Brazil #627439 v. Kraus et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TALLEON S. BRAZIL #627439,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATHANIEL KRAUS, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
Hon. Robert J. Jonker
Case No. 1:26-cv-1589
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the
Court dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants McKeon and Mackereth on grounds
of immunity, dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendant Kraus for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, and dismiss Plaintiff’s state-law claims without prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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I. Background
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Ionia Correctional Facility. The event underlying Plaintiff’s claims occurred while Plaintiff
was incarcerated at a different MDOC facility. Plaintiff sues Michigan State Police Trooper
Nathaniel Kraus and assistant Jackson County prosecutors Meaghen McKeon and Smantha
Mackereth in their individual capacities. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.1.)
Plaintiff has been charged in the 4th Circuit Court for Jackson County, Michigan, with the
murder of prisoner DeAndre Jackson on June 11, 2021, at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional
Facility near Jackson, Michigan, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316. (Id. at PageID.2.)
Plaintiff alleges that on October 13, 2023, Defendant McKeon charged him with open murder after
the Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office declined to authorize criminal charges against
him due to insufficient evidence to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id.) The case was
turned over to Defendant Mackereth on September 9, 2023. Although Plaintiff admits that he killed
Jackson, he claims he was acting in self-defense. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that on October 3, 2025, prisoner Shawn Highshaw signed an affidavit
stating that Plaintiff was acting in self-defense when he murdered Jackson. Prisoner Highshaw
claimed that MDOC staff had sent him and Jackson to attack Plaintiff due to his bragging about
an alleged escape. (Id.; ECF No. 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kraus noted this affidavit in
his October 6, 2025 Supplemental Incident Report.1 (ECF No. 1 at PageID.2.)
Plaintiff alleges that during an interview on October 6, 2025, Prisoner Highshaw told
Defendant Kraus that he wrote the affidavit, and Defendant Kraus confirmed that the affidavit was
1 Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the Supplemental Incident Report was dated October 6,
2025, but the report is dated October 3, 2025. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.2; ECF No. 1-2.)
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valid. (Id.) Defendant Kraus forwarded this information to Defendant Mackereth, who in turn
forwarded it to Defendant McKeon. In addition, Defendant Kraus sent Defendant Mackereth an
affidavit from Prisoner Angelo Allen, Plaintiff’s “bunky,” who stated that Plaintiff had in fact
“saved his life.” (Id.; ECF No. 1-5.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Kraus also interviewed private investigator Scott Lewis on
October 6, 2025, who told Defendant Kraus that he had drafted an affidavit for Prisoner Allen but
did not draft Prisoner Highshaw’s affidavit. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.2.) Plaintiff alleges that this
information sufficed to alert Defendants that Plaintiff acted in self-defense and that they lacked
sufficient evidence to charge Plaintiff with murder. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that on April 29, 2026, he received a 12-month continuous MDOC custody
hold due to the pending criminal charge. The document stated that Plaintiff would be called to the
Parole Board after his criminal case concluded.2 (Id. at PageID2–3.)
For relief, Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment and compensatory and punitive
damages against all Defendants. (Id. at PageID.5.)
II. Failure to State a Claim
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s
allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citations
and footnote omitted).
2 According to the MDOC’s Offender Tracking Information System, Plaintiff’s earliest release
date is July 8, 2026. See https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/Profile (last visited May 21, 2026).
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As the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy this rule, a complaint must contain “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard “is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the complaint simply “pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of
a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. 	Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged— but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678–79 (internal citations omitted).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983
is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
271 (1994).
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III. Discussion
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Defendants’ 	failure 	to 	dismiss 	the 	murder 	charge 	and 	their
continuation of the case against him after they were informed that the Jackson County Prosecuting
Attorney’s Office declined to authorize criminal charges due to insufficient evidence to prove the
case beyond a reasonable doubt constitutes malicious prosecution and violated his rights to due
process and equal protection.3 Plaintiff also alleges state-law false imprisonment and abuse of
process claims.
A. 	Federal-Law Claims
1. 	Prosecutorial Immunity
Prosecutors McKeon and Mackereth are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions in
prosecuting the criminal action against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court embraces a functional
approach to determining whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity. Kalina v. Fletcher,
522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219, 229 (1988); accord Watkins v. Healy, 986 F.3d 648, 661 (6th Cir. 2021); Koubriti v.
Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010); Lomaz v. Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir.
1998). Under a functional analysis, a prosecutor is absolutely immune when performing the
traditional functions of an advocate. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130; Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791,
797 (6th Cir. 2003); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1137 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme
Court has held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal
prosecution. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 43 (1976); Lomaz, 151 F.3d at 497. Acts that occur
3 To the extent Plaintiff alleges a false imprisonment claim under Section 1983, it arises under the
Fourth Amendment. Gorcaj v. Medulla, 51 F. App’x 158, 159 (6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff has no
claim under the Fourth Amendment because he was incarcerated under a valid conviction at the
time of the murder. Moreover, his earliest release date is more than a month away. Thus, the
decision to charge Plaintiff could not have resulted in false imprisonment.
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in the course of the prosecutor’s role as advocate are entitled to protection of absolute immunity,
in contrast to investigatory or administrative functions that are normally performed by a detective
or police officer. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 276-78 (1993); Watkins, 986 F.3d at
660–61; Grant, 870 F.2d at 1137. In the Sixth Circuit, the focus of the inquiry is how closely
related the prosecutor’s conduct is to her role as an advocate intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process. Spurlock, 330 F.3d at 797; Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1443
(6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants McKeon and Mackereth all focus on a
prosecutor’s role as an advocate, that is, initiating a criminal prosecution. Therefore, McKeon and
Mackereth are entitled to immunity from Plaintiff’s damages claims.
2. 	Equal Protection
Plaintiff mentions the words “equal protection” in his complaint, but he does not explain
how initiating the murder charge against him violated the Equal Protection Clause. Conclusory
allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim
under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by government actors which either
burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one differently than
others similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference. Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of
Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 681-82 (6th Cir. 2011); Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d
291, 312 (6th Cir. 2005). The threshold element of an equal protection claim is disparate treatment.
Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006); Center for Bio-
Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011) (“To state an equal protection
claim, a plaintiff must adequately plead that the government treated the plaintiff ‘disparately as
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compared to similarly situated persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a
fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.’”).
Plaintiff’s factual allegations do not implicate his equal protection rights. An “equal
protection” plaintiff must be treated differently than similarly situated comparators. Those
comparators must be similarly situated “in all relevant respects . . . .” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505
U.S. 1, 10 (1992); United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 651 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Paterek v.
Vill. of Armada, 801 F.3d 630, 650 (6th Cir. 2015) (“‘Similarly situated’ is a term of art—a
comparator . . . must be similar in ‘all relevant respects.’”); Tree of Life Christian Schools v. City
of Upper Arlington, 905 F.3d 357, 368 (6th Cir. 2018) (“A plaintiff bringing an equal protection
claim must be ‘similarly situated’ to a comparator in ‘all relevant respects.’”). Plaintiff alleges he
should not be prosecuted for Jackson’s murder, not that he is treated differently than anyone else
that engaged in the same or substantially similar conduct. Accordingly, he has failed to state a
claim for violation of his equal protection rights.
3. 	Due Process
The elements of a procedural due process claim are: (1) a life, liberty, or property interest
requiring protection under the Due Process Clause, and (2) a deprivation of that interest (3) without
adequate process. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006). As with
his equal protection claim, Plaintiff’s due process claim is nothing more than a conclusory
allegation of unconstitutional conduct. Plaintiff does not allege that any Defendant deprived him
of an interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.
To the extent Plaintiff asserts that the criminal charge has deprived him of a liberty interest
in parole, his claim lacks merit. The United States Supreme Court has definitively held that there
is no right under the United States Constitution for a lawfully convicted person to be conditionally
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released before the expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal &
Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); see also Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S.
454, 460 (1989). Simply stated, there is no federal constitutional right to parole. Gavin v. Wells,
914 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1990).
Moreover, the Michigan courts have held that a liberty interest in parole does not arise
under Michigan law. See Hurst v. Department of Corr. Parole Bd., 119 Mich. App. 25, 29 (1982)
(ruling that state law “creates only a hope of early release,” rather than a right to release); see also
Glover v. Michigan Parole Bd., 460 Mich. 511, 520–521 (1999). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has consistently ruled that Michigan’s statutory parole scheme does
not create a liberty interest in parole. See Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-1165 (6th Cir.
1994) (en banc); Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir. 2011); Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d
353, 368 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Hill v. Snyder, 878 F.3d 193, 202 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating that
the Michigan parole statutes “endow the [Parole] Board with discretion to deny parole to those
who are eligible”). Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim.
4. 	Malicious Prosecution
Although Defendants McKeon and Mackereth enjoy immunity from Plaintiff’s claim for
malicious prosecution, Defendant Kraus does not. In Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir.
2010), the Sixth Circuit recognized the existence of a claim of malicious prosecution arising under
the Fourth Amendment, which is cognizable under Section 1983. Id. at 308 (citing Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390 n.2 (2007)) (assuming, without deciding, that such a claim existed). The
Sykes court held that to succeed on a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) a prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and that the defendant
participated in the decision; (2) there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution;
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(3) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty as a consequence of the legal proceedings; and (4)
the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Id. at 308–09; see also Webb v. United
States, 789 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308–09); Gregory v. City of
Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 727 (6th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff's claim fails as to all elements. First, Plaintiff alleges no fact suggesting that
Defendant Kraus was involved in the initiation of the prosecution against him. Plaintiff’s
allegations show only that Defendants McKeon and Mackereth—who are assistant prosecutors
with the Jackson County Prosecutor’s Office—initiated the prosecution even though their own
office declined to do so. Plaintiff’s allegations as to Kraus indicate only that he was involved in
investigating the case during 2025, after it was initiated. Second, Plaintiff admits to murdering
Jackson and alleges no fact indicating that the prosecution was initiated without probable cause.
His assertion of a self-defense or defense-of-others defense does not vitiate probable cause.
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that the state court’s determination of probable cause
after a plaintiff’s “full and fair opportunity to litigate [the] issue” collaterally estopped the plaintiff
from challenging the existence of probable cause in a subsequent § 1983 action. Coogan v. City of
Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 175 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of
Bradford, 245 F.3d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1077
(6th Cir. 1998) (citing Coogan); Autrey v. Stair, 512 F. App’x 572, 581–83 (6th Cir. 2013 ) (citing
Coogan); Flowers v. City of Detroit, 306 F. App’x 984, 988 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Coogan). Here,
Plaintiff contested the issue of probable cause at his preliminary examination and was bound over
to circuit court upon a finding of probable cause.4 Third, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the
4 See https://micourt.courts.michigan.gov/case-search/court/C04/case-details?caseId=2023-
0000005009-FC&tenantKey=C04-38-0629165-00-
00&searchUrl=%2Fcourt%2FC04%2Fsearch%3FlastName%3DBrazil%26firstName%3DTalleo
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charges were initiated and remains so even today under a valid, pre-existing conviction. The
proceeding thus could not have resulted in a deprivation of liberty. Finally, Plaintiff cannot
establish the fourth element because his criminal proceeding has not been resolved in his favor.
That resolution is not final because Plaintiff's criminal proceedings are ongoing, with a jury trial
presently set for July 13, 2026. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against
Defendant Kraus is properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.5
B. 	State-Law Claims
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over his
state-law claims, I recommend that the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction. Ordinarily, where a
district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental
jurisdiction, and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining
state-law claims. See Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal law claim, it should not reach
state law claims.”) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966));
Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining whether
to retain supplemental jurisdiction, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial
economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against
needlessly deciding state law issues.” Landefeld, 994 F.2d at 1182; see also Moon v. Harrison
n%26page%3D1 (circuit court, last visited May 24, 2026);
https://micourt.courts.michigan.gov/case-search/court/D12/case-details?caseId=2023-
2305009FY-FY-01&tenantKey=D12-38-0629165-00-
00&searchUrl=%2Fcourt%2FD12%2Fsearch%3FlastName%3DBrazil%26firstName%3DTalleo
n%26caseStatus%3Dclosed%26page%3D1 (district court, last visited May 24, 2026).
5 Given the failure of Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim on a number of levels, there is no
need to consider abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–55 (1971).
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Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Residual jurisdiction should be exercised only
in cases where the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation
outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding state law issues.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556
U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)).
Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, I recommend that Plaintiff’s state-law claims be dismissed
without prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, I recommend that the Court dismiss
Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants McKeon and Mackereth on grounds of immunity,
dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendant Kraus for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, and dismiss Plaintiff’s state-law claims without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). For the same reasons that I recommend dismissal of this action, I discern no good faith
basis for an appeal and recommend that, should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court assess the
$605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11.
Date: May 26, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
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objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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