at the time of the search, his intent was to store the backpack at the
Bloomington Police Department’s Mall of America substation, or at the Bloomington
Police Department’s main station—if the latter, Officer Hanson’s decision to perform an
inventory search at the Mall substation appears irregular, and additional testimony could
have clarified that it was indeed the proper protocol. The Government narrowly met that
burden in this case only because the Court found no evidence that Officer Hanson’s
reliance on the inventory search exception was pretextual.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Officer Hanson’s search was a lawful inventory search, and
will therefore overrule Lewis’s objection, adopt the R&R, and deny the motion to
suppress.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	The Report and Recommendation (Docket No. [77]) is ADOPTED.
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2. 	Defendant Ryan Wayne Lewis’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation
(Docket No. [80]) are OVERRULED.
3. 	Lewis’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Derived from Illegal Search (Docket No.
[57]) is DENIED.
DATED: March 16, 2026 	_____/s/ John R. Tunheim ____
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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