Hernandez Franco v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
RUBICELA HERNANDEZ FRANCO ,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1274
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner initiated this action on October 21, 2025, by filing a counseled petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is presently detained
by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the North Lake Processing
Center (North Lake) in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of her current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: to issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or
provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 14 days and award
attorneys’ fees and costs for this action. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.13.)1 For the following reasons,
the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241.
1 In an order (ECF No. 3) entered on October 24, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three
business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted.
Respondents filed their response (ECF No. 4) on October 28, 2025. Petitioner filed a reply (ECF No. 5) on October
31, 2025.
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Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is citizen of Mexico. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) She entered the United States
“without being inspected and admitted or paroled by immigration officials” (Hughley Decl., ECF
No. 4-1, ¶ 4, PageID.40) in 2006 at the age of 15 (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10). Since that time,
Petitioner has continuously resided in the United States. (Id.) She currently lives in Illinois with
her 10-year-old child, who is a United States citizen, and who relies upon Petitioner for emotional
and financial support. (Id.)
On October 7, 2025, ICE encountered and arrested Petitioner near Chicago, Illinois.
(Hughley Decl., ECF No. 4-1, ¶¶ 5–6, PageID.40.) ICE placed Petitioner into removal proceedings
by issuing and filing a Form I-862, Notice to Appear, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility
pursuant to sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) because Petitioner
is an immigrant who is present in the United States without having been admitted
or paroled, or who arrived at a time or place not designated by the Attorney General,
and . . . for being an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not
in possession of valid immigration and travel documents.
(Hughley Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.41.)
At the time that she filed her petition, Petitioner had not been given a bond hearing. (Id.
¶ 7, PageID.41; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.11.) However, on October 30, 2025, Petitioner appeared
before an Immigration Judge for a bond redetermination. (Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.44.) The
Immigration Judge denied Petitioner an opportunity to seek bond due to a lack of jurisdiction. (Id.)
II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
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Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by noncitizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 145
S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
III. 	Exhaustion
Respondents first contend that this Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas
corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted her administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No.
4, PageID.19–21.) Specifically, Respondents argue that Petitioner has not requested a bond
hearing. (Id., PageID.19.)) They claim that “[s]hould she request and the court grant a hearing, she
would have the right to appeal any unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA).” (Id.) Petitioner contends that exhaustion is not required and that “[a]ny appeal to the BIA
is futile.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.11.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
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1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to
determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination
relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that
would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Moreover, this Court is not bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency
interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024)
(discussing that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act] may not defer to
an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
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Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to her detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner, which
are not premised on “correctable procedural errors,” generally do not require exhaustion because
the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th
Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process challenge generally does not require
exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable procedural errors,” such as a claim
“that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an ‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to
review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody
would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact
that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all noncitizens
who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest and detention. Notably, the BIA
recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was
later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 229 (B.I.A. 2025). It is simply unlikely
that any administrative review by the BIA of that denial would lead the Government to change its
position, and thereby obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4. A
court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is ‘fit’
for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529
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U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of
administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted).
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust her administrative remedies and request a bond hearing would likely
be futile. Moreover, it is clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. First, as noted
above, Petitioner would need to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge. There is no
evidence in the record as to how long Petitioner would have to wait until such a hearing, if any,
were scheduled. Petitioner’s request would likely be denied given the BIA’s recent decision in
Yajure Hurtado. Then, Petitioner would have the opportunity to appeal any unfavorable decision
to the BIA. Appeals of bond denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.”
Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citation omitted). It is
“unmistakable that . . . depriving [Petitioner] of [her] liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision
certainly equates to hardship. And any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to
avoid . . . —detention.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner “unambiguously meets
every element for detention under § 1225(b)(2),” and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were
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ambiguous, its structure and history support the agency’s interpretation of the statute.” (Resp.,
ECF No. 4, PageID.21.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And § 1226(a) states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c)[2] and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney
General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
Id. § 1226(a). The plain language of these provisions indicates that both § 1225 and § 1226 govern
the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. The difference is that § 1225 provides
for mandatory detention and § 1226 allows for the release of the noncitizen on conditional parole
or bond. As explained below, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs
Petitioner’s detention.
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted); see Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009);
see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts “must give effect
2 Subsection (c) refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” which does not apply here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The
parties do not contend that Petitioner has been convicted of any crime listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).
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to the clear meaning of statutes as written” (citation omitted)). “When interpreting a statute, the
inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In
re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted)). But “the meaning—
or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.”
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (cleaned up). And “the words of a statute must be read
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-
Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (citation omitted). The Court must also “use every tool
at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024).
As set forth above, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention “of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” See id. § 1225(a)(1).
The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See id. § 1101(a)(13).
The word “entry,” is not defined in the INA, see generally id. § 1101, but the dictionary definition
of “entry” is “the right or privilege of entering” or “the act of entering.” Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entry (last visited Nov. 16, 2025).
“Entry” has long been understood to mean “a crossing into the territorial limits of the United
States.” Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pierre, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 467, 468 (B.I.A. 1973)). Further, the phrase “seeking admission” also is undefined in the
statute. See generally id. Looking to the plain, ordinary meaning of “seeking,” this word is defined
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as “ask[ing] for,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
seeking (last visited Nov. 16, 2025), and the word “seeking” “necessarily implies some sort of
present-tense action.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 218 (D. Mass. 2025).
Respondents contend that any noncitizen who has not been lawfully admitted, regardless
of whether they are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking
admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. However, that reading of § 1225 would
render the qualifier “seeking admission” in the statute entirely unnecessary. “It is ‘a cardinal
principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that,
if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citations omitted). Given Congress’s decision to
use different terms in § 1225—i.e., “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission”—the
Court will presume that Congress intended these phrases to mean different things. See Pulsifer v.
United States, 144 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2024) (“In a given statute, . . . different terms usually have
different meanings.” (citation omitted)).
Here, Petitioner is not actively seeking to lawfully cross into the territorial limits of the
United States because she already entered the United States nearly two decades ago, in 2006. (See
Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10.). As the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York explained when addressing this issue:
[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then
proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be
described as “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be
described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered
to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission”
(or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered
unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the
United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to [the petitioner],
because he has already been residing in the United States for several years.
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Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 5937, 2025 WL 2371588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025);
see Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
29, 2025) (“[S]eeking admission’ . . . implies action—something that is currently occurring, and
in this instance, would most logically occur at the border upon inspection.”).
In comparison to § 1225, “[s]ection 1226(a) is less specific,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft,
No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025), and states that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision
on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Looking at
both § 1225 and § 1226, even if the statutory text appears unambiguous when viewed in isolation,
“courts are to interpret the words of a statute in context.” Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (citation omitted);
see Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (“Whether a statutory term is unambiguous,
however, does not turn solely on dictionary definitions of its component words. Rather, ‘[t]he
plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language
itself, [but as well by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context
of the statute as a whole.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
Section 1225 is titled, “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. A title such as this “is
especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.”
Yates, 574 U.S. at 552 (Alito, J., concurring). Additionally, Congress’s decision to include the
word “arriving,” as well as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such
as “stowaways” and “crewmen,” in § 1225 evidences an intent to address noncitizens arriving “at
a border or port of entry.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2)(3). By
contrast, § 1226 is titled, “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. “That Congress
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separated removal of arriving aliens [as set forth in § 1225] from its more general section for
‘Apprehension and detention of aliens’ implies that Congress enacted § 1225 for a specific, limited
purpose.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citation omitted) (citing Dubin v. United
States, 143 S. Ct. 1557, 1567–68 (2023)).
Further, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Supreme Court discussed that
§ 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports
of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is
admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. The Supreme Court stated that, in contrast, “[s]ection 1226
generally governs the process of arresting and detaining . . . aliens [already living within the
United States] pending their removal.” Id. at 288. Thus, in Jennings, the Supreme Court
differentiated between noncitizens initially arriving to the United States who are governed by §
1225, and noncitizens already present in the country who are governed by § 1226. See id. at 288–
89.
Moreover, the Court cannot ignore Congressional intent when conducting statutory
analysis. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe a
subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act
added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible
under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged
with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Quite simply, were the Court
to agree with Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered
entirely superfluous.
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Accordingly, for the above-discussed reasons, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States
and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested.3
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that her detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.12–13.) Petitioner contends that she “has a fundamental
interest in liberty and being free from official restraint” and “[t]he government’s detention of
Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether she is a flight risk or
danger to others violates her due process.” (Id., PageID.13.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s
arguments by stating that Petitioner has received due process because:
Petitioner received notice of the charges against her, has access to counsel, may
attend hearings with an immigration judge, can request bond at that time, and has
been detained by ICE for only two weeks.
(Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.36.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364,
3 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in a number of other habeas corpus actions filed by immigration
detainees. See, e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL 3077589, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4,
2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL 3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus
Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025 WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft,
No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271,
2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196, 2025 WL
3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9
(W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich.
Oct. 24, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025).
And this Court is far from the first federal district court to reach this conclusion.
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1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see also
Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
Respondents contend that Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time. (See Resp.
ECF No. 4, PageID.36.) Respondents’ assertion, however, is contradicted by their own supporting
evidence—there is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that a bond hearing has been
scheduled. 	Respondents 	claim 	further 	“that 	statutory 	provisions 	denying 	bond 	during
administrative removal proceedings do not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” (Id., PageID.34
(citation omitted).)
Granted, if this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the Government’s due process argument might hold true. However, as set forth
above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) clearly
sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that provision.
The statute allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien, or release the alien
on “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by,
the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). This discretionary
framework “requires a bond hearing to make an individualized custody determination.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit has discussed that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration
detention. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If
this court has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the
claim is an issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme
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Court set out in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following
three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos,
2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)
(citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e.,
“whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See
Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). Here,
Petitioner, through counsel, represents that she is the mother of a 10-year-old child. (Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.10.) Prior to her detention, Petitioner maintained consistent employment, and her child
relies upon her for emotional and financial support. (Id.) There can be no doubt that she is
“experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends
and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of
freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
Likewise, the second Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Clearly, there is a high
risk of erroneously depriving Petitioner of her freedom should she not receive an individualized
bond hearing at which the immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk
and/or a danger to the community.
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Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025). However, Respondents have not shown that they have a
significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably, continuing to enforce Petitioner’s
detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government, as it would be required to
continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
V. 	Castañon Nava
Petitioner also argues that she was originally arrested without a warrant in violation of the
consent judgment in Castañon Nava v. Department of Homeland Security, No. 1:18-cv-3757, 2025
WL 2842146 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2025). (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3; Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.4–
5.) As explained below, the Court will not resolve this issue in the context of the present § 2241
action.
Castañon Nava is a class action lawsuit filed in 2018 against the Department of Homeland
Security and ICE seeking “to ensure that ICE complies with its statutory obligations” regarding
the warrantless arrest of noncitizens. 2025 WL 2842146, at *1.4 In 2022, the Castañon Nava
parties reached a consent judgment that precluded ICE from making warrantless arrests unless
such arrests were in compliance with the law. Id. According to the consent judgment, “[c]lass
4 The plaintiffs in Castañon Nava are defined as “a settlement class consisting of all current and future persons arrested
without a warrant for a civil violation of U.S. immigration laws within the ICE Chicago Field Office’s Area of
Responsibility.” Castañon Nava, 2025 WL 2842146, at *4.
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members who are arrested contrary to the terms of the Agreement and are in ICE custody shall be
released from custody on their own recognizance without posting bond as soon as practicable
subject to certain exceptions (such as where the class member is subject to mandatory detention
pursuant to the INA).” Id. at *5. Further, the consent judgment provides that “class members who
were arrested contrary to the terms of the Agreement and who were released on conditions
including that they post bond shall have their bond payments reimbursed and any conditions of
release lifted subject to listed exceptions.” Id.
In October 2025, the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the plaintiffs had shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that ICE had arrested class members without a warrant in violation
of the consent judgment and the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). Id. at *2. The parties to
Castañon Nava are in the process of identifying plaintiffs eligible for relief under the consent
judgment. See Order, Castañon Nava, No. 18-cv-3757 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2025), ECF No. 247.
Based on the decision in Castañon Nava, release from custody without bond may be an
appropriate form of relief in an action outside of habeas for violation of the consent judgment.
Petitioner’s § 2241 action before this Court is not the proper avenue for Petitioner to seek such
relief and, therefore, this Court will not resolve the issue.
VI. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. (Resp., ECF No.
4, PageID.36.) “The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but
upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud.
Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction”
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requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has concluded “that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the [Immigration and Naturalization Service, ICE’s predecessor agency]
District Director for the district where he is being detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus
petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has named Detroit
Field Office of ICE, the United States Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States
Department of Homeland Security; the United States Attorney General; the Executive Office for
Immigration Review; The GEO Group, Inc.; and Unknown Party, referred to as the Warden of
North Lake, as Respondents.
In Roman v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit stated that although it “conclude[d] that the
immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, . . . [there is] the
possibility of exceptions to this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court explained:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods
are often transferred several times during their detention. In light of these transfers,
one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent other than his
immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official, such as the
Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event of a
transfer. Arias–Agramonte[ v. Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL
1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only
one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to
another local district).
Id. at 325–26 (citations omitted). Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be
appropriate if the INS were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas
petitions.” Id. at 326.
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In light of the foregoing, to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s conditional grant of habeas relief—i.e., the Court’s directive that Petitioner receive a bond
hearing or, alternatively, be released—in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these
proceedings. The Court will, however, dismiss the United States Department of Homeland
Security; United States Attorney General Pamela Bondi; the Executive Office for Immigration
Review; The GEO Group, Inc.; and Unknown Party, referred to as the Warden of North Lake, as
Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the
reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will dismiss the United States Department of Homeland
Security; United States Attorney General Pamela Bondi; the Executive Office for Immigration
Review; The GEO Group, Inc.; and Unknown Party, referred to as the Warden of North Lake, as
Respondents.
Dated: November 19, 2025 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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