Peralta Cecilio v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
GUSTAVO PERALTA CECILIO,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-814
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny without prejudice Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6; 2026 Form I-213,
ECF No. 5-1, PageID.110–111.) On or about November 23, 2013, Petitioner entered the United
States without inspection near Mission, Texas. (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.111.)
Petitioner encountered Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents and was issued a Form
I-860, Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under
§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an
“immigrant not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (2013 Form
Case 1:26-cv-00814-RJJ-MV ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/14/26 Page 1
of 7

2
I-860, ECF No. 5-2, PageID.115.) On November 26, 2013, Petitioner was removed from the
United States. (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.111.)
On or about January 6, 2015, Petitioner re-entered the United States and encountered DHS
agents near San Simon, Arizona. (Id., PageID.112; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10.) DHS took
Petitioner into custody and issued Petitioner a Form I-871, Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate
Prior Order, reinstating the 2013 order of removal. (2015 Form I-871, ECF No. 5-3, PageID.117.)
Petitioner “underwent a reasonable fear interview, and the asylum officer determined that he had
established a reasonable fear of persecution.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10; 2026 Form I-213, ECF
No. 5-1, PageID.112.) Petitioner was then “placed into withholding-only proceedings and released
after posting a bond on September 14, 2015.” (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.71; Bond, 2015 Form I-
830, ECF No. 5-4, PageID.119–120.) Thereafter, Petitioner filed an application for withholding of
removal. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10.) On February 13, 2020, the Immigration Judge (IJ)
denied Petitioner’s applications for withholding of removal. (Order of the IJ, ECF No. 5-5,
PageID.122.) Petitioner timely appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and
his appeal remains pending. (Pet., ECF No 1-2, PageID.28–29; 2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 5-1,
PageID.112.)
On January 27, 2026, Petitioner was detained by ICE after a traffic stop. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.11; 2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.112.) Petitioner has no criminal history. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.11; 2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.112.) In Petitioner’s § 2241
petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter
alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to
release Petitioner or ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements
of due process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.21–22; Br. Supp. Pet., ECF No. 2, PageID.66.)
Case 1:26-cv-00814-RJJ-MV ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/14/26 Page 2
of 7

3
In an order entered on March 17, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed their response on March 19, 2026,
(ECF No. 5), and Petitioner filed his reply on March 20, 2026, (ECF No. 6).
HABEAS CORPUS LEGAL STANDARD
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
I. Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
Case 1:26-cv-00814-RJJ-MV ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/14/26 Page 3
of 7

4
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
II. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every element for detention under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.
The Court, however, concludes instead that 8 U.S.C. § 1231 applies to Petitioner because
he is subject to a reinstated order of removal. Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 526
(2021). “[R]einstated removal orders are ‘administratively final.’” Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S.
at 534. Here, Petitioner’s order of removal became final on January 11, 2015, and the 90-day
removal period following the order expired well before Petitioner filed the present action.1 See 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Therefore, because § 1231—rather than § 1225 or § 1226—applies,
Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing while he pursues withholding of removal. Guzman
Chavez, 594 U.S. at 526.
Under § 1231, Petitioner’s detention is not unlawful. Section 1231 provides that “when an
alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States
within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C.
1 The Petitioner’s pending appeal of the immigration judge’s order denying his application for
withholding of removal does not affect finality. The pendency of withholding-only proceedings does not
affect the validity of a removal order. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 539–540 (“[T]he finality of the order
of removal does not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.”); see also
Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 269 (2025).
Case 1:26-cv-00814-RJJ-MV ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/14/26 Page 4
of 7

5
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” Id.
§ 1231(a)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) further provides:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title,
removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or
unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal
period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court considered whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) authorizes
indefinite detention when no other country is willing to take a person who has been ordered
removed. 533 U.S. at 682. In answering that question, the Court noted that the purpose of the
statute was to assure the “alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. Therefore, the
Court concluded that for post-removal-order detention to be authorized by the statute, the removal
itself must be reasonably foreseeable. Id. The Court indicated that this inquiry would vary from
case to case and that there was no specific point in time at which the detention became
constitutionally impermissible. Id. Still, to assist the lower courts in making the difficult judgment
calls about when the detention was no longer authorized by the statute, the Court designated six
months as a “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Id. at 701. Even after six months
has passed, though, the Court made clear that the alien may continue to be held unless the alien
“provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” Id.
Under this framework, it is the petitioner’s burden to come forward with evidence showing
that removal is not significantly likely to occur sometime soon. Id. Only after the petitioner has
come forward with such evidence does the burden flip to the respondents, who must then show
evidence that the removal is, in fact, reasonably foreseeable. See Abdalla v. Johnson, No.
16-14422, 2017 WL 345731, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2017) (rejecting Petitioner’s claim that
Case 1:26-cv-00814-RJJ-MV ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/14/26 Page 5
of 7

6
detention of more than a year violated Zadvydas when the petitioner “provide[d] no evidence” that
removal was unlikely to occur in the near future).
Here, Petitioner has not provided any evidence showing that his removal is not significantly
likely to occur soon. In fact, both parties agree that Petitioner’s has only been detained since
January 27, 2026. As such, Petitioner has remained in detention for roughly 2-and-a-half months—
which is well within Zavydas’s “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” 533 U.S. at 701.
Thus, at this point in time, nothing in the record indicates that Petitioner is in a state of “indefinite,
perhaps permanent, detention” that the Court in Zadvydas said would violate the constitution.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699; see also Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding
that a detention of over two years was constitutionally permissible because the removal was likely
to occur once Petitioner’s appeals were concluded).
The Court recognizes that continued detention may, over time, come to resemble the kind
of indefinite confinement that Zadvydas may not permit. “[A]s the period of prior postremoval
confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely [has] to shrink.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Courts applying this principle recognize that even where the
Government continues to pursue removal in good faith, the passage of time can eventually erode
the reasonableness of continued detention. See Martinez, 968 F.3d at 565 (explaining that
prolonged detention may become unreasonable if the petitioner later demonstrates that removal is
no longer likely).
Here, however, the Court is not yet faced with that situation. Petitioner’s two-and-a-half-
month detention, while the government actively pursues removal, is not unreasonable. At this
point, it seems to the Court that Petitioner’s removal remains significantly likely in the reasonably
foreseeable future. Accordingly, the petition will be denied without prejudice. Should the
Case 1:26-cv-00814-RJJ-MV ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/14/26 Page 6
of 7

7
Government’s efforts to secure removal ultimately stall or fail to bear fruit, Petitioner remains free
to file a new petition asserting that continued detention is no longer reasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment denying Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: April 14, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
Case 1:26-cv-00814-RJJ-MV ECF No. 7, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/14/26 Page 7
of 7