Worldwide Trophy Adventures, LLC v. Belding et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WORLDWIDE TROPHY ADVENTURES,
LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
KURTIS BELDING, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1282
HON. JANE M. BECKERING
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Worldwide Trophy Adventures (“Worldwide”) initiated this removed trade secret
action 	against 	Defendants 	Kurtis 	Belding 	and 	Western 	Obsessions 	TV, 	LLC 	(“Western
Obsessions”) by filing a Verified Complaint in state court on September 23, 2025. 	Worldwide
also filed a motion seeking an ex parte temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.
According to Worldwide, this case “arises out of Defendants’ theft and surreptitious use” of
Worldwide’s “confidential and proprietary customer database,” which qualifies as a trade secret
under Michigan law (Verified Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.6). Defendant Belding denies that
he misappropriated Worldwide’s trade secrets and notes that Worldwide never asked him to sign
a confidentiality agreement, non-compete agreement, employee handbook, or an employment
agreement of any kind. For the reasons and subject to the limitations set forth in detail below, the
Court will deny the motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1
Worldwide is a limited liability company based in Michigan that offers “outdoor adventure
services, including the coordination and facilitation of trophy hunting and fishing expeditions
around the globe” (Verified Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.5, 7). 	Defendant Belding is a
Colorado resident who worked as a digital marketing manager for Worldwide prior to his
resignation in August 2024 (id. at PageID.6, 8–9). 	Defendant Western Obsessions is a limited
liability company based in Colorado (id. at PageID.6).
Worldwide maintains a database containing a customer list, customer contact information,
and customer profiles that include financial information (id. at PageID.6–7). 	Worldwide has
expended time and money to compile this customer database over several years (id.). Defendant
Belding, as a Worldwide digital marketing manager, had access to this database (id. at PageID.6).
Worldwide attests that, from the company’s perspective, Defendant Belding “did not have
authorization to download or disclose” the information contained in the database “at any time,
during or after his employment” (id. at PageID.7, 9).2 	But Worldwide does not attest that
1 The following facts are drawn from the Verified Complaint (ECF No. 1-1). 	Worldwide has
elected to rely solely on the sworn statements in its Verified Complaint to support its motion for a
preliminary injunction, and Worldwide does not appear to request an evidentiary hearing under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, arguing instead that the “nontestamentary” evidence it has
submitted entitles it to injunctive relief (see Reply, ECF No. 13 at PageID.106). Defendants have
not submitted evidence, contending that Worldwide’s motion fails as a matter of law (see id.; see
also Opp., ECF No. 12). The key facts relied upon in this Opinion and Order are thus undisputed.
2 This statement from Paragraph 11 of Worldwide’s Verified Complaint—asserting Worldwide’s
conclusion that Defendant Belding lacked authorization to obtain or disclose information from the
database—resembles language from a contract, but as the record stands now, this statement is not
drawn from a contract, employment agreement, employee handbook, or any similar document (see
id. at PageID.7, 9). 	The Verified Complaint does not state whether the parties entered into an
express oral agreement or even an implied agreement regarding Defendant Belding’s authorization
to access the database. The Verified Complaint only offers the above-noted conclusion.
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Defendant Belding signed a confidentiality agreement, a non-competition agreement, an employee
handbook, an employment agreement, or any similar documents (see generally id.).
After Defendant Belding resigned from his employment as a digital marketing manager at
Worldwide, he formed the company Western Obsessions (id. at PageID.9). Western Obsessions
is based in Colorado, but it offers services related to hunting and outdoor excursions around the
world, broadcasting these trips on YouTube (id.).
Worldwide attests to the conclusion that, prior to Defendant Belding’s departure from the
company, he “accessed—and subsequently used—[Worldwide’s] confidential and proprietary
customer email database to target WTA’s customers and to attempt to induce them to book
excursions through Western Obsessions, rather than through [Worldwide]” (id. at PageID.9). To
support this conclusion, Worldwide attests that it embedded a number of its company email
addresses in the database file containing its customer contact information (id. at PageID.10). These
company email addresses served as a “safeguard”—if someone like Defendant Belding used
Worldwide’s customer contact information to send “marketing email blasts,” then the Worldwide
company email addresses “would be included in those blasts” and alert the company (id. at
PageID.10). Worldwide attests that it has received “marketing blasts” from Western Obsessions
and another competing company called Outdoors International, establishing that Defendant
Belding and Western Obsessions accessed and used Worldwide’s customer database (id.).
B. Procedural Background
On September 24, 2025, Worldwide initiated this action against Defendants Belding and
Western Obsessions by filing a Verified Complaint in Michigan state court (Verified Compl., ECF
No. 1-1). Worldwide sets forth six claims under Michigan law, all based on Defendants’ alleged
“taking” and using” of its customer database: (1) a breach of fiduciary duty; (2) misappropriation
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of trade secrets; (3) common law conversion; (4) statutory conversion; (5) unjust enrichment; and
(6) tortious interference (id. at PageID.11–15). Worldwide concurrently filed an Ex Parte Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 1-3).
On September 25, 2025, the state court denied Worldwide’s request for a temporary
restraining order, reasoning that “[t]here is no allegation as to why no action was taken [by
Worldwide] upon Belding’s departure over a year ago,” and “[w]ithout more specific allegations,
the fact that a year passed between Belding’s departure and the filing of this complaint suggests
that a short delay to give Defendants an opportunity to be heard will not cause harm to [Worldwide]
that is materially different from the harm that has already occurred” (State Order, ECF No. 1-4 at
PageID.50). The state court set a preliminary injunction hearing for October 23, 2025, and ordered
Worldwide to serve copies of the pleadings on Defendants not later than October 9, 2025 (id.).
On October 23, 2025, Defendants filed for removal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367 (see
NOR, ECF No. 1). This Court set an expedited briefing schedule on the Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (Scheduling Order, ECF No. 7). Defendants filed a response in opposition to the motion
for preliminary injunction on November 10, 2025 (Opp., ECF No. 12). Worldwide filed a reply
in support of the motion on November 17, 2025 (Reply, ECF No. 13). 	Having considered the
parties’ submissions, the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary to resolve the issues
presented. See W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(d).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion Standard
In evaluating a request for a preliminary injunction, a district court should consider: (1) the
movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable injury
without a preliminary injunction; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause
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substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of a
preliminary injunction. James B. Oswald Co. v. Neate, 98 F.4th 666, 672 (6th Cir. 2024); Ohio v.
Becerra, 87 F.4th 759, 768 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass’n v. Schimmel,
751 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (en banc)). These four considerations are factors
to be balanced and not prerequisites that must be satisfied. McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 615
(6th Cir. 2012) (citing Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 441 (1974)). That
said, a “finding that there is no likelihood of success on the merits ‘is usually fatal’ to a movant’s
preliminary injunction motion.” Raymond James & Assoc., Inc. v. Leonard & Co., 411 F. Supp.
2d 689, 693 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (quoting Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Medical Examiners, 225 F.3d
620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000)). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be
granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly
demand it.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty., 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2003).
The Sixth Circuit has stated that an evidentiary hearing on a preliminary injunction motion
“is only required when there are disputed factual issues, and not when the issues are primarily
questions of law.” See Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511
F.3d 535, 553 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Where facts are bitterly contested and credibility determinations
must be made to decide whether injunctive relief should issue, an evidentiary hearing must be held.
However, where material facts are not in dispute, or where facts in dispute are not material to the
preliminary injunction sought, district courts generally need not hold an evidentiary hearing.”)
(cleaned up); accord Lexington–Fayette Urban County Gov’t v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 14 F.
App’x 636, 639 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that Rule 65 “does not require the presentation of oral
testimony” particularly “when the issues litigated are primarily questions of law”).
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B . Discussion
For the reasons stated in greater detail below, the Court concludes that Worldwide has not
shown a likelihood of success on the merits of any of its claims, each of which arise from the same
set of underlying facts—Defendants “taking and subsequently using the client database” (See
Verified Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.6, 11–15). 	Given the “scant evidence” presented by
Worldwide, the balance of the four relevant preliminary injunction factors counsels against entry
of the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief. See Husted, 751 F.3d at 417.
1. Worldwide Fails to Establish a Likelihood of Success on the Trade Secrets Claim
Worldwide argues that Defendants’ “misappropriation of [Worldwide’s] trade secrets
constitutes a violation of the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“MUTSA”), MCL 445.1901
et seq.” (Verified Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.13). 	“To state a valid MUTSA claim, the
plaintiff must allege that (1) it has protectable trade secrets and (2) the defendant improperly
acquired, disclosed, or used those trade secrets.” See Ajuba Int’l v. Saharia, 871 F. Supp. 2d 671,
691 (E.D. Mich. 2012). Defendants have not shown a likelihood of success of this claim.
(a) Worldwide Has Carried Its Burden on the Client Database’s Trade Secret Status
“The MUTSA defines a trade secret as ‘information . . . that possesses independent
economic value and is the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.” 	Innovation
Ventures, L.L.C. v. Aspen Fitness Prods., No. 11-CV-13537, 2015 WL 11071470, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 31, 2015) (quoting M ICH. COMP . LAWS . § 445.1902(d)).3 Courts applying Michigan
3 “Michigan courts look to several factors to determine whether information constitutes a trade
secret: (1) extent to which information is known outside of owner business, (2) extent to which
information is known by employees and others involved in business, (3) extent of measures taken
to guard secrecy of information, (4) value of information to owners and competitors, (5) amount
of effort and money expended in developing information, and (6) ease or difficulty with which
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.” Innovation Ventures, 2015 WL
11071470 at *3.
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law frequently analyze whether “customer lists” similar to the client database here qualify as trade
secrets, and the status of customer information turns on the facts of each case.4 The limited record
before the Court indicates that Worldwide’s client database contains “detailed profile and financial
information” for thousands of customers, including “how they interact with the [Worldwide]
website,” and further indicates that the client database was “painstakingly prepared by the
company over the course of many years, at significant expense” (Verified Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at
PageID.6–7). 	These facts, although limited, are analogous to the “detailed information” in
Laethem that “can qualify as trade secrets.” See 2007 WL 2433980 at *19 (“The plaintiffs here
claim to have compiled very detailed information regarding its customers, their needs, and their
owners and employees. This type of information can qualify as trade secrets” under MUTSA). 5
Turning to whether Worldwide took “reasonable efforts to maintain [the] secrecy” of its
database, see Innovation Ventures, 2015 WL 11071470 at *3, the record shows that Worldwide
“limit[ed] the individuals with authorization to access” the database and “embedded” company
email addresses in it “as a safeguard” (Verified Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.10). Defendants
4 Compare Laethem Equip. Co. v. Deere & Co., No. 05-10113, 2007 WL 2433980, at *19 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 14, 2007) (concluding based on Michigan law that “[d]etailed information about
customers can constitute trade secrets. The plaintiffs here claim to have compiled very detailed
information regarding its customers, their needs, and their owners and employees. This type of
information can qualify as [a] trade secre[t]”) with Wysong Corp. v. M.I. Indus., 412 F. Supp. 2d
612, 629 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (“The Michigan Supreme Court has held that there is nothing improper
in an employee establishing his own business and communicating with customers for whom he
had formerly done work in his previous employment. Thus, customer lists developed by a former
employee and information relating to a customer’s needs are not ‘trade secrets’ under the MUTSA,
unless the employee is bound by a confidentiality agreement.”) (cleaned up).
5 The Court reiterates that the Verified Complaint is the only evidence presently before the Court,
and emphasizes that the “findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a district court in
granting or denying a preliminary injunction are not binding” on the Court in later proceedings on
the merits. 	See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Conway, 861 F. Supp. 2d 802, 816 (E.D. Ky.
2012) (cleaned up) (citing United States v. Edward Rose, 384 F.3d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 2004)).
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have offered no authority, no evidence, and only cursory argument 6 to suggest that Worldwide’s
specific actions fail to qualify as “reasonable efforts to maintain [the database’s] secrecy” under
Michigan law.7 See Innovation Ventures, 2015 WL 11071470 at *3. The Court thus concludes—
for the limited purpose of determining Worldwide’s likelihood of success on the merits as relevant
to the preliminary injunction motion at bar—that Worldwide’s client database qualifies as a “trade
secret” under MUTSA. See Laethem, 2007 WL 2433980 at *19.
(b) Worldwide Has Not Carried Its Burden of Showing Misappropriation
The Court must next determine whether Worldwide has shown Defendants “improperly
acquired, disclosed, or used [the] trade secrets” at issue—Worldwide’s customer database. 	See
Ajuba, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 691. Worldwide admits that it has no “direct evidence of downloading
or transfer” of the database by Defendant Belding (Reply, ECF No. 13 at PageID.110). 	And
Worldwide offers no details to support its conclusory statement8 that Defendant Belding “did not
6 See Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v. Eden Cryogenics, LLC, 521 F. App’x 453, 459–60 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“[W]hat is a ‘reasonable’ precaution to maintain the secrecy of a trade secret . . . depends on a
balancing of costs and benefits that will vary from case to case and so require estimation and
measurement by persons knowledgeable in the particular field of endeavor involved.”) (quoting
Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir.1991)).
7 That said, “[f]ailure to present” arguments in expedited briefing addressing a preliminary
injunction motion does not necessarily “amount to a waiver” of those arguments “at a later stage
in the litigation.” See United States v. Certain Land Situated in City of Detroit, 76 F.3d 380, 380
n.1 (6th Cir. 1996); Chase v. Morgan, No. 1:24-CV-265, 2025 WL 918438, at *11 (E.D. Tenn.
Mar. 26, 2025) (“While there are some contexts in which a party’s failure to respond can constitute
waiver or abandonment of an issue or claim, failure to respond in a meaningful or rigorous manner
to certain issues in response to a motion for preliminary injunction is not one of them.”).
8 Although the Verified Complaint qualifies as evidence supporting Worldwide’s motion, as with
evidence presented in an affidavit, “this Court cannot grant a preliminary injunction based on
conclusory statements alone.” Kensu v. Rapelje, No. 12-11877, 2014 WL 1028948, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 14, 2014); accord Herb Reed Enters. v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th
Cir. 2013) (indicating a district court should not rely on “unsupported and conclusory statements”
in finding facts as part of a preliminary injunction analysis); Rachel Roe v. Rutherford County, No.
3:25-CV-00429, 2025 WL 3205703, at *1 n.2 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 17, 2025) (“[O]n a motion for
preliminary injunction, a court naturally accepts only legal assertions that the court independently
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have authorization to download or disclose” the information contained in the database “at any time,
during or after his employment” (Verified Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 7, 9). Worldwide has not, for
example, submitted sworn statements from Defendant Belding’s supervisor identifying what
Worldwide told Defendant Belding about his authorization to retain or use customer information,
it has not submitted a single document from Defendant Belding’s employee file, and it has not
submitted any email communications to or from Defendants, Worldwide, or any of its customers
(see Reply, ECF No. 13 at PageID.106–109).9 	Additionally, Worldwide does not attest or
otherwise present evidence that Defendant Belding signed a confidentiality agreement, a non-
competition agreement, an employee handbook, an employment agreement, or any similar
documents. 	See Verified Compl., ECF No. 1-1; Wysong, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 629 (applying
Michigan law and noting that “there is nothing improper in an employee establishing his own
business and communicating with customers for whom he had formerly done work in his previous
finds to be meritorious.”). 	Cf. Mahammad v. Chadwick, 859 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1988)
(“Appellant’s conclusory statements fail to make such a showing; therefore, the portion of the
order denying a preliminary injunction is not immediately appealable.”); Wrenn v. Dep’t of Mental
Health, 798 F.2d 1417 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming a district court that “denied a preliminary
injunction because [the movant’s] allegations were conclusory”); Jones v. Berrien Cnty. Jail, No.
1:15-CV-1323, 2017 WL 2544188, at *2 (W.D. Mich. June 13, 2017) (“A plaintiff cannot simply
replace conclusory allegations of the complaint . . . with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.”)
(cleaned up); Thomas v. United States, No. 09 CV 1779, 2010 WL 596465, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb.
16, 2010) (“This Court need not, however, accept the legal conclusions offered in an affidavit.”)
9 Perplexingly, Worldwide argues—in response to Defendants’ assertion that Worldwide has
submitted “zero evidence” outside of the Verified Complaint—that “Defendants already possess
the very emails at issue because they sent them” (ECF No. 13 at PageID.106). But this is not a
discovery dispute. 	Worldwide is seeking the “extraordinary remedy” of injunctive relief, and
Worldwide must present evidence—to the Court—showing that the “circumstances clearly
demand” an injunction. Overstreet, 305 F.3d at 573. The Court does not have access to any emails
supporting the above-noted, conclusory statements in the Verified Complaint. See Sutherland v.
Warren, No. 18-CV-13568, 2020 WL 7635969, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2020), R&R adopted,
No. 2:18-CV-13568, 2020 WL 7626774 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2020) (denying a preliminary
injunction based on a lack of evidence after the court noted that plaintiff referred “to an affidavit
and exhibit to support his motion for preliminary injunctive relief, but neither are attached”).
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employment” given that under certain circumstances, whether use of client information obtained
through prior employment is improper depends on the existence of a “confidentiality agreement”).
Worldwide responds that it may properly rely on “indirect evidence” to prove unauthorized
access, citing a case decided under the separate standard applicable to a motion for summary
judgment. 	See Stratienko v. Cordis Corp., 429 F.3d 592, 601 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005). 	Worldwide
argues that its receipt of certain mass marketing emails—which are not in the record before the
Court—provides this “indirect evidence” of misappropriation (see Reply, ECF No. 13 at
PageID.106, 109). Assuming arguendo that Worldwide is correct, a movant seeking a preliminary
injunction must nevertheless come forward with more than “scant evidence” to satisfy its burden.10
See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 751 F.3d 403, 417 (6th Cir. 2014); McNeilly v.
Land, 684 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction given
that plaintiff made only a “small [evidentiary] showing”); United States v. Certain Land Situated
in City of Detroit, No. 95-1118, 1996 WL 26915, *1 n.1 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996) (noting a lack of
evidence to support speculative, conclusory statements). The Court concludes, after careful review
of the parties’ submissions, that the “scant evidence” Worldwide has provided, see Husted, 751
F.3d at 417, fails to satisfy Worldwide’s burden of showing that Defendants “improperly acquired,
disclosed, or used [the] trade secrets” in question, see Ajuba, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
10 For the reasons stated above, Worldwide has not presented sufficient evidence, as opposed to
conclusory 	statements 	and 	legal 	argument, 	showing 	Defendants 	“used 	theft, 	bribery, 	or
misrepresentation to acquire or disclose” the customer information at issue, and concomitantly,
Worldwide has not shown a likelihood that Defendant Western Obsessions received the
information in question “from or through a person who owed a duty to the person to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use.” See Baker Hughes, Inc. v. S & S Chem., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-531, 2015
WL 6159422, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Baker Hughes Inc. v. S&S
Chem., LLC, 836 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing MICH. COMP . LAWS . § 445.1902(b)(ii)(B)).
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In sum, although Worldwide has carried its burden of showing that the customer database
is a trade secret under MUTSA for the limited purpose of this motion, it has not shown a likelihood
of success on the merits of its misappropriation of trade secrets claim. See Neate, 98 F.4th at 672.
2. Worldwide Fails to Establish a Likelihood of Success on Its Remaining Claims
Defendants argue that Worldwide cannot show a likelihood of success on its breach of
fiduciary duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference claims because the
Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act “displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of
this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret” (Opp, ECF No. 12 at
PageID.99–102) 	(citing 	M ICH. COMP . LAWS . § 	445.1908(1)). 	Worldwide 	responds 	that
displacement depends on whether the “information at issue . . . satisfies” the definition of “trade
secrets as defined by MUTSA” (Reply, ECF No. 13 at PageID.111) (quoting Oldnar Corp. v.
Panasonic Corp. of N. Am., 766 F. App’x 255, 268 (6th Cir. 2019)).11
For the reasons stated and subject to the limitations explained above, Worldwide has
carried its burden of showing that the client database here qualifies as a “trade secre[t] as defined
by MUTSA.” See Oldnar, 766 F. App’x at 268 (noting that “displacement under MUTSA hinges
11 Worldwide further argues that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3) explicitly authorizes
pleading in the alternative, and courts have permitted common-law claims to proceed alongside
MUTSA 	claims 	where, 	as 	here, 	the 	trade 	secret 	status 	of 	the 	information 	remains
unresolved . . . because the factual record is undeveloped” (Reply, ECF No. 13 at PageID.111–
112) (quoting Prudential Def. Sols., Inc. v. Graham, 498 F. Supp. 3d 928, 940 (E.D. Mich. 2020)
(declining to grant a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on MUTSA displacement).
Worldwide fails to acknowledge that it is moving for a preliminary injunction, not responding to
a motion to dismiss, see id., and the Court must determine Worldwide’s likelihood of success on
the merits based on the preliminary injunction record that is presently before the Court. The parties
may litigate Worldwide’s entitlement to plead its misappropriation of trade secrets and separate
state law claims in the alternative at the motion to dismiss stage of this case—the “findings of fact
and conclusions of law made by a district court in granting or denying a preliminary injunction are
not binding” on the Court in later proceedings on the merits. See Merck, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 816
(cleaned up) (citing Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d at 261)
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on the ‘status’ of the information at issue in the plaintiff’s civil action” and remanding with
instructions that the district court consider whether the information at issue “satisfies MUTSA’s
definition of ‘trade secret’”).
The Court must thus examine whether Worldwide’s remaining claims are “based on
misappropriation of [the] trade secrets” at issue here, namely the client database. Id. If they are,
those claims are “displaced” by MUTSA. 	See id.; M ICH. COMP . LAWS . § 445.1908(1). 	The
Verified Complaint establishes that all Worldwide’s remaining claims are based on the “taking
and subsequent use” of Worldwide’s client database—the same facts that give rise to Worldwide’s
trade secrets claim (see Verified Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.6, 11–15).12 	The Court thus
concludes that Worldwide has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its remaining
claims because they are displaced by MUTSA. See Neate, 98 F.4th at 672.13
3. The Likelihood of Irreparable Injury Does Not Weigh in Favor of an Injunction
“[T]he loss of trade secrets is usually considered an irreparable harm [that] cannot be
measured in money damages” and thus “where it is shown that the defendant has misappropriated
the plaintiff’s trade secrets, irreparable harm is generally presumed.” Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v.
12 Under the heading “nature of the case” in the Verified Complaint, Worldwide indicates that its
claims “aris[e] out of Defendants’ theft and surreptitious use of [Worldwide’s] confidential and
proprietary customer database” (Verified Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.6). Worldwide again
cites the “taking and subsequen[t] us[e of] the client database” as the basis for the individual claims
set forth in the Verified Complaint (see id. at PageID.11–15).
13 Defendants suggest that Worldwide’s Verified Complaint is ambiguous as to whether its tortious
interference claim alleges interference with “business expectations” or “contracts” separate and
apart from the alleged misappropriation of the trade secrets discussed above (see Opp., ECF No.
12 at PageID.102). To the extent Worldwide’s claims are not fully displaced by MUTSA—and
the Court concludes that they are—those claims fail for the independently sufficient reason that
Worldwide has failed to come forward with more than “scant evidence” to support them, for the
reasons noted above adend in the opposition brief. See id.; Husted, 751 F.3d at 417; McNeilly, 684
F.3d at 614; Certain Land Situated in City of Detroit, 1996 WL 26915 at *1 n.1.
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Eden Cryogenics LLC, 630 F. Supp. 2d 853, 867 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (collecting cases) (emphasis in
original). 	“This 	presumption 	does 	not 	help 	[Worldwide] 	in 	this 	case, 	however,
because . . . [Worldwide] has not established a strong likelihood of success on the merits” of any
of its claims, and thus “irreparable harm cannot be presumed.” Id.14 This factor weighs against
the grant of a preliminary injunction. See Neate, 98 F.4th at 672.
4. The Balance of Harms Does Not Weigh in Favor of an Injunction
Worldwide cites no relevant, binding authority establishing that the balance of hardships
applicable to the facts here weighs in favor of an injunction. 	See Neate, 98 F.4th at 672. 	As
discussed in greater detail above, Worldwide has not carried its burden on whether Defendants
misappropriated customer information from Worldwide as opposed to compiling it properly on
their own. 	See Wysong Corp, 412 F. Supp. 2d 	629 (noting under Michigan law “that there is
nothing improper in an employee establishing his own business and communicating with
customers for whom he had formerly done work in his previous employment” and noting that
under certain circumstances, whether use of customer information obtained through prior
employment is improper depends on the existence of a “confidentiality agreement”). This factor
does not weigh in support of a preliminary injunction. See Neate, 98 F.4th at 672.
5. 	The Public Interest Does Not Weigh in Favor of an Injunction
Michigan has a “strong interest in protecting its residents” from “theft of trade secrets.”
Ford Motor Co. v. Launch Tech Co., No. 17-12906, 2018 WL 1089276, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Feb.
14 Furthermore, as the state court noted in denying Worldwide’s request for a temporary restraining
order, Worldwide “did in fact delay in filing suit and requesting injunctive relief,” undermining
the weight of Worldwide’s arguments regarding an imminent “threat of irreparable harm.” 	See
Kendall, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (noting plaintiff first sent a cease-and-desist letter and waited for
weeks before moving for injunction); see also Demand Letter from Varnum on August 14, 2025,
ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.17; State Court Order Denying TRO, ECF No. 1-4 at PageID.49–50.
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26, 2018). 	But, as discussed above, this “interest is not implicated in this case” given that
Worldwide “has not established a strong likelihood of success on its misappropriation claim” or
on any of its other claims. 	See Kendall, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 869. 	Worldwide cites no relevant,
binding authority to the contrary. This factor weighs against the grant of a preliminary injunction.
See Neate, 98 F.4th at 672.
6. 	The Motion Does Not Present Factual Disputes That Require an Evidentiary Hearing
The Sixth Circuit has stated that an evidentiary hearing on a preliminary injunction motion
“is only required when there are disputed factual issues, and not when the issues are primarily
questions of law.” 	See Certified Restoration, 511 F.3d at 553 (cleaned up). 	As noted in detail
above, the key facts supporting this Opinion and Order are undisputed at this stage of the litigation.
See id.15 And Worldwide has apparently chosen to rely on the “nontestamentary” evidence it has
submitted rather than seeking an evidentiary hearing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65
(see Reply, ECF No. 13 at PageID.106). 	The Court thus exercises its discretion to decide the
motion at bar on the documentary record. See Certified Restoration, 511 F.3d at 552.
15 Although the Court has noted a lack of evidence on several points, the absence of evidence is
distinct from a factual dispute. The deficiencies in proof noted above do not hinge on credibility
determinations amenable to resolution through an evidentiary hearing; these deficiencies could
have been addressed—if at all—through submission of a more developed documentary record.
See Lexington–Fayette Urban County Gov’t v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 14 F. App’x 636, 639
(6th Cir. 2001) (noting that Rule 65 “does not require the presentation of oral testimony”
particularly “when the issues litigated are primarily questions of law”).
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Worldwide Trophy Adventures, LLC’s Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 1-3) is DENIED.
Dated: November 25, 2025 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
JANE M. BECKERING
United States District Judge
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