Huver v. Mulliken, Village of et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
JOHN HUVER, 	Case No. 1:26-cv-670
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
Chief U.S. District Judge
v.
VILLAGE OF MULLIKEN, et al.,
Defendants
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
Pro se Plaintiff John Huver filed this Complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
against the Village of Mullikan, Trustees of the Village of Mullikan, and Mullikan
Officials Dennis Kepitis and Cheryl Goodrich. 	ECF No. 1. 	Plaintiff claims that
Defendants violated his constitutional rights by taking his property in Mulliken, MI
without due process.
Plaintiff was granted in forma pauperis status on March, 2, 2026. ECF No. 9.
II. Factual Allegations
Huver’s Complaint is two pages in length and includes the following four
factual assertions:
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ECF No. 1, PageID.1.
However, there is more to the story. 	Attached to the Complaint, Huver
includes the Register of Actions in the state court proceedings for Village of Mullikan
v. John Huver. The following are a few of the relevant entries spanning over the last
twenty-one years.
Id., PageID.4-5.
Id., PageID.6.
Id., PageID.7.
Id., PageID.8.
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Id., PageID.10.
Id., PageID.11.
Id., PageID.12.
Id., PageID.13.
Now, Huver says that the Village violated his due process rights under the 14th
Amendment (Count 1) and conducted an unconstitutional taking under the 8th and
14 th Amendments (Count 2). Id., PageID.1-2.
III. Standard of Law
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any action brought in
forma pauperis if the action is (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,
a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id. The court
must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 	Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a
“‘probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In addition, the Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true,
unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 33 (1992).
III. 	Analysis
A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
First, Huver asserts that Defendants violated his due process rights by
proceeding 	in 	the 	Michigan 	56th 	Circuit 	Court 	rather 	than 	the 	appropriate
Michigan District Court. ECF No. 1, PageID.1.
“The Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual from deprivation of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.” Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d
795, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due
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process violation, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	show 	that 	one 	of 	these 	interests 	is 	at
stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 162 L. Ed. 2d 174
(2005). Analysis of a procedural due process claim involves two steps: “[T]he first
asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered
with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon
that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient . . . .” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 104 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1989) (citations
omitted).
Here, Huver claims that the Village “bypassed MCL 66.6” by proceeding
before the Michigan 56th Circuit Court in Eaton County, MI. 	The Register of
Actions indicates that this case spans a twenty-one-year legal dispute concerning
Plaintiff’s property. ECF No. 1-1, PageID.3-14. The instant lawsuit in this Court
is a continuation of this long legal dispute. Huver attempts to appeal the Michigan
Circuit Court’s decision. 	The record indicates that Huver was provided extensive
due process over the last twenty-one years before the Michigan 56th Circuit Court.
To the extent that Huver is attempting to appeal the state court’s decision,
Huver’s claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from
which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before
the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Federal causes of action that amount to attacks on a final judgment of a state
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court fall within the Rooker-Feldman bar. 	See Pieper v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, Inc., 336
F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that attacks on the state court’s order
compelling arbitration called into question the state court’s arbitration decision,
and, accordingly, was inextricably intertwined with the federal claims in the case,
within the meaning of Rooker–Feldman’s bar). “Federal courts have no jurisdiction
over 	challenges 	to state court 	decisions, 	even 	if 	the 	challenges 	allege 	that
the state court acted unconstitutionally.” Luber v. Sprague, 90 Fed. Appx. 908, 910
(6th Cir. 2004)(quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486).
Huver requests that this Court void the state court’s decision to issue the
Village a deed. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, under the Rooker-Feldman
framework, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Huver’s attempt to appeal the state
court’s decision. 	Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that this
Court dismiss Huver’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.
B. Unconstitutional Taking
Next, 	Huver 	asserts 	an 	unconstitutional 	taking 	under 	the 	Eighth 	and
Fourteenth Amendments. 	It is unclear to the undersigned how the Eighth and
Fourteenth 	Amendments 	apply 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	claim. 	The 	Eighth 	Amendment
prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of
crimes. 	U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 	As applied to the state
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Takings Clause of the Fifth
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Amendment 	prohibits 	taking 	“private 	property…for 	public 	use, 	without 	just
compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff’s
Complaint does not sufficiently plead an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim.
However, Huver’s Complaint may be construed as a Fifth Amendment claim under
the Takings Clause.
The Sixth Circuit has applied a two-part test to Takings Clause claims analysis:
First, “the court must examine whether the claimant has established a
cognizable property interest for the purposes of the Just Compensation
Clause.” Coalition for Gov’t Procurement v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 365
F.3d 435, 481 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Raceway 	Park, 	Inc. 	v. 	Ohio, 	356 	F.3d 	677, 	683 	(6th 	Cir.
2004) (“[T]here is no taking if there is no private property in the first
place.”). Second, “where a cognizable property interest is implicated, the
court must consider whether a taking occurred.” Coalition for Gov’t
Procurement, 365 F.3d at 481.
The Takings Clause is about what happens when property is taken for
public use. Thus, success on Plaintiffs’ Takings Clause claim necessarily
implies that they actually had a protected property interest.
Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 609 (6th Cir. 2016).
Here, Huver alleges that a taking occurred when the Village obtained a deed
and issued a notice to quit with an eviction date of March 1, 2026. Huver includes in
an attachment to his Complaint that he has not been compensated for the property.
ECF No. 1-1, PageID.21. 	Huver’s Complaint does not support a Fifth Amendment
taking claim. Nowhere in Huver’s Complaint does he indicate that his property was
taken for public use. Rather, the Complaint indicates that the Village foreclosed on
Huver’s property, in accordance with a court order, after years of ordinance violation
litigation. Furthermore, the Register of Actions states that the Court found Huver in
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contempt and appointed a receiver. 	From Huver’s Complaint, it is unclear what
happened in connection with his property, but the dispute arises from repetitive
failure to comply with court orders.
In the opinion of the undersigned, Huver’s Complaint does not state a Fifth
Amendment taking claim with facial plausibility. 	Accordingly, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s unconstitutional taking
claim.
IV. 	Recommendation
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends that the Court
dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Dated: 	March 9, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served on opposing parties
and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report
and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich.
LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of any further
right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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