Davis v. Comerica Bank

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DENNIS DAVIS,
Plaintiffs, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
v. 	Case No. 1:26-cv-01466
COMERICA BANK,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s’ request for a preliminary injunction,
as taken from his Complaint. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.11-12). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be denied.
BACKGROUND
On or about March 25, 2026, Plaintiff filed this action in state court challenging
certain foreclosure proceedings associated with a property located in Muskegon,
Michigan. (ECF No. 1-1). In his Complaint, Plaintiff requested a temporary order
(TRO) and a preliminary injunction. (Id.). On May 4, 2026, Defendant removed the
action to this Court. (ECF No. 1). This Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for TRO. (ECF
No. 3). Per his request for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff moves the Court to
prevent “Defendant from proceeding with any foreclosure sale until this matter is
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resolved on its merits.” (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.12). It is unclear from Plaintiff’s
complaint whether any foreclosure is pending or has occurred.1
ANALYSIS
Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only
if . . . the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). To decide whether an injunction is
warranted, the Court must consider four factors: (1) whether the movant is likely to
prevail on the merits, (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury if the court
does not grant the injunction, (3) whether a preliminary injunction would cause
substantial harm to others, and (4) whether a preliminary injunction would be in the
public interest. See Samuel v. Herrick Memorial Hospital, 201 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir.
2000).
Rather than prerequisites, which must each be satisfied, these nondispositive
factors are competing considerations to be weighed and balanced. See Six Clinics
Holding Corp., II v. Cafcomp Systems, Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 1997). “It follows
that a district court need not address all the preliminary injunction factors where fewer
are dispositive of the issue.” Wandrie v. Planet Home Lending, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-
12238, 2026 WL 311575, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2026) (citation omitted). Ultimately,
the decision whether to grant injunctive relief lies within the Court’s discretion. See
Dana Corp., 251 F.3d at 1118.
1 Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that “Defendant has initiated or intends to initiate
foreclosure proceedings . . . .” (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.11).
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Consideration of these factors weighs against Plaintiff’s request. There is no
indication that Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if a sale proceeds. Michigan’s
foreclosure statutes create a right in a mortgagor to redeem their interest in a residential
property for six months after the property is sold. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3236; see
Chambers v. HSBC Bank USA, 796 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing principles
governing challenges to foreclosure sales under Michigan law). Only after the statutory
period has elapsed and the mortgagor has not availed themselves of their right of
redemption does the purchaser’s “interest in the property, including the right to possess
the property,” vest. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Werme, 966 N.W.2d 729, 737 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2021) (cleaned up). The mortgagor’s right to challenge the validity of the sale
is not extinguished until the conclusion of the same redemption period, and even then, a
suit remains “viable,” Holliday v. Wells Fargo Bank, 569 F. App’x 366, 369 (6th Cir. 2014)
(quoting El-Seblani v. IndyMac Mortg. Servs., 510 F. App’x 425, 428 (6th Cir. 2013)), if
the mortgagor can demonstrate “fraud or irregularity directly related to the foreclosure
procedure” that prejudiced the mortgagor’s ability “to preserve her interest in the
property,” id. (cleaned up).
Plaintiff does not assert injuries that would immediately result from any potential
foreclosure sale, as opposed to the expiration of the redemption period six months after
the sale. Section 600.5714 of the Michigan Compiled Laws appears to preclude eviction
of a mortgagor from a property that has been foreclosed upon until the redemption period
expires, see Werme, 966 N.W.2d at 737, and other statutes requiring a purchaser to
provide notice to the mortgagor before inspecting a property (and requiring the
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mortgagor to permit the purchaser to conduct that inspection) evidently contemplate the
mortgagor remaining in possession of the property during the redemption period, at least
in some circumstances. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3238(2), (5).
As to legal remedies, cases evaluating the statutory scheme have routinely
suggested that the power to set aside a foreclosure sale dissipates only “after the
statutory redemption period has expired.” Elsheick v. Select Portfolio Servicing, 566 F.
App’x 492, 497 (6th Cir. 2014); see Conlin v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 714 F.3d 355,
359 (6th Cir. 2013) (“once the statutory redemption period lapses”); cf. Munaco v. Bank
of Am., 513 F. App’x 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[O]nce a foreclosure is complete and the
redemption period following the foreclosure has expired, a former owner loses all right,
title, and interest in and to the mortgaged property.”); see also Richard v. Schneiderman
& Sherman, PC, 818 N.W.2d 334 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (challenge to validity of
foreclosure by advertisement can be raised “during the redemption period” absent “a
bona fide purchaser”), vacated on other grounds, 807 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 2012). The
Court has not identified any authority in support of the proposition that Plaintiff cannot
assert the full panoply of objections to the foreclosure of their property once the
foreclosure sale has been held.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged specific facts showing that irreparable harm
will occur from the foreclosure sale of his property. And because a finding that a
plaintiff has not shown irreparable harm is usually fatal for a preliminary injunction,
the undersigned recommends denying the motion. See Wandrie, No. 2:25-CV-12238,
2026 WL 311575, at *2-3.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s request for a
preliminary injunction (ECF No. 1-1) be denied.
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: May 12, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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