Rivero v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JOSE ANTONIO RIVERO,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1294
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner initiated this action on October 24, 2025, by filing a counseled petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is presently detained
by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the North Lake Processing
Center (North Lake) in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: order Respondents not to transfer Petitioner out of the Western District of
Michigan during the pendency of this action; declare that Respondents’ actions violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act; issue a writ of
habeas corpus and order the immediate release of Petitioner; and award attorney’s fees and costs.
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.18.) 1 For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
1 In his petition, Petitioner sought either an initial temporary restraining order compelling his
release and enjoining continued detention or compelling Respondents to conduct a bond hearing
to ensure Petitioner’s due process rights, or alternatively, Petitioner asked the Court to order
Respondents to show cause, within three days, why the petition should not be granted. (Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.2.) In an Order entered on October 31, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to
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Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) He represents that he has
been present in the United States since 2023. (Id.) Prior to his detention, Petitioner lived in Summit,
Illinois with his spouse and two children, ages 9 and 1. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1–2.)
On December 13, 2023, United States Border Patrol (USBP) encountered Petitioner and
served Petitioner with a Form I-862 Notice to Appear (NTA), charging him with inadmissibility
pursuant to sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) “for being
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived at a time and place
not designated by the Attorney General.” (Ellis Declaration, ECF No. 4-1, ¶ 5, PageID.59–60.)
Petitioner was also served with a Form I-200 Warrant for Arrest of Alien, Form I-286 Notice of
Custody Determination, and a Form I-220A Order of Release on Recognizance, which stated that
Petitioner was released contingent upon his successful participation in an alternatives to detention
(ATD) program. (Id.) Petitioner was released from custody on his own recognizance. (Id., ¶ 6,
PageID.60.)
On May 7, 2024, Petitioner filed a timely application for asylum with the Chicago
Immigration Court. (Id., ¶ 7, PageID.60; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Because of this pending
asylum application, Petitioner was able to secure an employment authorization document and work
in a barbershop. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on
November 5, 2025, (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on November 7, 2025, (ECF No.
5). As to Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order, because the Court will conditionally
grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, as set forth herein, the Court does not, and need not, separately
address Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order.
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On August 12, 2025, Petitioner “ceased complying with the conditions of his ATD
program.” (Ellis Declaration, ECF No. 4-1, ¶ 8, PageID.60.)
On October 1, 2025, ICE arrested Petitioner in Summit, Illinois and terminated him from
the ATD program. (Id., ¶ 9, PageID.60.) Petitioner is now detained at North Lake and has not
received a bond hearing. (Id., ¶ 9, PageID.49.)
On October 14, 2025, Petitioner submitted a request for parole; however, ICE denied that
request on October 24, 2025. (Id., ¶¶ 10, 12, PageID.61.)
II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
III. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents first argue that three provisions of the INA divest this Court of jurisdiction
over Petitioner’s habeas action: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9). (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.26–31.) For the following reasons, the Court concludes
that § 1252(e)(3), § 1252(g), and § 1252(b)(9) do not preclude the Court’s review of Petitioner’s
§ 2241 petition.
A. 	Section 1252(e)(3)
Section 1252(e)(3), which is titled, “Challenges on validity of the system,” states that:
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[j]udicial review of determinations under section 1225(b) of this title and its
implementation is available in an action instituted in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, but shall be limited to determinations of—
(i) whether such section, or any regulation issued to implement such section, is
constitutional; or
(ii) whether such a regulation, or a written policy directive, written policy
guideline, or written procedure issued by or under the authority of the Attorney
General to implement such section, is not consistent with applicable provisions
of this subchapter or is otherwise in violation of law.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
Here, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his detention without a bond hearing;
Petitioner is not challenging the validity of the statutory scheme itself. Indeed, Petitioner does not
appear to dispute that § 1225(b)(2) requires detention of noncitizens detained under that
subsection. Instead, Petitioner argues that Respondents lack statutory authority to detain him under
§ 1225(b)(2) because that statute does not apply to his circumstances. Petitioner’s present § 2241
petition is not the type of action that is contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3). Accordingly, the
Court concludes that § 1252(e)(3) does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction.
B. 	Section 1252(g)
Section 1252(g) provides:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law
(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas
corpus provision, . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by
or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General
to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the scope of § 1252(g) is “narrow,” and
“[t]hat provision [only] limits review of cases ‘arising from’ decisions ‘to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of
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Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). In Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., the United States Supreme Court explained that “[w]e have previously
rejected as ‘implausible’ the Government’s suggestion that § 1252(g) covers ‘all claims arising
from deportation proceedings’ or imposes ‘a general jurisdictional limitation.’” Id. (quoting Reno
v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)).
Here, contrary to Respondents’ assertions, Petitioner’s action requesting a writ of habeas
corpus ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing does not seek review of a discretionary
decision to “commence proceedings,” “adjudicate” a case, or “execute” a removal order. Instead,
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus challenging his continued confinement without bond. This
action falls outside of the narrow scope of § 1252(g) and within the Court’s jurisdiction.
C. 	Section 1252(b)(9)
Section 1252(b)(9) provides:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and
application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken
or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this
subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this
section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have
jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of Title 28 . . . or by any other
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such
questions of law or fact.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court held that
§ 1252(b)(9) did not bar the Supreme Court’s review of “questions of law” regarding whether
“certain statutory provisions require detention without a bond hearing.” Jennings, 582 U.S. at 292.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court explained that “the applicability of § 1252(b)(9)
turns on whether the legal questions that we must decide ‘aris[e] from’ the actions taken to remove
these aliens.” Id. at 293. The Supreme Court rejected an “expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9),”
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explaining that even if “[t]he ‘questions of law and fact’ . . . could be said to ‘aris[e] from’ actions
taken to remove the aliens in the sense that the aliens’ injuries would never have occurred if they
had not been placed in detention,” this “expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) would lead to
staggering results,” such as, for example, improperly precluding judicial review of inhumane
conditions of confinement claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). Id.
Here, Petitioner is challenging his entitlement to a bond hearing, and for the reasons set
forth above, the Court concludes that § 1252(b)(9) does not divest the Court of jurisdiction to
consider Petitioner’s habeas petition. 2
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before the immigration court and, therefore,
has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.32.) Respondents
further argue that Petitioner should request a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any
unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Id.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
2 As noted by Petitioner, Numerous other federal district courts have also concluded that the
statutory provisions cited by Respondents and discussed herein, do not divest federal courts of
jurisdiction over § 2241 petitions that are nearly identical Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
402 U.S. 479, 484 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95 (1969)),” to determine
whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination
relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that
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would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, this Court is not bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency
interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024)
(discussing that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not
defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner, which
are not premised on “correctable procedural errors,” generally do not require exhaustion because
the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th
Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process challenge generally does not require
exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable procedural errors,” such as a claim
“that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an ‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to
review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody
would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact
that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all noncitizens
who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest and detention. Notably, the BIA
recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was
later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is unlikely
that any administrative review by the BIA of that denial would lead the Government to change its
position and thereby obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
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Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies and request a bond hearing would likely
be futile. Moreover, it is clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. First, as noted
above, Petitioner would need to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge. There is no
evidence in the record as to how long Petitioner would have to wait until such a hearing, if any,
were scheduled. Petitioner’s request would likely be denied given the BIA’s recent decision in
Yajure Hurtado. Then, Petitioner would have the opportunity to appeal any unfavorable decision
to the BIA. Appeals of bond denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.”
Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citation omitted). It is
“unmistakable that . . . depriving [Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision
certainly equates to hardship. And any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to
avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every
element for detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were
ambiguous, its structure and history support the agency’s interpretation of the statute.” (Resp.,
ECF No. 4, PageID.21.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “. . . in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And, § 1226(a) states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c)[ 3 ] and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney
General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
Id. § 1226(a). The plain language of these provisions indicates that both § 1225 and § 1226 govern
the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. The difference is that § 1225 provides
3 Subsection (c) refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” which does not apply here. See
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The parties do not contend that Petitioner has been convicted of any crime
listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).
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for mandatory detention and § 1226 allows for the release of the noncitizen on conditional parole
or bond. As explained below, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs
Petitioner’s detention.
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted); see Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009);
see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts “must give effect
to the clear meaning of statutes as written” (citation omitted)). “When interpreting a statute, the
inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In
re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted)). But, “the
‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
context.’” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (citation omitted). And, “the words of a
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”
Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (citation omitted). The Court must also
“use every tool at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper Bright Enter.
v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024).
As set forth above, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention “of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . .” See id.
§ 1225(a)(1). The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien
into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See id.
§ 1101(a)(13). The word “entry,” is not defined in the INA, see generally id. § 1101, but the
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dictionary definition of “entry” is “the right or privilege of entering” or “the act of entering.”
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entry (last visited
Nov. 18, 2025). “Entry” has long been understood to mean “a crossing into the territorial limits of
the United States.” Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Matter
of Pierre, 14 I&N Dec. 467, 468 (BIA 1973)). Further, the phrase “seeking admission” also is
undefined in the statute. See generally id. Looking to the plain, ordinary meaning of “seeking,”
this word is defined as “ask[ing] for,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/seeking (last visited Nov. 18, 2025), and, the word “seeking” “necessarily
implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 218 (D. Mass.
July 24, 2025) (citations omitted).
Respondents contend that any noncitizen who has not been lawfully admitted, regardless
of whether they are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking
admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. However, that reading of § 1225 would
render the qualifier “seeking admission” in the statute entirely unnecessary. “It is ‘a cardinal
principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that,
if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citations omitted). Given Congress’s decision to
use different terms in § 1225—i.e., “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission”—the
Court will presume that Congress intended these phrases to mean different things. See Pulsifer v.
United States, 144 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2024) (“In a given statute, . . . different terms usually have
different meanings.” (citation omitted)).
Here, Petitioner is not actively seeking to lawfully cross into the territorial limits of the
United States because he already entered the United States two years ago, in 2023. (See Pet., ECF
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No. 1, PageID.1.) As the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
explained when addressing this issue:
[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then
proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be
described as “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be
described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered
to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission”
(or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered
unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the
United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to [the petitioner],
because he has already been residing in the United States for several years.
Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2025); see Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 29, 2025) (“[S]eeking admission’ . . . implies action – something that is currently occurring,
and in this instance, would most logically occur at the border upon inspection.”).
In comparison to § 1225, “[s]ection 1226(a) is less specific,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft,
No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025), and states that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision
on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Looking at
both § 1225 and § 1226, even if the statutory text appears unambiguous when viewed in isolation,
“courts are to interpret the words of a statute in context.” Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (citation omitted);
see Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (“Whether a statutory term is unambiguous,
however, does not turn solely on dictionary definitions of its component words. Rather, ‘[t]he
plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language
itself, [but as well by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context
of the statute as a whole.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
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Section 1225 is titled, “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. A title, such as this “is
especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.”
Yates, 574 U.S. at 552 (Alito, J., concurring). Additionally, Congress’s decision to include the
word “arriving,” as well as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such
as “stowaways” and “crewmen,” in § 1225 evidences an intent to address noncitizens arriving “at
a border or port of entry.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2)(3). In
contrast, § 1226 is titled, “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. “That Congress
separated removal of arriving aliens[, as set forth in § 1225,] from its more general section for
‘Apprehension and detention of aliens,’ [as set forth in] § 1226, implies that Congress enacted
§ 1225 for a specific, limited purpose.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citing Dubin v.
United States, 143 S. Ct. 1557, 1567–68 (2023)).
Further, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court
discussed that § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at the Nation’s
borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to
enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. The United States Supreme Court
stated 	that, 	in 	contrast, 	“[s]ection 	1226 	generally 	governs 	the 	process 	of 	arresting 	and
detaining . . . aliens [already living within the United States] pending their removal.” Id. at 288.
Thus, in Jennings, the United States Supreme Court differentiated between noncitizens initially
arriving to the United States who are governed by § 1225, and noncitizens already present in the
country who are governed by § 1226. See id. at 288–89.
Furthermore, Respondents’ interpretation urges this Court to turn a blind eye to the
remainder of the statutory scheme. Courts are instructed to “construe statutes, not isolated
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provisions.” King, 576 U.S. at 486. Whereas § 1225 governs the treatment of “arriving aliens,”
§ 1226 is much broader, referring to all other aliens not lawfully present but not arriving. To read
§ 1226 otherwise would ignore recent amendments to § 1226 and render Congress’ recent actions
entirely superfluous, a result that this Court has long been instructed to avoid. See TRW Inc., 534
U.S. at 31.
Just this year, Congress enacted the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025),
which amended § 1226 to prescribe a subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary
bond analysis. Specifically, the Act added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those
noncitizens who are inadmissible under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who
have been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).
If all individuals like Petitioner, “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,”
were already subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, then there would have been no need
for Congress to amend the INA to provide for mandatory detention of individuals who were
“present in the United States without being admitted or paroled” and who were arrested, charged
with, or committed certain crimes. If the Court accepted Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225
and 1226, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered entirely superfluous. See Corey, 556 U.S. at 314 (“A
statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.”)
Finally, 	it 	is 	Respondents’ 	position 	that 	applicants 	for 	admission 	detained 	under
§ 1225(b)(2) are subject to mandatory detention and are ineligible for any subsequent release on
bond. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.37–38.) However, in this case, Petitioner was not detained at the
time of his initial encounter with USBP; instead, Petitioner was released on recognizance, which
according to Respondents’ position would have been unavailable to him if, as Respondents now
contend, he was detained under § 1225(b)(2). (Id., PageID.25–26, 37–43.) Therefore, following
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Respondents’ reasoning, the very actions taken by Respondents suggest that Petitioner was not,
and is not, subject to § 1225. Cf. Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *7 (“It was not until Lopez-
Campos requested a custody redetermination hearing (bond hearing) that Respondents claimed his
detention was under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). The Court cannot credit this new position that was
adopted post-h[o]c, despite clear indication that Lopez-Campos was not detained under this
provision.”).
Accordingly, for the above-discussed reasons, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States
and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested. 4
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.15–17.) Petitioner contends that “Respondents have not
demonstrated that Petitioner needs to be detained.” (Id., PageID.15–16 (citation omitted).)
Petitioner also contends that he “should have the opportunity to have a bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge,” and that “[b]y issuing its decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, the BIA has
4 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in a number of other habeas corpus actions
filed by immigration detainees. See, e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL
3077589, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL
3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025
WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232,
2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271,
2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v.
Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez
v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025). And, this Court
is far from the first federal District Court to reach this conclusion.
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taken nearly all bond authority away from Immigration Judges.” (Id., PageID.16.) Respondents
counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received due process because:
Petitioner received notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may
attend hearings with an immigration judge, can request bond at that time, has the
right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for
a short time.
(Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.55.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
Respondents contend that Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time. (See Resp.
ECF No. 4, PageID.55.) Respondents’ assertion, however, is contradicted by their own supporting
evidence—there is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that a bond hearing has been
scheduled. 	Respondents 	claim 	further 	“that 	statutory 	provisions 	denying 	bond 	during
administrative removal proceedings do not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” (Id., PageID.53
(citation omitted).)
Granted, if this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the Government’s due process argument might hold true. However, as set forth
above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) sets
forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that provision. The
statute allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien, or release the alien on
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“bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the
Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). This discretionary
framework “requires a bond hearing to make an individualized custody determination.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit has discussed that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration
detention. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If
this court has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the
claim is an issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme
Court set out in Mathews v. Eldridge. . . .”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following
three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos,
2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that Petitioner
has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of liberty
interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (citation
omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a
detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v.
Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th
19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). Here,
Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he has a spouse and two children. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.1–2.) He asserts that his detention has prohibited him from being able to financially
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provide for his family. (Id., PageID.5.) There can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of]
the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income
earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See
Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
Likewise, the second Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. There is a high risk of
erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom should he not receive an individualized bond
hearing at which the immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk and/or a
danger to the community. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). But Respondents have not established
a significant interest in potentially “detaining someone who [could convince] a neutral adjudicator,
following a hearing and assessment of the evidence, that his ongoing detention is not warranted.”
See id. Furthermore, Respondents have not established that an individualized hearing would pose
“administrative or financial costs” in this case—“[t]o the contrary,” Respondents’ position
“requires the government to continue funding and overseeing [Petitioner’s] detention[.]” See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
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Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will Order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also Order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify
compliance with this Opinion and the corresponding Judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the
reasons for the denial.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
December 1, 2025 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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