USA v. Lussier

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
Criminal File No. 06-366(1) (MJD)
JACOB JOHN LUSSIER,
Defendant.
Katharine T. Buzicky, Assistant United States Attorney, Counsel for Plaintiff.
Jacob John Lussier, pro se.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Lussier’s Third Motion for
Compassionate Release (Doc. 167) under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). For the
reasons addressed below, this motion is denied.
II. 	BACKGROUND
On February 15, 2007, Lussier pleaded guilty to one count of Murder
in the Second Degree, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1115 & 1153(a).
(Doc. 38.) At sentencing, Defendant was found to be a career offender as he
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had three prior felony convictions that were crimes of violence. (PSR ¶
26.) Specifically, Lussier was convicted of Accomplice to Second Degree
Assault and Reckless Discharge of a Firearm, Theft of a Motor Vehicle and
Escape from Custody. (PSR ¶¶ 36-38.) Based on a total offense level of 35,
and a criminal history category of Category VI, the applicable guideline
range was 292 to 365 months. (PSR ¶ 73.)
On July 24, 2007 the Court sentenced Defendant to 292 months
imprisonment, followed by 5 years of supervised release. (Doc. 44.) He did
not appeal his sentence.
On July 13, 2012, Lussier filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in
which he challenged his career offender designation. (Doc. 46.) That petition was
dismissed as Lussier had failed to raise the issue on direct appeal and because
the petition was not timely filed. (Doc. 56.)
In 2016, Lussier filed a second motion to vacate under § 2255. (Doc. 60.) At
that time, a petition to file a second or successive habeas petition was pending
before the Eighth Circuit. Thereafter, the government moved to stay the second
motion pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles v. United States. The
motion to stay was granted. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in
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Beckles, in which it found that the sentencing guidelines are not subject to
vagueness challenges, the Eighth Circuit denied Lussier’s petition for
authorization to file a successive habeas petition and this Court dismissed
Lussier’s second § 2255 petition. (Doc. 68.)
On June 19, 2020, Lussier moved for compassionate release pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) based on the danger posed to him by the global COVID-19
pandemic and that his health conditions put him at an increased risk. (Doc. 77)
The Court denied the motion, finding that Lussier had not demonstrated
extraordinary and compelling reasons due to his medical condition or age to
warrant relief, and because he posed a danger to the community if released, and
therefore, a sentence reduction would be contrary to the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). (Doc. 95.)
On January 26, 2021, Lussier moved for compassionate release for the
second time pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Doc. 105.) In his second motion, Lussier
sought to raise arguments presented in his two prior § 2255 motions; namely,
that the definition of career offender had changed and his guidelines would be
lower if he were sentenced in 2021 due to amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines. (Id.) At that point, the Guidelines were amended to remove the
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residual clause of the of the definition of “crime of violence,” so neither Lussier’s
escape conviction nor his auto theft conviction would constitute predicate
convictions for career offender status. See U.S. Sent. Comm’n, Amendment 798,
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendment/798. The Court denied the motion,
finding that Lussier was improperly attempting to challenge his underlying
sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Doc. 116.) Instead, the Court noted that § 2255 is
the proper vehicle to challenge his sentence, and Defendant did not receive
authorization to file a successive § 2255 action. (Id.)
Lussier subsequently filed a series of motions in 2024 and early 2025.
Lussier first filed a Motion for Modification of Term of Imprisonment Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 821. (Doc. 149.) Lussier then filed a
Motion on the District Court Recharacterizing Lussier’s Pro Se Letter Doc. 129 as
Pro Se Litigant’s First Time Motion for Relief Under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) (Doc.
157.) Finally, Lussier filed a Motion in Response to United States’ Reply, which
the Court interpreted as Lussier’s Surreply to the Government’s Response to
Defendant’s Motion for Modification of Term of Imprisonment. (Doc. 160.) The
Court carefully reviewed each of these motions and denied them. (Doc. 161.)
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Before the Court is Lussier’s third motion for compassionate release. (Doc.
167.)
III. 	DISCUSSION
Lussier makes claims for compassionate release based on his initial
sentence as well as his current family circumstances. (Doc. 167.) Related to his
sentence, Lussier makes arguments about his criminal history score, argues that
he is no longer considered a career offender under the Guidelines, and maintains
that if he were sentenced today, he would benefit from Amendment 821 to the
Guidelines. (Id. at 1.) For his family circumstances, Lussier argues that his
mother suffers from chronic lung and heart disease, and that his sister is unable
to care for her. (Id.)
A. 	Legal Framework
The court may, upon a defendant’s motion following exhaustion of
administrative remedies or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request
by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier,
reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of
probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does
not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of
imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that--(i)
extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . .
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and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 lists various
circumstances to find that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a
reduction in prison sentence. Relevant here, “extraordinary and compelling
circumstances” can occur when a defendant’s parent is incapacitated and
defendant is the only one who can care for them, the age of the defendant, and
circumstances where the defendant is serving an unusually long prison sentence
and there has been a change in the law. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b).
B. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Before the Court will consider a defendant’s claim to reduce his prison
sentence, the claims must first be presented to the BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A);
United States v. Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 2021). Claims not first
presented to the BOP must be dismissed without prejudice because the
exhaustion requirement is a “mandatory claim processing rule.” Id.
Here, Lussier has presented evidence that he first raised his claims with
the BOP. Lussier specifically filed a document indicating that he sought a
reduction in sentence from the BOP. (Doc. 168.) The government agrees that
Lussier properly raised his request to the BOP and that his motion is ripe for
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adjudication. (Doc. 174 at 5.) Therefore, the Court will consider that this motion
is properly before the Court.
C. 	Compassionate Release
None of Lussier’s reasons satisfy his burden to state “extraordinary and
compelling” circumstances that comport with the statute. See United States v.
Avalos Banderas, 39 F.4th 1059, 1062 (8th Cir. 2022) (stating that “the inmate
bears the burden to establish that compassionate release is warranted and the
district court is not required to investigate possible avenues for relief or to
develop the record in support of a motion”) (citation omitted).
1. 	Criminal History
Lussier challenges the calculation of his criminal history, argues that he
would no longer be treated as a career offender today, and states that if he were
sentenced today, he would benefit from Amendment 821 of the Guidelines. (Doc.
169 at 1.)
First, to the extent that Lussier frames the grounds for compassionate
release as a challenge to his underlying sentence, such argument is precluded by
Eighth Circuit case law. See United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582, 586 (8th Cir.
2022) (holding that defendant could not “avoid the restrictions of the post-
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conviction relief statute by resorting to a request for compassionate release
instead”) (citation omitted); United States v. Mallett, No. CR 17-264(3) (DWF),
2023 WL 4203155, at *2 (D. Minn. June 27, 2023). Lussier has previously filed two
motions under § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, both of which the
Court denied. (Docs. 56, 68.) As the Court stated in response to Lussier’s most
recent compassionate release motion, “[b]ecause Defendant has previously filed
habeas petitions under § 2255, and because the motion currently before the Court
fits the description of a motion to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence under §
2255, he must seek authorization from the Eighth Circuit prior to filing a
successive petition.” (Doc. 116.) Lussier has not indicated that he has received
any proper authorization from the Eighth Circuit to file a successive motion. On
this basis then, the Court remains unpersuaded by Lussier’s arguments.
Second, if Defendant seeks to invoke the “unusually long sentence”
argument as permitted by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)1, this argument also fails.
1 The Court acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court is currently
considering the validity of § 1B1.13(b)(6). See Carter v. United States, S. Ct. No.
24-860; Rutherford v. United States, S. Ct. No. 24-820. The Court does not intend
to speculate as to how the Supreme Court will rule on this issue and instead
makes its current judgment based on the state of Eighth Circuit case law.
Depending on the outcome, the Supreme Court’s decision on this matter may
permit Lussier to submit a subsequent motion for compassionate release.
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Under section 1B1.13(b)(6), those who received an “unusually long” sentence
may be candidates for a reduced sentence if they have served at least 10 years of
the sentence and a change in the law has occurred that would generate a “gross
disparity” between the sentence imposed and one likely to be imposed at the
time the motion is filed. These circumstances do not apply to Lussier.
Lussier did not receive an unusually long sentence. Lussier was sentenced
to 292 months. (Doc. 44.) His Guidelines range at the time of sentencing was 292
months to 365 months based on his total offense level of 35 and criminal history
category of VI. (PSR ¶ 73.) It is true that Amendment 798 of the Guidelines
removed the residual clause of the crime of violence definition, so that neither
Lussier’s escape conviction, nor his auto theft conviction would constitute
predicate convictions for career offender status. See U.S. Sent. Comm’n,
Amendment 798, https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendment/798. Therefore, if
he were sentenced today, his criminal history category would be calculated as IV,
as opposed to VI. Based on this new calculation, his Guidelines range would be
235 to 293 months in prison. Considering Amendment 798’s effect on his
Guidelines – which, as the Court notes below is not necessary – his current
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sentence of 292 months still falls within this new Guideline range and could not
then be classified as “unusually long.”
Moreover, there has been no change in the law that would create a “gross
disparity” between the sentence he received and what the Court would likely
impose today. Regarding the arguments he presents about his criminal history,
as the government points out, there has been no change in the law that would
affect it.
Regarding his argument about his status as a career offender, such a claim
also fails. As discussed above, it is true that if Lussier were sentenced today,
Amendment 798 to the Sentencing Guidelines would be in effect, and he would
not be considered a “career offender” for purposes of the sentencing
enhancement. However, a change in the law that has “not been made
retroactive” is not a basis for determining whether there are extraordinary and
compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.13(b)(6),
1B1.13(c). Amendment 798 to the Sentencing Guidelines has not been made
retroactive, so Lussier’s claims are barred on this basis alone. See U.S.S.G. §
1B1.10.
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Lussier points the Court to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Wright, 163 F.4th 469, 473 (8th Cir. 2025), arguing that the Court is required to
consider a change in the law, even if not retroactive, when a defendant’s prior
convictions no longer qualify as predicate offenses. (Doc. 169 at 1; Doc. 181 at 1.)
In Wright, the Eighth Circuit noted that the district court had determined that
the defendant was eligible for a reduction even though the reduction was based
on a nonretroactive change in the law under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). 163 F.4th at
475. However, the Eighth Circuit noted that there is “significant tension between
the district court’s decision and our precedent.” Id. (citing United States v.
Crandall, 25 F.4th 582, 586 (8th Cir. 2022); Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603
U.S. 369, 401 (2024)). The court then noted that because the government did not
file a cross appeal, the Eighth Circuit could not enter judgment to benefit the
nonappealing party; therefore, the court determined that it “must accept the
district court’s determination that Wright was eligible for a sentence reduction”
and apply an abuse of discretion standard of review. Id. (citing Duit Constr. Co.
Inc. v. Bennett, 796 F.3d 938, 941 (8th Cir. 2015)). This Court is unpersuaded that
the unique appellate posture of the Wright case stands for the proposition that
the Court “must” factor in nonretroactive changes in the law that would be
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relevant to Lussier’s career offender status. Regardless, as stated above, under
the new Guidelines, Lussier would still have a Guideline sentence.
Finally, as the government points out, this Court has already considered
and dismissed Lussier’s argument about Amendment 821. (Doc. 161.) The Court
was evaluating Lussier’s Motion for Modification of Term of Imprisonment
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 821 (Doc. 149); Motion on the
District Court Recharacterizing Lussier’s Pro Se Letter Doc. 129 as Pro Se
Litigant’s First Time Motion for Relief Under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) (Doc. 157); and
Motion in Response to United States’ Reply, which the Court interpreted as
Lussier’s Surreply to the Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for
Modification of Term of Imprisonment. (Doc. 160). (See id.) The Court declines to
reevaluate what appears to be the same claim Lussier raised previously.
Therefore, as presented to the Court, Lussier’s sentence length and any
changes to the Guidelines do not present the type of “extraordinary and
compelling” reason to warrant compassionate release.
2. 	Family Circumstances
Lussier also asserts that his mother suffers from chronic lung and heart
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disease and claims that his sister is unable to provide care for their mother based
on her own “deteriorating health.” (Doc. 169 at 1.) The Sentencing Guidelines
find “extraordinary and compelling” reasons due to family circumstances exist
when 1) the defendant’s parent is “incapacitated,” and 2) the defendant “would
be the only available caregiver for the parent.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C).
First, Lussier has not met his burden in demonstrating that his mother is
incapacitated. Lussier’s mother provided a letter of support for Lussier’s
compassionate release motion as well as a letter from her doctor. (See Doc. 171;
Doc. 171-1.) In her letter, she indicates that she suffers from “lung disease” that
has no cure, that she is having shortness of breath more frequently, and that she
has to be on oxygen at night. (Doc. 171.) Her doctor’s letter verifies that she
experiences shortness of breath and indicates that she was hospitalized due to
COVID-19 that resulted in lung and other respiratory disease. (Doc. 171-1.)
However, he notes that she is “no longer requiring any oxygen therapy” and that
her fatigue “waxes and wanes.” (Id.) He also indicates that she is “undergoing
cardiac rehabilitation” following a heart procedure. (Id.)
The materials provided do not demonstrate that Lussier’s mother is
currently “incapacitated.” Courts in this District have relied on the Bureau of
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Prisons’ Program Statement that defines “incapacitation” as either 1) the family
member has “[s]uffered a serious injury, or a debilitating physical illness” such
that the individual “is completely disabled, meaning that the [family member]
cannot carry on any self-care and is totally confined to a bed or chair,” or 2) the
family has “[a] severe cognitive deficit . . . but may not be confined to a bed or
chair.” See e.g., United States v. Swarn, No. CR 20-118 (JRT/BRT), 2025 WL
2306990, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2025); United States v. Chachanko, No. 5:06-CR-
50117, 2024 WL 3293619, at *7 (D.S.D. July 2, 2024); see also Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, Program Statement 5050.50, at 9–10 (2019),
https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5050 050 EN.pdf (last accessed May 4,
2026). Lussier has not met this standard. The remarks from his mother and her
doctor indicate that she is suffering from serious medical conditions but is not
currently in a position where she is unable to perform self-care. It does not
appear from the provided materials that she is entirely bedridden or otherwise
unable to perform day-to-day tasks.
Because an extraordinary and compelling reason based on family
incapacitation requires that the family member is incapacitated and that the
defendant is the “only available caregiver,” the Court does not need to consider
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whether Lussier is the only available caregiver. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C).
Still, Lussier has not made this required showing either. Lussier indicates that his
sister is unable to care for their mother. (Doc. 169 at 1.) Lussier’s mother’s second
letter to the Court indicates that “family” came to care for her grandchildren
while she was in the hospital and that her three grandchildren have since taken
care of her needs “as best they could,” but now it is “Jacob’s turn to help.” (Doc.
183.) However, the Sentencing Guidelines only contemplate a circumstance
where the defendant is the “only available caregiver.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C)
(emphasis added). Lussier’s mother’s letter indicates the existence of other
possible caregivers in her life.
Therefore, as presented to the Court, Lussier’s mother’s health does not
present the type of “extraordinary and compelling” reason to warrant
compassionate release.
D. 	Section 3553(a) Factors
The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors also weigh against granting this motion.
Lussier was convicted of second-degree murder. The sentence the Court gave
Defendant of 292 months, where the guidelines at the time provided for up to
365 months in prison, provided just punishment for the offense, reflected the
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seriousness of the offense, and promoted respect for the law. Nothing in
Lussier’s motion indicates that the Court’s original analysis is not still sound.
IV. 	ORDER
Based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that
1. 	Lussier’s Motion For Compassionate Release Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) [Doc. 167] is DENIED; and
2. 	Lussier’s Motion for Leave to File Out of Time [Doc. 180] is DENIED as
moot.
Date: 	May 6, 2026
s/Michael J. Davis
Michael J. Davis
United States District Court
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