Boyle v. United States Attorney General et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SHANNON T. BOYLE, 	Case No. 	2:25-cv-00173
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Paul L. Maloney
U.S. District Judge
v.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
GENERAL, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. 	(ECF No. 4.) 	Plaintiff has not responded.
Pro Se Plaintiff Shannon T. Boyle filed this lawsuit against the United States
Attorney General, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Alexis M. Sanford, and
Marquette Prosecutor Jenna Nelson.1 	Boyle brings this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 	asserting 	federal 	question 	jurisdiction. 	He 	asserts 	that 	the 	amount 	in
controversy is over 50 billion dollars. 	Boyle alleges “[r]acketering, Federal Fair
Lending Act, [and] stealing money grand theft over $24,000.” 	(Id., PageID.3.)
1 	Boyle has filed four other cases that fail to invoke this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and/or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 	See Boyle
v. CoVantage Credit Union, W.D. Mich. Case No. 2:25-cv-158-PLM; Boyle v. State of
Michigan Child Protective Services, W.D. Mich. Case No. 2:25-cv-161-RJJ; Boyle v.
Iron County Friend of the Court, W.D. Mich. Case No. 2:25-cv-162-JMB; and Boyle v.
Peretto, W.D. Mich. Case No. 2:25-cv-223-JMB.
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Boyle alleges that “CoVantage Credit Union stole $24,000 [and] Charlie Zayaned and
staff authorized the theft.” 	(Id., PageID.4.) 	Boyle asserts no allegations against
any of the named Defendants.
Defendants U.S. Attorney General and AUSA Sanford move to dismiss the
complaint against them because the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. 	Defendant Jenna Norton was never served with a complaint. 	For
the following reasons, it is recommended that the Court grant the motion to dismiss
filed by the U.S. Attorney General and AUSA Sanford. 	It is further recommended
that the Court dismiss Defendant Nelson due to Plaintiff’s failure to perfect service
of a summons and complaint.
II. 	Analysis
1. 	Standing
“As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts may exercise only those powers
authorized by the Constitution and statute.” 	Fisher v. Peters, 249 F.3d 433, 444 (6th
Cir. 2001). 	Federal courts have an on-going obligation to examine whether they
have subject-matter jurisdiction over an action and may raise the issue sua sponte.
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
506 (2006). 	This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over actions that
involve “federal questions” that arise under the Constitution, federal law, or treaties
of the United States. 	28 U.S.C. § 1331. 	Ultimately, the plaintiff bears the burden
of establishing that this Court has jurisdiction. 	Peterson v. City of Grand Rapids,
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182 F. Supp. 3d 750, 753 (W.D. Mich. 2016) (citing RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996)).
As a starting point, for a plaintiff to invoke federal jurisdiction to bring suit in
the federal courts, he must demonstrate standing. 	Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992); Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2004).
Standing is central to the “case-or-controversy” requirement associated with Article
III of the Constitution. 	Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). 	Plaintiff
has the burden of demonstrating that he (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision. 	Id. 	An injury in fact is a harm suffered by
a plaintiff that (1) concrete and particularized and (2) not conjectural or hypothetical.
Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 471 (6th Cir. 2008).
Traceability requires “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of” and that the conduct not be a result of “the independent action of some
third party.” 	Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 	(internal quotation marks omitted). 	And for
an injury to be redressable, it must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” 	Id. at 561 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Boyle’s complaint identifies no claim that pertains to him. 	Thus, Boyle has
failed to identify an injury in fact.
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2. 	Motion to Dismiss
The Federal Rules provide that a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Put differently, if plaintiffs
do “not nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their
complaint must be dismissed.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a claim has facial plausibility, a court must construe
the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff, 	accept 	the 	factual
allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Those
factual allegations “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” 	League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations omitted).
First, Plaintiff brings a “racketeering” claim, but he asserts no facts to support
this claim and fails to explain how he is alleging that each Defendant engaged in
“racketeering.” 	As Defendants assert, Plaintiff might be attempting to assert a
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violation under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act.
RICO provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 	Thus, to state a RICO claim, Plaintiff must plead the following
elements: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering
activity.” 	Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 723 (6th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff has failed to assert allegations that could support the elements of a RICO
claim. 	Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to set forth ‘“a pattern of racketeering activity’
consisting of at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity occurring within a
ten-year period. 	18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).” 	Id. at 723.
Plaintiff also alleges a violation of the “federal fair lending act” but he fails to
set forth allegations explaining this claim. 	As Defendants point out, Plaintiff may
be attempting to allege a violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §
1601 et seq. or a violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. §
1991 et seq.
“TILA requires that creditors make certain disclosures as to the terms of
lending arrangements and provides for civil liability for failure to comply with its
provisions.” 	United States v. Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d 285, 294 (6th Cir. 2009). 	“[A]n
action under TILA can be brought only against creditors or their assignees. 	15
U.S.C. §§ 1640–1641. 	TILA defines a creditor as someone who both regularly
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extends consumer credit and is initially due payment for debt arising from a
consumer-credit 	transaction. 	15 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1602(g).” 	Mourad 	v. 	Homeward
Residential, Inc., 517 F. App’x 360, 364 (6th Cir. 2013). 	Plaintiff is not suing a
creditor as defined under TILA. 	Plaintiff has named as Defendants the U.S.
Attorney General, an AUSA, and the Marquette County Prosecutor. 	He fails to
explain how Defendants violated his rights.
Finally, under the ECOA it is unlawful for a creditor to discriminate against
an applicant based upon “race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status,
or age” or because they receive public assistance, or for exercising rights in good faith
under the ECOA. 	15 U.S.C. § 1691. 	Plaintiff has failed to allege discrimination or
that Defendants are creditors who denied him access to credit.
III. 	Unserved Defendant
In addition to failing to assert any factual allegations in his complaint against
Defendant Nelson, Plaintiff has failed to serve Defendant Nelson with a summons
and complaint. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, Defendant Nelson should be
dismissed without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 	Rule 4(m) provides that the
Court must, after providing plaintiff with notice, either dismiss or order service
within a specified time frame against a Defendant who has not been served within 90
days after the complaint was filed. 	More than 90 days have elapsed since the
complaint was filed.
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IV. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss this case
due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 	Alternatively, it is recommended that the
Court grant Defendant United States Attorney General and Defendant Sanford’s
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 	It is
further recommended that the Court dismiss Defendant Nelson without prejudice.
If the Court accepts this recommendation, this case will be dismissed.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	November 25, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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