Fetwi v. Raycraft

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
MELES ABREHA FETWI,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1450
Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated
this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF
No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s current detention and asks the
Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 accept jurisdiction
over this action and issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering
Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) In an order entered on May 5,
2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of
habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 5.)
Respondents filed their response on May 8, 2026, (ECF No. 5.)
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II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner “is a native and citizen of Eritrea who was admitted to the United States at the
Chicago O’Hare International Airport in Illinois on January 27, 2009, as a refugee.” (Anderson
Decl., ¶ 4, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.34.) On May 10, 2010, Petitioner filed s Form I-485, Application
to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, through the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS). (Id., ¶ 5.) USCIS approved Petitioner’s Form I-489 Application
on March 31, 2011. (Id., ¶ 6.)
Between May 2013 and December 2021, Petitioner was convicted of a variety of offenses.
Id., ¶¶ 7–16, PageID.35–36.)
On November 15, 2022, ICE agents arrested Petitioner and served him with a Form I-862,
Notice 	to 	Appear, 	charging 	him 	with 	removability 	pursuant 	to 	§§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) 	and
237(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). (Anderson Decl., ¶ 17. ECF No. 5-1,
PageID.36.) On February 16, 2023, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed to Eritrea.
(Id., ¶ 20, PageID.37.) Petitioner did not file a timely appeal. (Id.) Therefore, Petitioner’s order of
removal became final on March 20, 2023.1
On August 16, 2023, ICE released Petitioner from custody and placed him on an Order of
Supervision because there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future at the time. (Id., ¶ 23, PageID.38.)
1 For the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of
(i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming such an order; or (ii) the
expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board
of Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Petitioner had 30 days from the date of the
decision to appeal to the BIA. 8 CFR § 1003.38, 8 CFR § 1240.15.
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After Petitioner’s release on the Order of Supervision, Petitioner was convicted of carrying
a concealed weapon as a habitual offender, miscellaneous public order crime, liquor excluding
traffic, and obstructing police. (Id., ¶¶ 24, 25, PageID.38.)
On January 10, 2026, ICE agents arrested Petitioner for violating the conditions of his
Order of Supervision. (Id., ¶ 26.) On January 23, 2026, and again February 10, 2026, ERO
provided documentation to Petitioner to complete regarding his Eritrea citizenship. (Id., ¶¶ 27–
28.) Each time, Petitioner claimed that he did not know the necessary information to complete the
documentation. (Id.)
On February 27, 2026, ERO served Petitioner with a Form 71-091, Notice of Revocation
of Release, advising Petitioner that his release was revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). (Id.,
¶ 29, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.39; Notice of Revocation, ECF No. 5-2, PageID.38– 39.) Petitioner’s
release was revoked because Petitioner violated the conditions of his release by failing to report to
ERO as ordered on August 16, 2023, and for his multiple arrests and/or convictions following his
prior release. (Id.) As of April 9, 2026, ICE was awaiting a response from the Eritrean government
to schedule a national identification interview for the issuance of Petitioner’s travel documents.
(Id., ¶ 30.)
On February 23, 2026, Petitioner filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Fetwi v. Raycraft (Fetwi I), No. 1:26-cv-602 (W.D. Mich.) On March 18,
2026, the Court denied Petitioner’s first petition in Fetwi I without prejudice. Op. and Jud., Fetwi
I, (W.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2025) (ECF Nos. 7, 8).
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers upon the federal courts the power to issue
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writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Merits Discussion
Given that Petitioner has a final order of removal, Petitioner’s present detention is governed
by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Petitioner, however, contends that his detention is unlawful. In response,
Respondents argue that Petitioner has been detained for approximately four months and cannot
meet his burden of showing that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future and, therefore, is not eligible for release.
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Here, as noted above, Petitioner’s order of
deportation became final on March 20, 2023. The 90-day removal period following the order
expired well before Petitioner filed the present action. See id. § 1231(a)(1) (“The [90-day] removal
period begins on . . . [t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.”).
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that after expiration of the 90-day removal
period, the Government may continue to detain the noncitizen for a “presumptively reasonable
period” of time, which the Supreme Court concluded equaled six months. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 701. Following that six-month period, “once [a noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government
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must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. Id.2 “[O]nce [a noncitizen’s]
removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by
statute.” Id. at 699.
Here, Petitioner has been detained less than six months. “Although the Supreme Court
established a six-month period of presumptively reasonable detention,” courts have found that
Zadvydas does “not preclude a detainee from challenging the reasonableness of his detention
before such time.” See, e.g., Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 395–96 (D.N.J.
2025) (citing, inter alia, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–701; Ali v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F.
Supp. 3d 703, 706–07 (S.D. Tex. 2020); Hoang Trinh v. Homan, 333 F. Supp. 3d 984, 994 (C.D.
Cal. 2018)); Ali v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (“This six-
month presumption is not a bright line, however, and Zadvydas did not automatically authorize all
detention until it reaches constitutional limits.” (citations omitted)). That is, during the six-month
period of detention, “[t]he presumption of reasonableness is the default,” and “the government
bears no burden to justify detention,” “but if a person ‘can prove’ that his removal is not reasonably
foreseeable, then he can overcome that presumption.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted).
In this case, Petitioner contends that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable because
Eritrea refused to issue travel documents for Petitioner in 2023 and because Petitioner does not
have a birth certificate because he was born at home. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) However, these
assertions are insufficient to meet Petitioner’s burden to prove that “there is no significant
2 The Court notes that the Supreme Court recently held that § 1231(a)(6) does not require the
“Government to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which
the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen
poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.” See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573,
576 (2022). The Court, however, did not reach Arteaga-Martinez’s constitutional or Zadvydas
claims, concluding that such claims were not properly before the Court. See id. at 583–84.
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likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” particularly where Petitioner has
refused to cooperate in providing the information necessary to complete the paperwork required
for the travel documents. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
V. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will deny Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does
not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment denying Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice
Dated: May 19, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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