Allen #982161 v. Rubley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
TYLER MALIEK ALLEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNKNOWN RUBLEY,
Defendant.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1694
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 In a
separate order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required
to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must
read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to state a claim.
1 Plaintiff initiated this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Thereafter, the Eastern District of Michigan transferred the action
to this Court. (ECF No. 4.)
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Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City, Montcalm County, Michigan. The
events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility
(IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff named as Defendant in this case IBC Correctional
Officer Unknown Rubley. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 3.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rubley “smacked [Plaintiff] in the back of [the] head” and
“on [Plaintiff’s] face” while Defendant Rubley was escorting Plaintiff to segregation in 2021. (Id.,
PageID.3.) Plaintiff seeks damages and requests that Defendant Rubley be fired as a correctional
officer. (Id.)
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
In this action, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Rubley subjected him to excessive force in
violation of the Eighth Amendment more than three years ago in 2021, while Plaintiff was confined
at IBC.2 State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness of
claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268–69 (1985). For civil
rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich.
Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
2 The Court notes that the factual allegations in the instant complaint are similar to the factual
allegations that Plaintiff presented in Allen v. Rubley, No. 1:25-cv-1456 (W.D. Mich.), which the
Court dismissed as untimely. See Op. & J., Allen v. Rubley, No. 1:25-cv-1456 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
2, 2025), (ECF Nos. 5, 6). To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims in the instant complaint are
duplicative of the claims in his prior action, the instant complaint is subject to dismissal on this
basis as well. See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976); Missouri v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 259 F.3d 949, 953–54 (8th Cir. 2001);
Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2000); Smith v. SEC, 129 F.3d 356, 361
(6th Cir. 1997).
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Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Accrual of the
claim for relief, however, is a question of federal law. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th
Cir. 1996); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). The statute of limitations begins
to run when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his
action. Collyer, 98 F.3d at 220.
Plaintiff’s complaint is untimely. He asserts a claim against Defendant Rubley that took
place in 2021. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff had reason to know of the “harms” done
to him at the time they occurred. Hence, his claims accrued in 2021. But he did not file his
complaint until November 17, 2025, well beyond Michigan’s three-year limit.3 Moreover,
Michigan law no longer tolls the running of the statute of limitations when a plaintiff is
incarcerated. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5851(9). Further, it is well established that ignorance
of the law does not warrant equitable tolling of a statute of limitations. See Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d
1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1991); Mason
v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 01-5701, 2002 WL 1334756, at *2 (6th Cir. June 17, 2002).
A claim barred by the statute of limitations is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
claim. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (“If the allegations, for example, show that
relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for
failure to state a claim . . . .”); see also Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 590 (6th Cir. 2017)
(holding that if, on the face of a complaint, the allegations show that relief is barred by an
affirmative defense (lack of exhaustion), the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
3 Plaintiff’s complaint does not specify when in 2021 the alleged conduct took place. (See Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Because Plaintiff did not file his complaint until November 17, 2025, (see
id.), his claim is untimely regardless of when in 2021 it occurred.
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claim) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 215); Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir.
2012) (when a complaint on its face is barred by the statute of limitations, it fails to state a claim).
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly
dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be
frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies
that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	June 23, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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