Jackson v. Unknown Party #1 et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
M ICHAEL LLOYD J ACKSON, 	)
Plaintiff, 	)
) 	No. 1:26-cv-114
v. 	)
) 	Honorable Paul L. Maloney
UNKNOWN PARTY #1,
ET AL ., 	)
Defendants. 	)
)
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on Magistrate Judge Vermaat’s Report and
Recommendation (R&R), (ECF No. 7), in which he recommended that Plaintiff’s complaint
be dismissed under
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Plaintiff objected to the R&R.
(ECF No. 12). After reviewing the objections, the Court finds no error in the Magistrate
Judge’s analysis. The R&R will thus be adopted in full and Plaintiff’s complaint will be
dismissed.
I.
After being served with a report and recommendation issued by a magistrate judge, a
party 	has 	fourteen 	days 	to 	file 	written 	objections 	to 	the 	proposed 	findings 	and
recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A district court judge
reviews de novo the portions of the R&R to which objections have been filed. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Only those objections that are specific are entitled to a de
novo review under the statute.
Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam). An “objection does not oblige the district court to ignore the report and
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recommendation.”
Fharmacy Recs. v. Nassar, 465 F. App’x 448, 456 (6th Cir. 2012). Our
Local Rules require any party objecting to a report and recommendation to “specifically
identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objections are made and the basis for such objections.” W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b);
see also
Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that “objections disput[ing] the
correctness of the magistrate’s recommendation but fail[ing] to specify the findings . . .
believed [to be] in error” are too general).
Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true” to plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
requested.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Facts “merely consistent with” the
defendant’s liability suggest only possibility, not plausibility, and thus fail this test.
Id. In
assessing whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter, courts need only accept
factual allegations as true and not legal conclusions or unwarranted inferences.
Kottmayer v.
Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 2006).
II.
Plaintiff alleges that various state court clerks falsified documents related to his bond.
The harm from the allegedly false documents was a delay in Plaintiff’s trial. Plaintiff was
convicted and is presently incarcerated. In his objections, Plaintiff offers new documents and
allegations. Magistrate Judge Vermaat evaluated only the allegations in the complaint, as he
was required to do: a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “invites an inquiry into the legal sufficiency
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of the complaint” and, typically, nothing more.
Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233,
240 (6th Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff’s objections go into matters beyond the face of the complaint. Plaintiff
references a number of exhibits and sources for new factual allegations. But in evaluating a
motion to dismiss, courts “must focus only on the allegations in the pleadings.”
Bates v.
Green Farms Condo. Ass’n, 958 F.3d 470, 483 (6th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs may not “amend
their complaint in an opposition brief or ask the court to consider new allegations or evidence
not contained in the complaint.”
Id. (citation modified). Amending the complaint to add new
allegations is accomplished through a motion under Rule 15, not through an objection to a
magistrate judge’s R&R. Parties cannot “raise at the district court stage new arguments or
issues that were not presented to the magistrate.”
Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902
n.1 (6th Cir. 2000);
Morgan v. Trierweiler, 67 F.4th 362, 367 (6th Cir. 2023) (explaining that
issues raised for the first time in objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed order are
“deemed waived”);
Harvey v. Lillibridge, No. 1:21-cv-661, 2022 WL 2817666, at *1 (W.D.
Mich. July 19, 2022) (“[A] party cannot raise new arguments in an objection.”). The
Magistrate Judge here was not presented with any of the new evidence or allegations, but if
he had been, he would have been correct to not evaluate them and reach the conclusions he
did based on the face of the complaint.
Even if the Court were to evaluate Plaintiff’s new allegations, they would deepen the
Heck problem rather than resolving it. Plaintiff references both in his complaint, (ECF No.
1 at PageID.3), and in his objections, (ECF No. 12 at PageID.60), a Michigan constitutional
right to trial on a certain time frame that was allegedly violated. This appears to be the sole
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basis for all of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims, and the sole concrete injury traceable to
Defendants for which Plaintiff would have standing to sue.
See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Plaintiff argues that he does not claim “that the clerk[’]s action
played a role in any conviction,” (ECF No. 12 at PageID.62), but if the only injury Plaintiff
claims is a delay in his trial that supposedly made the proceedings constitutionally invalid, his
claim is inseparable from a claim that his criminal proceedings were unconstitutional. Such
claims must go through other channels, such as direct appeal in the state courts or habeas
proceedings.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Indeed, Plaintiff makes clear in his objection that he
made a motion in his state criminal proceeding on the issues he presents here that was
denied. (ECF No. 12 at PageID.62). If he believes this created a constitutional infirmity in
the proceedings, Plaintiff must either pursue a direct appeal or a collateral attack through a
habeas proceeding rather than a § 1983 claim.
III.
Plaintiff’s sole injury is an alleged unconstitutional delay in his trial. His claims thus
directly call into question the validity of his conviction, and § 1983 is not the correct vehicle
to bring his claims. The Magistrate Judge properly recognized this on the face of Plaintiff’s
complaint, so the R&R (ECF No. 7) is ADOPTED IN FULL. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF
No. 1) is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 	April 7, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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