Dukuren v. Unknown Party

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
ALI DUKUREN,
Petitioner,
v.
UNKNOWN PARTY,
Respondent.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1269
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1.)1 For the following reasons, the Court will deny Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
I. Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.)
In an order entered on April 22, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
1 The Court will substitute Kevin Raycraft, ICE Detroit Field Office Director, for Respondent
Unknown Party.
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not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 5.) Respondents filed their response on April 27, 2026. (ECF No.
6.)
II. Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of The Gambia. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 6-1,
PageID.29.) On January 7, 2027, Petitioner applied for admission into the United States at the
Hidalgo, Texas Port of Entry. (Id.) Customs and Border Protection agents originally detained
Petitioner, charging Petitioner with under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), but on May 3, 2017, Petitioner was released from custody on a $15,000 bond. (Id., ¶¶
5–10.)
On February 6, 2025, ICE agents arrested Petitioner. (Id., ¶ 18, PageID.31.) Petitioner
appeared before the Detroit Immigration Court on December 9, 2025, at which time an
Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed to The Gambia. (Id., ¶26, PageID.32–33.)
Petitioner did not file a timely appeal of that order, rendering Petitioner’s order of removal final
on January 19, 2026. (Id.)
On January 30, 2026, Petitioner was scheduled to meet with an official from the consulate
of The Gambia to complete an identification interview; however, Petitioner refused to participate.
(Id., ¶ 30, PageID.33–34.) Petitioner is currently detained awaiting an additional national
identification interview with the Government of The Gambia. (Id., ¶ 35, PageID.34–35.)
III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
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related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. Merits Discussion
The parties agree that Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.6; Resp., ECF No. 6, PageID.17.) Therefore, Petitioner’s present detention is governed by
8 U.S.C. § 1231. However, Petitioner contends that his detention is unlawful because “[t]here is
no assurance that [he] will be deported or accepted back into [his] country.” (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.6.) In response, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s continued “detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a) remains lawful and does not implicate the constitutional concerns identified in Zadvydas
v. Davis 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).” (Resp., ECF No. 6, PageID.22.)
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Here, as noted above, Petitioner’s order of
deportation became final on August 21, 2012. The 90-day removal period following the order
expired well before Petitioner filed the present action. See id. § 1231(a)(1) (“The [90-day] removal
period begins on . . . [t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.”).
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that after expiration of the 90-day removal
period, the Government may continue to detain the noncitizen for a “presumptively reasonable
period” of time, which the Supreme Court concluded equaled six months. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 701. Following that six-month period, “once [a noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government
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must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.2 “[O]nce [a noncitizen’s] removal
is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id.
at 699.
Here, Petitioner has been detained less than six months after his order of removal became
administratively final. “Although the Supreme Court established a six-month period of
presumptively reasonable detention,” courts have found that Zadvydas does “not preclude a
detainee from challenging the reasonableness of his detention before such time.” See, e.g., Munoz-
Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 395–96 (D.N.J. 2025) (citing, inter alia, Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 699–701; Ali v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 706–07 (S.D. Tex. 2020);
Hoang Trinh v. Homan, 333 F. Supp. 3d 984, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2018)); Ali v. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (“This six-month presumption is not a bright line,
however, and Zadvydas did not automatically authorize all detention until it reaches constitutional
limits.” (citations omitted)). That is, during the six-month period of detention, “[t]he presumption
of reasonableness is the default,” and “the government bears no burden to justify detention,” “but
if a person ‘can prove’ that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, then he can overcome that
presumption.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted).
In this case, Petitioner contends only that there is no “assurance” that he will be deported
or accepted into his country of origin. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) However, Petitioner provides
the Court with no facts that would suggest that that “there is no significant likelihood of removal
2 The Court notes that the Supreme Court recently held that § 1231(a)(6) does not require the
“Government to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which
the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen
poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.” See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573,
576 (2022). The Court, however, did not reach Arteaga-Martinez’s constitutional or Zadvydas
claims, concluding that such claims were not properly before the Court. See id. at 583–84.
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in the reasonably foreseeable future” other than his own refusal to participate in the scheduled
identification interview. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Petitioner’s assertion, without more, is
insufficient to meet Petitioner’s burden to “prove” that Petitioner’s deportation is not reasonably
foreseeable. Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
V. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will deny Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does
not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment denying Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: May 1, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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