Perez Yusti v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
LEONARDO JOSE PEREZ YUSTI,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-299
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.29–30.)
In an Order entered on January 29, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on February 3, 2026
(ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on February 5, 2026 (ECF No. 5).
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; Notice to
Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1, PageID.72.) Petitioner entered the United States on January 19,
2023, at the Brownsville, Texas, Port of Entry. (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.72.) At that time, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging
Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in
possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (Id., PageID.72, 75.) DHS then
paroled Petitioner into the United States “for one year.” (2023 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2,
PageID.79.)
From March 7, 2024 to April 2, 2025, Petitioner had Temporary Protected Status (TPS). 1
(Ex. 1 to Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.32.) Further, Petitioner has a pending asylum application, and
he has authorization to work in the United States. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10.)
On January 18, 2026, while Petitioner was working, ICE took Petitioner into custody. (Id.,
PageID.2.) Petitioner is scheduled for a master calendar hearing on August 5, 2026, in the Detroit
Immigration Court. (Notice of In-Person Hearing, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.81.)
1 In his § 2241 petition, Petitioner states that his detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4). (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Section 1254a(d)(4) of Title 8 provides: “An alien provided temporary
protected status under this section shall not be detained by the Attorney General on the basis of
the alien’s immigration status in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4). Petitioner states that
he had TPS “at the time of his arrest” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2); however, Petitioner attached a
copy of a Form 797A, Notice of Action, which indicates that he had TPS from March 7, 2024 to
April 2, 2025. (Ex. 1 to Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.32.) Under these circumstances, the record
presently before the Court does not show that Petitioner had TPS when he was arrested on January
18, 2026.
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III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, 	however, 	contend 	that 	Petitioner 	meets 	every 	element 	for 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). 2
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, is scheduled to attend hearings with an
immigration judge, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for a relatively short period of time.
2 Additionally, to the extent that Respondents intended to argue that Petitioner’s detention is
governed by § 1225 because the NTA charged him as an “arriving alien,” for the same reasons set
forth in Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6,
2026), the Court disagrees with this argument, and the Court concludes that § 1226(a) governs
Petitioner’s detention.
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The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes
that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set
forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.
Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025);
Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the Detroit ICE Field Office Director and the United
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States Secretary of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States
Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, and the Executive Office
for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify
compliance with this Opinion and the corresponding Judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will
dismiss the United States Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General,
and the Executive Office for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
/s/ Jane M. Beckering	February 9, 2026
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