Stewart #596832 v. Schroeder et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
MATTHEW JACOBI STEWART #596832, 	Case No. 2:25-cv-00033
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Paul L. Maloney
U.S. District Judge
v.
SARAH SCHROEDER, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment due to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
(ECF No. 15.)
State prisoner Matthew Jacobi Stewart filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by removing
him from his cell, restraining him, and keeping him in restraints for three days. (ECF
No. 1.) 	On July 15, 2024, a small fire was started near Plaintiff’s cell that was put
out with a fire extinguisher. 	(Id., PageID.4.) 	Plaintiff was accused of putting
flammable items into the fire, and he was removed from his cell and placed in
restraints.
Eight named Defendants remain in the case. 	Plaintiff also alleges claims
against John Does #1-5, who were allegedly members of the restraint team. The John
Doe Defendants have not been identified or served with a summons and complaint.
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Plaintiff says that two of the named Defendants – Lt. Arsenault and Sgt.
Peterson – were part of the restraint team and responsible for supervising staff.
Plaintiff asserts excessive force claims against these Defendants. 	(Id., PageID.12.)
Plaintiff also sues Warden Schroeder for failing to protect him because she allegedly
personally observed the excessive force during her daily rounds between July 16 and
17, 2024. 	(Id., PageID.13.) 	Plaintiff also named as Defendants Registered Nurse
(RN) Suvanto, RN Dow, RN Hacker, RN Grant and RN Wright because they
examined him between July 15 and 18 and allegedly failed to provide him with proper
medical care. (Id.)
Plaintiff also alleges that he subsequently learned that Lt. Arsenault issued a
misconduct ticket for adding flammable material to the fire. 	(Id., PageID.11.)
Plaintiff was found guilty of the misconduct ticket.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
against them by not properly naming them in a grievance that asserted the claims
raised in this lawsuit. 	Plaintiff argues that he exhausted his claims against
Defendants in grievance MBP 24-07-0806-03e.
It is respectfully recommended that the Court grant the motion in part and
deny 	the 	motion 	in 	part 	dismissing 	only 	the 	following 	Defendants: 	Warden
Schroeder, RN Suvanto, RN Grant, RN Dow, RN Wright and RN Hacker.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
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judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury[1] or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan, 421
F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and
admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing
the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A prisoner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense, which Defendants have the burden to plead and prove. 	Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 212-16 (2007). “[W]here the moving party has the burden—the plaintiff on
a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense—his showing must be
sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than
for the moving party.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986).
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that the party with the burden of proof
1 	The Seventh Amendment does not always require courts to submit factual
disputes about exhaustion to a jury. 	Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir.
2015). However, when the exhaustion issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim,
the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial on the exhaustion issue. 	Richards v.
Perttu, 605 U.S. 460, 479, 145 S.Ct. 1793, 1807 (2025).
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“must show the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that
the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.”
Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly,
summary 	judgment 	in 	favor 	of 	the 	party 	with 	the 	burden 	of 	persuasion 	“is
inappropriate 	when 	the 	evidence 	is 	susceptible 	of 	different 	interpretations 	or
inferences by the trier of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
Pursuant to the applicable portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must exhaust his available administrative remedies. Porter
v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733 (2001). 	A
prisoner must first exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner
may not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative
process. Porter, 534 U.S. at 520; Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215
F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1999).
To 	properly 	exhaust 	administrative 	remedies, 	prisoners 	must 	complete 	the
administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable
procedural rules. 	Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91
(2006). 	“Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is
required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” 	Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19. 	In rare
circumstances, the grievance process will be considered unavailable where officers
are 	unable 	or 	consistently 	unwilling 	to 	provide 	relief, 	where 	the 	exhaustion
procedures may provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner can navigate it, or “where
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prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process
through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” 	Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S.
632, 644 (2016).
“Beyond doubt, Congress enacted [Section] 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and
improve the quality of prisoner suits.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524. In the Court’s view,
this objective was achieved in three ways. 	First, the exhaustion requirement
“afforded corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally
before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” 	Id. at 525. 	Second, “the internal
review might ‘filter out some frivolous claims.’” Id. (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at
737). And third, “adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative record that
clarifies 	the 	contours 	of 	the 	controversy.” Id. 	When 	institutions 	are 	provided
adequate notice as required under the PLRA, the opportunity to address the claims
internally furthers the additional goals of limiting judicial interference with prison
administration. Baker v. Vanderark, 1:07-cv-004, 2007 WL 3244075, *5 (W.D. Mich.,
Nov. 1, 2007).
Michigan Dept. of Corrections (MDOC) Policy Directive 03.02.130 (effective
September 25, 2023) sets forth the applicable grievance procedures for prisoners in
MDOC custody at the time relevant to this complaint. Inmates must first attempt to
informally resolve a grievable issue within two business days of becoming aware of
the issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control. 	Id. at ¶ W.
If informal resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may proceed to Step I of the
grievance process and submit a completed grievance form within five business days
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of the attempted informal resolution. 	Id. at ¶¶ W, CC. 	The inmate submits the
grievance to a designated Grievance Coordinator, who assigns it to a respondent. Id.
at ¶ CC. 	The Policy Directive also provides the following directions for completing
grievance forms: “The issues should be stated briefly but concisely. 	Information
provided is to be limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what,
when, where, why, how). Dates, times, places and names of all those involved in the
issue being grieved are to be included.” Id. at ¶ Y (emphasis in original).
If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a
timely response, he may appeal to Step II by obtaining an appeal form within ten
business days of the response, or if no response was received, within ten days after
the response was due. 	MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 at ¶¶ JJ. 	The respondent
at Step II is designated by the policy, e.g., the regional health administrator for
medical care grievances. Id. at ¶ LL.
If the inmate is still dissatisfied with the Step II response, or does not receive
a timely Step II response, he may appeal to Step III using the same appeal form. 	Id.
at ¶¶ NN. 	The Step III form shall be sent within ten business days after receiving
the Step II response, or if no Step II response was received, within ten business days
after the date the Step II response was due. 	Id. 	The Grievance Section is the
respondent for Step III grievances on behalf of the MDOC director. Id. at ¶ OO.
When the grievance procedures are not available because the issue presented
is non-grievable, exhausting those procedures is not required. It is well-established
that a prisoner “cannot be required to exhaust administrative remedies regarding
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non-grievable issues.” Figel v. Bouchard, 89 F. App’x 970, 971 (6th Cir. 2004); Mays
v. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections, 2018 WL 4603153, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 25, 2018)
(“It is beyond debate that an inmate cannot be required to exhaust administrative
remedies regarding non-grievable issues.”); Reeves v. Hobbs, 2013 WL 5462147 (W.D.
Ark. Sept. 3, 2013) (“Defendants cannot treat a complaint as non-grievable, and
therefore not subject to the grievance procedure, and then turn around and maintain
the claim fails because [the plaintiff] failed to follow the grievance procedure. As the
well-known proverb states, they cannot have their cake and eat it too.”). 	However,
when other administrative remedies are available, the prisoner is required to exhaust
those remedies prior to filing a federal lawsuit.
When prison officials waive enforcement of these procedural rules and instead
consider a non-exhausted claim on its merits, a prisoner’s failure to comply with those
rules 	will 	not 	bar 	that 	prisoner’s 	subsequent 	federal 	lawsuit. 	Reed-Bey 	v.
Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 2010). 	The Sixth Circuit has explained:
[A] prisoner ordinarily does not comply with MDOCPD 130—and
therefore does not exhaust his administrative remedies under the
PLRA—when he does not specify the names of each person from
whom he seeks relief. 	See Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322,
324-25 	(6th 	Cir. 	2010) 	(“Requiring 	inmates 	to 	exhaust 	prison
remedies in the manner the State provides—by, say, identifying all
relevant defendants—not only furthers [the PLRA’s] objectives, but
it 	also 	prevents 	inmates 	from 	undermining 	these 	goals 	by
intentionally defaulting their claims at each step of the grievance
process, 	prompting 	unnecessary 	and 	wasteful 	federal 	litigation
process.”). An exception to this rule is that prison officials waive any
procedural 	irregularities 	in 	a grievance 	when 	they 	nonetheless
address the grievance on the merits. See id. at 325. 	We have also
explained that the purpose of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement “is
to allow prison officials ‘a fair opportunity’ to address grievances on
the merits to correct prison errors that can and should be corrected
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to create an administrative record for those disputes that eventually
end up in court.” Id. at 324.
Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 590-91 (6th Cir. 2017).
IV. Analysis
Defendants argue that Plaintiff never properly exhausted his claims against
them by naming them in a grievance involving the claims alleged in his complaint.
Plaintiff argues that he exhausted his claims against each Defendant in grievance
MBP 25-07-0806-03e. 	Plaintiff’s Step I grievance and the grievance response are
shown below.
(ECF No. 19-2, PageID.151.)
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The Step I grievance states that Plaintiff spoke with Lt. Arsenault and the
Warden (Defendant Schroeder). 	Plaintiff alleged that a “move team” restrained him
and left him without cover or gown in a position where he was unable to use the toilet.
Plaintiff further asserts that the misconduct ticket indicating that he added items to
the fire is false and that the video will validate his innocence.
Plaintiff’s 	Step 	II 	appeal 	and 	response, 	which 	is 	signed 	by 	Defendant
Schroeder, and his Step III appeal are shown below.
(Id., PageID.152.)
The MDOC requires a prisoner to identify the individuals being grieved, Reed-
Bey, 603 F.3d at 324-25, and the subject matter of the grievance. Mattox, 851 F.3d at
596. An inmate must name each defendant in a properly exhausted grievance before
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he files a federal complaint. 	Kean v. Hughes, No. 1:12-cv-847, 2013 WL 5771146 at
*2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2013) (“The MDOC had no reason to address a claim against
any other employee”). Where a prisoner fails to name a Defendant in his Step I
grievance, or mentions an individual involved for the first time during the Step III
appeal of the denial of a grievance, the claim against that individual is not properly
exhausted. Id. at *6.
As a starting point, Plaintiff failed to name in his grievance any of the nurses
that he sues. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to properly grieve his claims against
Defendants Suvanto, Grant, Dow, Wright, or Hacker.
In the first section of his grievance, Plaintiff says that he spoke with the
Warden and Arsenault to resolve the grievance before filing. 	In the opinion of the
undersigned, simply naming the individuals who Plaintiff had spoken with in an
effort to resolve a grievance before filing does not properly exhaust a claim against
the individuals named in the first section of the grievance. Rather, a prisoner must
describe the facts of his claim, including the individuals being grieved, in the second
section of the grievance. 	The Policy Directive provides the following directions for
completing grievance forms: “The issues should be stated briefly but concisely.
Information provided is to be limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved
(i.e., who, what, when, where, why, how). Dates, times, places and names of all those
involved in the issue being grieved are to be included.” 	Id. at ¶ Y (emphasis in
original).
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In this case, Plaintiff’s grievance is arguably against the “move team” for
restraining him and allegedly violating his Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff has
alleged in his complaint that Lt. Arsenault and Sgt. Peterson were part of the move
team:
(ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) Plaintiff also named John Doe Defendants in his complaint,
who were allegedly part of the move team. 	However, Plaintiff failed to assert any
claim against the warden in his grievance.
In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust a claim
against Defendant Warden Schroeder. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, a genuine
issue of material fact exists whether Plaintiff properly exhausted his claims against
Defendants Arsenault and Peterson.
V. Recommendation
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that this Court grant Defendants’
motion for summary judgment in part and deny the motion in part as follows:
1. 	Grant the motion with respect to Defendants Schroeder, Suvanto, Grant,
Dow, Wright and Hacker, and dismiss them from the case without prejudice
due to Plaintiff’s failure to properly exhaust his administrative remedies
against them; and
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2. 	Deny the motion as to Defendants Arsenault and Peterson because a
genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Plaintiff exhausted
his claim against them.
If the Court accepts this recommendation Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim
will remain against Defendants Arsenault and Peterson.2
Dated: 	October 29, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within
fourteen days of service of this notice on you. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b). All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR
72.3(b). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any further right
of appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); see Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140 (1985).
2 	It is further recommended that the Court dismiss the unserved John Doe
Defendants #1-5 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Rule 4(m) provides that the Court must,
after providing plaintiff with notice, either dismiss or order service within a specified
time frame against a Defendant who has not been served within 90 days after the
complaint was filed.
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