Smith #267009 v. People of the State of Michigan et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
DERRICK LEE SMITH,
Petitioner,
v.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 2:26-cv-84
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner purports to bring this action on his own behalf and on behalf of 11 other named
Petitioners (who did not sign the petition) and “Upper Peninsula Core Members and Supporters of
the In-Custody-PCC.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, Page ID.1.)
Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a
preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the
petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be
summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (discussing
district courts’ duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule
4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual
allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436–37 (6th Cir.
1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must
be dismissed because it is duplicative and frivolous.
Case 2:26-cv-00084-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 4, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/25/26 Page 1
of 4

2
Discussion
Petitioner Derrick Lee Smith is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) in Munising, Alger County, Michigan. He has
filed dozens of habeas petitions in this Court and the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, including multiple previous iterations of the present petition. Of particular
interest is a petition Petitioner Smith filed raising the same issues on behalf of 33,000 MDOC
prisoners on December 16, 2025. See Smith v. Michigan, No. 2:25-cv-314 (W.D. Mich. May 13,
2026). While that petition was pending, Petitioner Smith filed multiple additional petitions—
including this one—raising the same issues on behalf of various subsets of the 33,000 prisoners he
had included in Case No. 2:25-cv-314. Each of those petitions necessarily duplicated the claims
Petitioner Smith raised in Case No. 2:25-cv-314.
“Federal courts . . . retain broad powers to prevent duplicative or unnecessary litigation.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Parties generally have “no right to maintain two
separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against
the same defendants.” Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977). Accordingly, as part
of its inherent power to administer its docket, a district court may dismiss a suit that is duplicative
of another federal court suit. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976); Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007); Missouri
v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 259 F.3d 949, 953-54 (8th Cir. 2001); Curtis v. Citibank,
N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2000); Smith v. SEC, 129 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 1997). The
power to dismiss a duplicative lawsuit is meant to foster judicial economy and the “comprehensive
disposition of litigation,” Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952),
and protect parties from “the vexation of concurrent litigation over the same subject matter.” Adam
v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1991).
Case 2:26-cv-00084-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 4, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/25/26 Page 2
of 4

3
An action is duplicative and subject to dismissal if the claims, parties and available relief
do not significantly differ from an earlier-filed action. See Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d
221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993). Although actions may not “significantly differ,” they need not be
identical. Courts focus on the substance of the complaint, or in this case the petition. See, e.g.,
Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a complaint was duplicative
although different defendants were named because it “repeat[ed] the same factual allegations”
asserted in the earlier case). Considering the substantial identity between the legal claims, factual
allegations, temporal circumstances, and relief sought in the present petition and in Case No. 2:25-
cv-314, the Court concludes that the present action is duplicative. Therefore, pursuant to the
Court’s inherent power, upon the review required by Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases,
this action will be dismissed on the grounds that, when it was filed, it was duplicative and frivolous.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a
“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a
certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine
whether a certificate is warranted. Id. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth
by the Supreme Court in Slack, 529 U.S. at 473. Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this
Court has examined Petitioner’s claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, to
warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would
find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. “A
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists of reason could conclude the
Case 2:26-cv-00084-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 4, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/25/26 Page 3
of 4

4
issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits
review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of
Petitioner’s claims. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court’s dismissal of
Petitioner’s claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate
of appealability. Moreover, for the same reasons that the action is properly dismissed, the Court
concludes that any issue Petitioner might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
Conclusion
The Court will enter a judgment dismissing the petition as well as an order denying a
certificate of appealability.
Dated: June 25, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:26-cv-00084-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 4, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/25/26 Page 4
of 4