Webster #796217 v. Ruperd

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
ANTONIO DONTEZ WEBSTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNKNOWN RUPERD,
Defendant.
____________________________/
Case No. 2:25-cv-242
Honorable Maarten Vermaat
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action
under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 4.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendant is of particular significance in defining a putative
defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless
notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros.,
Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under
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longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a
named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in
that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless
a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non
directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive
rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s
claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the
proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette
Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of
the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendant has not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a
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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Applying these standards, the Court will partially dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim. 	Specifically, the Court will dismiss, for failure to state a claim, the following
claims against Defendant Ruperd: Eighth Amendment verbal harassment claim, Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim, and First Amendment retaliation claim.
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force against Defendant Ruperd remains
in the case. In addition, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claims against Defendant Ruperd.
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which
he complains, however, occurred at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette
County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues MBP Correctional Officer Unknown Ruperd in his individual
and official capacities.
Plaintiff alleges that on March 13, 2025, Defendant Ruperd “expressed his hate for these
monkeys in the unit.”2 (Compl. ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff responded to “Defendant that the
racist term used for Blacks was not disrespectful to one Black person, but to all.” (Id.) While
Defendant was “applying belly chains to escort Plaintiff to his attorney visit,” he allegedly “began
making monkey noises at Plaintiff.” (Id., PageID.3.)
Then, as Plaintiff was walking up the gallery, “fully shackled,” Defendant “roughly tugged
on Plaintiff’s chain, bear hugged Plaintiff from behind, and slammed Plaintiff.” (Id.) Plaintiff
claims that Defendant’s actions “shattered Plaintiff’s tooth . . . [and although] he was not in any
way resisting . . . Defendant began bending Plaintiff’s already cuffed arm to the backside until
Plaintiff’s arm popped.” (Id.)
After the above-described incident, Plaintiff “was moved to a base cell,” and he submitted
a “medical kite for the fracture of his tooth, along [with] the lump on Plaintiff’s elbow.” (Id.,
PageID.3–4.) Later that day, Plaintiff received an assault and battery misconduct ticket, which
accused him of spitting on and lunging towards another prisoner while being escorted by
2 In this opinion, the Court corrects the spelling, capitalization, and punctuation in quotations from
Plaintiff’s filings.
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Defendant, prompting Defendant’s use of force. (See id.) Plaintiff then filed a “grievance on
[Defendant] for slamming Plaintiff while completely shackled and for falsely accusing Plaintiff of
an assault.” (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant falsified the misconduct ticket issued
against him. (Id., PageID.5.)
Two days later, on March 15, 2025, Plaintiff was “re-reviewed” on the assault misconduct
ticket from March 13, 2025, and the updated misconduct ticket accused Plaintiff of assaulting a
different prisoner. (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff “requested a statement from [the assaulted prisoner
from the March 15, 2025, updated misconduct ticket] who denied ever being assaulted by Plaintiff
in any fashion.” (Id.) Plaintiff was “found not guilty of assault and battery but [was found guilty
of] threatening behavior.” (Id.) He was “then seen by dental who fixed Plaintiff’s broken tooth and
medical to get his swollen elbow x-rayed.” (Id., PageID.4–5.)
Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff avers that Defendant Ruperd’s actions violated
his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights, and his First Amendment right to be free from retaliation.
Additionally, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise an Eighth Amendment verbal
harassment claim. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages.
II. 	Motion for the Court to Answer, Respond, or Reply
Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the Court answer, respond, or reply to Plaintiff’s
pleadings “so the case can begin and move forward with the litigation process.” (ECF No. 9.) In
this opinion, the Court conducts a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s complaint as required by the
PLRA. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion
asking the Court to take action in this case will be dismissed without prejudice as moot.
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III. 	Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
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identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
IV. 	Discussion
A. 	Eighth Amendment Claims
1. 	Excessive Force
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ruperd used excessive force against him on March 13,
2025, in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)
Plaintiff claims that Defendant “bear hugged Plaintiff from behind and slammed Plaintiff,” during
which “Plaintiff was already fully shackled and getting his arm twisted while secured in belly
chains.” (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff also claims that “[although] he was not in any way resisting . . .
Defendant began bending Plaintiff’s already cuffed arm to the backside until Plaintiff’s arm
popped.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s injuries included a broken tooth and swollen elbow. (Id., PageID.4–5.)
As relevant to excessive force claims, the Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of
confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are
“totally without penological justification.” Id. However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to
a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “On occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and
discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under
common law.’” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Combs v.
Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)). Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth
Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
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Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034,
1037 (6th Cir. 1995)); Bailey v. Golladay, 421 F. App’x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011).
There is a subjective component and an objective component to Eighth Amendment claims.
Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693,
702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison
officials.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The objective
component requires a “contextual” investigation that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of
decency.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Although
the extent of a prisoner’s injury may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official,
it is not dispositive of whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy,
559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause
harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant
injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was “fully shackled,” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4), and
“was not in any way resisting,” (id., PageID.3), when Defendant “bear hugged Plaintiff from
behind and slammed Plaintiff,” (id.), subsequently causing his broken tooth and swollen elbow.
(Id., PageID.4–5.) At this early stage in the proceedings, the Court must take Plaintiff’s factual
allegations as true and in the light most favorable to him. Therefore, at this time, the Court will not
dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Ruperd.
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2. 	Verbal Harassment
The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendant’s statements involving a
racial slur as seeking to hold Defendant Ruperd liable for verbal harassment. (See generally
Compl., ECF No. 1.)
Although unprofessional, allegations of verbal harassment or taunts by prison officials
toward an inmate do not constitute punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Ivey
v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Additionally, allegations of verbal
harassment do not rise to the level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment. See id.; see Johnson v. Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
that harassment and verbal abuse do not constitute the type of infliction of pain that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits).
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim premised on verbal
harassment.
B. 	Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights as
related to the issuance of a misconduct ticket. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3–5.)
“The Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual from deprivation of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.” Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
To state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must show that one of
these interests is at stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Analysis of a procedural
due process claim involves two steps: “[T]he first asks whether there exists a liberty or property
interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures
attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient . . . .” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted).
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In Sandin v. Conner, the United States Supreme Court set forth the standard for
determining when a state-created right creates a federally cognizable liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause. 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). According to that Court, a prisoner is entitled
to the protections of due process only when the sanction “will inevitably affect the duration of his
[or her] sentence” or when a deprivation imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 486–87; see also Jones v. Baker,
155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790–91 (6th Cir. 1995). In
Sandin, the Court held that regardless of the mandatory language of the prison regulations, the
inmate did not have a liberty interest because his placement in administrative segregation for thirty
days did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship within the context of his prison life.
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; see also Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997). Without a
protected liberty interest, a plaintiff cannot successfully claim that his due process rights were
violated because “[p]rocess is not an end in itself.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983).
Here, Plaintiff states that he received a falsified misconduct ticket for assaulting a prisoner
on March 13, 2025, (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2), and on March 15, 2025, he was “re-reviewed
on the assault” and was accused of assaulting a different prisoner. (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff was
found not guilty of the assault and battery misconduct charge but was found guilty of threatening
behavior. (Id.) Plaintiff does not indicate what sanctions he received as a result of the threatening
behavior misconduct conviction. (See id.)
To state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must show that
the sanctions he received as a result of the misconduct conviction “inevitably affect[ed] the
duration of [Plaintiff’s] sentence” or imposed an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486–87. As an initial matter, because
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Plaintiff does not indicate what sanctions he received as a result of the threatening behavior
misconduct charge, he necessarily fails to show that he received any sanctions that implicate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, And, regardless, the sanctions available in the
MDOC disciplinary scheme do not affect the duration of an inmate’s sentence, and placement in
segregation or non-bond status for a limited period of time or the receipt of the loss of privileges
sanction do not constitute “atypical and significant hardship[s],” as contemplated by Sandin. See,
e.g., Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing that the loss of disciplinary credits
under the MDOC’s disciplinary scheme does not affect the duration of a prisoner’s sentence);
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (holding that placement in segregation for 30 days does not impose an
atypical and significant hardship); Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding
that 61 days in segregation is not atypical and significant); cf. Bazzetta, 430 F.3d at 805
(concluding that a permanent, but reviewable, loss of visitation privileges did not “rise[] to the
level of egregious conduct necessary to implicate the implicit guarantees of the Due Process
Clause” (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003))); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x
427, 429 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that prisoners have no constitutional right to rehabilitation,
education, or jobs).3
3 Under these circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to show that he received any sanctions for these
misconduct charges that impacted the duration of his sentence or constituted an “atypical and
significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486–87. Moreover, even if Plaintiff had alleged the loss
of a protected liberty interest, he would not state a due process claim because he fails to show that
he did not receive all the process due to him. See generally Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974) (setting forth the minimum process required for prison disciplinary proceedings that
implicate a liberty interest). Due process of law gives the person the opportunity to convince an
unbiased decision maker that, for example, he has been wrongly or falsely accused or that the
evidence against him is false. That is, the right to due process protects Plaintiff’s ability to respond
to spurious charges. It does not include the right to prevent or prevail on such charges. See
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
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Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff fails to state any Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process claims against Defendant regarding his various misconduct
charges and the hearings held for these misconduct charges.
C. 	First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ruperd retaliated against him, in violation of the First
Amendment, by “slamming Plaintiff while in full belly chains and falsifying a ticket against
Plaintiff.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the
Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to
set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the
plaintiff was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff
that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse
action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be
able to show that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the
defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir.
2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
1. 	Protected Conduct
With respect to the first element of a First Amendment retaliation claim, the Court
construes two allegations from Plaintiff to imply protected conduct: Plaintiff’s verbal complaint
to Defendant regarding his use of the term “monkey,” (Compl. ECF No. 1, PageID.2–3), and
Plaintiff’s submission of a written grievance. (Id., PageID.4.) A prisoner has a right to file
“non-frivolous” grievances against prison officials on his own behalf, whether written or oral.
Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 265 (6th Cir. 2018); Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286,
298–99 (3d Cir. 2016).
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Plaintiff alleges that after Defendant used the racial slur, “monkey,” Plaintiff informed
Defendant that the “racist term used for Blacks was not disrespectful to one Black person, but to
all.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff also submitted a written “grievance on [Defendant]
for slamming Plaintiff while completely shackled and for falsely accusing Plaintiff of an assault.”
(Id., PageID.4.)
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court assumes, without deciding, that Plaintiff’s
statement and written grievance were protected conduct for the purposes of his First Amendment
claim.
2. 	Adverse Action and Retaliatory Motive
Next, to establish the second element of a retaliation claim, a prisoner-plaintiff must show
adverse action by a prison official sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising
his constitutional rights. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396. The adverseness inquiry is an objective one
and does not depend on how a particular plaintiff reacted. The relevant question is whether the
defendant’s conduct is “capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness”; the plaintiff need not
show actual deterrence. Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir. 2002). Finally, to satisfy the
third element of a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege facts that support an inference that the
alleged adverse action was motivated by the protected conduct. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394. The
Court addresses the physical altercation and misconduct ticket below.
a. 	Physical Altercation on March 13, 2025
After Plaintiff told Defendant he was “disrespectful” for his use of the term “monkey,”
Defendant allegedly made “monkey noises to Plaintiff” and then escorted Plaintiff in full belly
chains. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2–3.) At some point during that escort, Plaintiff claims that
Defendant bear hugged and slammed him. (Id., PageID.3.) At this stage of the proceedings, the
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Court assumes, without deciding, that this force would be sufficient to deter a person of ordinary
firmness from exercising his constitutional rights. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396.
However, with respect to Plaintiff’s oral complaint as the protected conduct, Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim fails on the third element because Plaintiff alleges no facts to show that Defendant
acted due to Plaintiff’s verbal complaints. Although temporal proximity “may be ‘significant
enough to constitute indirect evidence of a causal connection so as to create an inference of
retaliatory motive,’” the Sixth Circuit has been reluctant to find that temporal proximity between
the protected conduct and an official’s adverse conduct, standing alone, is sufficient to establish a
retaliation claim. Compare Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting
DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 422 (6th Cir. 2004)), and Briggs v. Westcomb, No. 19-1837 (6th
Cir. Mar. 10, 2020) (unpublished) (holding that allegations of temporal proximity were sufficient
where the filing of retaliatory misconduct by correctional officers occurred six days after Plaintiff
filed a grievance against a medical provider, but only one day after the provider learned of the
grievance), with Hill, 630 F.3d at 476 (discussing that the Sixth Circuit has been reluctant to find
that temporal proximity alone shows a retaliatory motive).
Here, as detailed above, besides Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that Defendant retaliated
against him because he verbally complained to Defendant about his use of racial slurs, Plaintiff
alleges insufficient facts to show that the alleged adverse actions were in fact motivated by
Plaintiff’s protected conduct. Under these circumstances, the suggestion of temporal proximity
alone is insufficient to show a retaliatory motive. Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir.
1987) (“[A]lleging merely the ultimate fact of retaliation is insufficient.”); see Murray v. Unknown
Evert, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that in complaints screened pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, “[c]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive with no concrete and relevant
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particulars fail to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lewis
v. Jarvie, 20 F. App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]are allegations of malice on the defendants’
parts are not enough to establish retaliation claims [that will survive § 1915A screening].” (citing
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998))).
Further, with respect to Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation as it relates to his written grievance,
this claim also fails on the third element. Because Plaintiff filed his written grievance after
Defendant Ruperd’s use of force, the grievance could not be a motivating factor behind
Defendant’s prior use of force. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim premised on the March 13, 2025,
physical altercation will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
b. 	Misconduct Ticket
Following the physical altercation with Defendant, Plaintiff received a misconduct ticket
for assault and battery against a prisoner. (Compl. ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) The issuance of a
misconduct ticket constitutes adverse action. However, again, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim
premised on Plaintiff’s oral complaint as the protected conduct fails at the third element because
he fails to allege any facts to suggest that the ticket for assault and battery was issued because
Plaintiff had verbally complained to Defendant. Instead, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim regarding
these events is entirely conclusory, and “[c]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive with no
concrete and relevant particulars fail to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial.” See Murray v.
Unknown Evert, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation based on his written grievance also fails on the
third element because his grievance was filed after the issuance of the misbehavior ticket. (Compl.
ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) The written grievance was not a motivating factor behind Defendant’s
actions, as it occurred after the misconduct ticket was issued. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394.
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Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim premised on
the issuance of a misbehavior ticket will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
D. 	State Law Claims
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ruperd committed the “tort of assault and battery
under the law of Michigan.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)
As an initial matter, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant violated state
law fails to state a claim under § 1983. See Pyles, 60 F.3d at 1215; Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d
1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, in determining whether to retain supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial
economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against
needlessly deciding state law issues.” Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182
(6th Cir. 1993). Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF
Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). Here, because Plaintiff continues
to have a pending federal claim against Defendant, the Court will exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendant Ruperd.
Conclusion
The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and dismiss
Plaintiff’s motion for the Court to answer, respond, or reply (ECF No. 9) as moot. Having
conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court will dismiss, for failure to state a claim, the
following claims against Defendant Ruperd: Eighth Amendment verbal harassment claim,
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, and First Amendment retaliation claim.
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Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force against Defendant Ruperd remains
in the case. In addition, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claims against Defendant Ruperd.
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	June 17, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
Maarten Vermaat
United States Magistrate Judge
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