IN RE PORK ANTITRUST LITIGATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
In this multi-district litigation, three certified classes of pork buyers and dozens of
direct action plaintiffs brought claims against one benchmarking company and the
nation’s leading pork processors, alleging that Defendants1 conspired to limit pork supply
and fix prices in violation of state and federal antitrust laws. 	Following summary
judgment, certain Defendants2 and Defendant Triumph separately move the Court to
certify its summary judgment order for interlocutory appeal. Because the requirements
of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) are not met, the Court will deny both motions.
1 Defendants are Agri Stats, Inc. (“Agri Stats”); Clemens Food Group, LLC, and The Clemens
Family Corporation (collectively “Clemens”); Hormel Foods Corporation and Hormel Foods, LLC
(collectively “Hormel”); JBS USA Food Company (“JBS”); Seaboard Foods LLC (“Seaboard”);
Smithfield Foods, Inc. (“Smithfield”); Triumph Foods, LLC (“Triumph”); and Tyson Foods, Inc.,
Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., and Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc. (collectively “Tyson”).
2 Agri Stats, Clemens, JBS, Seaboard, Smithfield, Triumph, and Tyson.
IN RE PORK ANTITRUST LITIGATION
This Document Relates To:
ALL ACTIONS
Civil No. 18-1776 (JRT/JFD)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTIONS TO CERTIFY ORDER
FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 3168 Filed 10/27/25 Page 1 of 7

-2-
BACKGROUND
On April 28, 2025, the Court issued an Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order
on Motions for Summary Judgment, granting-in-part and denying-in-part the Parties’
motions for summary judgment. In re Pork Antitrust Litig., 781 F. Supp. 3d 758 (D. Minn.
2025).
Defendants Agri Stats, Clemens, JBS, Seaboard, Smithfield, Triumph, and Tyson
(collectively the “Moving Defendants”) seek certification of the Court’s Summary
Judgment Order for interlocutory appeal.3 Specifically, Moving Defendants ask the Court
to certify the question of whether “it is permissible to infer an unlawful Section 1
conspiracy from evidence that competitors participated in a third-party service that
provided historical average pricing information.” (Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Certify Order
Interlocutory Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (“Defs’ Mem. Supp.”) at 1, April 29, 2025,
Docket No. 2985.)
Additionally, 	Triumph 	separately 	asks 	the 	Court 	to 	certify 	its 	Order 	for
interlocutory appeal on the question of whether
offensive use of the single enterprise theory of antitrust
liability against a limited liability company—if cognizable at all
in the Eighth Circuit—requires a plaintiff to show that the
limited liability company and its members (a) are under
3 Defendants Hormel Foods Corporation and Hormel Foods, LLC (“Hormel”) take no
position on the other Defendants’ motion and do not seek to certify the Court’s granting of
Hormel’s motion for summary judgment. (Defs. Hormel Foods Corporation and Hormel Foods,
LLC’s Statement Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Certify Order Interlocutory Appeal, May 21, 2025, Docket No.
3052.)
CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 3168 Filed 10/27/25 Page 2 of 7

-3-
common ownership or control and (b) engaged in coordinated
activity tied to the alleged antitrust violation.
(Def. Triumph Foods, LLC’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Certify Order Interlocutory Appeal at 3, April
29, 2025, Docket No. 2979.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction over “all final decisions of the
district courts.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1291. 	However, a district court may certify in writing an
otherwise non-final civil order for interlocutory appeal if the action “involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Thus, a party seeking certification for interlocutory
appeal must establish that “(1) the order involves a controlling question of law; (2) there
is substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) certification will materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Union Cnty., Iowa v. Piper Jaffray & Co., 525
F.3d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
While § 1292(b) gives the Court the discretion to certify an order for interlocutory
appeal, the statute’s legislative history “indicates that it was to be used only in
extraordinary cases where decision of an interlocutory appeal might avoid protracted and
expensive litigation. It was not intended merely to provide review of difficult rulings in
hard cases.” Union Cnty., 525 F.3d at 646 (quoting U.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d
CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 3168 Filed 10/27/25 Page 3 of 7

-4-
784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966) (per curiam)). 	Therefore, “[a] motion for certification must be
granted sparingly, and the movant bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that the case
is an exceptional one in which immediate appeal is warranted.” White v. Nix, 43 F.3d 374,
376 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 	Indeed, “[i]t has . . . long been the policy of the
courts to discourage piecemeal appeals because most often such appeals result in
additional burdens to both the court and the litigants.” Control Data Corp. v. International
Business Machines Corp., 421 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir. 1970).
II. 	ANALYSIS
The Court will address the Moving Defendants’ and Triumph’s motions to certify
for interlocutory appeal in turn.
A. 	Moving Defendants
Moving Defendants argue that this “case centers on an important and unsettled
question of law,” as posed in their question of whether “it is permissible to infer an
unlawful Section 1 conspiracy from evidence that competitors participated in a third-
party service that provided historical average pricing information.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. at
1.) For purposes of § 1292(b) a question “cannot be a mixed question of law and fact.”
Su v. BCBSM, Inc., Civil No. 24-99, 2025 WL 2043663, at *2 (D. Minn. July 21, 2025); see
also White, 43 F.3d at 377. 	“[O]nly pure questions of law may be certified for
interlocutory appeal.” Su, 2025 WL 2043663, at *2 (quotation omitted). For two reasons,
the Court concludes that the query posed by the Moving Defendants is not a controlling
question of law but rather is a mixed question of law and fact.
CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 3168 Filed 10/27/25 Page 4 of 7

-5-
First, in its summary judgment order the Court concluded that “a reasonable jury
could find” that the reports provided by the third-party service “could be used by
subscribers to collectively target higher prices than they otherwise would have.” 	In re
Pork Antitrust Litig., 781 F. Supp. 3d at 815; see also id. at 811-13. Moreover, the Court
noted that the reports did not include only “historical average pricing information,”
(Defs.’ Mem. Supp. at 1) but, rather, provided “a recipient’s sales information by product
against averages for similar, bundled products sold by competitors,” In re Pork Antitrust
Litig., 781 F. Supp. 3d at 815. 	Thus, whether the reports provided by the third-party
service could have been used (and, indeed, were used) by Defendants to collectively
target higher prices is a question of fact for the jury.
Second, the Court did not hold that an unlawful Section 1 conspiracy can be
inferred solely from evidence that competitors participated in a third-party service that
provided historical average pricing information, as the Moving Defendants’ proposed
question implies. The Court concluded that the reports from the third-party service—and
evidence of how Defendants used those reports—were a factor that could be considered
by a jury in the context of several types of evidence of parallel conduct and a whole host
of plus factors. 	See In re Pork Antitrust Litig., 781 F. Supp. 3d 758. 	The Moving
Defendants’ proposed question would be controlling only if the Court had found that
CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 3168 Filed 10/27/25 Page 5 of 7

-6-
participation in the third-party service was necessary to infer the Defendants had
participated in an unlawful Section 1 conspiracy. The Court made no such finding. 4
Because the Moving Defendants have not articulated a controlling question of law,
the Court will deny their motion to certify its summary judgment order for interlocutory
appeal.
B. 	Triumph
The Court will deny Triumph’s motion to certify because certifying interlocutory
appeal on Triumph’s question related to the offensive use of the single enterprise theory
would not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
This case is now ready for trial. Further delaying the resolution of this litigation for
the other parties (including six additional Defendants who remain in the litigation) while
the 	Eighth 	Circuit 	addresses 	Triumph’s 	question—which 	is 	relevant 	only 	to
Triumph—would be inefficient. 	Moreover, Triumph’s appeal would further delay the
return of the direct action plaintiffs’ cases to their courts of origin, where Eighth Circuit
law may not control.
Because the Court concludes that certifying interlocutory appeal on Triumph’s
proposed question would not materially advance the ultimate termination of the
4 While the Court did find the evidence of participation in a third-party service important,
what the Court found suspicious was not participation in a third-party service that provided
historical 	average 	pricing 	information 	but 	rather 	the 	competitors’ 	decisions 	to 	share
competitively sensitive business information with a third-party service that further distributed
that sensitive information. See, e.g., In re Pork Antitrust Litig., 781 F. Supp. 3d at 829.
CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 3168 Filed 10/27/25 Page 6 of 7

-7-
litigation, the Court will not address if Triumph raises a controlling question of law or if
there exists a substantial ground for difference of opinion on a controlling question of
law. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 	Although the Court will address Triumph’s motion for
reconsideration in due course,5 the Court will deny Triumph’s motion to certify for
interlocutory appeal.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendant Triumph Foods, LLC’s Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) [Docket No. 2978] is DENIED; and
2. 	Defendants’ Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) [Docket No. 2983] is DENIED.
DATED: October 27, 2025
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
5 See Order Granting-In-Part and Denying-In-Part Defendants’ Requests for Leave to File
Motions for Reconsideration of Summary Judgment, October 8, 2025, Docket No. 3160 (setting
the briefing schedule for Triumph to file a motion for reconsideration).
CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 3168 Filed 10/27/25 Page 7 of 7