Matos Londres v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
YANDRO MATOS LONDRES,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1308
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from
detention. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10.)
In an order entered on April 24, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on April 29, 2026, (ECF
No. 4). Petitioner filed his reply on May 1, 2026. (Reply, ECF No. 5.)
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II. Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Petitioner entered
the United States without inspection on May 15, 2020. (Id.) On May 18, 2020, a U.S. border patrol
agent arrested and detained Petitioner near La Pryor, Texas. (2020 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3,
PageID.36–37.) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Petitioner with
removability pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
because Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in
possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document]” and processed Petitioner for
expedited removal. (Id., ECF No. 4-3, PageID.37; Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, ECF
No. 4-5, PageID.42.)
Following a credible fear interview, an asylum officer determined that Petitioner had not
shown a credible fear of returning to Cuba. (Credible Fear Order, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.31.)
Petitioner challenged the no credible fear determination to the immigration court. (Id.) On June
15, 2020, the immigration court affirmed the no credible fear determination. (Id.)
On March 18, 2021, Petitioner was released on an Order of Supervision, subject to
conditions. (Mar. 18, 2021, Supervision Order, ECF No. 4-6, PageID.46–48.). On June 3, 2024.
Petitioner was issued an Interim Notice Authorizing Parole for a one-year period from the date of
the Notice. (Interim Notice, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.12.)
On February 9, 2026, ICE arrested and detained Petitioner at an ICE facility in Grand
Rapids, Michigan, when he reported for an immigration check-in. (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-8,
PageID.53–55.) On February 20, 2026, ICE served Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of
Release advising Petitioner that his release was revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). (Notice
of Revocation, ECF No. 4-9, PageID.57–58.) That same day, ICE served Petitioner with a Notice
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of Removal, informing Petitioner that ICE intends to remove Petitioner to Mexico. (Removal
Notice, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.33.)
On February 20, 2026, Petitioner filed a civil action with the United States District Court,
Southern District of New York, seeking review of a decision by USCIS denying his Application
to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (I-485). (See Matos Londres v. Department of
Homeland Security et al., No. 2:26-cv-10625 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 2.) The matter was thereafter
transferred to the Eastern District of Michigan where District Judge Robert White enjoined the
government from removing Petitioner from the United States until further directed by the Court.
(See id. at ECF No. 7; see also TRO Order, ECF No. 1-3, Page.ID.15–16.) On February 23, 2026,
USCIS reopened Petitioner’s Application to Register Permanent Residence of Adjust Status,
which was filed under section 1 of the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA), Public Law 89-732
(November 2, 1966).
Petitioner subsequently filed this action challenging his detention pending removal.
III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. Analysis
Given that Petitioner has a final order of deportation, which orders his removal, Petitioner’s
present detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Petitioner, however, contends that his detention
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is unlawful. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8–10.) In response, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s
continued “detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) remains lawful and does not implicate the
constitutional concerns identified in Zadvydas v. Davis 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).” (Response,
ECF No. 4, PageID.23–27.)
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Here, as noted above, Petitioner’s order of
deportation became final on June 15, 2020. (ECF No. 4-1, PageID.31.) The 90-day removal period
following the order expired well before Petitioner filed the present action. See id. § 1231(a)(1)
(“The [90-day] removal period begins on . . . [t]he date the order of removal becomes
administratively final.”).
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that after expiration of the 90-day removal
period, the Government may continue to detain the noncitizen for a “presumptively reasonable
period” of time, which the Supreme Court concluded equaled six months. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 701. Following that six-month period, “once [a noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government
must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.1 “[O]nce [a noncitizen’s] removal
1 The Court notes that the Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) does not require the “Government
to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which the Government
bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen poses a flight risk
or a danger to the community.” See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 576 (2022). The
Court, however, did not reach Arteaga-Martinez’s constitutional or Zadvydas claims, concluding
that such claims were not properly before the Court. See id. at 583–84.
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is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id.
at 699.
“Although the Supreme Court established a six-month period of presumptively reasonable
detention,” courts have found that Zadvydas does “not preclude a detainee from challenging the
reasonableness of his detention before such time.” See, e.g., Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F.
Supp. 3d 387, 395–96 (D.N.J. 2025) (citing, inter alia, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–701; Ali v. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 706–07 (S.D. Tex. 2020); Hoang Trinh v. Homan, 333 F.
Supp. 3d 984, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2018)); Ali v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 707
(S.D. Tex. 2020) (“This six-month presumption is not a bright line, however, and Zadvydas did
not automatically authorize all detention until it reaches constitutional limits.” (citations omitted)).
That is, during the six-month period of detention, “[t]he presumption of reasonableness is the
default,” and “the government bears no burden to justify detention,” “but if a person ‘can prove’
that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, then he can overcome that presumption.” Id. at 397
(citations omitted).
Here, Petitioner was taken into custody by ICE on February 9, 2026. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.2.) He has not yet been in custody for six months. Because Petitioner has not proven that
his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the Court will deny Petitioner’s § 2241 petition without
prejudice.
V. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because Petitioner’s § 2241 petition is not ripe, the Court does not address the other claims
and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment denying Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: June 15, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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