Roche #612820 v. Way et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
TERRELL ROCHE,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNKNOWN WAY et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1582
Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a separate
order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss
any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept
Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events
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about which he complains occurred at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County,
Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following ICF staff: Correctional Officer Unknown Way, Correctional
Officer 	Unknown 	Gage, 	Inspector 	Unknown 	Salinas, 	Inspector 	Unknown 	Jaramillo, 	and
Administrative Law Judge Unknown Yarmalenka. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 2.)
On March 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Salinas and another
individual in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, alleging that
Defendant Salinas planted drugs in Plaintiff’s cell and falsified a drug test. (Id., PageID.3); Compl.,
Roche v. Morrison, No. 1:25-cv-312 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2025), (ECF No. 1, PageID.3). Four
months later, on July 12, 2025, Plaintiff was removed from his cell by unnamed correctional
officers and taken to segregation as part of a “pending investigation.”1 (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.3.) Plaintiff was then issued a misconduct ticket as “a form of retaliation at the direction
of [Defendant] Jaramillo” because of Plaintiff’s pending lawsuit against Defendant Salinas. (Id).
The misconduct ticket was issued after Defendants Way and Gage said they found documents
explaining how to smuggle drugs into the prison in Plaintiff’s property. (Id.) According to Plaintiff,
he did not have any such documents in his property. (Id.)
On 	July 	13, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	underwent 	a 	“misconduct 	review” 	before 	Defendant
Yarmalenka. (Id.) At the review, Defendant Yarmalenka acknowledged that the handwriting on
the documents Defendants Way and Gage found did not match a sample of Plaintiff’s handwriting.
(Id.) After the review, Plaintiff’s misconduct ticket was upheld.2 (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff was
sent to a more restrictive prison. (Id.)
1 In this opinion, the Court corrects the capitalization and punctuation in quotations from Plaintiff’s
complaint.
2 In Plaintiff’s complaint, he refers to multiple “misconducts” and “tickets.” (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.3.) But Plaintiff only provides factual allegations regarding the misconduct ticket
involving the documents found by Defendants Way and Gage. (Id.) Therefore, to the extent that
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On July 14, 2025, unidentified non-party individuals “acting on behalf of Defendant
Salinas” told Plaintiff that he “should’ve knew [sic] this was coming” and that he should “drop the
lawsuit or we’ll keep setting you up with misconducts [and] keep putting you in the hole.” (Id.)
Plaintiff seeks unspecified monetary damages. Plaintiff also seeks an order (i) requiring an
investigation of Plaintiff’s allegations to be conducted, (ii) directing Defendants to issue Plaintiff
a written and verbal apology, and (iii) removing the smuggling misconduct from Plaintiff’s record.
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
Plaintiff received any other misconduct tickets, the Court will not consider those tickets in its
analysis of Plaintiff’s claims.
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relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A. 	Defendant Salinas
Plaintiff alleges that the other named Defendants’ conduct was motivated by the lawsuit
Plaintiff filed against Defendant Salinas, but Plaintiff’s complaint does not attribute any specific
conduct to Defendant Salinas. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff only references
Defendant Salinas when discussing the pending lawsuit and when alleging that unidentified
individuals “acting on behalf of Defendant Salinas” told Plaintiff that he needed to drop the lawsuit
or he would continue to receive misconduct tickets and be placed in segregation. (Id., PageID.3.)
These allegations fail to show how Defendant Salinas was personally involved in the violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular
defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–61 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff
must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is
named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to
dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr.
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Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764
(6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree
of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each
alleged violation of rights). Further, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676. Here, Plaintiff refers to Defendant Salinas in the body of his complaint when
discussing Plaintiff’s past lawsuit against Defendant Salinas, but in the present action, Plaintiff
fails to allege that Defendant Salinas engaged in any active unconstitutional conduct. (See
generally Compl., ECF No. 1.)
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Salinas liable due to his
supervisory position, government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct
of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 676; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484,
495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional
behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d
889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory
liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899;
Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004).
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly summarized the minimum required to constitute active
conduct by a supervisory official:
“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending
individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee [v.
Luttrell], 199 F.3d [295,] 300 [(6th Cir. 1999)] (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,”
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the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved,
or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300);
see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995
F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendant Salinas encouraged or
condoned the conduct of his subordinates, or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
their conduct.
Accordingly, for these reasons, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Salinas will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
B. 	First Amendment Retaliation Claims
Plaintiff alleges that the misconduct ticket he received was retaliation for the lawsuit that
Plaintiff filed against Defendant Salinas. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff also alleges that
he was subsequently transferred to a “more restricted prison.” (Id.) The Court will construe these
allegations as raising First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Gage, Way,
Jaramillo, and Yarmalenka.
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the
Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to
set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the
plaintiff was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff
that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse
action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be
able to show that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the
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defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir.
2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
1. 	Protected Conduct
With respect to the first element of a First Amendment retaliation claim, the filing of a civil
rights lawsuit constitutes protected conduct. See, e.g., Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 607 (6th Cir.
2002). Here, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant Salinas in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) At this stage of the
proceedings, the Court assumes that Plaintiff engaged in protected conduct for purposes of his
First Amendment claim.
2. 	Adverse Action
Next, to establish the second element of a retaliation claim, a prisoner-plaintiff must show
adverse action by a prison official sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising
his constitutional rights. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396. The adverseness inquiry is an objective one
and does not depend on how a particular plaintiff reacted. The relevant question is whether the
defendant’s conduct is “capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness”; the plaintiff need not
show actual deterrence. Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir. 2002).
a. 	Misconduct Ticket
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was issued a misconduct ticket on July 13, 2025, for
attempting to smuggle drugs into the facility. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) The issuance of a
misconduct charge can be considered an adverse action. See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 441
(6th Cir. 2007) (discussing that the issuance of a misconduct ticket can “constitute[] an adverse
action”). Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the second element of a
retaliation claim.
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b. 	Transfer to “More Restricted Prison”
Ordinarily, transfers to the general population of another prison are not typically an adverse
action. See Smith v. Yarrow, 78 F. App’x 529, 543 (6th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). However, in
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 474–75 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit held that transfer to
administrative segregation or another prison’s lock-down unit can be sufficient to constitute
adverse action. The Hill court determined that transfer to a lock-down unit at another facility is
more than just a transfer, and is more akin to the transfer in Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693,
701-02 (6th Cir. 2005), in which the consequence of transfer would affect the prisoner’s ability to
pay his lawyer, thereby affecting his access to the courts.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to a “more restricted prison,” however,
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts about how the prison was “more restricted.” (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.3.) Under these circumstances, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that he was transferred to
a “more restricted prison” is insufficient to show that the conditions at the new prison were akin
to the segregation-like conditions addressed in Hill, 630 F.3d at 474–75. Therefore, Plaintiff fails
to show that his transfer to a “more restricted prison” constituted adverse action.
3. 	Retaliatory Motive
Finally, to satisfy the third element of a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege facts that
support an inference that the alleged adverse action was motivated by the protected conduct. The
Court addresses this third element below.
a. 	Defendants Way and Gage
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Way and Gage took adverse action against Plaintiff by
issuing Plaintiff a misconduct ticket based on fabricated evidence at the direction of Defendant
Jaramillo. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff further alleges that he was told by unidentified
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individuals that Plaintiff “should’ve knew [sic] this was coming, drop the lawsuit or we’ll keep
setting you up with misconducts and keep putting you in the hole.” (Id.)
However, Plaintiff has failed to show that the actions of Defendants Way and Gage with
regard to the issuance of the misconduct ticket were motivated by Plaintiff’s lawsuit against
Defendant Salinas. Plaintiff alleges no facts regarding Defendants Way and Gage that could show
that the issuance of this misconduct ticket was motivated by Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Defendant
Salinas. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) In fact, there is no indication in the complaint that
Defendants Way and Gage were even aware of the lawsuit. Instead, after Defendants Way and
Gage issued Plaintiff the misconduct ticket, Plaintiff alleges that unidentified individuals “acting
on behalf of Defendant Salinas” told Plaintiff that he would continue to receive misconduct tickets
if Plaintiff did not drop the lawsuit. (Id.) This is insufficient to show that the action of Defendants
Way and Gage were motivated by that lawsuit.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss any intended First Amendment retaliation claims
against Defendants Way and Gage.
b. 	Defendant Jaramillo
Plaintiff alleges that the misconduct ticket “was written [as] a form of retaliation at the
direction of [Defendant] Jaramillo” because of Plaintiff’s pending lawsuit against Defendant
Salinas. (Id.)
It is well recognized that “retaliation” is easy to allege and that it can seldom be
demonstrated by direct evidence. See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005);
Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1987). “[A]lleging merely the ultimate fact of
retaliation is insufficient.” Murphy, 833 F.2d at 108. Here, Plaintiff merely alleges the ultimate
fact that Defendant Jaramillo acted with a retaliatory motive, claiming that Jaramillo directed the
issuance of the misconduct ticket because of Plaintiff’s lawsuit; however, Plaintiff presents no
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facts to support this assertion. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Specifically, as an initial matter,
besides alleging in a conclusory manner that the misconduct ticket was issued at the direction of
Defendant Jaramillo, Plaintiff does not present any facts to support his conclusory assertion. For
example, Plaintiff’s complaint does not indicate how and when Defendant Jaramillo directed the
issuance of this misconduct ticket. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest that Defendant
Jaramillo had any interaction with Defendant Way and Gage, the officers who issued the
misconduct ticket, let alone that Jaramillo directed them to issue the misconduct ticket to Plaintiff.
Moreover, even setting this issue aside, Plaintiff does not present any facts to support his
conclusory assertion that Defendant Jaramillo’s act of directing others to issue Plaintiff a
misconduct ticket was motivated by Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Defendant Salinas. “[C]onclusory
allegations of retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state . . . a
claim under § 1983.’” Harbin-Bey, 420 F.3d at 580 (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534,
1538–39 (6th Cir. 1987)); see also Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003)
(discussing that in complaints screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, “[c]onclusory allegations
of retaliatory motive with no concrete and relevant particulars fail to raise a genuine issue of fact
for trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In short, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are
insufficient to show that Defendant Jaramillo’s actions were motivated by Plaintiff’s lawsuit.
Accordingly, this speculative allegation fails to state a claim. The Court will dismiss any
intended First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Jaramillo for failure to state a claim.
c. 	Defendant Yarmalenka
Plaintiff alleges that during the misconduct review hearing, Defendant Yarmalenka
acknowledged that the handwriting on the found document did not match a sample of Plaintiff’s
handwriting. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Yarmalenka
“allow[ed] and encourage[ed] the continuation and the corruption” of the other Defendants. (Id.)
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Any intended retaliation claim against Defendant Yarmalenka is entirely conclusory.
Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest that Defendant Yarmalenka’s ruling following the misconduct
review hearing was influenced by Plaintiff’s lawsuit, or that Defendant Yarmalenka was even
aware of that lawsuit. See Lewis, 20 F. App’x at 459 (“[B]are allegations of malice on the
defendants’ parts are not enough to establish retaliation claims [that will survive § 1915A
screening].” (citing Crawford-El, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998))). Under these circumstances, Plaintiff
fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Yarmalenka.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss any intended First Amendment retaliation claim
against Defendant Yarmalenka.
C. 	Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims
In addition to Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims, the Court will construe
Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Yarmalenka violated Plaintiff’s rights by “denying [Plaintiff]
freedom and causing [Plaintiff] to be sent to a more restricted prison” as raising a claim of a
violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.3.)
“The Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual from deprivation of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.” Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
To state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must show that one of
these interests is at stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Analysis of a procedural
due process claim involves two steps: “[T]he first asks whether there exists a liberty or property
interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures
attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient . . . .” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted).
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In Sandin v. Conner, the United States Supreme Court set forth the standard for
determining when a state-created right creates a federally cognizable liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause. 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). According to that Court, a prisoner is entitled
to the protections of due process only when the sanction “will inevitably affect the duration of his
[or her] sentence” or when a deprivation imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 486–87; see also Jones v. Baker,
155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790–91 (6th Cir. 1995). In
Sandin, the Court held that regardless of the mandatory language of the prison regulations, the
inmate did not have a liberty interest because his placement in administrative segregation for thirty
days did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship within the context of his prison life.
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; see also Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997). Without a
protected liberty interest, a plaintiff cannot successfully claim that his due process rights were
violated because “[p]rocess is not an end in itself.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he received a misconduct ticket for possessing a document
containing instructions on how to smuggle drugs into the prison. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Yarmalenka presided over the misconduct review hearing,
and, despite acknowledging that the handwriting on that document at issue did not match a sample
of Plaintiff’s handwriting, Defendant Yarmalenka found Plaintiff guilty of that misconduct charge.
(Id.)
To state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must show that
the sanctions he received as a result of the misconduct conviction “inevitably affect[ed] the
duration of [Plaintiff’s] sentence” or imposed an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486–87. However, the sanctions
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available in the MDOC disciplinary scheme do not affect the duration of an inmate’s sentence, and
placement in segregation or non-bond status for a limited period of time or the receipt of the loss
of privileges sanction do not constitute “atypical and significant hardship[s],” as contemplated by
Sandin. See, e.g., Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing that the loss of
disciplinary credits under the MDOC’s disciplinary scheme does not affect the duration of a
prisoner’s sentence); Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (holding that placement in segregation for 30 days
does not impose an atypical and significant hardship); Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868
(6th Cir. 2010) (finding that 61 days in segregation is not atypical and significant); cf. Bazzetta,
430 F.3d at 805 (concluding that a permanent, but reviewable, loss of visitation privileges did not
“rise[] to the level of egregious conduct necessary to implicate the implicit guarantees of the Due
Process Clause” (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003))); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80
F. App’x 427, 429 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that prisoners have no constitutional right to
rehabilitation, education, or jobs).3
Further, with respect to Plaintiff’s transfer to a “more restricted prison” (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.3), “prisoners generally do not have a state-created liberty interest in avoiding a
transfer from one prison to another, even if the second prison has worse conditions.” McClendon
3 If Plaintiff had been found not guilty of any of the misconduct charges, then he would not have
received any sanctions for a misconduct conviction. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff would
necessarily fail to show that he received any sanctions for these misconduct charges that impacted
the duration of his sentence or constituted an “atypical and significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S.
at 486–87. Moreover, even if Plaintiff had alleged the loss of a protected liberty interest, he would
not state a due process claim because he fails to show that he did not receive all the process due to
him. See generally Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (setting forth the minimum process
required for prison disciplinary proceedings that implicate a liberty interest). Due process of law
gives the person the opportunity to convince an unbiased decision maker that, for example, he has
been wrongly or falsely accused or that the evidence against him is false. That is, the right to due
process protects Plaintiff’s ability to respond to spurious charges. It does not include the right to
prevent or prevail on such charges. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
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El v. Washington, 144 F.4th 900, 905 (6th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted). And, because Plaintiff
fails to allege any facts about how the prison was “more restricted,” he necessarily fails to show
that his confinement there constituted an “atypical and significant hardship,” as contemplated by
Sandin.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff fails to state any Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process claims against Defendant Yarmalenka. The Court will dismiss
any intended Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendant Yarmalenka.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action
would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might
raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: June 18, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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