Huver v. Mulliken, Village of et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOHN HUVER,
Plaintiff,
v.
VILLAGE OF MULLIKAN, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-670
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
ORDER
Plaintiff John Huver brought this action against the Village of Mullikan and several of its
officials in order to prevent the Village from evicting him from his home. He owned that home
until the Eaton County Circuit Court authorized a foreclosure sale following a decades-long
ordinance enforcement action brought by the Village to abate nuisances that Plaintiff maintained
on the property. It appears that Eaton County took title to Plaintiff’s property and then transferred
it to the Village via a quit claim deed.1 (Quit Claim Deed, ECF No. 12-4.) On March 9, 2026, the
magistrate judge entered a Report and Recommendation (R&R) that the Court dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim. (R&R, ECF No. 11.) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s
objections to the R&R (ECF No. 12).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72,
the district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s
disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject,
or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
1 In its response to Plaintiff’s objections, the Village explains that Eaton County foreclosed on Plaintiff’s home and
that the Village purchased the home at a tax sale. (Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 14, PageID.72.)
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Objection 1
Plaintiff objects that the magistrate judge did not apply the proper standard for assessing
whether a complaint states a claim. He is correct that the proper standard is whether a complaint
contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). But he is mistaken in thinking that his complaint meets this
standard. It does not, for reasons explained by the magistrate judge.
Objection 2
Plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s application of the Rooker Feldman doctrine to
the state court’s judgment because the state court purportedly lacked jurisdiction. That objection
is meritless because the Rooker Feldman doctrine does not require a valid state-court judgment.
The premise of that doctrine is that federal courts do not act as courts of appeal for state courts.
Thus, if Plaintiff believed the state court judgment was invalid, the proper course was for him to
challenge it in state court. He cannot challenge it here.
Objection 3
Plaintiff objects to the dismissal of his due process claim because, in his view, the
ordinance-enforcement action violated a two-year statute of limitations. But a due process claim
focuses on the adequacy of the procedures available to Plaintiff for defending against the
deprivation of his liberty and property interests, not on the merits of his defenses. The magistrate
judge correctly determined that Plaintiff failed to plead any facts suggesting that the procedure
provided to Plaintiff through the state-court proceedings was constitutionally deficient.
Objection 4
The magistrate judge determined that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment because he does not allege that Defendants took his home for a
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public use. Plaintiff objects that he satisfied this requirement because the Village took title to his
property. But as the record demonstrates, and as Plaintiff alleges in his complaint, a court approved
a foreclosure sale of Plaintiff’s property in order to satisfy a tax debt. Such a taking is not a taking
for public use. See Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 637–39 (2023) (noting that the
government can sell sell a home to recover unpaid taxes and other amounts owed without running
afoul of the Takings Clause).2
Objection 5
Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge misconstrued the definition of “court” in 28
U.S.C. § 3002, which defines that term as “any court created by the Congress of the United States,
excluding the United States Tax Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(2). But that definition is irrelevant. It
applies to the interpretation of federal statutes. The magistrate judge was not interpreting a federal
statute when referring to the state court.
Objection 6
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the state-court judges involved in his proceedings were not
impartial because they “ignor[ed] statutory limits” when facilitating the sale of his home. (Pl.’s
Objs., ECF No. 12, PageID.53.) Even if that were true, however, it would not save Plaintiff’s
claims from dismissal. In effect, Plaintiff is attempting to challenge the outcome of his state court
proceedings by raising issues he could have raised there. As the Court explained in its order
denying Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, res judicata bars him from doing so.
(See 2/27/2026 Order 3, ECF No. 8.) And at any rate, dissatisfaction with “judicial rulings . . .
alone almost never constitute[s] a valid basis” for asserting partiality or bias. Liteky v. United
2 Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest that Defendant took more than the amount Plaintiff owed in taxes or other fees.
Instead, he simply alleges in conclusory fashion that Defendants “seiz[ed]” the entire value of his property for “an
unverified debt.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) But the proper place to contest the validity of his debt was in state
court, not here.
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States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). “Almost invariably, [judicial rulings] are proper grounds for
appeal, not for recusal.” Id.
In short, Plaintiff’s objections are meritless. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the R&R (ECF No. 11) is APPROVED and ADOPTED as the
opinion of the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court CERTIFIES that an appeal of this Order
would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
A judgment will enter in accordance with this Order.
Dated: April 3, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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