Singh v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
HARMEET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1676
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner Harmeet Singh, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County,
Michigan, initiated this action on December 8, 2025, by filing a counseled petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the
Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, declare that Respondents’ actions to detain Petitioner violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and
issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release
Petitioner or ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due
process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.11–12.)
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In an order entered on December 10, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on December 15,
2025, (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on December 18, 2025, (ECF No. 5). 1
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of India. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4; Notice to Appear
(NTA), ECF No. 4-1, PageID.4.) Petitioner entered the United States on or about June 11, 2022,
at or near Calexico, California, without being “admitted or paroled.” (NTA, ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.44.) On June 12, 2022, Department of Homeland Security agents encountered Petitioner
and 	issued 	him 	a 	Form 	I-862, 	NTA, 	charging 	Petitioner 	with 	inadmissibility 	under
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant
“present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States
at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” (Id.)
ICE arrested and detained Petitioner in June of 2025. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.9.) On June
18, 2025, the Cleveland, Ohio Immigration Court denied Petitioner’s request for a change in
custody status, stating: “Under Q. Li, the respondent’s detention i[s] under INA 235(b) and he is
not eligible for bond under INA 236(a).” (Order of the Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-2,
PageID.47.) On August 7, 2025, the Cleveland Immigration Court found Petitioner removable;
denied Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding of removal
under the Convention Against Torture; and ordered Petitioner removed to India. (Order of the
1 Petitioner has also filed a motion for leave to file his reply instanter. (ECF No. 6.) In his motion,
Petitioner suggests that Respondents filed their response early, on December 12, 2025, and that
his reply was, therefore, due on December 17, 2025. (Id., PageID.77.) As noted above, however,
Respondents filed their response on December 15, 2025, and Petitioner’s reply was, therefore, due
three business days later, on December 18, 2025. Because Petitioner filed his reply on December
18, 2025, the Court will deny his motion for leave to file instanter as unnecessary.
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Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-3.) Petitioner filed an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), which remains pending. (Notice-Briefing Schedule, ECF No. 4-4, PageID.55.) Because
Petitioner’s 	appeal 	to 	the 	BIA 	remains 	pending, 	Petitioner’s 	order 	of 	removal 	is 	not
“administratively 	final” 	for 	purposes 	of 	the 	INA. 	See 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1101(a)(47)(B),
1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A).2
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
2 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (finding that a final removal order becomes
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)));
see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed
[and affirmed] the [removal] order (or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is
free to remove the alien unless a court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included
‘administratively’ before the word ‘final’ in the first provision.”). Here, Petitioner appealed the
removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and that appeal remains pending. See
Automated Case Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (enter “240744111” for the A-
Number, select “India” for the Nationality, and select Submit) (last visited Dec. 15, 2025).
Therefore, § 1231 does not apply. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001) (recognizing
that § 1226 is “applicable to certain detention-related decisions in [the] period preceding entry of
final removal order” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)); Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The
parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”).
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related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should appeal the denial of his bond request to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA).
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, 	however, 	contend 	that Petitioner 	meets 	every 	element 	for 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
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apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, is scheduled to attend hearings with an
immigration judge, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for only a short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court
concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States
Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, The GEO Group, Inc., and
the Warden of the North Lake Processing Center as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
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immediately release Petitioner from custody.3 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will
dismiss the United States Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General,
The GEO Group, Inc., and the Warden of the North Lake Processing Center as Respondents.
Dated: 	December 19, 2025 	/s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
3 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer.
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