Loaiza Quintero v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
ANDRES FELIPE LOAIZA QUINTERO,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-235
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.8.) Petitioner also asked the Court to order Respondents to show cause, within three days,
why the petition should not be granted. (Id.)
In an order entered on January 27, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on January 30, 2026,
(ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on February 1, 2026, (ECF No. 5).
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Columbia. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6; Notice and
Order of Expedited Removal, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.46.) Petitioner entered the United States in
2022. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) On September 25, 2022, United States Border Patrol agents
apprehended Petitioner and his family. (I-213, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.44.) Petitioner was released
from custody and paroled into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) until November
29, 2022. (Id.; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5; Parole Doc., ECF No. 1-2, PageID.11) (stating that
Petitioner was paroled into the United States under Section 212(d)(5) of the Nationality and
Immigration Act which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).) Petitioner subsequently filed an
application for asylum, which remains pending. (I-797C, ECF No. 1-3, PageID.13; Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.7.)
On or about January 8, 2026, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents encountered
and arrested Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) That same day, DHS issued Petitioner a
Notice and Order of Expedited Removal. (Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, ECF No. 4-2,
PageID.46.) Petitioner is presently detained at the North Lake Processing Center. (Resp., ECF No.
4, PageID.19.)
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
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related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Here, Petitioner entered the in 2022 and was subsequently paroled into the United States
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Petitioner also filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and
Withholding Removal, which remains pending. Respondents nonetheless claim that Petitioner is
subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1).
First, Petitioner is not properly subject to expedited removal. There are two provisions
within § 1225(b)(1) providing for expedited removal: the “arriving aliens provision” and the
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“designated as provision.” “The Arriving Aliens Provision imposes expedited removal and
detention on any noncitizen who is inadmissible due to lack of entry documents or fraud or willful
misrepresentation on an admission application and ‘who is arriving in the United States.’”
Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, No. 2:25-cv-6065 (NJC), 2025 WL 3314420, at *19 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 28, 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)) (emphasis in Rodriguez-Acurio). It is
undisputed that Petitioner was, at one time, an “arriving alien,” who was granted humanitarian
parole into the United States as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). However, for the same
reasons set forth in detail in Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 WL 32076
(W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026), Petitioner is not an “arriving alien” subject to mandatory detention and
expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). See Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420 (holding
that the petitioner, who entered the United States as an “arriving alien,” was paroled into the United
States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), and who remained in the United States after the expiration of
parole cannot be classified as an “arriving alien” subject to expedited removal).
Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii), the “designated as provision” allows the Attorney General to
invoke expedited removal for “certain other aliens” who have “not been admitted or paroled into
the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). The record before the Court indicates that
Petitioner was paroled into the United States. Therefore, the Court finds that § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)
does not apply. See Aviles-Mena v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06783-RFL, 2025 WL 2578215, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)) (holding that, “because Aviles-Mena was
‘paroled into the United States,’ he cannot be subject to expedited removal under section
1225(b)(1)”); Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-872 (JMC), 2025 WL
2192986, at *30 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that individuals who had been paroled into the
United States cannot be subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)).
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Second, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such
as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States
when apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each
of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638,
at *4–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL
3562577, at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that “the process due under the
constitution 	is 	coextensive 	with 	the 	administrative 	immigration 	procedures 	provided 	by
Congress.”
The Court rejects Respondent’s arguments and concludes that Petitioner’s current
detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the
Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-
cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No.
1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem,
No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025).
VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court
concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States
Attorney General as a Respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.1 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
1 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer.
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report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will
dismiss the United States Attorney General as a Respondent.
Dated: 	February 18, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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