Ruiz Mejia v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
TOMAS RUIZ MEJIA,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1227
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner Tomas Ruiz Mejia initiated this action on October 13, 2025, by filing a counseled
combined 	petition 	for 	writ 	of 	habeas 	corpus 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 2241 and complaint for emergency injunctive relief. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the
North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention. Petitioner asks the Court for
the following relief: to accept jurisdiction over this action; to declare that Respondents’ actions to
detain Petitioner violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and
Nationality Act; to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering
Petitioner’s immediate release or ordering Respondents to promptly schedule a bond hearing for
Petitioner’s removal proceedings and accept jurisdiction to issue a bond order; and, to award
attorneys’ fees and costs for this action. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.17–18.)
Petitioner sought an initial temporary restraining order compelling his release and
enjoining 	continued 	detention 	or, 	alternatively, 	a temporary 	restraining 	order 	compelling
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Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to ensure Petitioner’s due process rights. (Id., PageID.2.)
As an alternative to emergency injunctive relief, Petitioner asked the Court to order Respondent to
show cause, within three days, why the petition should not be granted. (Id.) In an order (ECF No.
3) entered on October 17, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three
business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not
be granted. Respondents filed their response (ECF No. 4) on October 22, 2025. Petitioner, through
counsel, filed his reply (ECF No. 5) that same day. For the following reasons, the Court will grant
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Hughley Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.47.)
In 2008, Petitioner entered the United States “without being inspected and admitted or paroled by
immigration officials.” (Id. (noting that the “date, time, and place” of Petitioner’s entry is unknown
to ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations); Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID.1) On July 6, 2024,
Petitioner submitted a Form I-130, Petitioner for Alien Relative, with the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS). (Hughley Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.47.) The petitioner
is pending adjudication. (Id.)
On October 7, 2025, the United States Border Patrol (USBP) encountered and arrested
Petitioner in Burbank, Illinois. (Id. ¶ 6) Petitioner was charged with inadmissibility pursuant to
section 212(a)(6)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner was an
“immigrant who was present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, or who
arrived at a time or place not designated by the Attorney General.” (Id. PageID.47–48.)
Respondents contend that Petitioner is presently detained under INA § 235 on the basis that he “is
an applicant for admission to the United States seeking admission and he is not clearly and beyond
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doubt entitled to admission.” (Id. ¶ 8, PageID.48.) Petitioner’s Notice to Appear (NTA), the
document charging him with inadmissibility, was filed with the Detroit Immigration Court in
Detroit, Michigan. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9, PageID.47–48.) The NTA is “pending acceptance,” but
Respondents report that a “master calendar hearing is scheduled for November 4, 2025.” (Id. ¶ 9,
PageID.48.) Respondents note that Petitioner “has not requested a bond hearing.” (Id. ¶ 7.)
II. 	Exhaustion
Respondents contend that this Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus
relief because Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before the immigration court and,
therefore, has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 4, PageID.26.) Respondents
argue that should Petitioner request a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable
decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Id. PageID.28.) Petitioner argues that
exhaustion is not required for petitions brought pursuant to § 2241 and that, in any event,
exhaustion should be excused, as requesting a bond redetermination would be futile. (ECF No. 5,
PageID.67.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This discretion is referred to as “prudential”
exhaustion, Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019), and such a court-
made exhaustion rule must comply with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson,
725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet
decided “whether courts should impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s
habeas petition for unlawful mandatory detention.” See Pizzaro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-
12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez v. U.S. Dep’t of
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Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)).
However, courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United
States v. California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983), to determine whether prudential
exhaustion should be required.” See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL
2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). Thus,
courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of those factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination
relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that
would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, this Court is not bound by and is not required to give deference to any agency
interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (noting
that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an
agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner here,
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generally do not require exhaustion because the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See
Sterkaj v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of
Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that
conclusion based upon the fact that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that
§ 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all aliens who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest
and detention. Notably, the BIA recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the
United States unlawfully and was later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216,
229 (2025). If Petitioner were to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge, that request
would likely be denied given the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado. Moreover, it is simply
unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA of that denial would lead to the Government
changing its position, and thereby obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241
petition. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion
is not required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4. A
court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is fit for
resolution and delay means hardship.” See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529
U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of
administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted).
Here, there is no question that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. First, as noted
above, Petitioner would need to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge. There is no
evidence in the record as to how long Petitioner would have to wait until such a hearing, if any,
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were scheduled. Petitioner’s request would likely be denied given the BIA’s recent decision in
Yajure Hurtado. Then, Petitioner would have the opportunity to appeal any unfavorable decision
to the BIA. Appeals of bond denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.”
See Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239. 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025). It is possible that a
determination from the BIA as to whether Petitioner is entitled to bond would come before any
final decision regarding removal. Nevertheless, it is unmistakable that “depriving [Petitioner] of
his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And any delay
results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . –detention.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025
WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that prudential exhaustion is warranted,
the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the
Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
III. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.17.) According to Petitioner, noncitizens who “previously entered the
country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in
removal proceedings” are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “and are eligible for release on
bond, unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.” (Id.) Respondents, however,
contend that Petitioner “unambiguously meets every element for detention under § 1225(b)(2),”
and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were ambiguous, its structure and history support the
agency’s interpretation of the statute.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.28.)
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In order to address the parties’ arguments, this Court must engage in principles of statutory
interpretation. “A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Corey v.
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009); see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir.
2022 (noting how courts “must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written”). When
engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court’s “inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends
there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th
Cir. 2022) (quoting Binno v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 826 F.3d 338, 346 (6th Cir. 2016)). But, “the
‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
context.’” Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
“The words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012). This Court must also
“use every tool at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Raimondo, 603 U.S.
at 400.
With these principles in mind, the Court begins with the language of the statutes in
question. Section 1225(b)(2)(a) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(a). An “applicant for admission” is
defined as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States.” See id. § 1225(a)(1). The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the
lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). Section 1226(a), on the other hand, states that “[o]n a warrant
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issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Respondents argue that Petitioner “unambiguously is an ‘applicant for admission’ under
the plain text of [§ 1225] because he is a noncitizen, he was not admitted to the United States, and
he was present in the United States when he was apprehended.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.29–30.)
Respondents assert further that because “Petitioner has not agreed immediately to depart, logically
he must be seeking to remain—a legal action that requires ‘admission,’ i.e., a lawful entry.” (Id.,
PageID.31.) Respondents also argue that “applicant for admission” presumptively “characterizes
all unlawfully present noncitizens as applying for admission until they are either removed or
successfully obtain a lawful entry, regardless of their subjective intent.” (Id.) Essentially,
Respondents assert that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention of any noncitizen who is “present”
in the United States and who has not been lawfully admitted. However, for the reasons discussed
below, this Court agrees with the numerous other courts in the country that have concluded that
Respondents’ interpretation of the statute is simply much too broad.
As set forth supra, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention of an “alien seeking
admission” after an “examining immigration officer” determines that the alien “is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” In this Court’s opinion, the phrase “seeking admission”
refers to an action that is currently occurring and that would occur at the United States’ border
when the alien is being inspected. Here, under the facts and circumstances of Petitioner’s case, an
“examining immigration officer” did not make a determination as to whether Petitioner was not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted when Petitioner came into the United States
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during 2008. Moreover, notably, Petitioner was not crossing the border when he was arrested and
detained on October 7, 2025.1
Granted, Petitioner is now seeking to stay in the United States via a relative’s I-130 petition
on his behalf. But, such a petition is not exclusively for those entering the United States, the USCIS
notes the relative on whose behalf the petition has been filed might be “already in the United
States.” See https://www.uscis.gov/i-130 (last visited Oct. 24, 2025). There is nothing in the record
currently before the Court to suggest that Petitioner ever attempted to gain lawful status in the
United States before being apprehended and detained. The I-130 Petition form is submitted by,
and signed by, the citizen relative, not the non-citizen beneficiary. See https://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/document/forms/i-130.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2025)
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to aliens
undergoing inspection, which generally occurs at the United States’ border, when they are seeking
lawful entry into the United States. Thus, because the record clearly shows that Petitioner resided
in the United States for many years before being arrested and detained, there is simply no logical
reason to interpret § 1225(b)(2)(A) as applying to Petitioner given that Petitioner was not actively
“seeking admission” during those years.
Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), section 1226(a) provides that, when dealing with “apprehension
and detention of aliens,” the Attorney General may issue a warrant and “arrest[] or detain[] [an
alien] pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a). Here, § 1226(a) clearly applies to Petitioner’s situation—Petitioner was
1 Conveniently, after Petitioner was detained on October 7, “DHS determined that Petitioner was
an applicant for admission seeking admission, and not clearly and beyond doubt entitled to
admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).” (ECF No. 4, PageID.25.)
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apprehended, arrested, and detained, while he was residing in Illinois. Petitioner has been detained
pending removal proceedings before an immigration judge; thus, under § 1226(a), the Attorney
General has discretion to either detain or release Petitioner on bond or conditional parole. This
language clearly allows the alien to request a bond redetermination by an immigration judge.
This Court’s conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s clarification that sections
1225 and 1226 apply in different circumstances. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018).
As the Jennings Court noted, § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at
the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien
seeking to enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Section 1226, however,
applies to the process of “arresting and detaining” aliens who are already living within the United
States but are still subject to removal. See id. at 287. Thus, in Jennings, the Supreme Court
differentiated between noncitizens arriving to the United States, who are, therefore, governed by
§ 1225, and noncitizens already present in the country and are, accordingly, governed by § 1226.
The record before the Court also supports this conclusion. The arrest warrant issued for
Petitioner clearly states that Petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to INA § 236. (ECF No.
5-1, PageID.72.) The warrant was clearly addressed to “[a]ny immigration officer authorized
pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the [INA] and part 287 of title 8, Code of Federal Regulations,
to serve warrants of arrest for immigration violations.” (Id.) INA § 236 is codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226. It was not until Petitioner filed the instant § 2241 petition that the record contains any
suggestion that the Government claims Petitioner’s detention is pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A). Quite
simply, the Court does not credit this post hoc rationalization, particularly given the clear
indication that Petitioner was not detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
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Moreover, the Court cannot ignore Congressional intent when conducting statutory
analysis. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe a
subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act
added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible
under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged
with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Quite simply, were the Court
to agree with Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered
entirely superfluous.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested. The reading of the pertinent statutes clearly supports this conclusion.
Moreover, this Court is far from the first federal district court to reach this conclusion. See, e.g.,
Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8; see also Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1256–
61; Singh v. Lewis, No. 4:25-cv-96-RGJ, 2025 WL 2699219, at *3–5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025);
Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7–12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22,
2025); Campos Leon v. Forestal, 1:25-cv-1774-SEB-MJD, 2025 WL 2694763, at *2–5 (S.D. Ind.
Sept. 22, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 1:25-cv-1408 (LMB/IDD), 2025 WL 2682255, at *5–9
(E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-2677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at
*2–3 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025); Kostak v. Trump et al., No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL
2472136, at *2–4 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Romero v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11631-BEM, 2025 WL
2403827, at *8–13 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); Maldonado v. Olson, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE,
2025 WL 2374411, at *9–16 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); dos Santos v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-12052-
JEK, 2025 WL 2370988, at *6–9 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 1:25-
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cv-05937-DEH, 2025 WL 2371588, at *3–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Rosado v. Figueroa, No.
2:25-cv-02157-DLR, 2025 WL 2337099, at *6–11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-
cv-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *6–8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025).2
Rather, Petitioner’s case is governed by § 1226(a), and he is subject to the discretionary
bond determination set forth therein.
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.14.) Petitioner avers that there is “no credible argument”
that he “cannot be safely released back to his community and family.” (Id.) He contends that he
“should have the opportunity to have a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge,” and that “[b]y
issuing its decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, the BIA has taken nearly all bond authority away
from Immigration Judges.” (Id., PageID.15.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by
stating that Petitioner has received due process because he “received notice of the charges against
him, has access to counsel, is schedule[d] to appear in immigration court, and has been detained
by ICE for only two weeks.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.40.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends
to all persons, regardless of status. See A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025). Thus,
2 This is just a representative sampling of the various federal district courts that have reached the
same conclusion as this Court. In his reply brief as well as his motion for leave to file supplemental
authority, Petitioner, through counsel, has provided citations to several other federal district courts
that have concluded the same. (ECF No. 5, PageID.65–66; ECF No. 6, PageID.73–74.)
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noncitizens such as Petitioner are entitled to its protections. See id.; see also Chavez-Acosta v.
Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 236837, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
Respondents essentially contend that Petitioner is due no further process at this time
because he is “scheduled for a bond hearing and a hearing in immigration court in less than two
weeks.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.40.) Respondents’ assertion, however, is contradicted by their own
supporting evidence—as noted above, Petitioner has not requested a bond redetermination hearing,
and there is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that a bond hearing has been
scheduled. (McClure Decl. ¶ 11, PageID.4-1, PageID.48.) Respondents claim further that
“statutory provisions denying bond during administrative removal proceedings do not violate the
[D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.40.)
Granted, if this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the Government’s due process argument might hold true. However, as set forth
supra, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) clearly
sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that provision.
The statute explicitly allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien, or release
the alien either “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions
prescribed by, the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1), (2). This
discretionary 	framework 	“requires 	a 	bond 	hearing 	to 	make 	an 	individualized 	custody
determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit has held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
See United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, under Mathews,
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this Court must consider the following three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures
entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is
held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, No. 25-
CV-01151 (JMB/DLM), 2025 WL 1459154 at *7 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (citing Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d
Cir. 2020)). Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he is married to another Venezuelan citizen
and that they have two children. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Petitioner and his family
reside in Northfield, Illinois, and Petitioner is “the primary financial support for the family.” (Id.)
Here, Petitioner is now detained at a processing center that is in a different state than his home and
family, and there can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations of
incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack
of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 2025 WL
1459154 at *7.
Likewise, the second Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor, Clearly, there is a high
risk of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom should he not receive an individualized
bond hearing at which the immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk
and/or a danger to the community. Moreover, the Court finds it notable that when Petitioner
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encountered USBP on September 20, 2023, he was released on his own recognizance, but that he
now finds himself deprived of his freedom.
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025). However, on the record before the Court, Respondents
have not shown that it has a significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably,
continuing to enforce Petitioner’s detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government,
as it would be required to continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
IV. 	Prohibition on Transfer
Petitioner requests that the Court order Respondents “not to transfer Petitioner out of the
Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these proceedings to preserve jurisdiction
and access to counsel.” (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) Respondents counter that such a
restriction “is unnecessary . . . because the Court will maintain jurisdiction regardless of where
DHS holds [Petitioner] in custody.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.41.)
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Circuit Ct.
of Ky., 410 U.S. 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of [§] 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ ‘within its jurisdiction’
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
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or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has “concluded that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the INS District Director for the district where he is being detained—as the
respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2003).
Here, Petitioner has named Robert Lynch, the ICE Field Office Director, and Kristi Noem,
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, as Respondents. Respondents request that
Secretary Noem be dismissed because “only the ICE Field Office Director is a proper respondent
in this case.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.42.)
In Roman, the Sixth Circuit stated that while it “conclude[d] that the immediate custodian
rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, [there is] the possibility of exceptions to
this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court went on to note:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 374. Aliens
remaining in detention for extended periods are often transferred several times
during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y.2002)
(“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-to-day custodian, frequently
change when detainees are transferred among INS facilities, all of which are under
the control of the Attorney General.”); Rosenbloom, supra, at 549. In light of these
transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent other
than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official, such
as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event of
a transfer. Arias–Agramonte, 2000 WL 1617999, at *8 (explaining that a petition
naming only one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was
transferred to another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
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In light of the foregoing, the Court declines to enter an order directing Respondents not to
transfer Petitioner out of the Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these
proceedings. However, in order to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s grant of habeas relief and directive that Petitioner receive a bond hearing or, alternatively,
be released in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District of Michigan, the
Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these proceedings.
V. 	Summary
For the reasons set forth above, the Court disagrees with Respondents that Petitioner’s
detention is governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A) and, therefore, that Petitioner is subject to mandatory
detention. Instead, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a) and,
therefore, that Petitioner is entitled to a discretionary and individualized bond determination as set
forth in that statute. Likewise, the Court finds that because Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1226(a), his current detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights.
As the Eastern District of Michigan recently stated, “[t]he recent shift to use the mandatory
detention framework under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not only wrong but also fundamentally unfair.
In a nation of laws vetted and implemented by Congress, we don’t get to arbitrarily choose which
laws we feel like following when they best suit our interests.” Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379,
at *10. While Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, the Court notes that the immigration judge
is in the better position to evaluate whether Petitioner poses a flight risk and a danger to the
community. Accordingly, the Court leaves to the immigration judge’s sound discretion a
determination on that issue.
Conclusion
The Court will grant Petitioner’s motion for leave to file supplemental authority. (ECF No.
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6.) Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter an order and judgment granting
Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and accompanying order and judgment
or, in the alternative, immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order
Respondents to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and
accompanying order and judgment to certify compliance with this opinion. The status report shall
include if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was
denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: 	October 31, 2025 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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