DeMann v. Office of Public Defender et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
ARNOLD EDWARD DEMANN, 	Case No. 	1:26-cv-129; 1:26-cv-131;
1:26-cv-133; 1:26-cv-134;
Plaintiff, 	1:26-cv-135; 1:26-cv-136;
1:26-cv-137; 1:26-cv-138;
1:26-cv-139
v.
Hon. Robert J. Jonker
U.S. District Judge
UNKNOWN PARTIES, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
Pro se Plaintiff Arnold Edward DeMann filed nine civil complaints on January
13, 2026. 	DeMann asserts that he was born hard of hearing. 	He claims that his
condition was classified as “moderate to severe” in high school under the Rehab Act
of 1973. 	See e.g. Case No. 1:26-cv-134, ECF No. 3, PageID.100. 	DeMann brings
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various state of Michigan entities and
employees. DeMann’s complaints are not exactly clear, but he appears to assert
violations 	of 	the 	American 	with 	Disabilities 	Act 	(ADA) 	and 	violations 	of 	his
constitutional rights throughout criminal investigations and court proceedings that
began in 2005.
The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in each of his
cases on January 19, 2026. Pursuant to the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims,
the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s cases.
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Alternatively, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court dismiss the
complaints because the Plaintiff’s claims are either barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994) or frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
II. 	Summary of Complaints
It should be noted that Plaintiff’s nine complaints contain unclear and
overlapping narratives told through various duplicative attachments. However, the
throughline linking all of Plaintiff’s complaints is his assertion that various actors in
the Michigan criminal justice system violated the ADA during the investigation, court
hearings, trial, and incarceration associated with DeMann’s criminal proceedings in
the Michigan court system.
Plaintiff’s complaints each focus on various events throughout Plaintiff’s prior
criminal proceedings. 	Six complaints – Case Nos. 1:26-cv-129; 1:26-cv-131; 1:26-cv-
133; 1:26-cv-134; 1:26-cv-135; and 1:26-cv-138 – pertain to a search Plaintiff asserts
happened on December 6, 2004. 	In Plaintiff’s first Complaint, he alleges the
following:
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1:26-cv-129, ECF No. 1, PageID.4.
Plaintiff’s factual allegations across the five search complaints listed above
are largely the same. In addition to the general allegations above, Plaintiff asserts
the following regarding visor cards that law enforcement use to communicate with
the deaf and hard of hearing:
1:26-cv-135, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.11.
Plaintiff also states the following, in pertinent part, about an alleged “hear-say
confession” after the initial residential search:
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1:26-cv-138, ECF No. 1, PageID.4.1
Next, in Case No. 1:26-cv-136, Plaintiff asserts that he was pulled over in 2016
by state police in Kalamazoo, MI. 1:26-cv-136, ECF No. 1, PageID.4. Plaintiff alleges
that the jail did not know that he was hard of hearing during booking and failed to
comply with the ADA. 	Id. 	Plaintiff also claims that he was denied access to the
courts. Id. The following is a portion of Plaintiff’s assertions:
1 DeMann asserts that the “[f]irst time was Dec. 6, 2004 and continues everyday to
this very day.” 	1:26-cv-138, ECF No. 1, PageID.4. 	However, the factual scenario
underlying DeMann’s claim is an alleged “hear-say confession” that DeMann states
happened after the search in December 2004. Id.
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1:26-cv-136, ECF No. 1, PageID.5.
Additionally, in Case No. 1:26-cv-137, Plaintiff asserts that he could not hear
during his criminal trial. 1:26-cv-137, ECF No. 1, PageID.4. Plaintiff also states that
he was excluded from a case against the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) in 2014. Id., PageID.1, 4.
Finally, in Case No. 1:29-cv-139, Plaintiff asserts that he has experienced
issues with his ability to hear police, court proceedings, and township meetings.
Plaintiff’s Complaint includes the following factual statement, in pertinent part:
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1:26-cv-139, ECF No. 1, PageID.5.
In eight of the nine cases, Plaintiff includes the following ten demands for relief:
1:26-cv-129, ECF No. 1, PageID.5.
In Case No. 1:26-cv-135, Plaintiff includes the following nine demands for
relief:
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1:26-cv-135, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.11.
III. 	Standard of Law
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any action brought in
forma pauperis if the action is (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,
a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id. The court
must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 	Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a
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“probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In addition, the Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true,
unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 33 (1992).
IV. 	Analysis
A. Statute of Limitations
State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the
timeliness of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
268 69 (1985). 	For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of
limitations is three years. 	Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson,
782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999
WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Accrual of the claim for relief, however, is a
question of federal law. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996); Sevier v.
Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). 	The statute of limitations begins to run
when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis
of his action. Collyer, 98 F.3d at 220.
Here, DeMann’s claims arise from events he asserts took place in 2004, 2014,
and 2016. Plaintiff knew of the alleged harms at the time they occurred. However,
he did not file his complaints until January 13, 2026. 	Accordingly, the claims in
DeMann’s complaints are untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.
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B. Heck Analysis
Even if DeMann’s claims fell within the statute of limitations, his claims are
barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that an individual cannot make a cognizable
claim under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused
by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless
he first shows that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. at 486–87 (footnote omitted); see also Hayward v. Cleveland
Clinic Foundation, 759 F.3d 601, 609–14 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that Heck barred
the plaintiff’s civil rights action that police used excessive force in making an arrest
where the plaintiff was convicted of resisting arrest based on the same underlying
exercise of force); Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396, 398–99 (6th Cir.
1999) (holding that, where an allegedly illegal search produced evidence used to
obtain a conviction, the convicted cannot bring a § 1983 claim challenging the search
until the conviction is overturned unless the evidence was admitted under an
exception to the exclusionary rule), overruled in other part, Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384, 393 (2007) (recognizing that Heck bars the pursuit of a Fourth Amendment
arrest claim until the conviction is overturned, but concluding that the action accrues
at the time of the arrest).
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Here, DeMann has failed to make allegations in any of his nine complaints that
can establish that he was successful in his underlying criminal action. 	As shown
above, DeMann seeks “a complete expungement/exoneration of all charges where
ADA violations occurred” and one billion dollars in damages. DeMann does not assert
that he was acquitted, that the charges were dismissed, or that he successfully
appealed a conviction.
A review of Westlaw indicates that in 2007, the Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed a number of methamphetamine-related convictions in People v. Arnold
Edward Demann, No. 268657, 2007 WL 2404534 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2007). The
Michigan Supreme Court subsequently denied DeMann’s application for leave to
appeal. 	People v. Demann, 480 Mich. 1135, 745 N.W.2d 789 (2008). 	DeMann also
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court related to the aforementioned
state proceedings. 	Demann v. Harvatich, W.D. Mich. Case No. 1:11-cv-438. 	That
petition was denied. 	DeMann v. Harvatich, No. 1:11-CV-438, 2011 WL 2881145, at
*1 (W.D. Mich. July 18, 2011).
Accordingly, DeMann must first allege facts that establish that he successfully
challenged the criminal action against him in the Michigan courts before he can file
a claim for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that his arrest and
prosecution violated his federal rights.
C. Frivolous or Malicious Complaints
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court has a responsibility to decide whether a
complaint is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
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granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th
Cir. 1997). A complaint “is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact. 	Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338
(1989). Factual allegations that are “clearly baseless,” “fantastic,” or “delusional” are
frivolous. Id. at 327-28.
Finally, 	in 	the 	opinion 	of 	the 	undersigned, 	a 	review 	of 	DeMann’s 	nine
complaints establishes that they must be dismissed as clearly baseless. 	First,
DeMann’s complaints are largely incoherent and comprised of repetitive attachments
that 	contain 	a 	patchwork 	of 	images, 	documents, 	and 	often 	incomprehensible
monologues. See Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F. 3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[t]he
dismissal of a complaint on the ground that it is unintelligible is unexceptionable.”)
It appears DeMann is attempting to grieve the entirety of the criminal justice system
for alleged ADA violations, but his complaints lack clarity and specificity.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court dismiss
DeMann’s nine complaints as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
V. 	Recommendation
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s nine complaints because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by
the statute of limitations. 	Alternatively, the undersigned respectfully recommends
that the Court dismiss the complaints because the Plaintiff’s claims are either barred
by Heck, 512 U.S. 477, or frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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Dated: 	March 20, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within
fourteen days of service of this notice on you. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b). All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR
72.3(b). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any further right
of appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); see Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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