Diaz Madera v. Unknown Party #1 et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
HERIBERTH JOSE DIAZ MADERA,
Petitioner,
v.
UNKNOWN PARTY #1 et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1577
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either
ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing.
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) In an Order entered on May 15, 2026, the Court directed Respondents
to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed their response on May
20, 2026. (ECF No. 5.)
Case 1:26-cv-01577-JMB-RSK ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/17/26 Page 1
of 10

2
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 5-1,
PageID.27.) On September 24, 2024, Petitioner entered “the United States of America at the
Nogales, [Arizona] Port of Entry[.]” (Id.) At that time, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging him with inadmissibility pursuant to
§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for being “an immigrant who,
at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of [valid immigration and travel
documents].” (Id., PageID.30.) DHS then paroled Petitioner into the United States pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), until April 24, 2026. (Form I-94, ECF No. 5-3, PageID.35.) Thereafter,
Petitioner filed a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal. (2026
Form I-213, ECF No. 5-5, PageID.41.) Petitioner has no criminal history. (Id.)
On January 13, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by ICE agents. (Id., PageID.40.) Petitioner’s
application for asylum remained pending at the time of his arrest. (Id., PageID.41.)
In an order entered on March 19, 2026, the Detroit Immigration Court denied Petitioner’s
application for asylum and withholding of removal because that application was incomplete.
(Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 5-7, PageID.46–47.) In that same order, the Detroit
Immigration Court ordered that Petitioner be removed to Venezuela. (Id.) Petitioner filed an appeal
to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remains pending. See Automated Case
Information, 	https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ 	(enter 	“244728178” 	for 	the 	A-Number, 	select
“Venezuela” for the Nationality, and select Submit) (last visited Jun. 12, 2026). Because
Petitioner’s 	appeal 	to 	the 	BIA 	remains 	pending, 	Petitioner’s 	order 	of 	removal 	is 	not
Case 1:26-cv-01577-JMB-RSK ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/17/26 Page 2
of 10

3
“administratively 	final” 	for 	purposes 	of 	the 	INA.1 	See 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 1101(a)(47)(B),
1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A).
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Detention
Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry and was subsequently paroled
into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (NTA, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.27; Form I-94,
1 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled, “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (discussing that a final removal order becomes
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed [and affirmed] the [removal] order
(or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is free to remove the alien unless a
court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included ‘administratively’ before the word
‘final’ in the first provision.”). Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, § 1231
does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The
parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”).
Case 1:26-cv-01577-JMB-RSK ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/17/26 Page 3
of 10

4
ECF No. 5-3, PageID.35.) Petitioner also filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and for
Withholding of Removal, which remained pending at the time of his arrest. (2026 Form I-213,
ECF No. 5-5, PageID.41.)
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from
the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further
governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who
arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed
‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7
(noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply,
but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is
deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the
noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of persecution.” Id. at 1132 & n.8
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The government may place the noncitizen into expedited
removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into
regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission
may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to
Case 1:26-cv-01577-JMB-RSK ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/17/26 Page 4
of 10

5
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then,
“when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable
regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the
“[t]ermination of parole,”
In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section,[2] upon accomplishment of
the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the
officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor
public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States,
parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be
restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may
be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public
benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025
WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below,
the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory
provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the government failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be
2 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where
the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the
parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that either circumstance applies here. In
fact, Respondents concede that Petitioner’s parole did not expire until April 24, 2026. (Resp., ECF
No. 5, PageID.16.)
Case 1:26-cv-01577-JMB-RSK ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/17/26 Page 5
of 10

6
subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL
3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025
WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same).
First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that the purpose of
Petitioner’s parole had been accomplished at the time of his arrest. Petitioner left Venezuela,
seeking asylum in the United States, and Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry.
(NTA, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.27; 2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 5-5, PageID.41.) At that time,
Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which provides for parole into
the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A). (Form I-94, ECF No. 5-3, PageID.35.) Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application
for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, which remained pending at the time of his arrest.
(2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 5-5, PageID.41.) Thus, when Petitioner was recently arrested and
detained, Petitioner was still seeking asylum. (See id.) Moreover, there is nothing before the Court
to suggest that the humanitarian reason or public benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer
applied. Indeed, Respondents make no argument about whether the requirements for termination
of parole in § 1182(d)(5)(A) and its regulations had been satisfied.
Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have
found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires
a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and
Case 1:26-cv-01577-JMB-RSK ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/17/26 Page 6
of 10

7
ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4
(same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025
WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298
(KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and
granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release
from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed
by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s
order to release the petitioner).3
Here, there is no indication in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case
determination regarding the revocation of Petitioner’s parole was made. Indeed, Respondents
concede that Petitioner’s parole was not terminated before his recent arrest. (Resp., ECF No. 5,
PageID.16.)
In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the
Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those
3 But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025) (reversing district court’s grant
of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the termination notice for previously
granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in showing
that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these grants of parole under the [parole]
program[s] on an individual basis”). The Court finds that Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the
present case for the same reasons the Court found it distinguishable in Caceres Martinez v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *5 n.2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado
Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *4 n.2 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL
547955, at *5 n.6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
Case 1:26-cv-01577-JMB-RSK ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/17/26 Page 7
of 10

8
requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there
[wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022)
(discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own
regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to
follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends
to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))).
Respondents assert that Petitioner’s parole expired by its terms and therefore, Petitioner is properly
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) because of his status as a noncitizen who is “seeking admission”
to the United States. (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.17–19.) But Petitioner’s parole did not expire
until April 24, 2026, more than three months after ICE arrested Petitioner. (Form I-94, ECF
No. 5-3, PageID.35.)
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole.
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, and has appeared in removal proceedings.
The 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Petitioner’s 	current 	detention 	violates 	Petitioner’s 	Fifth
Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in
Case 1:26-cv-01577-JMB-RSK ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/17/26 Page 8
of 10

9
each of the following cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at
*7–8 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *7–8
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-
216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5–7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
V. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does
not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VI. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of the other named Respondent.4
The Court concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper
Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
4 The Court previously dismissed the Warden of North Lake Processing Center as a Respondent.
(Order, ECF No. 4.)
Case 1:26-cv-01577-JMB-RSK ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/17/26 Page 9
of 10

10
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report
within three days of the issuance of the Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify compliance with
this Opinion and the corresponding Judgment.
Dated: 	June 17, 2026 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
Case 1:26-cv-01577-JMB-RSK ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/17/26 Page 10
of 10