United States of America v. Benson et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOCELYN BENSON and the STATE OF
MICHIGAN,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1148
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
This is one of over two dozen lawsuits that the United States has recently brought seeking
voter registration data from states and localities. This particular case arose after the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) requested that the State of Michigan turn over its electronic statewide
voter registration list. Michigan turned over a partial list that omitted certain fields containing
voters’ personal information. The United States subsequently brought this lawsuit to compel
disclosure of the full list, citing its authority under provisions of the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA), 52 U.S.C. § 21083, the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 52 U.S.C. § 20507,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (CRA), 52 U.S.C. § 20703. The Court has allowed the Michigan
Alliance of Retired Americans and two individuals to intervene as defendants in this action. (See
ECF No. 46.)
Before the Court are two motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim: one filed by
Defendants Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson and the State of Michigan (ECF No. 38), and the
other filed by the Intervenor-Defendants (ECF No. 47). As explained below, the Court concludes
that (1) HAVA does not require the disclosure of any records, (2) the NVRA does not require the
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page 1
of 23

2
disclosure of voter registration lists because they are not records concerning the implementation
of list maintenance procedures, and (3) the CRA does not require the disclosure of voter
registration lists because they are not documents that come into the possession of election officials.
Thus, the Court will grant the motions to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the DOJ’s July 21, 2025, request for voter records from Michigan.
(Compl. ¶ 35, ECF No. 1.) Michigan, like other states, maintains an electronic list of every person
registered to vote in the state. See 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A). The DOJ sought, among other
things, “a list of the election officials who are responsible for implementing Michigan’s general
program of voter registration list maintenance,” “a description of the steps that Michigan has taken
in furtherance of” voter registration list maintenance, and “a current electronic copy of
[Michigan’s] computerized” voter registration list. (Compl. ¶ 35.) The DOJ indicated that this
information was necessary to determine whether Michigan was complying with its obligations
under the NVRA and HAVA. (Id. ¶ 43.) As to the voter registration list, the DOJ requested the
following information that Michigan maintains about voters: their “full name, date of birth,
residential address, and either their state driver’s license number or the last four digits of their
Social Security number.” (See id. ¶ 66.) On September 9, 2025, Michigan informed the DOJ that
it would provide only the public voter registration list, which omits dates of birth, driver’s license
numbers, and social security numbers (SSNs). (Id. ¶ 46.) Michigan asserted that this sensitive
information was exempt from disclosure under Michigan law, see Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 15.243,
168.509gg, as well as provisions of the federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and the Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721. (Compl. ¶ 48; see also ECF No. 39-6.) In response,
the United States brought this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment and an order requiring
Michigan to disclose its full voter registration list.
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page 2
of 23

3
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it does not “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The Court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled
to relief.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts “construe the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Parrino v. Price, 869 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 2017). The court “may consider the Complaint and
any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case
and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the
Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430
(6th Cir. 2008).
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page 3
of 23

4
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
The United States first argues that it can obtain Michigan’s voter registration list under
HAVA, a federal statute enacted in 2002 that regulates state election administration. HAVA
requires states to maintain, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner, a single, uniform,
official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the
names of all registered voters and their pertinent personal information. 52 U.S.C.
§ 21083(a)(1)(A). It also requires states “to ensure that voter registration records in the State are
accurate and are updated regularly,” and to implement “[s]afeguards to ensure that eligible voters
are not removed in error from the official list of eligible voters.” Id. § 21083(a)(4)(B). Further,
states must “make[] a reasonable effort to remove registrants who are ineligible to vote from the
official list of eligible voters.” Id. § 21083(a)(4)(A). HAVA also provides that “[t]he Attorney
General may bring a civil action against any State or jurisdiction in an appropriate United States
District Court for such declaratory and injunctive relief . . . as may be necessary to carry out the
uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and administration requirements
under section[] . . . 21083.” Id. § 21111.
The United States argues that HAVA authorizes it to obtain Michigan’s voter registration
list, though it acknowledges that HAVA lacks any provision related to disclosure. Rather, the
United States contends that it may seek the voter registration list “through the ordinary discovery
process necessary to prosecute its [HAVA] claim.” (Pl.’s Resp. 15, ECF No. 53.) But the United
States does not state a HAVA claim because it does not allege any violations of HAVA’s
substantive provisions. For example, the United States does not allege that Michigan has failed to
conduct proper list maintenance; it merely claims that the DOJ needs “to determine Michigan’s
compliance with the voter list maintenance requirements of . . . HAVA.” (Compl. ¶ 46.) There is
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page 4
of 23

5
simply no basis in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States’s suggestion that it
can file a HAVA claim, allege no violations of HAVA, and obtain information to support its (as-
yet-nonexistent) claim via discovery. See Curney v. City of Highland Park, No. 11-12083, 2012
WL 1079473, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2012) (“Plaintiff cannot allege a . . . claim hoping that
discovery will reveal facts to support the claim.”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (“[O]nly a complaint
that states a plausible claim for relief” can “unlock the doors of discovery.”) Thus, the Court will
dismiss the HAVA claim.
B. The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)
The United States also seeks disclosure of Michigan’s voter registration list under the
NVRA. Enacted in 1993, the NVRA requires states to take various measures related to the
management of voter rolls. For instance, states must “ensure that any eligible applicant is
registered to vote in an election,” prevent the removal of people from voter rolls except under
limited circumstances, and “conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove
the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters.” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(1),
(3), (4). Relevant here, the NVRA also contains the following public disclosure provision:
(1) Each State shall maintain for at least 2 years and shall make available for public
inspection and, where available, photocopying at a reasonable cost, all records
concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the
purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters,
except to the extent that such records relate to a declination to register to vote or to
the identity of a voter registration agency through which any particular voter is
registered.
(2) The records maintained pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include lists of the names
and addresses of all persons to whom notices described in subsection (d)(2) are
sent, and information concerning whether or not each such person has responded to
the notice as of the date that inspection of the records is made.
Id. § 20507(i). Either the Attorney General or a private individual can bring a lawsuit to enforce
the NVRA. Id. § 20510(a)–(b).
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page 5
of 23

6
The United States argues that Michigan violated § 20507(i) by refusing to disclose its full
voter registration list. Michigan contends that while its voter list is subject to disclosure under
§ 20507(i), it can omit sensitive voter information. Although no court in the Sixth Circuit has
addressed this issue, it appears that every out-of-circuit court to do so has concluded that § 20507(i)
does not require states to disclose voters’ sensitive information. See Project Vote/Voting for Am.,
Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331, 339 (4th Cir. 2012); Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Bellows, 92 F.4th 36, 56
(1st Cir. 2024); Voter Reference Found., LLC v. Torrez, 160 F.4th 1068, 1083 n.14 (10th Cir.
2025); Voting for Am., Inc. v. Andrade, 488 F. App’x 890, 902–03 (5th Cir. 2012); Tex. Democratic
Party v. Bettencourt, Civ. A. H–08–3332, slip op. at 16–18 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 2009); True the
Vote v. Hosemann, 43 F. Supp. 3d 693, 729 (S.D. Miss. 2014); Project Vote, Inc. v. Kemp, 208 F.
Supp. 3d 1320, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2016); Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Boockvar, 431 F. Supp. 3d 553,
562 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 2019); Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. N.C. St. Bd. of Elections, 996 F.3d 257, 267
(4th Cir. 2021); Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Matthews, 589 F. Supp. 3d 932, 942 (C.D. Ill.
2022); Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, Civ. A. No. 2:22cv205-MHT, 2022 WL
5027180 at *4 (M.D. Ala. 2022), reversed in part on other grounds, 105 F.4th 1324 (11th Cir.
2024); United States v. Weber, No. 2:25-CV-09149-DOC-ADS, 2026 WL 118807, at *12 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 15, 2026).
The Court agrees that § 20507(i) does not require public disclosure of voters’ sensitive
personal information. Interpreting § 20507(i) to require such disclosure would contradict the
NVRA’s objective of increasing voter participation, see Voter Reference Found., 160 F.4th at
1079, because the risk of having one’s personal information misused will deter people from
registering to vote, see Project Vote/Voting For Am., Inc. v. Long, 752 F. Supp. 2d 697, 711 (E.D.
Va. 2010); Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U.S. 28, 51 (2019) (interpreting statute to avoid conflict between
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page 6
of 23

7
specific provisions and general purposes). Such an interpretation would also fly in the face of
other federal statutes protecting private information; Congress could not have intended § 20507(i)
to “create a gaping hole in the statutory landscape whereby personal, otherwise protected
information would lose its protection once a citizen registered to vote.” True the Vote, 43 F. Supp.
3d at 735. This interpretation of § 20507(i) would also undermine HAVA’s requirement that
people submit their driver’s license number or the last four digits of their SSN to register to vote.1
52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(5)(A)(i). Requiring the submission of this information, which is used for
“verification” of a person’s identity, id. § 21083(a)(5), would serve little purpose if the very act of
submitting this information made it public. The provision of personal information can establish
someone’s identity because that information is only possessed by that individual; if everyone has
access to the information, it can no longer be used to verify that a person is who they claim to be.
Finally, interpreting § 20507(i) to require public disclosure of all private information
submitted for voter registration purposes would potentially cause the statute to impose an
unconstitutional burden on the right to vote guaranteed by the First Amendment. See Norman v.
Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 (1992) (right to vote “derives from the First and Fourteenth
Amendments”). In Greidinger v. Davis, the Fourth Circuit held that a state law impermissibly
burdened the right to vote when it required people to subject their SSNs to public disclosure as
part of the voter registration process. 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993). Given that “courts should,
if possible, interpret ambiguous statutes to avoid rendering them unconstitutional,” United States
v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 463 n.6 (2019), the Court is disinclined to read § 20507(i) as requiring
public disclosure of all personal information provided by prospective voters.
1 There is an exception for people who do not have a driver’s license or SSN. See 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(5)(A)(ii).
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page 7
of 23

8
All this to say, the Court concurs with prior courts insofar as they have reasoned that
§ 20507(i) does not authorize members of the public to obtain voters’ sensitive information. But
ruling out this interpretation does not necessarily indicate what the correct interpretation is. And
here this Court diverges from prior courts, which have generally invented an ad hoc exception to
§ 20507(i) that allows states to redact voters’ private information. See, e.g., Bellows, 92 F.4th at
56 (“[N]othing in the text of the NVRA prohibits the appropriate redaction of uniquely or highly
sensitive personal information in the Voter File.”). This widely adopted approach suffers from a
simple flaw: there is no privacy exception in § 20507(i)’s text. To the contrary, § 20507(i) requires
disclosure of “all records” within its scope. Perhaps it would have been prudent for Congress to
include a personal information exception, similar to the exception in the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) for “files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). But § 20507(i) lacks any such exception, and courts “do
not—[and] cannot—add provisions to a federal statute.” Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S.
330, 352 (2010).
Other courts have relied on statutes like FOIA to port in an analogous privacy exception to
§ 20507(i), reasoning that § 20507(i) “must be read in conjunction with the various statutes enacted
by Congress to protect the privacy of individuals and confidential information held by certain
governmental agencies.” N.C. St. Bd. of Elections, 996 F.3d at 264. However, it is hard to see
how the inclusion of privacy exceptions in other federal statutes that do not apply here would
evince an intent by Congress to impose an implicit privacy exception here. Arguably, the opposite
is true: “Where limiting language present in earlier statutes is not included in later legislation, it
can be presumed that the omission was intentional.” Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202
n.12 (9th Cir. 2000). Even if it seems plausible that Congress would want to exclude sensitive
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page 8
of 23

9
information from disclosure, “[t]he Court may not ‘replace the actual text with speculation as to
Congress’ intent.’” Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629, 642 (2022) (quoting Magwood v.
Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 334 (2010)). “Rather, the Court ‘will presume more modestly’ that ‘the
legislature says what it means and means what it says.’” Id. (quoting Henson v. Santander
Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 89 (2017)).
In short, there is no plausible reading of § 20507(i) that gives rise to a privacy exception,
nor is there any legal basis for the Court to impose an exception ungrounded from statutory text.
But the analysis does not end there. There is a plausible interpretation of § 20507(i) that is rooted
in the text and does not require states to disclose voters’ sensitive information. Under this reading,
which the Court adopts, § 20507(i) does not require the disclosure of voter registration lists or any
other voter-specific information. This conclusion follows from the premise that a voter registration
list is not a “record[] concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the
purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters.” 52 U.S.C.
§ 20507(i)(1). Rather, a natural reading of that language encompasses only records about the
process that a state uses to maintain their voter list—not the underlying list itself. And if § 20507(i)
does not require disclosure of voter registration lists (or other information regarding individual
voters), then there is no need to graft on an atextual privacy exception.
The Court acknowledges that several courts have rejected this interpretation of § 20507(i)
and adopted a broader reading under which any documents related to the maintenance process—
including voter registration lists—must be disclosed. See Long, 682 F.3d at 335; Bellows, 92 F.4th
at 49; Voter Reference Found., 160 F.4th at 1087; True the Vote, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 723; Kemp, 208
F. Supp. 3d at 1341; Ill. Conservative Union v. Illinois, No. 20 C 5542, 2021 WL 2206159, at *5
(N.D. Ill. June 1, 2021); N.C. St. Bd. of Elections, 996 F.3d at 266; Greater Birmingham Ministries,
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page 9
of 23

10
105 F.4th at 1329; Matthews, 589 F. Supp. 3d at 941; Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Knapp, 749
F. Supp. 3d 563, 568–69 (D.S.C. 2024). But these cases are not binding, and the Court is not
persuaded by their analyses. Congress could easily have specified that § 20507(i) applies to voter
registration lists. Instead, it referred only to records concerning the implementation of programs,
which would be an extremely circuitous way to describe the underlying lists. It is more plausible
that Congress intended to capture only records describing the list maintenance process.
Other courts have reasoned that a voter registration list is a record concerning the activities
used to maintain that list because the voter registration list is “the output and end result of such
activities.” Bellows, 92 F.4th at 47. But it is necessary to distinguish between two closely
connected (yet different) meanings of the word “concerning.” On the one hand, “concerning” can
mean “relating to”; on the other, it can mean “regarding, respecting, [or] about.” Concerning,
Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com (last visited
Jan. 30, 2026). The first meaning is broader than the second. For instance, the summary of a book
is related to the book, and the book in turn is related to the summary. The summary is also about
the book—but the book is not about the summary. “Relating to” encompasses connections of any
kind, and thus a relation is symmetrical: “X relates to Y” entails that “Y relates to X.” By contrast,
“about” denotes an asymmetrical connection: “X is about Y” does not entail that “Y is about X.”
Here, one might say that the process used to manage a voter registration list is related to
the list, and therefore that the list is related to the process. The process is also (in some sense)
about the list, but the list is not about the process. Thus, whether the list is a record concerning
the process that creates it depends on whether “concerning” in § 20507(i) is taken to mean “relating
to” or “about.” And the second meaning is more plausible. “Concern” is commonly understood
in the narrower asymmetrical sense: it is natural to say that a summary “concerns” a book, but
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
10 of 23

11
awkward to say that a book “concerns” its summary. The word “records” also clarifies the
meaning of “records concerning the implementation.” A record is always about something—i.e.,
the thing it is a record of. So “records concerning the implementation” naturally means records of
the implementation. And records of the implementation are records describing the
implementation, not records produced by the implementation.
The courts that have disagreed with this interpretation have relied on other statutory
language to infer the scope of § 20507(i), but this Court does not find their reasoning persuasive.
First, courts point to § 20507(i)(1)’s exception for records that “relate to a declination to register
to vote or to the identity of a voter registration agency through which any particular voter is
registered.” Because this exception appears to cover individualized voter information, courts
reason that the scope of § 20507(i) must cover such individualized information, or else there would
be no need for such an exception. See Kemp, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1339–40. But that conclusion
does not necessarily follow; perhaps Congress included the exception to clarify § 20507(i)’s scope
out of an abundance of caution. And even if the Court read the exception as implying that
individualized information about voting declination or where people registered would otherwise
have been within the scope of § 20507, the exception may simply evince Congress’s concern that
such information could inadvertently appear within records regarding voter list maintenance
policies. This understanding of Congress’s intent would not entail that voter registration lists
themselves are within the scope of § 20507.
Other courts also point to § 20507(i)(2), which provides that “[t]he records maintained
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include lists of the names and addresses of all persons to whom
notices [of removal from the voting list] are sent.” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(2). Courts reason that
the word “includes” implies that this individualized information was already covered by the scope
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
11 of 23

12
of § 20507(i)(1), and thus that voter registration lists are covered too. See Kemp, 208 F. Supp. 3d
at 1339. But again, that conclusion does not follow from the text. It is perfectly natural to use the
phrase “the records include” to introduce an additional category of documents that must be
disclosed. See Include, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (noting that “including” “may,
according to context, express an enlargement and have the meaning of and or in addition to”);
Adams v. Dole, 927 F.2d 771, 775 (4th Cir. 1991) (“If we say that ‘all licensed drivers, including
applicants for driver’s licenses, shall take an eye exam,’ the word ‘including’ means ‘and’ or ‘in
addition to.’”). For example, in Adams the Fourth Circuit interpreted the scope of a statute that
referred to “employer[s], including a Commission licensee, an applicant for a Commission license,
or a contractor or a subcontractor of a Commission licensee or applicant.” 927 F.2d at 775. The
court noted that an “applicant” cannot be an “employer,” and instead took the statutory language
to mean “no employer, by which we mean to include an applicant.” Id. at 777. Similarly, here the
Court reads “shall include” as adding an additional category of records to those requestable under
§ 20507(i). In fact, if § 20507(i)(2) was instead understood to describe records already covered
by § 20507(i)(1)’s language, then § 20507(i)(2) would be surplusage. See Nielsen v. Preap, 586
U.S. 392, 414 (2019) (canon against surplusage expresses “the idea that ‘every word and every
provision is to be given effect [and that n]one should needlessly be given an interpretation that
causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174
(2012))).2
2 Furthermore, even if § 20507(i)(2) implies that the names of people who have been sent notices are contained within
the scope of § 20507(i)(1), that does not necessarily imply that the voter registration list is within the scope of
§ 20507(i)(1). The list of people who were sent notices of removal is more closely tied to the process of list
management, and thus more arguably about that process than the list itself is.
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
12 of 23

13
In sum, a natural reading of § 20507(i) suggests that it requires states to disclose
information regarding the process by which they maintain their voter registration list but not the
list itself. Perhaps this result seems odd, but this oddity disappears when one considers that state
voter registration lists were often already subject to public disclosure under state law when the
NVRA was enacted. See True the Vote, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 735 (noting that “Mississippi enacted
its Public Records Act in 1983, at approximately the same time that other States enacted similar
public disclosure-type laws,” and collecting similar state statutes); Prac. Pol. Consulting v. Sec’y
of State, 789 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing history of Michigan’s public
disclosure laws regarding voter registrations). There was therefore no need for the NVRA to
require disclosure of voter registration lists. But since the NVRA imposed a set of new list
maintenance requirements, it makes sense that Congress required states to preserve and disclose
records about the process used to meet those requirements.
To recap: the Court’s interpretation of § 20507(i) avoids the implausible suggestion that
Congress intended for every member of the public to access voters’ sensitive information. Just as
importantly, it avoids reading into § 20507(i) a privacy exception that appears nowhere in the text.
Instead, the most plausible interpretation of § 20507(i) is that Congress did not intend to mandate
disclosure of voters’ personal information because that information is not about the voter list
maintenance process. Thus, the United States cannot obtain Michigan’s voter list under
§ 20507(i), and the Court will dismiss the United States’ NVRA claim.
C. Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (CRA)
Finally, the United States argues that it can compel disclosure of Michigan’s voter
registration list under Title III of the CRA. The CRA requires states to preserve election records
for 22 months after any given federal election. The records to be preserved are “all records and
papers which come into [a state officer of election’s] possession relating to any application,
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
13 of 23

14
registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting in such election.” 52 U.S.C.
§ 20701. The CRA also mandates that “[a]ny record or paper required by section 20701 of this
title to be retained and preserved shall, upon demand in writing by the Attorney General or [her]
representative . . . be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying.” Id. § 20703.
When making such a demand, the Attorney General must provide “a statement of the basis and the
purpose therefor.” Id. If a state does not comply with a demand from the Attorney General,
federal courts “shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel the production of such
record or paper.” Id. § 20705.
As an initial matter, the Court construes a request for records under the CRA as a form of
administrative subpoena. The CRA’s language is similar to that of 31 U.S.C. § 3733, a provision
of the False Claims Act that allows the DOJ to issue “civil investigative demands” requiring the
production of documents or compelling testimony. 31 U.S.C. § 3733(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit has
held that civil investigative demands are a type of administrative subpoena. United States v.
Markwood, 48 F.3d 969, 975–76 (6th Cir. 1995). And the Fifth Circuit has held that a records
request under the CRA is “comparable to the form of a traditional order to show cause, or to
produce in aid of an order of an administrative agency.” Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d 222, 225 (5th
Cir. 1962); see also In re Gordon, 218 F. Supp. 826, 826–27 (S.D. Miss. 1963) (“A careful study
and analysis of the [CRA] reveals that it creates a new right and provides a remedy therefor in the
nature of a summary proceeding . . . .”) The characterization of a CRA request as an administrative
subpoena has both procedural and substantive consequences.
Beginning with the procedural implications, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally
“apply to proceedings to compel testimony or the production of documents through a subpoena
issued by a United States officer or agency under a federal statute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(5).
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
14 of 23

15
However, in determining the propriety of an administrative subpoena, a court may conduct “a
summary enforcement proceeding so long as the rights of the party summoned are protected and
an adversary hearing, if requested, is made available.” Becker v. United States, 451 U.S. 1306,
1308 (1981) (quoting Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 529 (1971)). The Sixth Circuit
has indicated that “[m]ost of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are simply inapplicable to the . . .
enforcement of an administrative subpoena.” Markwood, 48 F.3d at 982. For example, “in
summary subpoena enforcement proceedings, discovery is generally disallowed absent
‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. (quoting SEC v. McGoff, 647 F.2d 185, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
And generally, “[t]he proceedings are instituted by filing a complaint” or petition to enforce the
subpoena, “followed by answer and hearing.” United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 n.18
(1964); see also, e.g., United States v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 3d 697 (N.D. Ohio 2016). Here, the
procedural circumstances are somewhat abnormal because the United States brings its CRA
records request alongside claims under the NVRA and HAVA, which do not confer administrative
subpoena authority. The United States’ complaint thus takes the form of a traditional civil
complaint, not a petition for summary enforcement. Accordingly, the Court will apply the Rule
12(b)(6) standard to evaluate the United States’ CRA claim.
As to the substantive implications of applying the law of administrative subpoenas, “it must
be emphasized that a district court’s role in the enforcement of an administrative subpoena is a
limited one.” Markwood, 48 F.3d at 976. The court must “decide whether the agency has met the
statutory requirements pertaining to the issuance and enforcement of the subpoena” and “whether
the agency has satisfied or complied with the judicially created standards for enforcement of the
subpoena.” Id. at 976–77. To satisfy these judicially created standards, an agency must show
“that [its] investigation ha[s] a legitimate purpose, that its inquiry may be relevant to that purpose,
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
15 of 23

16
that it d[oes] not already have the [requested] information and that it otherwise [has] followed any
statutory requirements.” Id. at 978 (citing Powell, 379 U.S. at 57–58). Even if these standards are
satisfied, “[a]n agency investigatory tool might be resisted if the agency acted in ‘bad faith,’” such
as with the purpose of harassing the subpoena recipient or “pressur[ing] the recipient to settle a
collateral dispute.” Id. An investigation would also be in bad faith if the agency made “a conscious
decision . . . to pursue a groundless allegation without hope of proving that allegation.” Id. (quoting
SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc)). Finally, the
court may also decline to issue a subpoena if the agency is “found to be abusing the court’s
process.” Id. (quoting Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 648 F.2d at 125).
The United States contends that § 20703 requires Michigan to provide its voter registration
list to the Attorney General. Michigan and Defendant-Intervenors make several arguments in
response. As explained below, the Court rejects Michigan’s arguments but finds persuasive
Defendant-Intervenors’ argument as to the scope of documents requestable under the CRA.
First, Michigan contends that the DOJ failed to assert a proper basis for its request, as
required by the CRA. The DOJ’s July 21, 2025, letter to Michigan cited the State’s obligations
under the NVRA and HAVA and pointed to several purported anomalies within Michigan’s voter
registration data: a high percentage of registered voters, a low confirmation notice rate, a low voter
removal rate, and a high duplicate registration rate. (ECF No. 39-2, PageID.492–493.) The letter
also indicated that the DOJ had received a complaint regarding Michigan’s compliance with
HAVA’s requirements relating to the provision of unique voter identifiers. (Id., PageID.494.)
These asserted bases for reviewing Michigan’s voter registration list are sufficient to comply with
the CRA. Michigan disputes the accuracy of DOJ’s claims about the State’s list maintenance
practices, but the CRA does not allow courts to evaluate the substance of the DOJ’s purported
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
16 of 23

17
basis and purpose. See Kennedy, 306 F.2d at 226 (courts lack the power “to ascertain the factual
support for, or the sufficiency of, the Attorney General’s ‘statement of the basis and the purpose
therefor’ as set forth in the written demand”). And insofar as Michigan contends that the DOJ’s
request is in bad faith, that contention goes to the truth of the DOJ’s allegations and cannot be
addressed on a motion to dismiss.3
Second, Michigan argues that the DOJ cannot use the CRA’s disclosure provision to
investigate potential violations of the NVRA. One district court has agreed with Michigan that the
DOJ cannot use the CRA to enforce the NVRA “because the passage of [the CRA] in 1960
preceded the NVRA by several decades,” Weber, 2026 WL 118807, at *9, but the Court finds this
temporal argument unavailing. There is no rule of statutory interpretation that prevents a statute
from interacting with, or being used in conjunction with, subsequently enacted statutes. Michigan
also argues that the NVRA falls outside the scope of the CRA’s intended use because the NVRA
is unrelated to the remediation of racially discriminatory voter registration practices. See H. Rep.
86-956, at 7 (1959) (“The purpose of title III [of the CRA] is to provide a more effective protection
of the right of all qualified citizens to vote without discrimination on account of race.”). But the
CRA’s text includes no such limitation, and courts “have no warrant to elevate vague invocations
of statutory purpose over the words Congress chose.” Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450,
463 (2022). The CRA aids the Attorney General in assessing states’ compliance with federal
election law and protecting voting rights; the NVRA is a federal election law that protects voting
rights. See 52 U.S.C. § 20501(a)(1) (“[T]he right of citizens of the United States to vote is a
fundamental right[.]”); Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (“The right of suffrage can be
3 Michigan also notes that the DOJ did not cite its authority under the CRA until a follow-up letter on August 14, 2025
(ECF No. 39–4), and argues that the DOJ was required to include its basis and purpose and its reference to the CRA
in the same letter. But the DOJ’s communications collectively put Michigan on notice of the basis and purpose of its
request, which is sufficient to comply with the CRA.
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
17 of 23

18
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” (cleaned up)). Thus, the DOJ may use the CRA to
investigate possible violations of the NVRA. See also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S.
632, 652 (1950) (administrative subpoena should be enforced “if the inquiry is within the authority
of the agency”); Markwood, 48 F.3d at 977 (“[T]he district court should have enforced the
subpoena where ‘the evidence sought by the subpoena was not plainly incompetent or irrelevant
to any lawful purpose of the Secretary in the discharge of her duties.’” (quoting Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943))).
Finally, Michigan contends that the DOJ’s records request is not reasonably related to
investigating Michigan’s compliance with the NVRA. The DOJ asserts that it intends to use
Michigan’s voter registration list to determine whether the State is properly removing ineligible
voters and duplicate registrations from the rolls. It further contends that the entries Michigan seeks
to omit from the list—such as SSNs and driver’s license numbers—are “necessary to identify
duplicate registration records, registrants who have moved, and registrants who have died or
otherwise are no longer eligible to vote in federal elections.” (U.S. Br. in Opp’n 12, ECF No. 53.)
Given the Court’s limited role in reviewing the purpose behind an administrative subpoena, the
DOJ’s representations sufficiently establish that Michigan’s voter registration list is relevant to
investigating the State’s compliance with the NVRA.
In sum, the Court is not persuaded by Michigan’s arguments regarding the scope of the
CRA. However, Defendant-Intervenors make an additional argument as to why the voter
registration list is not requestable: a voter registration list is not a “record” that “c[a]me into [the
state’s] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act
requisite to voting in such election.” 52 U.S.C. § 20701. They contend that this language refers
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
18 of 23

19
only to documents that people submit to the State as part of the voter registration process, not a
document like the voter registration list that is created by state officials. The Court agrees.
The phrase “come into [their] possession” naturally refers to a process by which someone
acquires an item from an external source. See, e.g., Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443, 449
(2017) (defining “obtain” as “to come into possession of” (quoting Random House Dictionary of
the English Language 995 (1966))); Receive, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining
“receive” as “to come into possession of or get from some outside source”); 16 U.S.C. § 620e
(defining “acquire” as “to come into possession of”). As Intervenors observe, Congress frequently
uses the phrase “come into possession” to refer to items that a person obtains rather than creates.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (prohibiting postal employees from destroying letters that “come
into [their] possession”); 50 U.S.C. § 217 (requiring soldiers to report when abandoned property
“comes into [their] possession”); 13 U.S.C. § 214 (prohibiting census takers from disclosing
information that “comes into [their] possession”); 18 U.S.C. § 654 (prohibiting embezzlement of
property that “comes into [one’s] possession”); 46 U.S.C. § 10705 (describing process to follow
“[w]hen money, property, or wages of a deceased seaman comes into possession of a consular
officer”); 44 U.S.C. § 3572 (imposing limits on federal employees’ use of confidential information
that they “come[] into possession of”). Indeed, at least one federal statute draws an explicit
distinction between possessing something and having something come into one’s possession. See
8 U.S.C. § 1454 (“If the certificate or declaration has been lost, the applicant or any other person
who shall have, or may come into possession of it is required to surrender it . . . .” (emphasis
added)). Here, Congress could have referred simply to “records in the possession of” election
officials, or even just “records” without any qualifier, which is the language used in the NVRA,
see 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). In order to give effect to the phrase “come into [their] possession”
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
19 of 23

20
and prevent it from being surplusage, the Court interprets the phrase as referring to only those
documents that state election officials receive from prospective voters.
This interpretation of “come into [their] possession” is bolstered by the next words in the
sentence: “relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to
voting in such election.” Each of these terms refers to something that the voter submits or does as
part of the registration process. Here, the meaning of “come into possession” is clarified by the
rest of the sentence, which indicates the sorts of records covered by the statute: namely, records
that election officials receive, rather than create. This fact supports the conclusion that the
provision requires officials to preserve voters’ submissions to the State so that the federal
government can determine whether the State is improperly rejecting voter registration applications.
Such an interpretation makes sense given that when the CRA was passed, the federal government’s
attempts to protect the voting rights of Black citizens had been frustrated by state officials’
destruction of voter registration applications. See Report of the United States Commission on Civil
Rights 93 (1959), https://perma.cc/2PDF-GZHB (“Rejected applications were destroyed
approximately 30 days after being rejected, which fact made accurate statistical review of the
records impossible.”).4 The CRA responded to that problem by requiring states to preserve records
that voters submit to them—not records that states create.
At first glance, drawing a distinction between voter registration applications and the voter
registration list—which is largely a compilation of information from those applications—may
4 Additional evidence for this reading of the statute is found in the report of the House Judiciary Committee on the
CRA, which justified the disclosure provision by citing a recent case in which a court had explained that “the
inspection of voting records[ ] ‘must be considered to be an essential step in the process of enforcing and protecting
the right to vote.’” H. Rep. 86-956, at 7 (quoting In re Wallace, 170 F. Supp. 63, 67 (M.D. Ala. 1959)). The records
requested in that case were those “pertaining to the registration of all persons heretofore registered as voters, including
applications, questionnaires, and other evidence touching upon the qualifications of such persons registered and not
registered.” In re Wallace, 170 F. Supp. at 70. In other words, the federal government sought records of the documents
that prospective voters submitted to the State.
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
20 of 23

21
seem needlessly pedantic. Cf. Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Lamone, 399 F. Supp. 3d 425, 440–41 (D. Md.
2019) (rejecting as “a purposeless obstruction” state’s argument that NVRA requires disclosure of
individual voter registration records but not voter list). However, the voter registration list is not
assembled purely from information in voter registration applications, as it includes information
that election officials obtain about individual voters from other state agencies. See Mich. Comp.
Laws § 168.509r(2). Michigan also makes changes to the voter registration list based on data from
the United States Social Security Administration and information shared by other states. See id.
§ 168.509o(4)–(5). And the voter registration list includes individuals’ voting histories, which is
not information that would appear on a voter registration application. See id. § 168.509q(f).
Even if the voter registration list and the individual applications contained identical
information, the distinction between them would still be significant. First, this distinction only
appears meaningless when the DOJ’s request is framed as one for voter information—after all, the
information in the list comes from applications. But the CRA is not designed to facilitate the
disclosure of voter information. Rather, it requires the disclosure of documents, such as the voter
applications that a state might be improperly discarding. Given this understanding, the distinction
between applications and a voter list is perfectly logical: a voter application can be examined to
determine whether it was unlawfully rejected, whereas a list of those who successfully registered
to vote would be little help in such an investigation. This is not to say that the DOJ is precluded
from using the statute to acquire individualized information from voter applications. The Court
simply notes that the DOJ’s abnormal use of the statute may run into abnormal procedural
obstacles.
Second, any document subject to disclosure under the CRA must also be preserved. See
52 U.S.C. §§ 20701, 20703. If the Court were to hold that the voter registration list is disclosable
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
21 of 23

22
because it contains the same information as the individual voter registration applications, that
holding would entail that the voter registration list—and any document produced by a state that
contains voter information—must be preserved. But nothing in the CRA’s text implies an intent
to require states to preserve every election-related record that they create. And if the states can
destroy records that they create, then they also have no obligation to disclose them.
Finally, the Court returns to the touchstone of statutory interpretation: the text itself. As
discussed above, the Court’s conclusion that the voter registration list is not subject to disclosure
is based on the statutory text. If the distinction between voter registration applications and voter
registration lists is overly pedantic, it is a pedantic distinction made by Congress, and it is
Congress’s prerogative to make distinctions that may seem unnecessary to a person reading the
statute over six decades after its passage. Needless to say, the existence of a statewide
computerized voter list was not foreseeable to the Congress of 1960, and it is possible that
legislators would have included such a list in the CRA’s disclosure provisions had they imagined
the possibility. But a court is not a “telepathic time-traveler,” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 350, and
thus it “cannot rewrite Congressional legislation to cover a situation that Congress may not have
foreseen,” King Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 946 F.2d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1991). As much as we
might wish for prophetic legislatures or impeccably logical statutes, “[w]ishes are not laws.”
Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629, 642 (2022) (quoting McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S.
894, 907 (2020)).
In sum, the records requested by the United States do not fall under the CRA’s disclosure
provision, and the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss the CRA claim.
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
22 of 23

23
IV. CONCLUSION
HAVA, the NVRA, and the CRA do not allow the United States to obtain the records at
issue in this case. Therefore, the Court will grant the motions to dismiss. An order and judgment
will enter in accordance with this Opinion.
Dated: February 10, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-01148-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 67, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/10/26 Page
23 of 23