Sorcan v. Rock Ridge School District (Independent School District No. 2909) et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Austin M. Lysy, Douglas P. Seaton, UPPER MIDWEST LAW CENTER, 12600
Whitewater Drive, Suite 140, Minnetonka, MN 55343; Nicholas J. Nelson,
CROSS CASTLE, 2140 Fourth Avenue North, Suite 140, Anoka, MN 55303,
for Plaintiff.
Marcus B. Jardine & Trevor S. Helmers, SQUIRES, WALDSPURGER, & MACE,
P.A., 333 South Seventh Street, Suite 2800, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for
Defendant.
Plaintiff Pollyann Sorcan served as a member of her local school board near
Eveleth, Minnesota. 	During her tenure, she regularly questioned and commented on
district 	operations, 	supported 	various 	policy 	initiatives, 	and 	advocated 	for 	fiscal
responsibility. 	Sorcan alleges that Defendants retaliated against her for exercising her
free speech rights under First Amendment rights by removing her from all committee
assignments and preventing her from attending committee meetings. She filed this action
POLLYANN SORCAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROCK RIDGE SCHOOL DISTRICT
(INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
2909); and
BILL ADDY, Board Chair, in his official
capacity as Chair, and any successor,
Defendants.
Civil No. 23-1174 (JRT/LIB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 1 of 26

-2-
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking nominal damages as well as injunctive and declaratory
relief against the district and Bill Addy in his official capacity as chair of the board
(collectively, “Defendants”). 	The Court granted Defendants’ initial motion to dismiss,1
but the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.2 Defendants have
now filed a renewed motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
asserting that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court
will grant Defendants’ motion. 	Because Plaintiff does not plausibly allege a First
Amendment retaliation claim, the Court will grant the motion as to the federal claims and
will dismiss those claims with prejudice. The Court will, however, dismiss Plaintiff’s state
law claims without prejudice, as it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
those claims. The state law claims are more properly filed in state court.
BACKGROUND
I. 	BOARD STRUCTURE
The Independent School District 2909, Rock Ridge (“District”) formed on July 1,
2020, as a result of a consolidation of other school districts. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 50, July
15, 2023, Docket No. 11.) The District’s board has generally consisted of seven members
1 Sorcan v. Rock Ridge Sch. Dist., Civ No. 23-1174 (WMW/LIB), 2024 WL 230081 (D. Minn.
Jan. 22, 2024). This matter was reassigned to Judge Tunheim on March 13, 2025. (Docket No.
37.)
2 Sorcan v. Rock Ridge Sch. Dist., 131 F.4th 646 (8 th Cir. 2025).
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 2 of 26

-3-
and eighteen committees or liaisons. 	(Id. ¶ 22.) 	At the time of Sorcan’s censure, the
board consisted of nine members. (Id. ¶ 32.)
Under District Policy 213.II.C., committees are “advisory in nature” and possess
“only such authority as specified by the school board.” (Id. ¶ 27.) Policy 213.IV.E. further
provides that the “power of a committee or subcommittee of the school board is advisory
only and is limited to making recommendations to the school board.” (Decl. of Marcus B.
Jardine (“Jardine Decl.”) ¶ 5, Ex. G, July 16, 2025, Docket No. 48.)3 Although the board
receives committee recommendations for consideration, the board “has the duty to make
all final decisions related to such reports or recommendations” under Policy 213.II.E. (Id.
[https://perma.cc/Q4NL-GFSA]) The District’s Code of Ethics likewise states that, when
dealing with the public, board members must “[i]nsist that committees be appointed to
serve only in an advisory capacity to the school board.” 	(Id. [https://perma.cc/5EGF-
NA7R] (Policy 209.II.C.6.)) It also emphasizes the advisory role of committees by requiring
members to “[r]ecognize that school district business may be legally transacted only in an
open meeting of the school board.” (Id. (Policy 209.II.F.4.))
The board chair has the power to appoint members of committees at their
discretion. (Id. (Policy 213.III.C.)) The policies do not establish a minimum or maximum
3 	Rock 	Ridge 	School 	Board 	Policies, 	https://rrps.org/district/school-board/policies/
[https://perma.cc/ZW4D-65NZ] (last visited Mar 10, 2026). Earlier in this litigation, the Eighth
Circuit took judicial notice of certain public records, including the District’s board policies.
Sorcan, 131 F.4th at 652 n.3. The Court will cite to those materials throughout this opinion.
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 3 of 26

-4-
number of committee assignments. (Id.) At any given time, board members have held
differing numbers of committee assignments. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 25.)
On May 10, 2021, the board adopted a policy providing that only those board
members listed on the committee assignment sheet could attend committee meetings.4
On April 10, 2023, the board decided to allow other board members to attend committee
meetings, provided that the meeting notice included the following statement: “No
decisions will be made at this committee meeting; however, a quorum of the school board
may be present.”5
Despite the advisory and discretionary nature of board committees, Sorcan alleges
that committee positions are important because much of the board’s business is
conducted through these committees. 	(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27–43.) 	Committee members
often receive information on topics that are not provided to the full board. 	(Id. ¶ 29.)
Committees also exercise control over the board’s broader agenda by choosing which
topics to present at general board meetings. 	(Id. ¶¶ 35–39.) According to Sorcan, the
4 Rock Ridge School Board – Regular Meeting 5/10/21, at 1:18:00–1:18:30, 1:27:00–
1:27:30 (YouTube, May 10, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9mlWhijupE.
5 	Rock 	Ridge 	Public 	Schools 	– 	ISD 	2909 	Meetings, 	Boardbook 	Premier,
https://meetings.boardbook.org/Public/Organization/1613 	[https://perma.cc/28DP-WDBW]
(last visited Mar. 10, 2026); Rock Ridge School Board Meeting 4/10/23 at 6:00 PM, at 1:56:20–
2:15:15 (YouTube, Apr. 10, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6ZyWKgF5wE.
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 4 of 26

-5-
board often defers to the decisions of the committees by “rubber-stamping” committee
recommendations. (Id. ¶¶ 40–42.)
II. 	SORCAN’S BOARD SERVICE
Sorcan served as a member of the board of the District and its predecessors for
over twenty years. (Id. ¶ 1.) As a board member, Sorcan represented her constituents by
voting on and discussing school policy at board meetings. (Id. ¶ 2.)
In August 2021, the board censured Sorcan. (Id. ¶ 8.) On Friday, August 6, 2021,
the board circulated the agenda for a meeting that was to occur three days later. 	(Id.
¶ 58.) Item ten was labeled, “Closed Session for preliminary consideration of allegations
against an individual who is subject to the Board’s authority pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 13D.05, subd. 2(b).” (Id. ¶ 59.) The next item was titled, “Open Session: Possible action
based on the topics discussed in closed session.” 	(Id. ¶ 60.) 	Later that day, Sorcan
contacted Superintendent Noel Schmidt to inquire whether the subject of the discipline
had been notified about the proposed action, since that person would have the right to
request that the meeting be public. (Id. ¶ 61.) The next day, Saturday, August 7, 2021,
Schmidt replied, indicating that Sorcan was the subject of the proposed discipline. (Id.
¶¶ 63–65.)
Plaintiff participated in the meeting on Monday, August 9, 2021. (Id. ¶ 69.) She
moved to dismiss the censure and asserted her right to make the meeting public. 	(Id.
¶¶ 69–70.) The motion to dismiss was denied for lack of a second, but the board chair
granted her request to make the session public. (Id. ¶¶ 69–71.) The board voted in favor
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 5 of 26

-6-
of the resolution to censure Sorcan, and the resolution was adopted. 	(Id. ¶ 80.) 	The
censure alleged that Sorcan had: (1) “failed to respect and follow the District’s policies,
including the District’s Rules of Order at Board meetings; (2) violated data privacy laws;
and (3) failed to carry out the District’s mission and has actively undermined the District’s
mission by refusing to work with the Board’s Negotiation Committee on a contract,
undercutting the District’s mission on social media, and more.” (Id. ¶ 81.)6
6 The Resolution provided the following reasons for the censure:
Ms. Sorcan has violated District policy and has failed to take
direction from the Board Chair. Ms. Sorcan has been unwilling to
accept direction from the Board Chair, Stacey Sundquist, in Board
meetings. Ms. Sorcan tends to waste time with questions and non-
tangential comments. For example, Ms. Sorcan consistently brings
up older topics the Board has already discussed and acted upon;
Ms. Sorcan has failed to respect data privacy laws, District Policy
205 (Open and Closed Meetings), and District Policy 406 (Public and
Private Personnel Data). 	She revealed private data at a general
Board meeting, including private data on personnel issues, which
was previously discussed in closed session. This conduct violates
District policy and data privacy under the Minnesota Government
Data Practices Act, which all public officials must follow; and
Ms. Sorcan has at times acted against the mission of the District.
For example, she has been unwilling to accept the District’s legal
counsel’s advice and has failed to support Board actions after
action has been taken in Board meetings. She has also undermined
Board committees; for example, she was removed from the
Negotiation 	Committee 	for 	refusing 	to 	sit 	down 	with 	the
Committee to discuss a new contract. 	Ms. Sorcan has also
published misleading and inaccurate social media posts which
contradict official Board actions and discussions.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 82 (cleaned up)).
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 6 of 26

-7-
By passing the resolution, the board removed Sorcan from all committees “until
such time as the Board decides that Ms. Sorcan may again be assigned to committees.”
(Id. ¶ 9.) 	Despite the censure, Sorcan attempted to attend committee meetings to which
she was not assigned. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 102, 108.) For instance, on November 16, 2022, Sorcan
tried to attend a public negotiation committee meeting concerning the Superintendent’s
contract. 	(Id. ¶ 102.) 	At this time, the board policy providing that only those board
members listed on the committee assignment sheet could attend committee meetings
was still in place. See supra note 4. Then-board chair Riordan locked the door as Sorcan
attempted to enter. (Id. ¶ 102.) When another individual opened the door for Sorcan,
Riordan initially blocked her entrance, but Sorcan eventually proceeded to the meeting.
(Id. ¶¶ 103–04.) While in the hallway between the door and the meeting room, Riordan
told Sorcan that he believed her presence would create a quorum of the board and violate
the Open Meeting Law (“OML”). (Id. ¶ 105.) Following the meeting, Sorcan requested a
copy of the Superintendent’s contract, and Riordan refused. (Id. ¶ 107.) Sorcan contends
that this refusal violated the OML. (Id.)
On November 30, 2022, Sorcan again attempted to attend a committee meeting.
(Id. ¶ 108.) This meeting ended prematurely when board member Brandi Lautigar left the
meeting because she believed that Sorcan’s presence (in addition to those of the
committee members) would violate the OML. (Id.)
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 7 of 26

-8-
From August 9, 2021, to February 13, 2023, Sorcan was not assigned to any
committees. (Id. ¶ 92.) In 2023, Sorcan requested six committee or liaison appointments.
(Id. ¶ 24.) On February 13, 2023, board chair Addy assigned Sorcan to three committees
and did not assign Sorcan as a liaison. (Id. ¶ 94.) The other six board members served in
four to six committee or liaison positions. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 94.)
III. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sorcan initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 26, 2023, against the
District and Addy in his official capacity as the current chair of the board. (Compl., Apr.
26, 2023, Docket No. 1.) She alleges that the censure and the board’s misinterpretation
of Minnesota’s OML violated her free speech rights under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution. (Am.
Compl. 	¶¶ 	124–148.) 	Sorcan 	requests, 	among 	other 	things, 	nominal 	damages,
declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief mandating Defendants to rescind
her censure and appoint her to a number of committees commensurate with her peers.
(Id. at 28–29.)
On July 28, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (Defs.’ First Mot. Dismiss, July 28, 2023, Docket No. 12.) The Court
granted the motion, concluding that Addy was legislatively immune and that Sorcan failed
to allege a “persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct” sufficient to state a Monell
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 8 of 26

-9-
claim against the District.7 Sorcan v. Rock Ridge Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 23-1174 (WMW/LIB),
2024 WL 2300081, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2024). The Court declined to address whether
Sorcan plausibly alleged a First Amendment claim. Id. Sorcan appealed.
On March 13, 2025, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Addy was not entitled
to legislative immunity because he was sued in his official capacity. Sorcan v. Rock Ridge
Sch. Dist., 131 F.4th 646, 651 (8 th Cir. 2025). The Eighth Circuit also concluded that the
district court erred as to Sorcan’s Monell claim against the District. Id. Because Sorcan
alleged that the District maintained “an unwritten policy of retaliating against individuals
for their protected speech,” she was not required to allege “a persistent pattern of
unconstitutional misconduct.” Id. Instead, it was sufficient to allege “that a constitutional
violation resulted from authorized decisionmakers making ‘a deliberate choice of a
guiding principle or procedure.’” Id. (quoting Corwin v. City of Independence, 829 F.3d
695, 700 (8 th Cir. 2016). 	The Eighth Circuit, however, declined to decide in the first
instance whether Sorcan plausibly alleged a First Amendment claim against Defendants.
Id. at 652 n.2.
Defendants have now filed a renewed motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (Defs.’ Renewed Mot. Dismiss, July 16, 2025, Docket No. 45.)
7 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 9 of 26

-10-
DISCUSSION
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
Court considers all facts alleged in the Complaint as true to determine if the Complaint
states a “claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588
F.3d 585, 594 (8 th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 	The
Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665
(8 th Cir. 2009). Although the Court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, it
is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation[.]” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Instead, “[a] claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court may consider the allegations in the
complaint 	as 	well 	as 	“those 	materials 	that 	are 	necessarily 	embraced 	by 	the
pleadings.” 	Schriener 	v. 	Quicken 	Loans, 	Inc., 	774 	F.3d 	442, 	444 	(8 th Cir. 	2014).
Additionally, the Court may consider matters of public record and exhibits attached to the
pleadings, as long as those documents do not conflict with the Complaint. Porous Media
Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8 th Cir. 1999). The Court may also consider any
materials that are subject to judicial notice. U.S. ex rel. Kraxberger v. Kan. City Power and
Light Co., 756 F.3d 1075, 1083 (8 th Cir. 2014).
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 10 of 26

-11-
II. 	FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM
Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint fails to allege a First Amendment
retaliation claim. 	Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under Monell, a municipality is a “person” for purposes of
§ 1983. Monell v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). “Section 1983 liability for a
constitutional violation may attach to a municipality if the violation resulted from (1) an
official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure
to train or supervise.” Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8 th
Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
To allege a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege that: “(1) [she] engaged in a protected activity, (2) the government official[s]
took adverse action against [her] that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from
continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the
exercise of the protected activity.” 	Bennie v. Munn, 822 F.3d 392, 397 (8 th Cir.
2016) (citation omitted).8
8 Although Defendants do not concede that all of Plaintiff’s conduct constituted protected
activity, they acknowledge that at least some of it was protected. 	(Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot.
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 11 of 26

-12-
After careful review of the record that may be properly considered on a motion to
dismiss, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a First Amendment retaliation
claim. The Court concludes that Sorcan has not plausibly alleged that her censure and
removal from committee assignments is an adverse action. As for Sorcan’s exclusion from
committee meetings, the Court concludes that she has plausibly alleged an adverse action
but that she fails to allege that the action was made with a retaliatory motive.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim. The Court will first
address the adverse action element and then the retaliatory motive element.
A. 	Adverse Action
Sorcan contends that Defendants took two adverse actions against her: (1)
censuring her and removing her from committee assignments, and (2) banning her from
attending committee meetings. 	(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–11.) 	The Court will address each
action in turn.
1. 	Censure and Removal from Committee Assignments
Governmental 	bodies 	possess 	broad 	discretion 	to 	manage 	internal 	affairs.
Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468, 475 (2022). This discretion includes the
power to censure one of their members. Id. But a censure may infringe on an individual’s
First Amendment rights if the censure “would chill a person of ordinary firmness from
Dismiss at 16 n.18, July 16, 2025, Docket No. 47.) The Court’s analysis will therefore focus on the
second and third elements.
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 12 of 26

-13-
engaging in that activity.” 	Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 849 (8 th Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted). Before turning to the facts of this case, the Court finds it helpful to address the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Zutz.
In Wilson, the Supreme Court considered whether the censure of an elected
member of the board of trustees of a community college constituted an adverse action
under the First Amendment after he publicly accused the board of violating its bylaws and
ethics rules. Wilson, 595 U.S. at 471. To determine whether the board’s censure amount
to a materially adverse action, the Court considered “[l]ong settled and established
practice” as well as “contemporary doctrine” to confirm its historical considerations. Id.
at 474, 477 (alteration in original). A unanimous Court concluded that the board did not
violate the member’s First Amendment rights because the censure itself was form of
speech by equal members of a deliberative body, concerned the conduct of another
member, and “did not prevent [plaintiff] from doing his job” nor did it “deny him any
privilege of office.” 	Id. at 479. 	The Court also noted that the plaintiff was an elected
official, and in the United States, “we expect elected representatives to shoulder a degree
of criticism about their public service from their constituents and their peers—and to
continue exercising their free speech rights when the criticism comes.” Id. at 478. Wilson,
however, only addressed verbal censures and did not contemplate the constitutionality
of censures that include punishments. See id. at 480, 482 (“[W]e do not address today
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 13 of 26

-14-
questions 	concerning 	legislative 	censures 	accompanied 	by 	punishments” 	such 	as
“expulsion, exclusion, or any other form of punishment.”).
In Zutz v. Nelson, plaintiffs, members of a watershed district board, suspected that
the board was involved in various financial improprieties, which resulted in plaintiffs
bringing an action alleging § 1983 violations and state law defamation claims. 601 F.3d
at 845–46. After defendants filed motions to dismiss, plaintiffs sought leave to amend
their complaint, seeking to include factual allegations to support their First Amendment
retaliation claim. Id. at 847. Plaintiffs sought to include allegations that one plaintiff had
been unlawfully censured and that both plaintiffs were unlawfully denied appointment
to certain committees, barred from signing checks on the board’s behalf, and prohibited
from renting property from the board. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
denial of plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend on futility grounds, explaining that “[w]e
have 	doubts 	as 	to 	whether 	these 	added 	factual 	allegations 	state 	constitutional
deprivations sufficient to chill a person of ordinary firmness.” Id. at 851.
In light of Wilson and Zutz, the Court concludes that Sorcan’s censure and removal
from committees does not constitute a material adverse action for at least two reasons.
First, removal from committee appointments is among the most common forms of
internal discipline used by political bodies. See Temple v. Lower Elkorn Nat. Res. Dist., Civ.
No. 4:23-3198, 2023 WL 8934916, at *5 (D. Neb. Dec. 27, 2023) (noting that “removing
elected officials from committee assignments is a common sanction”). In fact, one court
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 14 of 26

-15-
in this District has dismissed First Amendment retaliation claims at the Rule 12 stage
based on sanctions far more severe than those imposed here. See Kleis v. City of Becker,
Civ. No. 16-1005, 2016 WL 4007573 (D. Minn. July 26, 2016).
In Kleis, the city council censured its mayor twice after he made comments critical
of the city’s golf course. 	Id. at *1. 	The first censure prohibited Kleis from contacting
certain 	individuals, 	discussing 	golf 	course 	matters 	except 	with 	specified 	officials,
participating in employment decisions involving city employees, and serving on the golf
committee. Id. The second censure imposed other restrictions. Id. at *2. It limited Kleis’s
contact with certain individuals unless another council member was present, barred him
from calling city staff, required him to copy the Mayor pro tem on communications and
data requests to staff, directed that data requests be submitted in writing in advance of
board meetings, and prohibited him from raising employment concerns during public
meetings. Id. Kleis alleged that the board censured him in retaliation in violation of his
First Amendment rights. Despite these substantial restrictions, the court dismissed the
First Amendment retaliation claim, concluding that Kleis failed to “plausibly allege[] that
the censures against him ‘would chill a person of ordinary firmness’ from exercising his
First Amendment rights.” Id. at *3 (citing Zutz, 601 F.3d at 849). The sanctions imposed
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 15 of 26

-16-
on Sorcan do not approach the severity of those upheld in Kleis, underscoring that her
allegations fail to establish a material adverse action.9
Second, Sorcan’s removal from committee assignments did not prevent her from
performing her duties or deprive her of any privilege of office because the committees
are purely advisory. 	See Wilson, 595 U.S. at 479; Temple, 2023 WL 8934916, at *5–6
(concluding that suspension from committee assignments was not a materially adverse
action under the First Amendment because the committees were “advisory in nature”).
Sorcan’s own pleading concedes that committees are “advisory in nature” and possess
“only such authority as specified by the school board.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 27.) Board Policy
213.IV.E 	likewise 	provides 	that 	committees 	are 	“advisory 	only” 	and 	may 	issue
recommendations only. 	Although the board may consider those recommendations,
Policy 213.II.E makes clear that the board “has the duty to make all final decisions related
9 Some sanctions may rise to the level of a material adverse action, such as those imposed
in Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764 (9 th Cir. 2022). The sanctions in Boquist included a prohibition
on entering the state capitol unless Boquist gave notice twelve hours before entering. Id. at 773.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that 12-hour notice rule constituted an adverse action because it
removed an authority Boquist enjoyed by virtue of his popular election and prevented him from
doing his job. Id. at 783.
The circumstances here are markedly different. Committee assignments are not powers
guaranteed by virtue of Sorcan’s elected position. Nor were they essential to carrying out her
core responsibilities. By her own account, the fundamental functions of her role were advocating
for her constituents and voting at board meetings—activities she remained fully able to perform.
Unlike the restriction in Boquist, which erected a concrete barrier to the performance of official
duties, Sorcan’s removal from committee assignments left her with the full authority of her office
intact. 	For that reason, Boquist is distinguishable, and the sanctions imposed here do not
constitute a material adverse action.
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 16 of 26

-17-
to such reports or recommendations.” Because the board retained the ultimate decision-
making authority, Sorcan’s censure did not prevent her from doing her job—attending
board meetings, advocating on behalf of her constituents, and voting her conscience at
board meetings. 	See Wilson, 595 U.S. at 471. 	Nor are committee appointments a
privilege of office since the board chair has complete discretion to grant or deny
committee requests.10
Because Sorcan retained all the rights and responsibilities of her elected office, and
because the censure did not hinder her ability to carry out her official duties, she cannot
plausibly allege a chilling effect. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that her
censure and removal from committee assignments constituted an adverse action.
Because the Court concludes that the board’s censure and subsequent removal from
10 Plaintiff argues that she has a de facto right to serve on committees. (See Am. Compl.
¶ 21.) That argument fails because board policy and Plaintiff’s own allegation make clear that
committees exercise no final decision-making authority. As purely advisory bodies, they are not
essential to the duties of board members, who remain free to advocate their positions, question
committee recommendations, and vote in accordance with their constituents’ interests at full
board meetings. To support her claimed entitlement, Sorcan points to a single instance in which
she asserts that a committee exercised final decision-making authority—when Rock Ridge boys’
hockey team changed its class designation from class A to AA. (See id. ¶ 28.) But the undisputed
public record demonstrates that the superintendent—not a committee—made that decision.
See Rock Ridge School Board Meeting 2/27/23 at 6:00 PM, at 22:00–31:30 (YouTube, Feb. 27,
2023), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fMbwLnbu4vk. 	Thus, Plaintiff fails to plausibly
allege that committees exercise final-decision making authority. Although the Court must view
the facts in the light most favorable to Sorcan at this stage, it need not accept allegations that
are plainly contradicted by video evidence, as well as those subject to judicial notice. See Waters
v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 734 (8 th Cir. 2019) (noting that, when deciding a motion to dismiss,
there is no need to adopt plaintiff’s version of the facts if it is “blatantly contradicted” by video
evidence).
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 17 of 26

-18-
committee assignments did not constitute an adverse action, the Court will not address
whether it was motivated by retaliation.
2. 	Committee-Meeting Attendance Ban
On May 10, 2021, the board implemented a policy stating that committee
meetings shall be attended only by the members listed on the committee assignment
sheets. On April 10, 2023, the board revised this policy to allow other members to attend
committee meetings, as long as the meeting notice included a disclaimer. 	The notice
read: “No decisions will be made at this committee meeting; however, a quorum of the
school board may be present.”11
In general, members of the public have a First Amendment right to attend
government meetings “open to public participation.” Lee v. Driscoll, 871 F.3d 581, 585
(8 th Cir. 2017) (citing City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisc. Emp. Rels. Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167, 175–76 (1976)). However, “there is no First Amendment right to participate
in a non-public government meeting as a member of the public.” Id. at 585–86.
Minnesota’s OML requires school board meetings to be open to the public. Minn.
Stat. § 13D.01, subd. 1(b)(1). 	“Meetings” are “those gatherings of a quorum or more
members of the governing body . . . at which members discuss, decide, or receive
11 	Rock 	Ridge 	Public 	Schools 	– 	ISD 	2909 	Meetings, 	Boardbook 	Premier,
https://meetings.boardbook.org/Public/Organization/1613 	[https://perma.cc/28DP-WDBW]
(last visited Mar. 10, 2026).
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 18 of 26

-19-
information as a group on issues relating to the official business of that governing
body.” Moberg v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 281, 336 N.W.2d 510, 518 (Minn. 1983).
Sorcan alleges the board misinterpreted Minnesota’s OML and used that flawed
interpretation as a pretext to punish her for exercising her free speech rights. (See, e.g.,
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 110–112, 121.) In support, Sorcan relies on a Minnesota Attorney General
Opinion, which opined that the OML is not violated when a board member attends an
unnoticed committee meeting and creates a quorum so long as the member “merely
observes an event or proceeding which is open on an equal basis to all members of the
public.” Open Meeting Law: City Council: Committees, Minn. Op. Att’y Gen. 63a-5, at 3
(Aug. 28, 1996).12 	Defendants respond that the board’s policy—prohibiting members
from attending committees on which they do not serve—was not imposed as a sanction
for Sorcan’s speech but rather was adopted to ensure compliance with the OML.
The Court concludes that Sorcan has adequately alleged an adverse action based
on her exclusion from public committee meetings.13 On May 10, 2021, the board adopted
a policy providing that committee meetings could be attended only by members listed on
the committee assignment sheets. She further alleges that several board members took
12 	Available 	at: 	https://www.ag.state.mn.us/office/opinions/63a5-19960828.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SJJ6-5BSA] (last visited Mar. 10, 2026).
13 The Court does not find that the board’s committee attendance policy was adopted as
part of her censure. The policy was instituted on May 10, 2021, and Sorcan was not censured
until August 9, 2021.
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 19 of 26

-20-
informal steps to enforce this policy, including locking the building where meetings were
held, physically blocking her entry, and canceling a meeting she attempted to attend.14
These allegations plausibly allege that the committee attendance ban created a chilling
effect. Unlike Sorcan’s removal from committee assignments, the committee attendance
ban prevented Sorcan from exercising rights she otherwise possessed as a member of the
public, which supports the conclusion that Sorcan has plausibly alleged a material adverse
action.
B. 	Retaliatory Motive
The third element of a First Amendment retaliation claim requires the adverse
action be related to a retaliatory motive. 	Bennie, 822 F.3d at 397. 	The defendant’s
retaliatory motive must have been a “substantial factor” in the alleged retaliatory actions.
Kilpatrick v. King, 499 F.3d 759, 767 (8 th Cir. 2007). That is, “the retaliatory motive was a
but-for cause of the harm.” Id. “[A] plaintiff cannot recover if the defendant would have
taken the same adverse action even in the absence of the improper motive.” Gearin v.
14 Defendants correctly point out that in Kleis v. City of Becker, the court observed that
the absence of an enforcement mechanism reduced the likelihood that a censure constituted an
adverse action. 2016 WL 4007573, at *3. However, unlike the censure in Kleis, Sorcan alleges
that board members actively enforced the ban on committee attendance by locking the building
door, blocking Sorcan in the hallway, and prematurely adjourning a meeting. 	These actions
appear to have been taken to enforce the attendance ban and were based on board members’
concerns that Sorcan’s presence at the committee meeting would violate the OML. 	Taken
together, Sorcan plausibly alleges that the attendance ban was backed by enforcement
measures. That, in turn, supports the conclusion that the ban could have had a chilling effect.
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 20 of 26

-21-
City of Maplewood, 780 F. Supp. 2d 843, 856 (D. Minn. 2011) (citing Osborne v. Grussing,
477 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8 th Cir. 2007)).
Defendants assert that the board passed the committee attendance ban in May
2021 to comply with the Minnesota OML. Sorcan alleges that the board instituted that
attendance ban with the purpose of punishing Sorcan for her speech.
The Court finds that the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege that the board
adopted the committee attendance ban with a retaliatory motive for two reasons.15 First,
the committee attendance ban was adopted by the board only after it was advised to so
by 	Superintendent 	Schmidt 	and 	the 	District’s 	attorney.16 	The 	Superintendent
recommended the policy in response to circulating rumors about possible school
consolidation, the lack of books in the new elementary school, and alleged misuse of
taxpayer funds. 	The stated purpose of the recommended policy was to ensure
compliance with Minnesota’s OML—not to target Sorcan. 	The Amended Complaint
contains no factual allegations linking the policy to Sorcan’s speech. The policy applied
equally to all board members and did not single out Sorcan. Although Sorcan claims the
stated reasons were pretextual, the Amended Complaint is void of factual allegations that
15 As previously noted, because the Court concludes that the Board’s censure and
subsequent removal from committees did not constitute an adverse action, the Court will not
address whether it was motivated by retaliation.
16 Rock Ridge School Board – Regular Meeting 5/10/21, at 1:14:00–1:27:30 (YouTube, May
10, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9mlWhijupE.
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 21 of 26

-22-
would allow the Court to draw the inference of pretext, and the Court is not required to
accept conclusory allegations of pretext where the well-pleaded facts and public record
show that the ban applied uniformly to all board members and was adopted upon the
advice of the Superintendent and legal counsel.
Second, the timeline alleged in the Amended Complaint further undermines any
plausible inference of retaliation. 	The board adopted the attendance ban on May 10,
2021. Sorcan was not censured until August 9, 2021—three months later. Because the
ban preceded the censure, the ban cannot reasonably be characterized as a retaliatory
sanction flowing from the censure. Moreover, the stated grounds for the censure were
unrelated to Sorcan’s committee attendance. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 82.) This disconnect in
both timing and subject matter further defeats any plausible inference of retaliatory
motive.
Taken together, record shows that the board enacted a generally applicable policy
based on advice from administrative and legal professionals and did so months before
issuing any discipline. 	These allegations do not plausibly support an inference that
retaliation was a substantial factor or but-for cause of the implementation of committee
attendance ban. Accordingly, Sorcan fails to plausibly allege that Defendants “took the
adverse action in retaliation for the protected activity.” 	See Gearin, 780 F. Supp. 2d at
856.
* 	* 	*
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 22 of 26

-23-
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Sorcan’s censure and subsequent removal
from committee assignment did not amount to an adverse action. While Sorcan plausibly
alleges that the board’s committee meeting attendance ban was an adverse action, she
fails to allege that the action was done with a retaliatory motive. Accordingly, Sorcan fails
to state a First Amendment retaliation claim.
III. 	MOOTNESS
The Eighth Circuit held that although Sorcan had been removed from the board
after the Court dismissed her suit January 2024, her claims were not rendered moot
because she requests nominal damages, in addition to other declaratory and injunctive
relief. Sorcan, 131 F.4th at 650. The Eighth Circuit, however, declined to address whether
Sorcan’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot. 	Id. at 650 n.1.
Defendants argue that Sorcan’s request for injunctive and declaratory are moot because
Sorcan is no longer on the board. Sorcan concedes that her injunctive relief requests are
moot, but she argues that her declaratory relief claims are not because “Sorcan is
considering running for re-election to the Board just a few months from now, and as part
of her campaign she would want to tell voters that she would be able to serve on school
board committees. (Pl.’s Opp. Mem. at 23, Aug. 8, 2025, Docket No. 54.)
The Court finds that even if Sorcan plausibly alleged a First Amendment retaliation
claim, her requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, a “case of actual controversy” refers to any case and controversy justiciable
under Article III of the United States Constitution. 	Maytag Corp. v. Int'l Union, United
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 23 of 26

-24-
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 687 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8 th Cir. 2012).
“There must be a concrete dispute between parties having adverse legal interests, and
the declaratory judgment plaintiff must seek ‘specific relief through a decree of a
conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.’” Id. (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
227, 241 (1937)). Stated differently, the case-or-controversy requirement in declaratory
judgment actions is satisfied if “there is a substantial controversy, between parties having
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).
In her Amended Complaint, Sorcan asks the Court to (1) declare that Defendants’
censure and removal from committee assignments violated her First Amendment rights;
(2) order Defendants to rescind the censure and appoint her to a number of committees
comparable to those of her peers; (3) declare that the District’s interpretation of the
Minnesota OML is improper and in violation of her First Amendment rights; (4) order that
she be permitted to attend committee meetings on which she does not serve, to require
Defendants to provide three days’ notice of such meetings, and to enjoin the negotiations
committee from caucusing privately during District-union negotiations; (5) and award
nominal damages and attorneys’ fees. (Am. Compl. at 28–29.)
After careful review of Plaintiff’s requested relief, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
injunctive relief and declaratory relief claims are moot. 	As for Plaintiff’s request for
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 24 of 26

-25-
injunctive relief, these requests are moot because Sorcan no longer serves on the board,
and Plaintiff conceded as much at oral argument. In the absence of ongoing conduct to
enjoin, there is no live controversy with respect to injunctive relief. 	As for Plaintiff’s
declaratory relief claims, these claims are likewise moot. To stave off mootness, Plaintiff
relies solely on her intent to run for re-election and her desire to inform voters that she
could serve on committees. This stated intention, however, is insufficient to establish a
case or controversy. 	Currently, Sorcan is in the same position as any other individual
eligible to run for a seat on the Rock Ridge school board. If the Court were to conclude
that Sorcan’s declaratory claims remained justiciable, it would effectively permit any
resident eligible for election to initiate litigation concerning issues that might affect their
potential future board service. 	Such claims would rest on speculation rather than an
existing dispute and would amount to an advisory opinion, which Article III does not
authorize. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s injunctive and declaratory relief
claims are moot.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court concludes that Sorcan’s censure and her removal from
committee assignments did not constitute an adverse action. 	Although she plausibly
alleges that the board’s ban on her attendance at committee meetings qualifies as an
adverse action, she fails to allege facts showing that the ban was motivated by retaliation.
Sorcan therefore fails to state a viable First Amendment retaliation claim. Even if Sorcan
had adequately pled such a claim, her requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 25 of 26

-26-
moot. The Court will, therefore, dismiss all federal claims with prejudice and will decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Sorcan’s remaining state law claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c). See Crest Const. II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 359 (8 th Cir. 2011).
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. [45]) is
GRANTED, as follows:
1. 	Plaintiff Pollyann Sorcan’s claims under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution are DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. 	The 	Court 	declines 	to 	exercise 	supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	Plaintiff’s
remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 	Therefore,
Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED: March 16, 2026 	_____/s/ John R. Tunheim ____
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
CASE 0:23-cv-01174-JRT-LIB Doc. 61 Filed 03/16/26 Page 26 of 26