Bogasky v. Osceola, County of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BRYAN BOGASKY,
Plaintiff,
v.
OSCEOLA COUNTY,
Defendants.
Hon. Jane M. Beckering
Case No. 1:26-cv-1396
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Bryan Bogasky filed his pro se complaint in this case on April 29, 2026, against
Osceola County. (ECF No. 1.) On May 15, 2026, Plaintiff filed a document titled “2nd Amended
Complaint.” (ECF No. 6.) Because it appears that Plaintiff intended his amended pleading to
supplement, rather than supersede, his original complaint, I will consider both documents together.
In his amended pleading, Plaintiff requests to add the following additional Defendants to the case:
Deputies Houghton, Sims, and Jones; Prosecuting Attorney Anthony Badovinac; and Judges Peter
Jaklevic and Kimberly Booher. (Id. at PageID.25–26.) Plaintiff alleges claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961 et seq.
Having granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed as a pauper (ECF No. 8), I have conducted
an initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. After conducting this review, I
recommend that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim against all
Defendants.
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 1
of 13

2
I. Background
Plaintiff alleges that on August 26, 2022, he was operating something he believed fell under
an “implement of husbandry[.]” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.1.) The something he was operating appears
to have been a 1999 GMC Jimmy. (ECF No. 1-2.) An Oceola County Sheriff’s Department Deputy
initiated a traffic stop, and the vehicle was seized. Plaintiff was subsequently charged with a
misdemeanor offense of operating a motor vehicle without insurance, in violation of Mich. Comp.
Laws § 500.3102. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.8.) Plaintiff alleges that he never received a hearing to
contest the seizure. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.1.) The criminal case was dismissed after about six
months. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed an action in the Michigan Court of Claims to obtain “just compensation” for
the vehicle. The prosecutor argued that Plaintiff was not entitled to compensation because he was
not the registered owner of the vehicle. The case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Id.)
In April 2025, the criminal case was reinitiated, and Plaintiff was arrested. It appears that
the charges were operating a motor vehicle without a valid license, in violation of Mich. Comp.
Laws §§ 257.301 and 257.311. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.12.) Following a jury trial, Plaintiff was
convicted of the charge and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.1 (ECF No. 1 at PageID.2; ECF
No. 1-1 at PageID.16; ECF No. 6 at PageID.23.) Plaintiff complains that his Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial was violated and that the court adjourned the case multiple times without
cause. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.2–3.)
1 Plaintiff was also charged in the 49th Circuit Court for Osceola County with assaulting or
obstructing a public officer, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.4792. The offense date was
November 12, 2025, and he was found guilty following a jury trial on April 7, 2026. See
https://micourt.courts.michigan.gov/case-search/court/C49~2/case-details?caseId=2025-
0000006572-FH&tenantKey=C49-67-1621363-00-
00&searchUrl=%2Fcourt%2FC49~2%2Fsearch%3FlastName%3DBogasky%26firstName%3Db
RYAN%26page%3D1 (last visited May 29, 2026).
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 2
of 13

3
Plaintiff also indicates that his “home property” was “taken” without compensation. (Id. at
PageID.4; ECF No. 6 at PageID.23.) It appears, although is by no means clear, that the County
foreclosed on Plaintiff’s property for unpaid taxes.2 It also appears that Plaintiff’s neighbor
purchased the property at the tax sale and evicted Plaintiff in November 2025. (ECF No. 6-2.)
II. Failure to State a Claim
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s
allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citations
and footnote omitted).
As the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy this rule, a complaint must contain “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard “is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the complaint simply “pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of
a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
2 See https://www.courts.michigan.gov/c/courts/coa/case/376003.
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 3
of 13

4
experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged— but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678–79 (internal citations omitted).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his pleading more liberally
than it does for pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But this
liberal pleading standard “is not without its limits, and does not ‘abrogate basic pleading essentials
in pro se suits.’” Clark v. Johnston, 413 F. App’x 804, 817 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). Stated differently, “[l]iberal construction does not require a
court to conjure allegations on a litigant's behalf.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th
Cir. 2001). To require otherwise “would not only strain judicial resources . . . but would also
transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate
seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City
of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. Discussion
A. 	Deputies Houghton, Sims, and Jones
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff includes Osceola County Deputies Houghton, Sims,
and Jones but fails to allege what they did or how Plaintiff has a claim against them. It is a basic
pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations
to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage
claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must
allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted
constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v.
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 4
of 13

5
Northville Reg’l Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Where a person is named as a
defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even
under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x
762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with
any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or
responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL
1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against
each defendant) (citing Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)); Rodriguez
v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against
those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to
them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries.”). Therefore,
these Defendants are properly dismissed.
B. 	Prosecuting Attorney Badovinac
Plaintiff mentions Prosecuting Attorney Anthony Badovinac in his amended complaint but,
like the Deputies mentioned above, fails to allege what he did. Assuming that Plaintiff sues
Badovinac for his role as the prosecutor in the criminal case against Plaintiff, any claim for
damages is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity.
The Supreme Court embraces a functional approach to determining whether a prosecutor
is entitled to absolute immunity. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997); Burns v. Reed, 500
U.S. 478, 486 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988); accord Watkins v. Healy, 986
F.3d 648, 661 (6th Cir. 2021); Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010); Lomaz
v. Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 1998). Under a functional analysis, a prosecutor is
absolutely immune when performing the traditional functions of an advocate. Kalina, 522 U.S. at
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 5
of 13

6
130; Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2003); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d
1135, 1137 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune
for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 43
(1976); Lomaz, 151 F.3d at 497. Acts which occur in the course of the prosecutor’s role as advocate
are entitled to protection of absolute immunity, in contrast to investigatory or administrative
functions that are normally performed by a detective or police officer. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
509 U.S. 259, 273, 276-78 (1993); Watkins, 986 F.3d at 660–61; Grant, 870 F.2d at 1137. In the
Sixth Circuit, the focus of the inquiry is how closely related the prosecutor’s conduct is to her role
as an advocate intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Spurlock, 330
F.3d at 797; Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1443 (6th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff’s allegations against Prosecuting Attorney Anthony Badovinac all focus on a
prosecutor’s role as an advocate, that is, initiating and maintaining a criminal prosecution.
Therefore, Prosecuting Attorney Anthony Badovinac is entitled to immunity from Plaintiff’s
damages claims.
C. 	Judges Jaklevic and Booher
Plaintiff includes Judges Jaklevic and Booher in his amended complaint. He includes them
based on their conduct of the criminal proceedings. Generally, a judge is absolutely immune from
a suit for monetary damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991) (“[I]t is a general principle
of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising
the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself.”) (internal quotations omitted); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d
246, 254 (6th Cir. 1997); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Absolute
judicial immunity may be overcome in only two instances. First, a judge is not immune from
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 6
of 13

7
liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11; see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (noting that immunity is grounded
in “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”). Second,
a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all
jurisdiction. Id. at 12; Bright v. Gallia Cnty., 753 F.3d 639, 649 (6th Cir. 2014) (recognizing the
difference between an “excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the
subject matter[,]” and noting that only the latter deprives a judge of judicial immunity).
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to implicate either of the exceptions to judicial immunity. There
is no doubt that, in presiding over and making rulings during Plaintiff's criminal cases, Defendants
Jaklevic and Booher were acting in their judicial capacities with the jurisdiction to do so.
Accordingly, Judges Jaklevic and Booher are absolutely immune from liability.
D. 	Post-Seizure Hearing Claim against Osceola County
Plaintiff complains about lack of a post-seizure forfeiture hearing for his seized vehicle.
This claim is asserted against the County. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.1, 3–4.) In his prior action, Case
No. 1:24-cv-980, Plaintiff complained that the prosecutor never initiated any deprivation or
forfeiture proceedings for his seized vehicle. Plaintiff sued Prosecutor Badovinac and Osceola
County Sheriff Mark Cool and Deputy #1 in their official capacities. Case No. 1:24-cv-980 (W.D.
Mich.), ECF no. 11 at PageID.11.) Plaintiff sought $150,000 for loss of ownership, loss of usage,
and loss of earnings. Id. The action was dismissed on screening against the County Defendants for
failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff’s claim against the County in this action is barred by claim preclusion. The
doctrine of claim preclusion, sometimes referred to as res judicata, provides that if an action results
in a judgment on the merits, that judgment operates as an absolute bar to any subsequent action on
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 7
of 13

8
the same cause between the same parties or their privies, with respect to every matter that was
actually litigated in the first case, as well as every ground of recovery that might have been
presented. Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 15 F.3d 573, 582 (6th Cir. 1994); see Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 n.6 (1982). Claim preclusion therefore not only bars
the parties from relitigating issues that were actually litigated, but also from relitigating issues that
could have been raised in the prior action. J.Z.G. Res., Inc. v. Shelby Ins. Co., 84 F.3d 211, 214
(6th Cir. 1996). The doctrine serves to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits,
conserve judicial resources and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on
adjudication. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). A court will apply claim preclusion where
the following elements are present: (1) a final decision on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies; (3) an issue in a
subsequent action which should have been litigated in the prior action; and (4) an identity of the
causes of action. Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 193 F.3d 415, 422 (6th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quoting Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d 877, 880 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Here, all of the elements of claim preclusion are satisfied. The prior case resulted in a final
judgment on the merits. Case No. 1:24-cv-980, ECF Nos. 12 and 13. Plaintiff raised the issue of
lack of a hearing for his seized vehicle in the prior action, and there is an identity of causes of
action between the former and present cases. As for the second factor, while the County was not a
party in the prior action, it was “adequately represented by someone with the same interests who
[wa]s a party” to the first suit. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008) (quoting Richards v.
Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)). The Sixth Circuit has held that “[a] government official
sued in his or her official capacity is considered to be in privity with the government.” Pittman v.
Michigan Corrs. Org., 123 F. App’x 637, 640 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 8
of 13

9
Because Plaintiff sued Sheriff Cool and Deputy #1 in their official capacities, the privity
requirement is satisfied. Accordingly, claim preclusion bars Plaintiff’s claim against the County
for lack of a hearing for the seized vehicle.
E. 	The Criminal Cases
Plaintiff’s claims challenge the validity of his criminal convictions and his incarceration
by the State of Michigan. In fact, for relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court “[o]verturn [his]
conviction & dismiss [with prejudice] Case 23-28557ST.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.2.) However, a
challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus;
it is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to Section 1983. See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (discussing that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by
a person in custody upon the legality of that custody and the traditional function of the writ is to
secure release from illegal custody). Therefore, because Plaintiff’s complaint challenges the fact
or duration of his incarceration, it must be dismissed. See Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App’x 856, 858
(6th Cir. 2004) (finding that dismissal is appropriate where Section 1983 action seeks equitable
relief and challenges fact or duration of confinement); see also Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22,
23– 24 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing that the reasons for not construing a Section 1983 action as one
seeking habeas relief include (1) potential application of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
(2) differing defendants, (3) differing standards of Section 1915(a)(3) and Section 2253(c), (4)
differing fee requirements, (5) potential application of second or successive petition doctrine or
three-strikes rules of Section 1915(g)).
Plaintiff’s claims for alleged violations of his constitutional rights are independently barred
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a
state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under Section 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 9
of 13

10
conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87 (footnote omitted). The holding in Heck has been extended to actions
seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646–48 (1997)
(applying Heck to a claim for declaratory relief); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189–90 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding that Heck applies to a claim for injunctive relief intertwined with request for
damages); Wilson v. Kinkela, No. 97-4035, 1998 WL 246401, at *1 (6th Cir. May 5, 1998)
(applying Heck to a claim for injunctive relief).
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that his criminal convictions were unlawfully obtained and
should be reversed. Because Plaintiff’s criminal convictions have not been overturned, his claims
are barred under Heck unless and until his criminal convictions are invalidated.
F. 	Tax Foreclosure
Plaintiff also makes allegations regarding the tax foreclosure on his property. In his original
complaint, Plaintiff alleges that failure to provide him a free transcript of the “civil” case
(presumably the tax foreclosure) based on his lack of financial resources and his lack of counsel,
when the Treasurer had the assistance of counsel, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No.
1 at PageID.3.) In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his “home property was ‘[t]aken’
[without] compensation,” and that this case is similar to Pung v. County of Isabella, 632 F. Supp.
3d 743 (E.D. Mich. 2022), aff’d sub nom. Pung v. Kopke, Nos. 22-1919/1939, 2025 WL 318222
(6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025), cert. granted, 146 S. Ct. 80 (2025). (ECF No. 6 at PageID.24.)
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page
10 of 13

11
As for Plaintiff’s first assertion, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to free copies or a free
transcript based on his indigent status. See Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding that an indigent pro se prisoner had “no constitutional entitlement to subsidy” to
prosecute a civil suit); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1991) (there is no
constitutional right to free photocopies); Harrell v. Keohane, 621 F.2d 1059, 1061 (10th Cir.
1980); United States v. Delgado, No. 06CR60074-08, 2012 WL 2952425, at *2 (W.D. La. July
18, 2012) (“[A]n indigent defendant has no constitutional right to acquire a free copy of her
transcript or other court records for use in a collateral proceeding.”); Hom v. Brennan, 840 F. Supp.
2d 576, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (indigent plaintiff not entitled to a free transcript in a civil matter).
Likewise, an indigent plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel in a civil matter. See Britt v.
Fox, 110 F. App’x 627, 628 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court did 	not violate the
Americans with Disabilities Act by not appoint counsel to represent the plaintiff because there is
no “constitutional right to counsel in a civil proceeding” (citing Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601,
604–06 (6th Cir. 1993)). Thus, Plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation based on his
indigency.
As for Plaintiff’s Pung-based allegation, in Pung, the Sixth Circuit held that the
government violates the Fifth Amendment by retaining proceeds from a tax foreclosure sale in
excess of the delinquent property tax debt. 2025 WL 318222, at *3. The court confirmed that a
property owner is entitled only to the excess sale proceeds resulting from the tax sale, not the fair
market value of the property. Id. Here, although Plaintiff broadly claims that he was given no
“compensation” for his property and asserts that this case is like Pung, he alleges no fact supporting
such a claim. For example, Plaintiff does not allege the amount of the delinquent property tax debt;
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page
11 of 13

12
nor does he allege that the tax sale resulted in excess sale proceeds. Absent such allegations,
Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a Fifth Amendment violation against the County.
G. 	RICO Claim
Plaintiff also mentions RICO and alleges that he is entitled to “triple damages.” (ECF No.
1 at PageID.3.) This claim is entirely conclusory and lacks any factual support to establish the
elements of a RICO claim. See Ruther v. Kentucky, No. 3:08-CV-425, 2008 WL 4949052, at *1
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2008) (concluding that the plaintiff’s “mere mention of the RICO statute
without any factual allegations in support of such a claim is wholly insufficient to state a viable
claim”); McClure v. Villa in the Parke HOA, No. 1:07CV366, 2007 WL 2021856, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
June 28, 2007) (holding that the plaintiffs’ “mere mention of [RICO and the Hobbs Act] is
insufficient to state a claim thereunder”). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under RICO.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint and
amended complaint because they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Court must also decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). Good faith is judged objectively, Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962), and
an appeal is not taken in good faith if the issue presented is frivolous, defined as lacking an
arguable basis either in fact or law. See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.
2001). For the same reasons that I recommend dismissal of the action, I discern no good faith basis
for an appeal and recommend that, should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court assess the
$605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to Section 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11.
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page
12 of 13

13
Date: June 3, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Case 1:26-cv-01396-JMB-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page
13 of 13